Concept
Freedom to Limit Remedies
Limitation of Remedies
Contractual Limits on Remedies
Freedom to Limit Remedies
Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code lets a buyer and seller rewrite the remedies Article 2 would otherwise supply for breach of a sale of goods, and it sets the boundaries of that rewriting.1 The remedies being rewritten are the Article's general ones, among them the buyer's remedies in § 2-711 and the damages rules of §§ 2-714 and 2-715, and they govern unless the contract displaces them.2 In practice the party who exercises that freedom is usually the seller, who writes the form and writes it to narrow what a buyer can recover when goods prove defective.
The freedom is conditional. Subsection (1) opens by yielding to subsections (2) and (3) and to the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages, so a clause that satisfies the grant can still be undone by a later control.3 Three controls do most of the work. A remedy meant to be the buyer's only one must be expressly agreed to be exclusive; otherwise resort to it is optional.4 A limited or exclusive remedy that fails of its essential purpose gives way, and the buyer may pursue the remedies the Act provides.5 And a clause excluding consequential damages stands unless it is unconscionable.6 Behind all three stands the Code's insistence that a sales contract leave the buyer at least a fair quantum of remedy: a clause that modifies the Article's remedies in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion, and the Article's remedies then apply as though the clause had never existed.7
Remedy limitations take one of two forms. Some terms preclude recovery of an element of damages, such as consequential damages; others substitute a different remedy for the ones the law provides, such as the cost to repair or replace the promised property.8 The second form can do the work of the first, because a buyer who may recover only the cost of repair has no route to consequential damages. Some contracts contain both kinds of term.9 The grant itself comes first.
Permitted Limits and Substitutes
Section 2-719(1)(a) authorizes two kinds of change. The agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those Article 2 supplies, and it may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under the Article, as by confining the buyer to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts.10 The first half changes which remedies exist; the second changes how much the buyer can collect. The grant runs in both directions, since a contract could add a remedy the Article does not supply, such as a right to attorneys' fees. A contract provision that restricts the remedies available when a party defaults is a limitation-of-remedies clause, and under the Code it is valid unless it fails of its essential purpose or unconscionably limits consequential damages.11
A frequently used illustration shows how the narrowing works. Machinex Corporation sells a machine to Acme, Inc., and the contract states clearly that repair or replacement of the machine is the exclusive remedy for breach of warranty. The warranty is breached, and Acme loses $50,000 in profit. That lost profit is consequential damage, and Acme cannot recover it: even if the agreement never mentioned consequential damages, limiting Acme to repair or replacement effectively eliminates the right to recover them.12 A decision cited for the point reaches the same result, treating a valid exclusive-remedy provision as excluding consequential damages.13 The logic turns on what the seller promised. A promise to repair or replace defines the whole of the seller's duty, which is to make the goods right, and a lost order is a loss that promise never touches. Sellers often add an express exclusion of consequential damages as a precaution, but the substituted remedy does the work with or without one.
Sellers want this protection for a reason that shows up in price. A tractor dealer, for example, may be glad to repair a defective tractor and still hesitate to answer for the consequential damages that flow from, say, a farmer's loss of part of his crop; the dealer can avoid that exposure by disclaiming all warranties or by excluding consequential damages as a remedy.14 Remedies are part of the total cost of administering a contract, and the price reflects them: a contract with fewer effective remedies is worth less to the non-breaching party, who therefore pays a lower price.15 A buyer who accepts the narrower remedy is paid for doing so in the price, and that exchange is what allows the parties to strike the bargain in advance.
