Concept
Sales of Goods Under the UCC
Specific performance and injunction
Sales of Goods Under the UCC
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives the buyer of goods a statutory path to specific performance. Section 2-716(1) provides that specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances,1 and the buyer’s remedies section points to it, allowing a buyer in a proper case to obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as § 2-716 provides.2 A sales contract therefore sends the analysis first to this text and only then to the general adequacy test developed earlier in the chapter.
The drafters wrote on a crowded slate. Before the Code, the most familiar requirement was that the plaintiff’s remedy at law be inadequate to put him where performance would have, and the Uniform Sales Act tried to relax it by inviting a court to order specific performance of “specific or ascertained goods” whenever it “thinks fit.” Courts did not take much advantage: the pre-Code decisions did little to expand specific performance in sales cases.3 Article 2 tries again, with “a more liberal attitude than some courts have shown.”4 The reason may be that the parties to these transactions tend to be sophisticated and that replacement goods can be hard to obtain by cover, which means buying substitutes from another seller.5 The text reflects the change. Section 2-716(1) recites no requirement that the legal remedy be inadequate.6 It also no longer confines the remedy to goods already ascertained when the parties contracted.7 Even goods that are not unique can qualify if the buyer shows other proper circumstances.8
The liberalization is real but bounded. Like the common law, §§ 2-709 and 2-716 reserve specific performance for special cases and treat damages as the primary remedy for breach.9 A buyer who does not receive the goods may recover any price already paid and obtain cover or market damages, or may instead seek an order compelling delivery, and the statute says only that the decree “may” issue.10 One commentator observes that it is usually assumed a plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy “as a matter of course,” and cautions that the assumption may not be sound, especially since courts of law and equity have merged in most states.11 For the buyer, then, the remedy is a real choice. Three questions govern it: whether the goods are unique, whether other proper circumstances exist, and whether the buyer may recover particular identified goods instead.
Unique Goods
Section 2-716(1) names uniqueness first but leaves it undefined, and the Code fills the gap by asking about replacement. Because Article 2 emphasizes the commercial feasibility of replacement, uniqueness depends on the total contract situation and not on the goods considered in isolation.12
The question has this shape because of how damages work. At common law, money damages were ordinarily thought adequate because, in a market economy, money lets a disappointed promisee arrange a substitute transaction. Land was the exception: each parcel was considered unique, so not even money could buy the injured purchaser a substitute.13 Article 2 keeps that logic and applies it to goods. Goods meet the test of uniqueness where no commercially reasonable substitute is readily available without undue expense, difficulty, or delay, and difficulties of valuation, prospective problems collecting damages, and the risk of multiple suits may point the same way.14 Most often the critical factor is whether the buyer can enter the market and cover. Where goods are relatively fungible, as most commodities are, damages ordinarily suffice.15
The Code departs from older practice in two ways. A buyer no longer needs goods already ascertained when the parties contracted, so it can seek a decree before the seller has set anything aside. And the court must weigh the total contract situation, not just the physical qualities of the goods.16
Courts meet three kinds of cases. At one end are goods no market duplicates, such as a one-of-a-kind painting. At the other end are perfectly fungible goods, for which a buyer almost never seeks specific relief.17 The contested cases fall between, where similar goods exist but the contracted-for goods or terms are hard to find.18
Output and requirements contracts tied to a particular or peculiarly available source or market are the typical commercial setting for a decree today.19 In Almetals, Inc. v. Wickeder Westfalenstahl, GmbH, the court held specific performance the appropriate remedy for a requirements contract. It reasoned that the varieties of clad metal supplied under the contract were unique and that there were no known alternative sources of supply, only speculation about a possible source for a tiny fraction of the product.20 A requirements label settles nothing by itself, however. Courts compare the commercial alternatives to an assured supply, the parties’ reasonable expectations, the burden of supervising a decree, and the hardship each side would bear.21
Goods made to order or produced in limited numbers raise the same question in another form. Courts have granted specific relief for a custom-made yacht in Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, for a limited-edition Corvette in Sedmak v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., though the car was not one of a kind in the traditional sense, and for hog casings with no comparable counterpart in the marketplace in International Casings Group, Inc. v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc. In each, the buyer could not simply buy a comparable item elsewhere.
