Concept
Reliance in Promissory Estoppel
Reliance interest
Reliance in Promissory Estoppel
A promise that the law enforces without a bargain raises a question a contract never does: how much must the promisor pay? Promissory estoppel answers by loosening the remedy. It needs neither an agreement nor consideration. The promisor's obligation arises because the promisee foreseeably changed position in reliance on the promise, and the remedy may be limited to the extent of that reliance rather than the promisee's expectation.1 Restatement (Second) § 90 says so directly: the remedy for breach “may be limited as justice requires.”2 The measure it points toward is the reliance interest defined at the start of this chapter, the interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance by being put in as good a position as if the contract (here, the promise) had never been made.3
The nephew's car
An uncle promises his nephew $10,000 to buy a car, and the nephew spends $5,000 on one in reliance. The Restatement (Second) does not require reliance of a definite and substantial character, and it allows recovery of less than the full value of the promise; its authors plainly contemplated cases in which the plaintiff recovers reliance damages only.4 A nephew who can assert only promissory estoppel may therefore recover the $5,000 he spent, or less. If he can readily resell the car for $4,000, the resale value offsets his loss, and his reliance damages could shrink to $1,000.5
Bargain first
The $10,000 returns if the nephew proves a bargain. Suppose the uncle sought the car purchase as the price of his promise and the nephew agreed: the parties then made a contract, the nephew recovers the full $10,000, and the uncle cannot hold him to reliance.6 Where the promise was bargained for, consideration is present and promissory estoppel is unnecessary.7 A stem that pairs a promise with a purchase in reliance therefore calls for one question before any arithmetic: did the promisor bargain for the purchase? The common error runs the other way. The student spots the detrimental purchase, reaches for § 90, and awards $5,000 without asking whether the facts show an exchange. A plaintiff who proves the exchange collects the whole expectation; one who proves only reliance may collect half that, or less.
The normal measure or one option among several
Courts disagree about how often the lesser remedy applies, and the disagreement tracks a deeper one about what promissory estoppel is. If its role is to estop the promisor from denying that a contract exists, the promise should be treated as a contract, expectation should be the normal relief, and reliance should be reserved for exceptional cases. If it is an independent, tort-like theory of liability, reimbursing actual reliance losses should be the normal relief, and full enforcement should be confined to cases in which that lesser remedy is clearly inadequate.8 The range of damages courts actually award makes it hard to say which view dominates.
The decisions run both ways. Goodman v. Dicker and Wheeler v. White limited recovery to reliance. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. is among the best known of the cases in which courts concluded that “justice” required compensating the reliance interest instead.9 Drennan v. Star Paving Co., by contrast, measured recovery by the difference between a withdrawn bid and the higher price the promisee then paid, an expectation-like result. And a trial court with discretion to choose among expectation, reliance, and other remedies may select reliance even against a very large lost-profits claim: in Walser v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., the plaintiffs sought about $7.6 million in lost profits, and the court approved an instruction limiting damages on the promissory estoppel claim to out-of-pocket expenses.
Even a court that holds the power to award expectation may decline to use it. In Tynan v. JBVBB, LLC, the court acknowledged its discretion to award expectation relief but declined, because the promises were somewhat vague, Tynan had worked as a consultant for only a short time, and the defendant had not acted unfairly.10 It then gave Tynan the chance to prove reliance damages. He tried to show that he had lost employment opportunities in reliance on the promise, but he could not prove them with sufficient certainty, and he recovered nothing. The court's reasons mark out the features that favor the lesser remedy: vague promises, brief reliance, and fair dealing by the promisor.
Limits that still apply, and a ceiling that does not
Reliance damages carry no guarantee of recovery, as Tynan's empty award shows. The doctrines that limit expectation damages (foreseeability, causation, certainty, and mitigation) also limit reliance damages.11 In an ordinary contract case, reliance serves as the plaintiff's fallback when lost profits cannot be proved with certainty, and § 349 allows expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss the breaching party proves with reasonable certainty the plaintiff would have suffered had the contract been performed.12 Promissory estoppel can promote reliance from fallback to primary measure, but the same limits come with it.
Reliance does not cap every promissory estoppel recovery. The Restatement (Second) apparently contemplates specific performance in promissory estoppel cases involving land (§ 90, Illustration 11), a remedy that is in one sense the most purely expectation-based of all.13 Cases involving land are usually good candidates for specific performance or other equitable relief.14
A fact pattern with a promise and a detrimental change of position deserves a sort before any computation. If the promisor sought the promisee's performance in exchange for the promise, the claim is a contract claim and the measure is expectation. If the facts show only a promise that induced reliance, apply § 90, note that the remedy may be limited as justice requires, and name the competing views on the normal measure. Then compute reliance net of whatever the promisee kept, as the car's resale value reduced the nephew's loss, and test the figure against foreseeability, causation, certainty, and mitigation. Certainty is the limit that left Tynan with nothing.