Four clauses recur in practice:
- A repair-or-replace clause confines the seller's duty to fixing or exchanging defective goods or parts.16
- A refund clause confines the buyer to return of the goods and repayment of the price.17
- A price cap provides that the seller will be liable for no more than the price of the goods alleged to be defective.18
- A consequential-damages exclusion provides that the seller will not be liable for incidental or consequential damages, or for injuries to persons or property.19
Two decisions show courts applying the grant. In Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., a contract for the sale of an executive passenger aircraft limited the buyer's remedy for non-delivery to cancellation and refund of the deposit. When the buyer sued for consequential damages, the court held that § 2-719(1)(a) authorized the clause, and § 2-719(3), which permits the parties to limit or exclude consequential damages, supports the result.20 In BHC Development, L.C. v. Bally Gaming, Inc., the court had already granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' fraud claim, and it held their damages on the contract claim limited to the $281,135 they had agreed to pay for the software, a ceiling keyed to the price.21
The freedom has a floor. Parties may shape their remedies to their particular requirements, and reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are given effect, but it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available, and the parties must accept that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach.22 A contract that left the buyer of a seriously defective machine with nothing but a written apology would fall below that floor. A limitation that grossly undercompensates the buyer and deprives it of meaningful relief could be substantively unconscionable.23 Later sections take up the controls that enforce the floor: failure of essential purpose and unconscionability.
One boundary needs marking before the next topic. A limitation of damages places a ceiling on what a party may claim after breach or excludes a category of loss, while a liquidation forecasts the harm and settles its amount in advance.24 Section 2-719 does not apply to liquidated damages clauses, which fall under § 2-718, and § 2-719(1) says so by making itself subject to § 2-718.25 A clause that fixes a sum payable on breach is therefore tested under § 2-718, while one that only caps or excludes recovery is tested under § 2-719.
Sorting the clause correctly matters because the two sections apply different tests. A limitation is not subject to the tests that govern liquidated damages; it is enforceable unless it is unconscionable.26 Applying the wrong section applies the wrong test, so the first step with any remedy clause is to ask whether it caps or excludes recovery or fixes it in advance.
Limits Versus Disclaimers
Article 2 gives sellers two separate tools for avoiding or limiting responsibility for product defects and false warranties: disclaimers of warranty under § 2-316, and limitations on remedy under §§ 2-718 and 2-719.29 The tools may serve the same seller objective, but they operate independently and are conceptually distinct.30 Section 2-316(4) makes the separation explicit by sending the question of limiting a remedy to the remedy sections instead of to § 2-316 itself.31
The two tools act at different points in a claim. An effective disclaimer prevents a warranty from ever arising, so the seller has nothing to breach and no question of remedy follows.32 The Official Comment to § 2-316 states the consequence: if no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty.33 A remedy limitation starts from the opposite premise. It assumes that a valid warranty exists and was breached, and it governs only the nature and extent of the remedy; an effective limitation under § 2-719 typically confines the buyer to repair or replacement of the product and allows no recovery of incidental or consequential damages.34 A disclaimer erases the seller's liability, and a limitation caps it.
The McCarty opinion illustrates the difference with a new-car buyer who sues for breach of warranty while the seller raises two defenses, one built on a disclaimer and one on an exclusionary clause. The disclaimer defense denies the existence of any cause of action. The exclusionary-clause defense denies that the buyer is entitled to the remedy demanded, consequential damages for example.35 See McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc. One defense asks whether a claim exists, and the other asks what the claim is worth.
The Code polices the two devices by different standards. The comment to § 2-316 targets form clauses that exclude all warranties, express or implied; it denies effect to disclaimer language inconsistent with an express warranty, and it permits exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances that protect the buyer from surprise.36 A limitation of remedy concedes the promise and prices its breach, so its controls ask other questions: whether the remedy is expressly exclusive, whether a limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose, and whether an exclusion of consequential damages is unconscionable.37 The separation is not always honored in practice. Courts hostile to warranty disclaimers, particularly in consumer contracts, have applied the unconscionability rule of § 2-302 to disclaimers whether or not they comply with § 2-316, although some commentators think the drafters never intended that overlay.38 Whatever the courts do at the margins, the first step with a defendant's form is to identify which device the clause is.
