Concept
Where Rule 301 Yields
Effect of civil presumptions (Rule 301)
Where Rule 301 Yields
Rule 301 limits its own reach in two places. It speaks only to civil cases, and its command operates “unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise.”1 The production-only effect, the bursting bubble, and the residual inference, all discussed earlier in this chapter, describe what a presumption does when neither limit applies. That effect is a default: it fills the gap when no more specific source of law has said what a particular presumption does, and a more specific source displaces it. A presumption problem is unfinished until you have asked whether anything has displaced the default.
Presumptions rest on such a variety of reasons that a single approach to all of them seems destined to fail.2 The Thayer effect can underserve a presumption supported by both convincing probative force and strong policy, because those considerations arguably support reallocating the burden of persuasion once the basic facts are established.3 The opening clause of Rule 301 lets whoever creates such a presumption assign it a different effect, and the rule’s uniformity then gives way to that considered choice.
Rule 301 also stops short of two settings. Rule 302 sends the effect of some presumptions to state law, and the Federal Rules do not address presumptions in criminal cases, where the Supreme Court has spoken as a matter of constitutional law.4 The four subsections below follow the order in which a problem tends to present itself: federal statutes that specify an effect, older presumptions that courts have long treated as shifting the burden of persuasion, Rule 302 and state law, and the boundary at criminal cases.
Federal Statutory Presumptions
Congress may create a presumption and specify its effect, for example by providing that it persists until rebutted by clear and convincing evidence or that it shifts the burden of persuasion.5 Rule 301 anticipates this, because its production-only effect applies only “unless a federal statute . . . provide[s] otherwise.”6 When a statute speaks to effect, it governs its own presumption, and the default fills only what the statute leaves open.
A statute controls because it is the more specific judgment. Rule 301 is one procedural setting for many presumptions drawn from case law and other sources, so it takes no position on how much any one of them deserves. A statute that creates a presumption reflects a choice about that presumption alone, and the two choices Congress can make work differently. A clear-and-convincing standard raises what the opponent must show before the presumption yields, so testimony that would burst a presumption under Rule 301 because it permits a finding that the presumed fact is untrue may fall short. A shift in the burden of persuasion decides who loses when the evidence is evenly balanced, which gives the presumption a job Rule 301 never assigns it: settling tied cases. Letting a general evidence rule override either choice would undo a legislative decision about who bears the risk of uncertainty.
The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act is the standard example. It makes common carriers liable to shippers for loss, damage, or injury to property they receive for transportation. In Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, the Supreme Court held that the shipper makes out a prima facie case by showing delivery in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and the amount of damages. The burden of proof then rests on the carrier to show that it was free from negligence and that the damage was due to one of the excepted causes that relieve a carrier of liability.7 The structure matches the access-based presumptions discussed earlier in this chapter. The shipper can prove the condition of the goods at each end of the journey but cannot see what happened in between, while the carrier had the goods throughout. The statute, as construed, places the risk of uncertainty on the party with that access.
In Plough, Inc. v. Mason & Dixon Lines, a shipper sought recovery for 198,568 aerosol cans of Solarcaine spray whose caps in the top two layers of cartons were discolored, apparently by road dirt that entered through a hole in the truck.8 The judge who tried the case gave judgment for the carrier, and the Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that the Carmack Amendment, as the Supreme Court construed it, shifts the burden of persuasion, and it rejected the carrier’s argument that Rule 301 supported the judgment. The carrier’s burden, the court explained, is more than a burden of going forward: it is a true burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion.9 That description decides the case on an uncertain record. Under Rule 301 alone, a carrier that came forward with evidence of a harmless cause would burst the presumption, and the shipper, who kept the burden of persuasion, would lose a tie. Under the statute the same tie falls on the carrier.
The shipper and the supplier each prove a few easy facts, yet a tie costs the carrier in the first case and the proponent in the second. The difference is that Congress, through the statute as construed, said what the carrier’s presumption does, and nothing said what the supplier’s does.
Patent validity supplies a second example. In Tenneco Chemical v. William T. Burnett & Co., the Fourth Circuit treated the statutory presumption that a patent is valid as shifting the burden of persuasion and held that Rule 301 does not apply to it.10 Tenneco and Plough share a method. Each court took the policy of the federal statute as the reason to give the presumption strong effect, and each declined to let Rule 301 weaken what Congress had built.11
A statutory origin does not by itself fix the effect, and the courts have not been uniform. In many suits under federal statutes, courts have concluded that Rule 301 does not apply to presumptions created by those statutes or created to implement them. Some decisions reason that, even if the rule applies, the statute’s policy requires an inference to remain after rebuttal, so that the basic facts can still support a finding when the jury is not persuaded by the rebutting evidence. Other decisions hold that a presumption under a particular federal statute shifts the burden of persuasion to the opponent.12 The Title VII presumption shows that a presumption implementing a statute can also leave persuasion where it began: in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court held that the prima facie case shifts to the employer only the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, while the burden of persuasion never leaves the plaintiff.13 What controls is what the statute says about effect, or what courts have construed it to say, and a statute silent on effect leaves the default in place.
