Concept
Buyer’s Incidental and Consequential Damages
Expectation interest (including direct, incidental, and consequential damages)
Buyer’s Incidental and Consequential Damages
UCC § 2-715 adds two kinds of recovery to the buyer’s primary measure of damages, and each answers a different question. Incidental damages ask what the buyer spent in reacting to the breach: expenses reasonably incurred in inspecting, receiving, transporting, and caring for goods rightfully rejected, the commercially reasonable charges of effecting cover, and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or breach.1 Consequential damages ask what the breach did beyond the goods themselves, and they include injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.2 Together the two supply the other-loss term of the Restatement’s expectation formula, which adds incidental and consequential loss to the loss in value of the promised performance.3
The add-ons are needed because every primary measure prices the goods and nothing around them. Loss in value compares the goods promised with the goods received or, when nothing arrives, values the whole promise.4 Cover compares a substitute’s cost with the contract price,5 the market measure compares the market price when the buyer learned of the breach with the contract price,6 and the accepted-goods measure compares the goods’ warranted value with their actual value.7 None of those figures records what the buyer spent in reaching the point where its measure could operate, or what the breach cost the buyer elsewhere. The cover and market sections therefore add incidental and consequential damages through § 2-715, and § 2-714(3) allows them “in a proper case” for accepted goods.8
The add-ons follow the buyer’s remedies wherever they lead. Section 2-711 indexes the remedies for goods the buyer has not accepted or has justifiably revoked, § 2-714 governs goods it has finally accepted, and § 2-715 serves both.9 A buyer that covers a $100,000 steel contract at $110,000 recovers the $10,000 difference under § 2-712(2), and the broker’s fee it paid to arrange the substitute comes on top of that through § 2-715.
Each add-on carries its own test. Incidental damages must be reasonable and must flow from the breach. Consequential damages for commercial loss turn on what the seller had reason to know when it contracted and on whether the buyer could have prevented the loss, while injury to person or property from a breach of warranty turns on proximate cause alone. The tests apply the foreseeability and certainty limits from earlier in the chapter to the Code’s own text, and the subsections below take them in that order.
Buyer’s Incidental Damages
Section 2-715(1) defines incidental damages by example. They “include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.”10 The Code never defines the term. Comment 1 calls the list illustrative and sorts the typical expenses into three groups: those of handling goods rightfully rejected, those of handling goods whose acceptance is justifiably revoked, and those of effecting cover.11 In plain terms, incidental damages are the out-of-pocket expenses a buyer incurs to deal with the consequences of the seller’s breach.12
The buyer recovers these expenses because the primary measures price the goods and nothing around them, and a buyer who absorbed them would end up worse off than performance would have left it. Restoring the position performance would have given is the aim of the buyer’s remedies.13 The principle survives a primary measure of zero. A seller who resells at the contract price has no direct loss, yet it recovers the storage, insurance, and advertising costs of reselling, because performance would have spared it those costs.14 A buyer who covers at exactly the contract price likewise recovers the broker’s fee for finding the substitute, added to a cover differential of zero. The anvil problem shows the opposite case: Wiley covers with 500 premium anvils, incurs no incidental expenses, and recovers cover damages of $50,000 and nothing more.15
The statute’s list follows the buyer’s path through a failed transaction, each item attaching to one stage of it:
- Inspection and receipt reach the cost of testing delivered goods to learn whether they conform, and the expense of taking delivery of goods that prove nonconforming.
- Transportation reaches freight to return rejected goods or to move them to a place where they can be held or resold.
- Care and custody reach the storage, insurance, and upkeep of rejected goods while the buyer holds them.
- Cover reaches the commercially reasonable charges and commissions of buying a substitute, such as a broker’s fee or extra freight on the replacement.
- The residual clause reaches any other reasonable expense that the delay or breach produces, which lets the list cover facts its drafters did not name.