Because the devices are independent, a seller may use either one or both. A seller worried about consequential loss may disclaim all warranties, or it may keep the warranty and exclude consequential damages as a remedy; sellers often choose the second route because buyers value warranties and sellers are willing to provide some remedy.39 A seller that keeps its warranty may still confine the remedy, for example by making repair or replacement the buyer's sole remedy or by capping its liability at the price of the goods.40
The Exclusivity Requirement
Section 2-719(1)(b) adds a second condition to every remedy clause, and this one concerns what the clause says. Resort to a remedy the contract provides is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.43 The text sets a default and a trigger. The default treats a remedy written into the contract as one more choice, available beside the remedies Article 2 already supplies, and the trigger is an express agreement that the remedy is exclusive. Official Comment 2 describes the default as a presumption that clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative rather than exclusive, but a seller can rebut the presumption through good drafting in the original agreement.44
The burden falls on the seller because the seller writes the clause. One sentence declaring the remedy exclusive costs the seller almost nothing, while a buyer who reads a promise to repair has little reason to suppose it also surrenders the damages Article 2 would provide. When exclusivity is at all ambiguous, the remedy provided is deemed to supplement the Article 2 remedies instead of displacing them.45 The Machinex clause shows what the requirement accomplishes: it stated expressly that repair or replacement was the exclusive remedy, and that statement is why Acme's $50,000 of lost profit could not be recovered. Without the word exclusive, the same promise would be an extra option, and Acme could take the repair and still pursue the damages the Code provides.
Ford Motor Co. v. Reid is the standard example of a clause that looked like a limitation and did not operate as one. The Reids were consumers whose house burned down because of defective wiring in their new car.46 Ford contended that its warranty's promise to replace 'any such defective part' was a contractual limitation of remedy that could yield no more than the $6,100 the car had cost.47 The court rejected the argument. Language that speaks of obligations does not speak of remedies, it reasoned, because remedies are not obligations but the rights that arise when obligations go unperformed. The court added that § 2-316(4) cross-references the Code's remedy sections as the provisions governing those matters, and that if Ford had meant repair to be exclusive it should have said so in express language.48
The distinction the court drew explains why wording decides these cases. A clause limiting what the seller warrants or owes describes the seller's promise, while a clause limiting remedies describes what the buyer may collect after the promise is broken. A contract that purports to limit the seller's warranties, obligations, or liability, instead of the buyer's remedies, may therefore be read as an invalid disclaimer instead of a valid limitation of remedies.49
A clause can fail from the opposite side too, by naming a remedy without saying it is sole. In Lowe v. Smith, the contract specified a remedy, but the trial court did not enforce it and awarded money damages, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed because nothing in the contract specifically stated that the remedy provided was intended to be the sole remedy available in the event of breach, so other Code remedies remained available.50 Reid and Lowe fail for different reasons. The Reid form addressed the wrong subject, since it spoke of obligations when the question was remedies, while the Lowe contract addressed the right subject and was silent on exclusivity. Because the Lowe contract's remedy was written for the other party, the case also shows that the presumption protects the party against whom the clause operates, whichever side that is.
The courts show more sympathy to consumers than to business persons, and the pattern appears in the treatise's comparison. The plaintiffs in two of its cases were business persons who incurred commercial losses, while the Reids were consumers whose home burned.51 A seller cannot count on that difference falling its way, and Wyatt Industries is the treatise's example of a seller whose drafting rebutted the presumption.52 See Wyatt Industries, Inc. v. Publicker Industries, Inc. A clause that satisfies the requirement says both what the buyer may recover and what the buyer may not, as in this model language: the buyer's sole and exclusive remedy shall be repair or replacement of defective parts, and the seller shall not be liable for damages for injuries to persons or property.53
Whether exclusivity can come from outside the written text, through usage of trade, belongs to the larger question of what the agreement contains, which is taken up next.
Getting the Clause Into the Contract
Section 2-719(1)(a) lets the agreement provide for added or substituted remedies and limit the measure of damages, so a seller who relies on a repair-only clause or a damages cap must first show that the clause belongs to the agreement the parties actually made.56 Subsection (1)(b) rests on the same premise, since it asks whether the parties expressly agreed that a stated remedy is exclusive.57 A clause that never entered the agreement never reaches the later controls. Three situations decide most disputes over entry, and they point in different directions: trade practice and prior dealing can supply a limit that no document states, a seller's form can add a limit unless the limit would unfairly surprise the buyer, and a term printed on packaging that departs from the bargain can fail as a material alteration.
