Concept
Why Congress Acted
Prior sexual misconduct of a defendant
Why Congress Acted
Sexual assault and child molestation trials once followed the same script on character evidence as every other case. The prosecution could not offer the defendant’s character unless he chose to make it admissible1, and he, in turn, could choose to make the victim’s character admissible.2 In sex offense cases the rules no longer work this way.3 Rule 413(a) lets the court, in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of a sexual assault, admit evidence that he committed any other sexual assault, and the factfinder may consider that evidence on any matter to which it is relevant.4
Congress, not the judiciary’s rulemakers, made this change. In 1994 it enacted Rules 413 through 415, which invite prosecutors to prove a sexual assault or child molestation by showing that the defendant assaulted or molested others, and which pave the way for the same proof in civil suits arising out of such acts. The provisions sparked controversy and were delayed, but they took effect in 1995.5 Congress adopted them without the usual rulemaking process.6 Their reach in federal court is narrower than their notoriety, because few sexual assault or molestation cases are tried there; but such cases do arise in federal enclaves like national parks, military bases, and Indian reservations.7
The judiciary’s own rulemakers opposed the change. The Advisory Committees of the Judicial Conference and its Standing Committee objected to the new provisions, and the Conference urged Congress to reconsider them.8 As part of the compromise that produced the rules, Congress invited the Conference to offer alternative recommendations, and the Conference did. It proposed an amendment to Rule 404(b) that would have allowed some use of prior assaults and molestation, but only after courts weighed such factors as how close in time the prior and charged offenses were, how much they resembled each other, and how often the other acts occurred. Congress ignored the proposal.9 The choice was therefore plain: the Conference would have kept judges inquiring, case by case, into time, resemblance, and frequency, while Congress wrote a rule whose text lists none of those factors.10
Congress had two things to build on. One was a line of cases showing increasing receptivity to evidence of collateral sexual misconduct similar to the charged offense.11 The other was a concern recorded in the legislative history that “too often, crucial evidentiary information is thrown out at trial because of technical evidentiary rulings”.12 Rules 413 through 415 were the “corrective” measures Congress chose in response, and they are far-reaching. One account calls Congress’s steps bold and adds that many would call them unprincipled.13
The practical argument for such evidence is easy to state. Without it, a sexual assault trial so often comes down to her word against his. Whether that justifies admitting proof of the defendant’s propensity is the question the rules left open.14 The defense answer shows what is at stake. Suppose Craig is charged with assaulting Karin at Fort Linden, and the government offers another woman’s account along with Craig’s conviction for abusing N. Under the traditional character rule, the government could not use that history to show propensity unless Craig opened the door15, so it would need another theory. The defense says none fits. The woman’s story cannot show intent or modus operandi, because no one disputes who the alleged assailant was and the situation is too dissimilar from what supposedly happened between Craig and Karin. The conviction for abusing N involves acts of a totally different nature. What remains, the defense argues, is an invitation to convict because Craig is “that sort of person”; the proofs will inflame the jury to convict out of anger at what he may have done before, which is classic unfair prejudice.16
Rule 413(a) removes the need for the first kind of theory, because the evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.17 That leaves the defense with dissimilarity and prejudice, and courts have held that Rule 403 still carries those arguments in civil suits under the new rules. In a 2002 suit by a prisoner who alleged sexual abuse by a jailer, an appellate court reversed a judgment for the defendant because the trial judge had excluded testimony by 17 others describing relevant acts. Rule 403 allowed exclusion, and the court could weigh “similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged,” but the judge never said how he “evaluated the factors.” Some of the excluded testimony also answered the claim that the presence of a witness had deprived the jailer of any opportunity to abuse the plaintiff.18 In Johnson v. Elk Lake School District, a harassment suit against a school guidance counselor, Rule 403 applied and the testimony of a former colleague was excluded. She was “equivocal” about whether a touching was intentional, and the “bizarre incident” differed so much from the misconduct in issue that the “dissimilarities reduced significantly the probative value”.19 The Rule 403 section below takes up that balancing in detail.
Sex offense cases now run on their own track, while the ordinary character rule continues to govern other cases.20 Rules 412 through 415 address sexual offenses in both criminal and civil cases, with different provisions depending on which kind of case is tried. State practice varies considerably and sometimes departs significantly from the federal scheme.21 In People v. Donoho, the Illinois Supreme Court counted four states that had added a propensity exception in sexual offense cases by statute or court rule, and 25 others that recognize an exception to the bar on other-offense proof when it shows lustful disposition or a tendency toward sexual predation. Some of those states confine the doctrine to cases involving the same victim, a minor victim, or incest.22 California followed the federal lead: as People v. Soto notes, Evidence Code section 1108 is modeled on Rules 413 through 415, which were enacted in 1994 as part of the Federal Crime Bill.23