Two cases show the handling stages. In Colton v. Decker, police seized a truck because of the seller’s breach of the warranty of title, and the buyer spent more than $4,000 to have the damaged vehicle towed back from police custody. Giving him only the difference in value would not have made him whole, so he recovered the towing in addition to the loss in value.16 In Lanners v. Whitney, a buyer who revoked acceptance of an airplane recovered the cost of preserving it afterward.
The residual clause reaches expenses that no other stage names. In Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., unsuitable oil made a sawmill’s hydraulic system work improperly for two and a half years; the court found a breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and allowed incidental damages for the excess oil the buyer used and for repairing and replacing the mechanical parts the oil damaged. A Georgia court likewise gave a buyer of carpeting mats the testing expenses it reasonably incurred to learn whether the goods were defective.17 Adam Metal Supply, Inc. v. Electrodex, Inc. allowed expenses incurred before the buyer discovered the defect.
Reasonableness runs through every clause of the list: expenses must be “reasonably incurred,” charges “commercially reasonable,” and any other expense “reasonable.” The limit is structural. The buyer chooses the carrier, the warehouse, and the broker, but the seller pays, so nothing in the buyer’s own accounts disciplines the price. Causation sets a second limit. Comment 1 indicates that finance charges running from the date of sale should not be recovered, because they are not incurred in handling rejected goods or in effecting cover, and a substitute bought after an unreasonable delay cannot count as a reasonable expense. Past some point the link between breach and expense is too attenuated for the expense to be “incidental to the breach,” and courts draw that line case by case.18
A recovery also counts only what the breach added. The cover and market formulas subtract the expenses the seller’s breach saved the buyer. A San Diego buyer rejects $20,000 of nonconforming goods shipped F.O.B. Chicago; California’s market price when it learned of the breach was $25,000, and shipping would have cost it $4,000. Its damages are ($25,000 − $20,000) − $4,000, or $1,000, which puts it where cover in San Diego would have put it.19 The court in Productora e Importadora de Papel v. Fleming applied the same logic to the add-ons, denying import fees and freight on the goods the seller never delivered, because the breach had spared the buyer those expenses.20
The line between incidental and consequential damages follows what the expense responds to. Incidental damages do not arise from the breach’s impact on some other transaction or activity that depended on the contract; they are expenses directly related to the buyer’s attempt to manage the effects of the breach.21 Consequential damages are the losses from that wider impact, chiefly the buyer’s inability to use the goods as intended, and they must clear the screens taken up next.22 In the clinic scene, the technician’s, carrier’s, and warehouse’s charges are incidental, while appointment revenue lost during the weeks without chairs would be consequential. The same division appears outside sales. When GE’s cleaning left the rotor of the SS Sky Princess unbalanced and delays from the repair forced the owner to cancel a ten-day Christmas cruise, the cancelled cruise was the kind of loss that results from being unable to use property as intended.23 The label can decide a case. In Gaynor Electric Co. v. Hollander, the contract barred consequential damages and limited the seller’s liability to the cost of correcting defects, yet a buyer that packed up and returned about 29,000 defective switches recovered its unpacking, packing, and shipping expenses as incidental damages.24 Gottlieb v. Alps in Florida drew the same line, allowing a buyer’s incidental damages although a limitation clause insulated the seller from consequential ones.
Consequential Loss From Known Needs
Section 2-715(2) provides that consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach include “any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”26 Consequential loss reaches past the goods themselves. The typical example is profit the buyer expected to earn from the transaction, such as the rental income a buyer of commercial property expected, and recovery is subject to controls that ordinary damages escape.27 The statutory sentence asks for three showings: the loss resulted from the buyer’s requirements and needs, the seller had reason to know of those requirements and needs when it contracted, and cover or another reasonable step could not have prevented the loss. The first two decide whether the seller can be charged with the loss at all. The third decides whether the buyer let a chargeable loss grow larger than it had to.
