Concept
When Section 2-711 Applies
Aggrieved buyer's remedies when the seller breaches
Buyer's Remedies for Seller Breach
When Section 2-711 Applies
The remedies in § 2-711 open only when one of four events occurs: the seller fails to make delivery, the seller repudiates (announces that it will not perform), the buyer rightfully rejects the goods, or the buyer justifiably revokes acceptance.1 After any of them, the buyer may cancel. Whether or not it cancels, it may also recover so much of the price as it has paid and pursue the further remedies the section lists. Those remedies reach the goods involved in the breach and, when the breach goes to the whole contract under § 2-612, the contract as a whole.2
Each trigger leaves the buyer without conforming goods that it must keep. After nondelivery or repudiation, the buyer has no goods. After a rightful rejection, it holds goods it was entitled to refuse. After a justifiable revocation, it holds goods it once accepted but may now return. A buyer that has finally accepted the goods, and cannot revoke, stands elsewhere: its damages for nonconforming goods fall under § 2-714.3 The line follows the loss. A buyer that keeps the goods still has most of what it bargained for and has lost only the value that is missing. If it could also cancel, take back the price, and recover the cost of substitutes, it would be paid twice for the value it kept.
Section 2-711 works as an index of the buyer’s remedies, sending the reader to the sections that measure each one. Paragraph (1)(a) lets the buyer cover and recover damages under § 2-712 “as to all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract,”4 and paragraph (1)(b) allows damages for nondelivery under § 2-713.5 The two measures are alternatives. Selectouch Corp. v. Perfect Starch, Inc., applying Washington’s enactment, describes them this way: the buyer may purchase substitute goods and recover the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price, provided it covers in good faith and without unreasonable delay; or, as “a complete alternative,” it may recover the difference between the market price when it learned of the breach and the contract price, a measure that applies only when and to the extent the buyer does not cover.6 Incidental and consequential damages come from § 2-715 and attach to the nondelivery measure,7 and cover, unlike a seller’s resale, carries consequential damages as well.8
The remaining subsections reach beyond damages. Subsection (2) adds that when the seller fails to deliver or repudiates, the buyer may also reach for the goods themselves.9 One example is recovery of identified goods under § 2-502, a right of a buyer that has paid some or all of the price and stands ready to tender the rest.10 It applies when goods bought for personal, family, or household purposes are not delivered, and otherwise only if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receiving the first installment of the price.11 Subsection (3) gives a buyer that rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes a security interest in the goods it holds.12
Because the trigger decides which remedies are open, a remedies problem starts by naming the breach. The four subsections below take the triggers in turn: nondelivery and repudiation; rejection and revocation; the boundary with accepted goods under § 2-714; and the language that extends the remedies to the whole contract. Later sections measure each remedy and assemble them on a single set of facts.
Nondelivery and Repudiation
The first two triggers leave the buyer with nothing: the seller fails to make delivery, or it repudiates.13 Nondelivery is the simple case. The contract calls for goods, the time for tender arrives, and none come; the missing delivery is itself the breach, and no reading of the seller’s intentions is needed. Repudiation takes more analysis, because it turns on what the seller’s words or conduct mean and can occur before performance is due. A repudiation that precedes the performance date is an anticipatory repudiation, a clear announcement that the seller will not perform.
The test is clarity. The seller’s language “must be sufficiently clear and distinct to be reasonably interpreted to mean that the promisor cannot or will not perform.”14 Commercial buyers bargain for actual performance, not merely for a promise or for a promise plus the right to win a lawsuit,15 and once a seller has made plain that the goods are not coming, forcing the buyer to idle until the delivery date adds only risk.
Hessler v. Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth shows how a repudiating seller’s defenses fare. The buyer was the first person to order a Chrysler Prowler from the dealer and to forward a deposit for one, so the court rejected the dealer’s claim that the contract merely locked in a price at which the buyer could purchase a vehicle.16 The dealer also pointed to the buyer’s own actions, and the court answered with § 2-610(b): an aggrieved party may “resort to any remedy for breach” even after telling the repudiating party that it would await performance, and cover is one such remedy, available on the seller’s repudiation whether or not the buyer cancels.17 A buyer’s willingness to proceed, the court said, does not excuse a repudiation.18 Nor did the buyer have to request assurances first, because the Code does not make a request for assurances a condition of recovery.19
Words that fall short of a clear refusal are not a repudiation, and the Code gives a worried buyer a separate route. Under § 2-609, each party to a sales contract must not impair the other’s expectation of due performance. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise, the other party may demand adequate assurance in writing and, if commercially reasonable, suspend any performance for which it has not yet received the agreed return.20 After a justified demand, a failure to give adequate assurance within a reasonable time, not exceeding thirty days, is a repudiation.21 The reasoning is that a continuing sense of reliance and security is part of the bargain: if a party’s willingness or ability to perform declines materially before performance is due, the other is threatened with losing a substantial part of what it bargained for.22 Insecurity can thus ripen into a trigger without forcing the buyer to guess whether a vague remark was a refusal, and the seller can end the matter at any time by giving the assurance.
