Concept
The Bruton Problem
Limited admissibility
The Bruton Problem
A limiting instruction works only if jurors can hear the limit and honor it, and one setting exists in which the Constitution refuses to presume that they will. Rule 105 states the ordinary remedy: when evidence is admissible against one party or for one purpose but not against another party or for another purpose, the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.1 Everything earlier in this chapter assumes that remedy is available, which is why the discussion of whether jurors follow instructions ended where the assumption starts to weaken. This section begins at that point.
The setting is a joint criminal trial in which one defendant’s out-of-court confession names the other. Against the defendant who made it, the confession is admissible as that defendant’s own statement. Against the defendant it accuses, it is inadmissible, and that party limit is exactly what Rule 105 exists to enforce. The Confrontation Clause, which gives an accused the right to confront the witnesses against him, is what sets this pattern apart. If the confessor does not testify, the accused cannot cross-examine the person who is in substance accusing him, and no instruction can stand in for cross-examination.
Because the limit comes from the Constitution, the analysis changes. In the ordinary case the judge forecasts how well an instruction will work and weighs that forecast against the evidence’s value. Here the forecast is beside the point, since the Constitution withdraws the instruction as a sufficient remedy for this kind of statement however the balance might otherwise come out. A stem that seats two defendants at one trial, has one of them confess without taking the stand, and has the confession name the other is built to test whether you spot the problem before you reach for an instruction. The three parts below trace how the law moved from accepting instructions to refusing them, then the routes that keep a joint trial alive, and finally the edge where ordinary instructions resume.
From Delli Paoli to Bruton
A co-defendant’s confession that describes another defendant’s part in the crime comes in against its maker as that defendant’s own statement, but it ordinarily cannot come in against the person it names. The co-conspirator route is closed when the statement is made after the conspiracy ends, because a conspiracy that has ended cannot be furthered. Such a declaration may be used only against the declarant, under appropriate instructions to the jury.2 For roughly a decade the Supreme Court treated those instructions as sufficient protection for the named defendant, and then it reversed itself.
The first answer came in Delli Paoli v. United States (1957). A co-defendant, Whitley, confessed to government agents after the conspiracy had ended, and the confession referred to the petitioner’s participation. The Court put the issue as whether the instructions were sufficiently clear and whether it was reasonably possible for the jury to follow them. The trial court’s admonition was repeated several times during the cross-examination of a government agent and again in the final charge, and the Court found that nothing could have been clearer. The petitioner, who made no objection to the instructions at trial, conceded as much.3 The Court then presumed that the jury obeyed. It pointed to features of that trial: the conspiracy was so simple that each defendant’s part was easily understood, there was no mass trial and no multiplicity of evidentiary restrictions, and the separate interests of each defendant were emphasized throughout.4 The majority also tied its result to the jury system itself, reasoning that unless courts proceed on the basis that jurors follow clear instructions they can reasonably be expected to follow, the jury system makes little sense.5 One more detail matters later. The Court observed that a confession with no reference to the petitioner, or with every reference deleted, would have drawn no objection, and it accepted that deletion was impractical on that record.6
Bruton v. United States arose from a similar joint trial. The confession of one defendant, Evans, implicated the other, Bruton. The Eighth Circuit reversed Evans’s conviction because his confession should not have been admitted against him, but it affirmed Bruton’s conviction on the strength of Delli Paoli, reasoning that the instructions prevented any harm. The Supreme Court reversed.7 Delli Paoli had assumed that an instruction to disregard the inadmissible hearsay could avoid the encroachment on the right of confrontation, and the Court said that assumption had since been effectively repudiated. The repudiation came in a different setting, Jackson v. Denno, which struck down a New York rule that submitted the voluntariness of the confession itself to the jury, but its message for Delli Paoli was clear.8
Bruton did not discard the presumption that jurors follow instructions. The Court agreed that there are many circumstances in which reliance on instructions is justified. It found one context in which the risk of disobedience is too great to ignore, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side by side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.9 Those statements are devastating to the defendant, yet their credibility is inevitably suspect, since an accomplice has every motive to shift blame. That is why jurors are told to weigh an accomplice’s testimony carefully when the accomplice does take the stand. When the confessor does not testify, the suspect account can never be tested by cross-examination, and the unreliability is intolerably compounded.10 If jurors treat the confession as evidence against the defendant, the co-defendant has functionally become an accuser, yet the accuser cannot be questioned, and that is the Sixth Amendment violation.11
A bank robbery shows the rule at work. Defendants A and B are tried together, and A’s out-of-court confession says, “B and I robbed the bank.” The confession is admissible against A but ordinarily not against B, and the traditional solution would be an instruction to use it against A only. Bruton holds that the instruction cannot protect B’s confrontation right, because jurors cannot reasonably be expected to compartmentalize a statement that names B. The prosecutor must therefore try the defendants separately or redact the confession to remove every reference to B.12 The result differs in two situations. If A takes the stand and is cross-examined, B’s confrontation right is satisfied, as the Court held in Nelson v. O’Neil, and the confession comes in with an ordinary limiting instruction.13 And a confession that never mentions B was already beyond objection in Delli Paoli. What separates these cases from the problem is whether the jury is asked to weigh an accusation from a speaker nobody can question.