The Code’s rule descends from Hadley v. Baxendale. Damages for breach should be such as arise naturally, in the usual course of things, from the breach itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, when they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach.28 When special circumstances were communicated and so known to both parties, the damages are those that would ordinarily follow from a breach in those circumstances.29 Hadley itself turned on that limit: millers who send a broken shaft to a carrier would not, in the great run of cases, lose profits as a result, and the mill’s special circumstances were never communicated to the carrier.30 Article 2 states the same idea from the buyer’s side, by asking what the seller had reason to know of the buyer’s general or particular requirements and needs. Courts often treat the UCC rule as identical to the traditional rule, so a familiar foreseeability analysis may be written in the Code’s vocabulary.31
One further requirement has no place in the Code. Some courts have asked whether the seller consciously accepted liability for the special loss, which comes to asking whether the risk of that loss formed part of the basis of the bargain. A supplier of cattle feed, for example, probably means to guarantee the price of feed without insuring the herd, so the rancher’s cattle losses when supply is interrupted might fall outside the bargain.32 Comment 3 rejects the extra step: the seller need not consciously accept an insurer’s liability, and its obligation for consequential damages is not limited to cases in which it failed to use due effort in good faith.33
The statute fixes the seller’s knowledge at the time of contracting because a seller can manage only the risks it learns of before it commits. A seller told that late delivery could idle the buyer’s plant can raise its price, write a clause limiting its liability, decline the sale, or take extra care to perform, and Comment 3 points a seller that wants no part of the risk to the Code’s section on contractual limitation of remedy.34 Each choice is open only before the deal is made, so what the seller learns afterward cannot enlarge what the price paid for. The test asks what the seller had reason to know, not what it actually knew or agreed to bear.
The pairing of general with particular needs divides the burden of disclosure by who can see what. Comment 3 says that particular needs of the buyer must generally be made known to the seller, while general needs must rarely be made known to charge the seller with knowledge.35 A general need comes with the type of sale and the type of buyer, so the seller can read it off the transaction. A buyer in the business of reselling goods intends to resell them, and a buyer that uses goods in its business means to earn money with them; if the seller’s breach prevents the planned use, the resulting loss is consequential loss.36 A retailer of seasonal goods whose wholesaler repudiates after every other supplier has sold out of seasonal stock therefore need not prove that it told the wholesaler of its resale plans. The sale to a store discloses the resale need, and cover is impossible, so the lost resale profit is recoverable on the remaining showings.
A particular need has to be communicated because nothing in the sale reveals it, and the buyer is the only party who knows its own plans. Suppose a farmer contracts for a harvesting machine to be delivered by July 14 and tells the seller that the wheat will ripen then and that no other machine can be had in time. The seller delivers a month late, the wheat spoils, and the farmer sells the damaged crop at a lower price. The seller had reason to know of the particular need because the farmer told it, and cover could not have prevented the spoilage because no other machine was available. The farmer need not show that the seller agreed to bear crop loss. Had the farmer said only that it grew wheat, the seller would have learned that the machine was meant for harvest but nothing of the ripening date or the lack of another machine, and the cost of lateness would rest on circumstances the seller never had a chance to price.