Buyers often offer facts that look like uniqueness but are not. A rising market is one. In Duval & Co. v. Malcolm, a shortage drove up the price of cotton and the sellers refused to deliver. The court declined to order delivery because the buyer’s higher cost of cover simply increased its damages. A bargain price is another. In Hilmor Sales Co. v. Helen Neushaefer Division of Supronics Corp., a buyer of closeout lipstick and nail polish could not find similar goods at so favorable a price, but the only unusual feature of the contract was the price, and the buyer did not claim that replacement was impossible. Heavy investment is a third. In i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Service Level Corp., a software licensee argued that the program was unique because it was copyrighted, took years to develop, and the licensee had tailored its business to it. Even assuming Article 2 applied, the court rejected the claim: many non-unique things are copyrighted and costly to produce, competing packages performed the same functions, and the licensee was confusing reliance with uniqueness. Availability of comparable goods likewise defeated the buyer in Klein v. Pepsico, Inc., where it was error to award specific performance of a contract to sell an airplane because comparable planes were on the market.22
Each of these is a money loss that damages can measure: a price gap, a lost bargain, a sunk investment. Even in land, where uniqueness was presumed, one court awarded the buyers $1,000, the profit they would have made by buying for $21,000 and reselling to a third party for $22,000, because that sum gave them all the relief a deed would have given.23 The inquiry always returns to what the buyer would have done with the goods and whether money lets it do the same thing.
Step three does the real work on an exam, because fact patterns often dangle a price spike or a heavy investment to tempt an answer that confuses a large loss with an irreplaceable good. A one-of-a-kind object needs little analysis at step two, since no seller has another copy, while a commodity fails there because the buyer simply buys elsewhere.
Other Proper Circumstances
Section 2-716(1) gives a second ground for ordinary goods: other proper circumstances. The statute does not define the phrase, and Comment 2 supplies the working evidence. Relief may be granted in other proper circumstances, and inability to cover is strong evidence of them.25 Everything under this ground reduces to a practical question: could this buyer have gone into the market and replaced what the seller promised?
The question matters because cover is how damages ordinarily make a buyer whole. When substitutes are for sale, the buyer buys them, collects cover damages, and ends up with goods in hand. When no commercially reasonable substitute is available without undue expense, difficulty, or delay, damages leave the buyer holding money in place of performance.26 Courts applying the Code accordingly lean toward denying a decree where goods are readily available and grow more willing where neither substitute goods nor a substitute contract can be had.27
Easy cover defeats the claim even when the contract runs long. In INEOS Americas LLC v. Dow Chemical Co., the Second Circuit found no error in denying the buyer specific performance of a long-term agreement for ethylene oxide, because the buyer could make short-term contracts to cover its requirements and any loss was remediable with money damages under Article 2’s cover formula.28
Relief follows when cover is difficult, even if it is not impossible. In Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., the buyer of cryolite could have covered partially by buying the uncommitted portion from other sellers and completely by contracting with buyers who already held long-term supplies, though presumably at high cost.29 The court quoted Comment 2 and held that this difficulty was enough: costly cover can warrant specific performance.30 A court in the same vein explained that where a scarce material is an important input in the buyer’s manufacturing, damages do not adequately protect the buyer’s expectation interest.31
Supply contracts signed before a shortage form the largest group. The goods may be ordinary, petroleum products for example, but if the seller breaches during a shortage the buyer may be able to prove that no market exists in which to arrange a comparable long-term contract, so the contract obligation is itself hard to replace.32 In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., a court enjoined Gulf Oil from breaching a large jet fuel contract because interruption would cause “chaos and irreparable damage.”33 Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., discussed earlier in the chapter, fits the same pattern of a long-term supply contract breached amid a shortage. A federal court in Colorado awarded specific performance on a combination of uniqueness and other circumstances.34 It reasoned that damages measured by the cost of a chemical additive to bring the buyer’s precipitator up to state pollution-control levels would be unsatisfactory, because the state might stop allowing additives, and speculative, because of deregulation and market fluctuations. The buyer would also be irreparably harmed by a shutdown for clean-air violations.35 These buyers could not replace supply on any terms that assured it, whereas INEOS could cover through short-term contracts and measure its loss with the cover formula.