The difference between the two decisions lies in what the law asks of the instruction. Delli Paoli examined the clarity of the words and the features of the trial and concluded that obedience could be presumed. Bruton holds that for this category of statement no presumption of obedience can replace cross-examination, so a perfectly worded instruction does not save the admission. The worry that a confession adds little to a strong case now works through harmless-error review. If the case against the defendant, apart from the confession, was so overwhelming that its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court will not reverse.14 The Court found the error harmless in Harrington v. California, where the defendant’s own confession placed him at the scene.15 The rule also binds state courts, because the Confrontation Clause applies in state prosecutions to the same extent as in federal court.16
Ways Around Bruton
A prosecutor who wants a joint trial still has options, because the Bruton problem has two ingredients and removing either one removes the problem. The first is a confession that accuses the co-defendant. The second is the co-defendant’s inability to cross-examine the person who made the accusation. Joint trials remain attractive because they conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.18 Yet when the confessor will not testify and the confession names the accused, the prosecutor must either try the defendants separately or redact the confession to eliminate every reference to the accused.19 Each response below removes one of the two ingredients:
- Obtain the confessor’s testimony, which supplies the cross-examination.
- Seat separate juries, so the jury deciding the co-defendant’s case never hears the confession.
- Sever the trials, so the confession reaches only the jury trying the confessor.
- Redact the confession, so it no longer incriminates the co-defendant on its face.
The first route works because Bruton rests on the right of confrontation. When the confessing defendant testifies and is subject to cross-examination, admitting the confession does not violate the co-defendant’s confrontation rights, and the ordinary limiting instruction is all that remains.20 The difficulty is timing. A prosecutor deciding whether to try the defendants together cannot know in advance whether the confessor will take the stand, so this is a thin reed on which to build a joint trial.
Separate juries and severance attack the same problem from the other side, by keeping the accusation away from the jurors who must decide the accused’s fate. With two juries in one courtroom, the jury hearing the case against the co-defendant is excused while the confession is offered. The method removes the danger at its source, since jurors who never hear a statement cannot misuse it, but courtrooms are not built for it and keeping the panels apart is a daunting task. Severance is the cleaner version of the same idea. The trial judge severed the trials of McVeigh and Nichols, each of whom had made statements implicating the other, in United States v. McVeigh.21 Severance costs the government the efficiency of a single trial, but it ends the problem completely.
Redaction keeps the joint trial intact by editing the confession so that it no longer refers to the co-defendant. The confessor bears the price of the edit, because “Bob and I did it” becomes “I did it,” which is more damaging to the speaker than the original. Courts therefore ask a precise question about whether a redaction is good enough. A properly redacted statement is one that does not facially incriminate the co-defendant. The Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when the confession is edited to eliminate not only the co-defendant’s name but any reference to his existence.22 Courts have also accepted the insertion of “we” or “they,” or an indefinite expression such as “someone” or “another person,” provided that after the insertion the statement does not, without reference to other evidence, still obviously refer to and implicate the co-defendant.23 The instruction remains part of the cure, so Rule 105’s ordinary machinery returns once the facial accusation is gone.
The tempting shortcut is to swap the co-defendant’s name for a pronoun or a description and treat the job as finished. The question is how the edited statement reads to jurors, not what the editor deleted.
A redaction that works removes the accusation itself and not only the name attached to it.
