Concept
The Reasonable Certainty Rule
Certainty of damages
Certainty of Damages
The Reasonable Certainty Rule
Section 352 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts caps contract recovery at what the claimant can prove: damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.1 The proof sets the ceiling. A claimant must have suffered a loss and must also be able to show it in a form that gives the factfinder something to compute. The ceiling bites hardest on claims for lost profits.2
“Certainty” promises more than the rule delivers. Comment a to § 352 says the requirement does not bar a claimant who cannot establish the total amount of the loss; it excludes only those elements of loss that cannot be proved with reasonable certainty.3 The comment to UCC § 1-106 speaks the same way: damages need not be calculable with mathematical accuracy, are “at best approximate,” and must be proved with “whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no more.”4 The standard is one of reasonableness rather than mathematical precision, and it is met when a rational basis exists for computing the loss.5 Courts reject pure speculation by juries, not reasonable estimates based on evidence.6
The rule applies to each component of a damage award separately. A claimant who proves one component recovers it even though another component fails, and the breacher cannot avoid all damages because one element is uncertain.7
The rule screens out amounts that cannot be proved, so it has no reason to forfeit amounts that can be.
The standard builds on the claimant’s ordinary burden. A breach victim who cannot show the fact and extent of its loss by a preponderance of the evidence recovers nothing, and reasonable certainty restates that principle: the evidence must persuade the factfinder that the loss more likely occurred than not, and it must give the factfinder enough basis to calculate a monetary award.8 Even so, the claimant’s burden is described as more onerous than the ordinary preponderance requirement.9 The difference shows in review of jury verdicts. A court that doubts an award need not conclude that no reasonable juror could find the amount more likely than not; it may conclude instead that no reasonable juror could find the amount reasonably certain. That framing is more modest and less invasive of the jury’s role, so the rule emboldens judges by weakening the rhetoric required to intervene.10
The formula in § 352 reflects a loosening over time. An 1858 New York decision, Griffin v. Colver, required that damages be shown “with certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture.”11 In the older law the contingent nature of lost profits was regarded as a complete bar to recovery in any case.12 Early opinions also feared that leaving damages to a jury’s unbridled discretion could ruin a party who broke a very simple contract, for a loss nobody had contemplated. Parties who wanted a breach to carry such enlarged responsibility, one court said, should provide for it expressly, as by liquidating the amount.13 The rigid bar has since given way to a flexible requirement of reasonable certainty, though the evidence must still rise above conjecture or speculation.14 Courts have also grown more receptive to sophisticated economic and financial data and to expert opinion, which makes the requirement easier to meet.15
Contract law nonetheless keeps a stricter posture than tort law. Courts have traditionally required greater certainty in proving damages for breach of contract than in proving damages for a tort.16 Some losses call for more exacting proof than others, and lost profits from breach of contract are the standard example: a high quantum of reliable evidence is generally needed to establish them.17
Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co. shows what sufficient proof looks like. The claim concerned lost profit on a strawberry harvest, and the plaintiff testified to itemized costs: picking at a little over $100 a ton, $2.23 per $100 of wages for State Accident Insurance Fund payments, $1 per ton to the Strawberry Commission, and $10 per ton for hauling. Those costs totaled $10,658 for the harvest, and from them the plaintiff’s lost profits came to $18,580. The trial court entered general findings for $17,880, and the reviewing court affirmed, concluding that the damages were established with reasonable certainty and that substantial evidence supported the judgment.18 Itemized, per-unit figures gave the factfinder a rational basis for computation.
The novelist in the Restatement’s first illustration stands on the other side of the line. A publisher repudiates a contract to publish the author’s novel, and the author cannot place the book elsewhere. If the evidence does not permit the loss of royalties and reputation to be estimated with reasonable certainty, the author recovers no damages for that loss, although nominal damages remain available.19 The result turns on the proof, not on the kind of loss claimed.
Two questions follow from the rule and organize what comes next: whether the uncertainty goes to the existence of any loss or only to its size, and how courts treat doubts that the breach itself created. Lost profits, where the rule matters most, then receive their own treatment.