The Code treats the parties' agreement as broader than their writing. It includes terms implied from course of dealing, meaning the parties' own earlier transactions, and from usage of trade, meaning a practice observed so regularly in a vocation that parties can expect it to govern, and those terms supplement the written ones. A seller whose paper is incomplete can therefore still argue that a limit rests on industry practice. If the practice is proven (the party who relies on a usage must prove it) and the buyer offers no evidence against it, the practice can supply the limit and, with it, the exclusivity that § 2-719(1)(b) demands. Figgie International, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc. shows the problem such a seller faces. The seller could not produce the original sales agreement, which it said was lost in a business reorganization, so it relied on standard terms that purportedly accompanied every sales agreement of that period. The buyer's copy said the quotation was subject to general terms printed on the reverse, but the reverse side was blank, and the seller called that a copying mistake while the buyer said the terms were never part of the agreement.58
A limit that appears in a seller's form instead of the negotiated terms faces the Code's material-alteration question. Official Comment 4 to § 2-207 lists clauses that materially alter a contract, all of which significantly depart from standard industry practice and so could surprise a buyer, while Comment 5 lists clauses that do not, and among those is a clause limiting remedy in a reasonable manner.59 Between merchants, a limitation on remedies or damages becomes part of the agreement unless the non-assenting party proves unreasonable surprise in light of prior dealings, industry custom, or the inconspicuousness of the term, or proves that the clause is unconscionable or that the limitation fails of its essential purpose.60 Only the first of those is a formation question, since the other two are the controls of § 2-719(3) and § 2-719(2) that later sections take up.61
The form in Suzy Phillips Originals, Inc. v. Coville, Inc. barred claims of any kind for goods after they had been cut or changed and barred claims for consequential damages, including lost profits; Suzy Phillips sued for lost profits plus the cost of cutting and shipping the defective goods.62 The court held the limitation clauses incorporated. The defendant's evidence of standard trade practice, together with the fact that all of the parties' dealings were on the same terms and the absence of any evidence that the terms were inconspicuous, compelled the conclusion that the terms did not materially alter the agreement, and the plaintiff's claim of unreasonable surprise was a legal conclusion presented as a fact, which could not create a material issue.63
The court in Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, Inc. reached the opposite result on a similar form. PPG's acknowledgment forms contained a damages limitation, but the provision was not negotiated; it was boilerplate in small print on the back of a form dense with other small print. Marvin's witnesses testified to their surprise, and the testimony was uncontradicted and supported elsewhere in the record, including by evidence that PPG and other coatings manufacturers had always made things right when a product failed, replacing the damaged product instead of merely refunding the price.64 The product's catastrophic failure was new to the relationship, which made PPG's refusal to pay consequential damages all the more a surprise and a hardship. The court held that the limitation did not become part of the contract, adding that Official Comment 5's approval of reasonable remedy limits has no force of law and could not rescue a clause that in fact surprised the buyer.65
The two decisions differ in how well the clause fit the relationship. In Suzy Phillips the limit repeated what trade practice and the parties' own history already said, so the buyer's consent could be presumed. In Marvin Lumber the limit contradicted how sellers in the trade had always handled failures and shifted the risk of a catastrophic failure to the buyer through a term no one had discussed. The evidence differed as well, since Suzy Phillips offered only a conclusory claim of surprise, while Marvin offered uncontradicted testimony and proof of a contrary practice.66 Because the Marvin limit never became part of the contract, nothing was left for the later controls to test, which is why formation is the gate through which every clause must pass first.67
A limit that surfaces only after the bargain is struck stands on weaker ground still. Suzy Phillips distinguished Step Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, where express warranties were part of the original agreement, the disclaimers printed on the goods' package differed substantially from those the parties had discussed, and the plaintiff had specifically objected; the Third Circuit held that the package disclaimer altered the distribution of risk and was a material alteration.68 Another decision cited there refused to bind a defendant to a warranty waiver and damages limitation in a form faxed by the plaintiff, because the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant ever received or saw the language.69 The common thread is that a limit must be agreed during the bargaining, or be fairly expectable from it, to become part of the agreement.
Step four does the real work in most disputes, because a seller's form is the usual vehicle for a limit and the party resisting the limit carries the burden of proving surprise. A buyer who can point to a contrary trade practice, a contrary history of dealing, or a term buried where no one would look stands where Marvin stood, while a buyer who can offer only a statement of surprise against a standard industry clause stands where Suzy Phillips stood.