The fourth step marks the boundary of the doctrine, and two decisions explain where it falls. In Richardson v. Marsh, a co-defendant’s confession described the events that culminated in a robbery and murder, and it was admitted over the other defendant’s Bruton objection. The confession incriminated her only when linked with evidence introduced later, her own testimony, and when such linkage is necessary the generalization that jurors will not obey an instruction to disregard loses much of its force.24 Cruz v. New York involved interlocking confessions, each telling a story that matched the other’s. The Court held, five to four, that the Confrontation Clause still barred the co-defendant’s confession, even though the defendant’s own confession to the same effect was in evidence, and left the overlap to harmless-error review.25 The two decisions differ in where the accusation sits. The confession in Richardson said nothing about the defendant and became harmful only after other proof supplied the connection, so jurors could keep it in its box. The confession in Cruz accused the defendant on its face.
Where Instructions Still Suffice
Bruton is a constitutional exception to Rule 105, and the exception has edges. Where the risk of prejudice is less severe than it was in Bruton, the common practice is still to admit evidence for a limited purpose or against fewer than all of the parties and to instruct the jury accordingly.27 A student who sees a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession in a fact pattern and stops at Bruton has skipped the question that decides the problem, which is what the statement is offered to do.
The exception stays narrow because of the reason it exists. Bruton rests on the danger that jurors will treat a powerfully accusing confession as proof against the defendant, coming from a speaker whose account is suspect and who cannot be cross-examined. Every part of that danger assumes the jurors are using the words for what they assert. If the statement is offered only to show that it was made, for a point that does not depend on whether it is true, the jurors are not asked to credit an accuser. The instruction then asks them to do something they can do, which is to consider the statement on the one issue for which it was admitted.
Tennessee v. Street marks that line. The defendant there testified that his own confession was a coerced “copy” of a statement by an accomplice, Peele, and the State introduced Peele’s confession to rebut that testimony. The Court held that the confession was offered for the legitimate, nonhearsay purpose of rebutting the claim, that the prosecutor’s questions and closing argument directed the jury’s attention to that distinctive and limited purpose, and that in this context the trial judge’s instructions were the appropriate way to limit the jury’s use of the evidence consistently with the Confrontation Clause.28 The instructions were pointed, telling the jury not to consider the truthfulness of the confession in any way whatsoever.29 The holding is tied to its setting by the Court’s own words, because the context is a limited purpose that the trial itself kept in front of the jury.
That purpose also explains why the State was not forced to call Peele. A claim that one statement was copied from another is tested by laying the two side by side, and what matters is what Peele’s statement said, not whether it was accurate. The trial judge was right not to force the State to call a witness who could offer no relevant testimony on the immediate issue of coercion, and he left to the defendant the choice whether to call Peele.30
Bruton and Street share more than they differ. In each, an accomplice’s confession bearing on the defendant went to a jury though the accomplice did not testify, and in each the trial court relied on an instruction. In Bruton, however, the co-defendant’s confession implicated the accused at a joint trial, where jurors could use it against him only by believing it, and the substantial risk that they would disregard the instruction made its admission improper.31 In Street the confession reached the jury only to rebut a coercion claim, with the jury’s attention directed to that purpose, and the instruction was enough.32 The one variable that moved the result is the use the jury is asked to make of the words, accusation in the first case and rebuttal in the second.
The first trial sits within Street, because the jury’s attention is held on the limited purpose and the instruction describes what the trial is actually doing with the evidence. In the second, the judge’s words say one thing and the closing argument asks for another. The premise that the jury’s attention was directed to the limited purpose is gone, and the confession is functioning as the accusation that Bruton addresses, so a court would have strong reason to doubt that the instruction alone can carry the weight. A recited limited purpose protects the defendant only as far as the evidence is actually used for that purpose, so an exam stem calls for reading the whole trial.
Street also belongs to a long line of decisions that trust jurors to follow instructions. The Court has repeatedly upheld the practice of admitting evidence with limiting instructions, even in situations with potentially life-and-death stakes and even for statements that are some of the most compelling evidence of guilt available to a jury, as it said in Samia v. United States. It has described the assumption that juries follow the trial judge’s instructions as crucial to the system of trial by jury.33 Against that background, Bruton reads as a targeted response to a setting where the risk of misuse is unusually great, and Street reads as the ordinary confidence in instructions applied to a confession. Rule 105’s request requirement still applies in a Street setting, so the defendant who wants the confession confined to its rebuttal purpose must ask for the instruction when the evidence is offered.34