Sales to manufacturers show the general-needs rule at work, because a seller of industrial supplies knows it is selling to a business that depends on them. In Lewis, the sawmill’s lost profits for the two and a half years of malfunction could be computed from its past profits, since the plaintiff had an established business. The court denied profits for the two and a half years after the problem was corrected, rejecting the argument that the earlier burden had so hurt the sawmill’s capital that it could not operate at full capacity.37 Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp. reached a similar result under the CISG, applying the Hadley rule: compressors that fell short of the specifications cost the Italian manufacturer sales, and the lost profit on its unfilled orders was recoverable because it was objectively foreseeable that Delchi would take orders based on the number of compressors it had ordered.38
The closing phrase of § 2-715(2)(a) writes the buyer’s duty to limit its loss into the definition. Recoverable loss is loss that “could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise,” so the claim shrinks by whatever a reasonable response would have avoided.39 A buyer that covers confines its loss to the cover differential and avoids any adverse impact on its other planned transactions.40 Laredo Hides, which had contracted to sell to a Mexican tannery the hides it expected from its seller, bought hides on the open market to meet that contract after the seller cancelled.41 Cover is optional as a damages measure, and a buyer that skips it keeps its other remedies,42 but skipping a reasonable substitute can cost it the consequential loss that the substitute would have prevented. The words “or otherwise” extend the duty beyond buying replacement goods to any reasonable step, such as repair, rental, or rearranged production. Once the seller bears the whole loss, a buyer that ignores a cheap fix pays nothing for ignoring it, and the clause removes that incentive. The opposite case is a buyer that cannot reasonably obtain a substitute. It cannot prevent its loss by cover, and the same fact leads courts to treat damages as an inadequate remedy and to consider specific performance.43
The first two steps settle whether the seller can be charged with the loss, and the third settles how much of that loss the buyer was entitled to let accumulate. An answer that demands notice of every need, or that forgets that a reasonable substitute purchase cuts the claim down, has skipped one of them.
Injury to Person or Property
Section 2-715(2)(b) adds a second category of consequential damages: “injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.”46 It asks the buyer to prove far less than paragraph (a). The commercial losses covered there must clear two screens, the seller’s reason to know of the buyer’s needs when it contracted and the buyer’s inability to prevent the loss by cover or otherwise. Paragraph (b) contains no foreseeability requirement, so a seller answers for injury to person or property even when it had no reason to know how the buyer meant to use the goods.47
The difference tracks what each kind of loss depends on. Lost profits depend on the buyer’s private plans, which the seller cannot see and can price only if it learns of them before the deal, so the Code ties liability to what the seller had reason to know. Physical harm depends on the defect. A warranty is in part a promise that ordinary use of the goods will not hurt the buyer or the buyer’s belongings, so injury from the defect lies within the risk the seller took on when it made the promise, and proximate cause marks the boundary of that risk. The value difference prices the goods and nothing more, so consequential damages are the only Code remedy that reaches the harm.
The injury recovery stacks on the buyer’s primary measure. When a buyer accepts goods and cannot effectively revoke, § 2-714(2) gives it the difference between the value the goods would have had as warranted and their actual value, $20 in the textbook example in which goods warranted at $90 are worth $70.48 Damage to the buyer’s person or other property is added to that figure under § 2-715(2)(b), and the buyer must prove it with reasonable certainty, though not with mathematical precision.49 If a $650 espresso machine has a wiring defect, catches fire, and is destroyed, the buyer recovers the machine’s value as the value difference and the $1,000 of damage to the kitchen counter as consequential damages.
Because foreseeability is off the table, causation does the screening, and the official comment ties it to the buyer’s conduct. When an injury follows use of the goods without discovery of the defect, the question is whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use them without an inspection that would have revealed the defect. If it was not, or if the buyer actually discovered the defect before using the goods, the injury does not proximately result from the breach.50 A buyer who finds ground glass in a soft drink, feels it in the throat, and keeps drinking has therefore broken the chain between the breach and the injuries. Proximate cause does here the work that the prevention clause does in paragraph (a), since both deny recovery for harm the buyer could and should have avoided. A common mistake is to run the reason-to-know analysis on a burned hand or a damaged herd, or to award the injury without asking whether the defect and the buyer’s own conduct caused it.
This category is also where contract clauses draw the most scrutiny. A term excluding consequential damages is valid unless unconscionable under § 2-719(3), and clauses limiting commercial consequential losses are expressly authorized. The Code adds a rebuttable presumption of unconscionability when a contract for consumer goods precludes recovery for personal injuries.51 The presumption protects the buyer where a warranty matters most: a consumer is unlikely to read or bargain over such a clause, and bodily harm is the loss a product warranty is most expected to cover.