The ground has independent significance, because inability to cover depends on the buyer’s actual position. In Stephan’s Machine & Tool, Inc. v. D & H Machinery Consultants, Inc., the plaintiff borrowed $96,000 to buy a machine that failed to function, and the defendant agreed to replace it but did not. The plaintiff could not raise the money to buy a replacement, although such machines were available, and the court ordered specific performance of the replacement agreement because of the plaintiff’s financial position.36
Courts disagree about how much difficulty is enough. Most courts find that the availability of only similar goods or sales conditions makes the goods “unique” and that costly replacement supplies “other proper circumstances,” and they often grant relief on both grounds without separating them. A minority holds that difficulty in obtaining replacement goods amounts to neither.37 On cotton in a shortage, Duval illustrates the minority’s caution, while a federal court in Alabama took the other view in Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep. It granted a buyer specific performance of its contracts with farmers and enjoined the farmers from violating them because “the cotton in question is unique and irreplaceable because of the scarcity of cotton.”38 An essay answer on a buyer whose cover is costly but possible should state both approaches and apply each. Because the statute says specific performance “may” be decreed, even a buyer who proves inability to cover depends on the court’s discretion.
The fact that decides the two scenes is the supply terms other producers will give, not the size of the price gap. A buyer who can replace the supply, even at a premium, is made whole by money, while a buyer who has lost an assured source of supply has lost something no price difference measures.
Replevin of Identified Goods
Article 2 gives a buyer two routes to the goods themselves, in addition to the decree of specific performance. The first is recovery of identified goods under § 2-502, which § 2-711(2)(a) cross-references: if the goods have been identified, the buyer may recover them as § 2-502 provides.41 The second is replevin under § 2-716(3), which the statute gives for goods identified to the contract.42
Both routes depend on identification, the step that ties particular goods to the contract. In the standard illustration, the seller selects goods from its inventory, sets them aside, and tags them for the buyer, and then repudiates. The buyer makes a reasonable effort to buy substitutes, cannot, and may replevy the tagged goods.43 The buyer’s right under § 2-502 “vests upon acquisition of a special property, which occurs upon identification of the goods to the contract.”44 A decree under § 2-716(1) needs no such step, because specific performance is no longer limited to goods already ascertained at contracting.45 The difference follows from what each remedy does. Replevin moves a particular thing from the seller to the buyer, and until the seller designates goods there is no particular thing to move.
Section 2-716(3) conditions replevin on the buyer’s inability to cover. The buyer may replevy if, after reasonable effort, it cannot effect cover, or if the circumstances reasonably indicate that the effort will be unavailing, or if the goods were shipped under reservation and the security interest in them has been satisfied or tendered.46 This condition echoes Comment 2’s treatment of inability to cover as strong evidence of other proper circumstances,47 and it rests on the same reason: a buyer who can buy substitutes is made whole by cover damages and gives a court no reason to take particular goods from the seller. A buyer who skips the attempt must be ready to show that the circumstances reasonably indicated it would have failed. For goods bought for personal, family, or household purposes, the replevin right vests upon acquisition of a special property, even if the seller has not yet repudiated or failed to deliver.48
Section 2-502 does not depend on cover. A buyer who has paid part or all of the price of identified goods, and who tenders any unpaid balance, may recover them in two situations. For goods bought for personal, family, or household purposes, the buyer may recover when the seller repudiates or does not deliver as the contract requires. In all other cases, the buyer may recover if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receiving the first installment of the price.49 The right applies even if the seller has not yet shipped the goods.50 The insolvency prong answers a problem from earlier in the chapter: a buyer who prepaid a failing seller holds only a claim for money, and § 2-502 lets that buyer reach the paid-for goods instead.
The prong is narrow, and timing defeats many claims. In re Surplus Furniture Liquidators, Inc., a customer claimed under § 2-502 but could not show that the debtor first became insolvent within ten days after her payment. The evidence suggested serious cash-flow problems several months earlier, so even if the debtor was insolvent on the date in question, the customer failed to prove it became insolvent within the ten-day window.51
Replevin and specific performance ask the same question of the buyer, whether it can cover, but they differ in what they require of the goods. Replevin reaches only identified goods, while a decree of specific performance does not require identification. In practice the two remedies sit close together:52 if goods are unique, a decree is available, and if they are not, the buyer can usually cover.
When a court does order performance, § 2-716(2) lets it shape the decree: the decree may include such terms and conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court deems just.53 A court can therefore condition delivery on payment of the price and add damages for loss the delay caused. The § 2-502 buyer faces a parallel condition, because recovery requires making and keeping good a tender of the unpaid price.54
Step three decides most problems, because a buyer who can buy elsewhere has a damages claim and no claim to the goods. Step one marks the threshold that replevin has and specific performance lacks, so an answer that lets a buyer replevy goods the seller never set aside has run the wrong remedy.