Because the answer depends on where the presumption comes from, the statute comes before the default in the analysis. The steps are these:
Surviving Persuasion-Shifting Presumptions
Rule 301 has not erased every older presumption that courts treated as shifting the burden of persuasion. Federal courts have occasionally upheld the continuing validity of presumptions with early statutory or common-law origins that, usually for compelling policy or probative reasons, have been consistently construed as shifting the burden of persuasion.15 Here the persuasion-shifting effect comes from the presumption’s own history and reasons, not from a new statute announcing it. Two examples are standard: the maritime presumption of negligence against a vessel found adrift, and the securities-fraud presumption of reliance. Treat the category as narrow. The courts uphold such presumptions only occasionally, and an unfamiliar presumption does not join the list merely because its policy sounds persuasive.
The bursting bubble explains why these presumptions are treated differently. Under the Thayer default, an opponent who produces evidence sufficient to support a finding that the presumed fact does not exist, even a single sworn denial, removes the presumption from the case. For a routine presumption that costs little, because the jury can still weigh the basic facts for whatever natural force they carry. For a presumption supported by both convincing probative force and strong policy, the cost is high, since the considerations that justified the presumption arguably support reallocating the burden of persuasion once the basic facts are established.16 A presumption that vanished on thin rebuttal would give its beneficiary the least help in the closely balanced cases where its policy matters most. Shifting the burden of persuasion keeps the presumption in force until the opponent actually convinces the factfinder.
The maritime presumption is the older example. In James v. River Parishes Co., the Fifth Circuit treated the longstanding presumption of negligence against a vessel found adrift as shifting the burden of persuasion and as unaffected by Rule 301.17 The basic fact is one an outsider can prove with little difficulty, namely that the vessel was found loose, while those who operated the vessel know how it came to be adrift. The presumption therefore carries the access-based logic described earlier in this chapter, reinforced by a long judicial history of giving it persuasion-shifting effect.
The securities-fraud presumption of reliance is the modern example. In Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, the Supreme Court considered the fraud-on-the-market presumption of investor reliance. The defendants argued that the presumption could be burst by a minimal showing that the individual plaintiffs did not rely. The Court held instead that the presumption shifted to the defendants the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence.18 It reasoned that the benefit of the presumption, and its rationale of protecting investors, would be meaningless if some evidence of lack of reliance could easily rebut it.19 The importance of transparency in the securities market, which underlies the fraud-on-the-market theory of liability, justifies imposing on the defendant the burden of proving lack of reliance.20
Thin rebuttal therefore produces opposite results for these presumptions and for an ordinary one. A securities defendant who makes a minimal showing that some investors did not rely has not burst the presumption of reliance, but an addressee who swears that a letter never arrived has burst the presumption of receipt under the Rule 301 default. The difference lies in what stands behind each presumption. Giving every routine presumption the force of a persuasion-shifting one would produce a procedural effect greater than is desirable.21
On an exam, treat this as a recognition point. A stem that describes a vessel found adrift, or a securities plaintiff relying on the integrity of the market price, signals that the opponent carries the burden of persuasion, so evidence that merely permits a contrary finding will not end the presumption and an evenly balanced record goes against the opponent. A stem that offers a presumption you cannot place in either family takes the Rule 301 default however sensible its policy sounds: the opponent produces evidence sufficient to support a finding, the presumption drops out, and persuasion stays where it began. If state law supplies the rule of decision for the claim, the question moves to Rule 302, which the next subsection takes up.
Rule 302 and State Law
Rule 302 provides that in a civil case, state law governs the effect of a presumption regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.23 It is one of the “rules” that can displace Rule 301’s default.24 It displaces the default for a different reason than a federal statute or a persuasion-shifting tradition does, because here the claim itself belongs to a State. A presumption problem in federal court therefore starts with a question about the claim, namely whose law supplies the rule of decision, before it asks anything about the bubble.
Rule 302 follows the Erie doctrine, leaving to state law the application of presumptions in claims for which state law supplies the rule of decision.25 The accommodation accords with the principles and policy of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.26 The mechanism is easy to trace through the burden of persuasion. Whether a presumption shifts that burden decides who loses when the evidence is evenly balanced, so it can decide the case. If a State shifts persuasion to the opponent of a presumption and a federal court sitting in diversity applied Rule 301 instead, the same claim on the same proof would be won in one courthouse and lost in the other, and a litigant could choose a forum for the presumption alone. Rule 302 removes that incentive by making the State’s chosen effect control whenever state law creates the right being enforced.
