Concept
Rejecting the Tacit Agreement Test
Causation and foreseeability
Rejecting the Tacit Agreement Test
The modern foreseeability rule asks one question about the breacher's state of mind: what did it have reason to know when the contract was made? A loss beyond the ordinary course of events is recoverable when it results from special circumstances that the party in breach had reason to know,1 and nothing is recoverable for loss the breacher had no reason to foresee as a probable result of breach at formation.2 Some courts once demanded more. Under the tacit-agreement test, a plaintiff had to show not only that the probable consequences of breach were reasonably foreseeable to the breacher, but also that the circumstances of the contract justified the conclusion that the breacher tacitly assumed the risk of liability for them.3 Modern courts have largely abandoned that demand, but its vocabulary still turns up in opinions, so you need to recognize it.
Justice Holmes added the requirement in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co. (1903), as federal common law. He built on Hadley v. Baxendale, which allows damages that arise naturally from the breach, or that may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time of contracting as the probable result of breach.4 Holmes's addition required not only knowledge of the special circumstances but also a tacit agreement by the party to be charged to accept the liability that the notice imposed.5 One court has called this a second fiction, an embellishment on Hadley, and has observed that courts and commentators have generally rejected it.6
Comment a to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 and Comment 2 to UCC § 2-715 reject the test in terms, and most modern courts treat it as too restrictive.7 The Code adds that no conscious acceptance of an insurer's liability on the seller's part is necessary, and that the seller's liability for consequential damages is not limited to cases in which it fails to use due effort in good faith.8 Section 2-715(2)(a) accordingly reaches any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting, and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.9
The objection to the test is practical. Notice gives the breacher what it needs to decline the job, raise its price, or write a limit into the contract, and a contractual clause can prevent recovery of consequential damages.10 The assumption element asks for something more, and contracting parties rarely discuss who pays if the deal fails. A plaintiff required to prove an implicit acceptance of risk would seldom find one, so special-loss claims would fail even against a defendant that held full information. The objective standard places the burden on the informed party instead: a seller told of the buyer's exposure at formation can speak up, charge for the risk, or limit its liability.
The rule matters most for consequential loss, which results as a secondary consequence of nonperformance and is measured by something other than the value of the performance itself.11 A failed feed delivery shows the difference.
Rejecting the test removes the second hurdle and leaves the first in place. In an old wedding case, a suitor sued a dressmaker whose failure to deliver two gowns had postponed the wedding; the bride then broke the engagement, and he sought the five hundred dollars he had spent uselessly on the ceremony. The court denied recovery because, absent specific warning, it was hardly to be contemplated that she would forever refuse to wed if the dresses were late, and the damages were too remote.12 That loss failed at notice. Kenford Co. v. County of Erie shows the other way a claim can fail. The county knew that the landowner expected surrounding land to rise in value once the stadium opened, yet the court denied recovery for the lost appreciation because nothing showed the county had taken on responsibility for that loss. The denial rested on assumption of risk, not on a lack of notice.
Courts that cite § 351 sometimes reason about risk in the same way. In a shipowner's suit built on a classification certificate for its vessel, the court held that the owner could not rely on the certificate as a guarantee that the ship was soundly constructed.13 It reasoned that the gap between the $85,000 fee and the $264,000,000 in damages sought was strong evidence that such a result was not intended by the parties, and, citing § 351, it concluded that the small fees could not have been meant to cover the risk and that the classification industry could not continue to exist on such terms.14 Disproportion between price and exposure is the subject of the next section.
Changing the label does not always change the result. In Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central New Mexico Electric Co-op., Inc., the court formally abandoned its tacit-agreement standard in favor of the § 351 standard, which applies Hadley's requirement of special circumstances. It noted that it was unclear the two standards differed much, and it held that cutting off electricity to a hydroponic tomato farm was not a foreseeable cause of crop damage.15 The decision turned on foreseeability, and the court did not ask whether the cooperative assumed the risk. On an exam, apply the reason-to-know standard and ask only whether the breacher had notice of the special circumstances when the contract was made.