Once a repudiation exists, § 2-610 gives the aggrieved party two paths. It may await performance for a commercially reasonable time, or it may resort to any remedy for breach, which for a buyer includes § 2-711, even though it has told the seller that it will wait and has urged retraction.23 The second path leads to cancellation, recovery of the price paid, and either cover or damages for nondelivery,24 and it is open at once.
The first path carries a time limit and a risk. The statute permits waiting only for a commercially reasonable time. Waiting also leaves the repudiation open to retraction: the repudiating party may retract until its next performance is due, unless the aggrieved party has since cancelled, materially changed its position, or otherwise indicated that it considers the repudiation final.25 The timing also touches the damages. Under the Iowa enactment of § 2-713 quoted in Oloffson v. Coomer, nondelivery damages run from the market price “at the time when the buyer learned of the breach,” and the market-price section takes up how that time is fixed after a repudiation.26 Taken together, these rules keep the buyer from holding a free option, suing or not suing as prices move, at the seller’s expense.
Rejection and Revocation
The last two triggers cover a buyer that received goods: it rightfully rejects them, or it justifiably revokes an acceptance already given.30 Both open the remedies that nondelivery opens, because both leave the buyer holding goods it is entitled to refuse or return and a contract that no one has performed. Both also open a remedy that nondelivery does not: on rightful rejection or justifiable revocation, a buyer in possession or control of the goods has a security interest in them for the payments it made on the price and for reasonable expenses of inspecting, receiving, transporting, and caring for them, and it may hold the goods and resell them as an aggrieved seller would.31
This section assumes that the rejection or revocation was effective. What makes a tender nonconforming and how the seller’s cure right works belong to other units. The questions here are narrower: what each event is as a trigger, and why revocation is harder to establish than rejection.
Rejection is the easier route. Under a contract calling for delivery in one lot, the buyer may reject for any defect in tender, the rule known as perfect tender. The seller’s right to cure softens that rule, and the buyer must reject in good faith and not merely to escape an unwise bargain.32 The buyer must also reject effectively: after a reasonable opportunity to inspect, a failure to make an effective rejection is itself an acceptance.33 Rejection carries a procedural advantage as well. Because the buyer is the one refusing, the seller has the burden of proving that the tender conformed to the contract.34
Revocation comes after acceptance, which under § 2-606 can happen in three ways: after a reasonable opportunity to inspect, the buyer signifies that the goods conform or that it will keep them despite nonconformity; it fails to make an effective rejection after that opportunity; or it does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership.35 Once the buyer has accepted, it may cancel and recover what it has paid only by establishing that it has justifiably revoked.36 A buyer that succeeds then draws on the same § 2-711 list as a rejecting buyer, and the pieces add together. In one vehicle case, the court measured “nondelivery” damages as the difference between the purchase price and the market value of the vehicle with clear title, and combined that figure with the purchase price to reach the award.37
The price of that equivalence is a heavier showing. A buyer that accepted has told the seller, by words or conduct, that the matter is settled, and the goods may have aged or changed while the seller relied on that signal. The Code therefore makes the buyer earn the right to undo the acceptance. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, applying Arkansas’s enactment, lists what a buyer must establish for a revocation to be justifiable.38
On every element the burden rests on the buyer. Section 2-607(4) places on a buyer that has accepted the burden of proof as to all the requirements for revocation, whereas a buyer that rejected can make the seller prove that its tender conformed.39
Harper shows a buyer that carried the burden. Answering a repossession notice, Harper’s lawyer wrote to Ford Credit that the tractor must be repaired or replaced or Harper would revoke his acceptance and demand his down payment back. When no response came, a September 4 letter revoked the acceptance outright, with a copy to Tri-County. Tri-County’s October letter, reporting that the tractor had been repaired, found Harper with a different tractor and in the middle of harvest.40 On the trial court’s findings and the record, the court of appeals held the revocation justifiable as a matter of law, which entitled Harper to the relief the trial court had prescribed.41 The letters to a financer reflect a common setting for these disputes. Consumer advocates pressed for limits on the holder in due course doctrine because a consumer who received shoddy goods and signed a negotiable note or installment contract could see it transferred to a lender that insisted on full payment.42
Notice is an element a buyer cannot skip. Revocation must occur “within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects,” and it “is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.”43 Riley v. Ken Wilson Ford, Inc. restates that rule under North Carolina’s enactment, and it recalls that in Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen the court found that complaints combined with cessation of payments sufficed as notice of revocation.44 Notice need not be elaborate, but silence is not notice.
When a fact pattern gives a buyer that received defective goods and asks about a refund, first decide whether the buyer rejected before accepting or is revoking after accepting. That answer fixes who carries the burden of proof, how much the buyer must show, and whether notice is a live issue.
