471 U.S. 409 (1985)
Ben Tester was last seen alive on August 26, 1981, walking toward his home in Hampton, Tennessee. The next day his body was found hanging by a nylon rope from an apple tree in his yard after his house had been ransacked and signs of a struggle appeared.1
Respondent, a neighbor of Tester, was arrested and charged with the murder. At his severed trial the State introduced a detailed confession respondent gave Sheriff Papantoniou and Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agents on September 17, 1981, describing how he and Clifford Peele along with two others burglarized Tester’s house, were surprised by Tester’s return, and participated in hanging him.2
Respondent testified that he neither burglarized the house nor participated in the murder and that his September 17 confession had been coerced. He claimed Sheriff Papantoniou read Peele’s prior written statement aloud and directed respondent to repeat the same account.3
In rebuttal the State called Sheriff Papantoniou, who denied reading Peele’s statement or pressuring respondent. To corroborate this testimony the Sheriff read Peele’s confession to the jury after the trial judge twice instructed the jury that the statement was admitted solely for rebuttal and not to prove the truth of Peele’s assertions.4 Peele’s statement was generally consistent with respondent’s but differed in details such as portraying respondent as an active participant in the hanging, and the prosecutor elicited testimony and argument emphasizing those differences.5
The jury convicted respondent and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on Confrontation Clause grounds, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.6
Whether respondent’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated by the introduction of the confession of an accomplice for the non-hearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s testimony that his own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice’s statement?7
The Confrontation Clause protects a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses against him.8 An out-of-court statement introduced for a nonhearsay purpose raises no Confrontation Clause concerns when the witness presenting the statement is available for cross-examination.9 This is true provided the jury is instructed not to consider the statement for its truth.10
No. The State introduced Peele’s confession solely to rebut respondent’s claim that his own confession was a coerced imitation.11 Sheriff Papantoniou testified and was subject to cross-examination regarding the circumstances of respondent’s confession.12 The trial judge instructed the jury that Peele’s statement could be considered for rebuttal purposes only and not for the truthfulness of the statement in any way whatsoever.13 The prosecutor emphasized the differences between the confessions in questioning and closing argument.14
These steps allowed the jury to assess the plausibility of respondent’s coercion claim without using Peele’s statement as substantive evidence against him.15
Respondent’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan joined the Court’s opinion on the understanding that the trial court’s limiting instruction is not itself sufficient to justify admission of the confession.17 Admission of the out-of-court confession for nonhearsay purposes was proper only because the confession was essential to the State’s rebuttal and no alternative would have adequately served the State’s interest.18 Respondent created the need to admit the statement by pressing the defense that his confession was a coerced imitation of Peele’s out-of-court confession.19
Also, the record contains no suggestion that the State was engaged in any improper effort to place prejudicial hearsay evidence before the jury.20