327 U.S. 220, 233-234
In June 1924, the Supreme Court of the State of New York entered an interlocutory judgment divorcing the respondent from the petitioner.1 In 1926, the judgment was modified to require the petitioner to pay the respondent alimony of $3,000 annually in equal monthly installments.2 Both parties were residents of New York at the time of the divorce action, which was contested.3 The petitioner left New York in 1929 and was a resident of the District of Columbia when the present suit began.4
In 1935, the respondent moved in the original divorce proceeding to punish the petitioner for contempt for failure to pay alimony installments.5 The petitioner cross-moved to modify the judgment by reducing past due and future installments.6 The New York court referred issues of the amount of unpaid alimony and the petitioner's ability to pay to a referee.7 After contested hearings, the referee's January 7, 1936 report found arrears due and no credible evidence of inability to pay.8 On February 25, 1936, the New York supreme court ordered that $18,493.64 was due from the petitioner to the respondent for alimony arrears and interest through October 25, 1935.9 The petitioner's appeal from this order was dismissed for want of prosecution.10
Later, the respondent moved for an order directing the county clerk to enter a money judgment for the arrears of alimony due and unpaid.11 On February 19, 1938, the court granted the motion ex parte and ordered the clerk to docket a judgment for $25,382.75, which included the 1936 amount plus interest, additional installments from October 25, 1935 to the order date, and interest on those.12 The judgment was entered by the clerk on February 23, 1938 without notice to the petitioner.13
The respondent then brought suit in the district court of the District of Columbia to recover on the 1938 New York judgment.14 On motion for summary judgment supported by the New York records, the district court entered judgment for the respondent in the amount of $25,382.75 with interest.15 The court of appeals for the District affirmed without opinion.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
Whether the 1938 New York judgment for alimony arrears, entered ex parte without notice to the petitioner, is entitled to full faith and credit in the District of Columbia?18
A judgment obtained in violation of procedural due process is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon in another jurisdiction.19
No. The established facts show that the 1938 judgment was entered ex parte without notice to the petitioner after the respondent moved for an order directing the county clerk to docket a money judgment for arrears.20 This deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to raise defenses available under New York law, such as payment or modification nunc pro tunc under Civil Practice Act section 1170, in the very proceeding that culminated in the judgment.21 Because the judgment was rendered without notice calculated to inform the petitioner of the time and place of the proceeding, it lacked jurisdiction over his person and is ineffective to establish personal liability.22
The 1938 judgment therefore cannot serve as the basis for recovery in the District of Columbia suit to the extent it adjudicates liability for installments accruing after October 25, 1935.23
The 1938 New York judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit in the District of Columbia to the extent it adjudicates liability for alimony installments accruing after October 25, 1935.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Rutledge dissented in part. He concurred in the opinion except as it holds or implies that the 1938 New York judgment is invalid and therefore is not entitled to full faith and credit in so far as it includes instalments of alimony accruing after October 25, 1935, and interest upon them. He argued that the 1938 judgment is valid because the original 1926 decree together with New York statutes provided advance notice that installments could be docketed as judgments.25
He believed the New York practice permits the husband to raise defenses of changed circumstances either before or after docketing.26 He concluded that the judgment should be enforced in the District of Columbia unless the petitioner shows a meritorious defense under New York law.27
Justice Frankfurter joined Justice Rutledge's dissent and supported affirming the judgment in its entirety.28 He stressed that a judgment for future alimony is ambulatory in character and that the obligation to pay arrears flows from the original judgment.29 Mitigating defenses such as payment or changed circumstances may therefore be asserted when the decree is sued upon in a sister jurisdiction.30
He concluded that the District of Columbia could give the 1938 judgment full effect on grounds of full faith and credit or comity.31 The petitioner had not shown any valid defense that would bar enforcement, and pleadings should not be read so rigidly as to deny relief justified by the facts alleged.32
Whether due process requires notice to the petitioner before the New York court could docket a judgment confirming the 1936 order for arrears through October 25, 1935?33
Due process does not require that notice be given before confirmation of rights theretofore established in a proceeding of which adequate notice was given.34
No. The established facts demonstrate that the 1936 order resulted from contested hearings before a referee after the petitioner received notice through the 1935 motions and cross-motion.35 The petitioner's appeal from the 1936 order was dismissed for want of prosecution, making that adjudication final as to arrears through October 25, 1935.36 The 1938 judgment merely confirmed the amount already determined in the 1936 proceeding without reopening or newly adjudicating those issues.37
Due process does not require additional notice to the petitioner before the New York court could docket a judgment confirming the 1936 order for arrears through October 25, 1935.38
Whether the 1938 judgment could adjudicate or cut off defenses to alimony installments accruing after October 25, 1935 without notice to the petitioner?39
Due process forbids any exercise of judicial power which, but for the constitutional infirmity, would substantially affect a defendant's rights.40 The assertion for the first time by the 1938 judgment of power to adjudicate petitioner's liability for accrued alimony and to direct its enforcement by execution does not differ in its nature and constitutional effect from the like assertion of power to issue execution by any other judgment rendered without notice.41
No. The established facts establish that the 1938 judgment incorporated additional installments from October 25, 1935 onward and directed execution for the total sum without any notice to the petitioner.42 This action purported to cut off defenses such as payment or modification that the petitioner was entitled to assert under New York law in the docketing proceeding itself.43 Because the judgment authorized immediate levy on property without prior notice, it substantially affected the petitioner's rights in violation of due process.44
The 1938 judgment could not adjudicate or cut off defenses to alimony installments accruing after October 25, 1935 without notice to the petitioner.45
Whether the petitioner may assert defenses arising after the 1936 order when the 1938 judgment is sued upon in the District of Columbia?46
The 1938 judgment, because rendered without notice, could not foreclose defenses going to the discharge of the obligation established by the order of 1936, and arising since its date.47 It follows that, upon further proceedings upon the remand of this cause to the district court, respondent will be taken as having established the amount of alimony accrued to October 25, 1935 remaining due and unpaid as of February 25, 1936, subject to any subsequent defense going to the discharge of the obligation so established, which petitioner should be permitted to raise, if any he has.48
Yes. The established facts show that the 1938 judgment was entered without notice and therefore cannot foreclose defenses arising after the 1936 order, such as payment or other discharge of the obligation.49 On remand to the district court the petitioner must be allowed to raise any such post-1936 defenses to the amount confirmed by the 1936 order.50
The petitioner may assert defenses arising after the 1936 order when the 1938 judgment is sued upon in the District of Columbia.51