Accepted Goods and Section 2-714
A buyer that has accepted goods and notified the seller of the breach recovers under § 2-714, not § 2-711. Subsection (1) allows the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach, determined in any reasonable manner. Subsection (2) fixes the measure for breach of warranty as the difference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the goods as accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.47
Section 2-711(1) never opens for this buyer, because none of its four triggers has occurred.48 The official comment says so directly: the remedies it lists belong to a buyer that has not accepted the goods or has justifiably revoked its acceptance, and the remedies for goods finally accepted appear in the section on breach in regard to accepted goods.49
A buyer that receives nonconforming goods therefore chooses between two routes, and the choice sets its remedy. If it rejects, or later justifiably revokes, it stands in § 2-711 and may cancel and recover the price it paid. If it keeps the goods, it recovers damages for the nonconformity under § 2-714. In Harper, the court of appeals separated two “distinct strands” of buyer’s remedies, revocation of acceptance and damages for breach of warranty, that the district court had “erroneously intertwined.” Once goods are accepted, the buyer may cancel and recover what it has paid only upon establishing a justifiable revocation, and the Code separately lets the buyer recover damages for breach of warranty on accepted goods.50
The split follows the buyer’s loss. A buyer that keeps the goods has most of what it bargained for, so § 2-714(2) pays only the value that is missing, and a refund of the whole price as well would pay the buyer for value it still holds. The split also protects the seller. A seller whose goods were accepted may have relied on that acceptance, so a revoking buyer must prove substantial impairment, a reasonable basis for having accepted, timely revocation, and no substantial change in the goods, and it must notify the seller. If a finding of warranty breach alone opened the refund route, every buyer with a warranty claim could bypass those requirements.
Michiana Mack, Inc. v. Allendale Rural Fire Protection applies the line to a defective truck. The buyer, Allendale, kept the truck, never tried to rescind the contract or return the truck, and sued only for damages. The trial court concluded that Allendale had accepted the truck because there had been no effective rejection, yet it ordered the seller to repair the truck or refund the purchase price and to pay damages, including Allendale’s interest and insurance expenses.51 The appellate court held the refund alternative to be error. After quoting the comment to § 2-711, it explained that the § 2-714(2) measure equals the purchase price only occasionally, as with pigs delivered “so infected with disease as to be worthless,” because defective goods will normally have at least scrap value.52
When a fact pattern gives a buyer that holds defective goods and demands its price back, ask first whether the buyer ever rejected or justifiably revoked. A buyer that accepted, notified the seller of the defect, and kept using the goods recovers under § 2-714 by the value-difference measure, and its demand for cancellation and refund fails. A buyer that refused the goods in time, or proves every element of revocation, stands under § 2-711 and may cancel, recover the price paid, and pursue cover or market damages.
Breach of the Whole Contract
Section 2-711(1) extends the buyer’s remedies “with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract.”55 Ordinarily the remedies attach to the goods whose nondelivery, repudiation, rejection, or revocation triggered the section. They reach the entire contract, including goods not yet due, only when § 2-612 says the breach goes to the whole. The question arises when delivery is in installments, and this section stays at the level of the clause instead of teaching that section’s full regime.
Where a contract calls for delivery in a single lot, any defect in tender lets the buyer reject the lot, subject to the seller’s right to cure, so no later delivery remains to protect. Language or circumstances showing that the goods can be delivered in separate lots make it an installment contract under § 2-612(1), and further lots are still to come after a defective one.56 The contract in Traynor v. Walters was of that kind: it “tacitly authorized installment deliveries at the option of the parties” and so fell under § 2-612(3).57
Two different thresholds apply in an installment contract, and keeping them apart is the main discipline in this topic. A buyer may reject a single installment only if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured.58 The clause in § 2-711(1) asks a larger question: whether nonconformity or default in one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract, because if it does, § 2-612(3) says there is a breach of the whole.59 The first threshold measures one delivery against itself, and the second measures what has gone wrong against the value of the entire bargain. A buyer can clear the first and fall short of the second, in which case its remedies reach the goods in the rejected installment and the contract continues for the rest. Misjudging the first threshold has a cost: in Traynor, the court held the buyer’s rejection of 600 Scotch Pine trees tendered on December 14 wrongful, denied damages for those trees, and treated them as conforming deliveries when it computed damages.60
The second threshold is deliberately hard to meet. Parties who agree to installment delivery expect an ongoing, cooperative relationship, and the Code tolerates some minor bumps in performance to preserve it.61 If any defective lot freed the buyer entirely, a seller that had arranged production and shipping for a year of deliveries could lose the whole contract over one fixable flaw. The official comment sharpens the screen by directing a court to ask only whether the installments already delivered substantially impair the value of the whole contract, and not whether the defects suggest that future deliveries will also be defective.62 The standard is a tough one and reflects a policy of keeping installment contracts on track despite the seller’s failures.63 A buyer that merely fears more bad shipments therefore has no breach of the whole yet. The tool for that fear is the written demand for adequate assurance taught earlier in this chapter.
A buyer that has a breach of the whole can still give it up. The last sentence of § 2-612(3) provides that the aggrieved party reinstates the contract by accepting a nonconforming installment without seasonably notifying the seller of cancellation, by bringing an action with respect only to past installments, or by demanding performance as to future installments.65 The reason follows from what each side may rely on. A seller that hears the buyer demand the next installment will reasonably go on shipping, and a buyer cannot demand continued performance while keeping the right to say that the whole bargain is already dead. A buyer that wants out must give seasonable notice of cancellation and then stop acting as though the contract lives.