In diversity actions, presumptions that supply facts constituting elements of claims or defenses are governed by state law, so if the State applied the Morgan-McCormick view, that view would be applied in federal court.27 The presumption stays the same in the hypothetical; the sovereign that supplies the rule of decision moves the answer. In a federal-question case the claim arises under federal law, so Rule 301 sets the effect of a presumption unless a federal statute says otherwise, and a sworn denial that bursts the bubble leaves the burden of persuasion with the proponent.
Rule 302 also has a limit that keeps it from swallowing Rule 301 in every diversity case. It defers to state law only as to presumed facts that constitute an element of a claim or defense, and presumptions of lesser impact stay under the Thayer approach of Rule 301 even when state law governs the case.28 A presumed fact that bears only on a subsidiary question, such as a preliminary point about an exhibit, does not decide who wins the claim, so the forum-shopping concern that justifies deference does not arise. When a stem places a presumption in a diversity suit, ask first whether the presumed fact is an element of the claim or defense. If it is, the State’s rule on the effect of the presumption governs, and if it is not, Rule 301 applies.
Civil Cases Only
Rule 301 marks its own boundary in its opening words: “In a civil case,” the party against whom a presumption is directed must produce evidence to rebut it, and the burden of persuasion stays with the party who had it originally.30 Everything this chapter has taught about the production-only effect, the bursting bubble, the residual inference, and the instructions that follow from them describes civil litigation. The Federal Rules do not address presumptions in criminal cases; the Supreme Court has addressed that issue as a matter of constitutional law.31 A presumption problem set in a criminal trial therefore cannot be answered by asking whether the defendant produced enough evidence to burst the bubble.
The civil model cannot be carried over because of who bears the burden of persuasion. A civil presumption lets proof of the basic fact stand in for direct proof of the presumed fact and charges the opponent only with coming forward, while the proponent must still persuade the factfinder by the ordinary civil standard. In a criminal prosecution the government must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt, and that requirement places limits on what a presumption may do.32 Suppose a presumption let the government prove a basic fact and then required the defendant to disprove an element such as intent. The government would have established the element without convincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and the demanding standard would attach only to the basic fact. For that reason a presumption may never shift to a criminal defendant the burden of persuasion on an element, and a conclusive presumption operating against the accused is likewise unconstitutional.33 A verdict on an element also may not be directed against an accused, so even the civil consequence of an opponent’s silence, a directed finding of the presumed fact, is unavailable in a criminal case.34
The contrast is easiest to see in Sandstrom v. Montana, where the jury in a prosecution that turned on intent was told that “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.”35 Montana’s own Rule of Evidence 301(b)(2) said that a presumption of this kind could be overcome only “by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption,” a requirement that shifts not only the burden of production but also the ultimate burden of persuasion on intent, even though the Montana Supreme Court had held otherwise in this case.36 The state court’s reading, under which the defendant had to produce only some contrary evidence, is the effect Rule 301 gives a civil presumption, yet it did not save the instruction. A reasonable jury could have read the instruction as conclusive, an irrebuttable direction to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering it. Alternatively, it could have read the instruction as a direction to find intent unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof, possibly well beyond “some” evidence, which would effectively shift the burden of persuasion on intent. Numerous federal and state courts have warned that instructions of this type can be interpreted in just these ways.37
The jury-instruction problem from the civil discussion returns here with higher stakes. A civil jury that reads a presumption as shifting persuasion has received something close to the rule that Morgan jurisdictions adopt on purpose. A criminal jury that reads it that way has been given a rule the Constitution forbids, because the instruction can relieve the government of its burden on an element. The same sentence of instruction can thus be harmless in a civil trial and reversible in a criminal one.
What the Constitution does tolerate resembles the permissive inference described at the start of this chapter. A permissive inference violates due process only if the suggested conclusion is one that reason and common sense do not justify in light of the proven facts, and the instruction must explain the inference clearly enough that jurors do not take it as shifting the burden of proof to the defense.38 The decisions in County Court of Ulster v. Allen and Francis v. Franklin, which sit beside Sandstrom, develop how permissive inferences and mandatory presumptions are sorted, and that body of law belongs to the study of criminal procedure.39 For this chapter the useful habit is a threshold one. When a stem uses the word presumption, first ask whether the case is civil. If it is a prosecution, the argument that the opponent’s evidence bursts the bubble has no footing, and the question becomes whether the instruction could be read to relieve the government of proving an element beyond a reasonable doubt.