Concept
Elements of Discharge
Impracticability
Elements of Discharge
Section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the doctrine in a single sentence. A party's duty is discharged when, after the contract is made, an event occurs whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract and that makes the party's performance impracticable without the party's fault, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.1 The Uniform Commercial Code gives sellers a rule of the same shape: delay or non-delivery by a seller who complies with the allocation and notice paragraphs is not a breach when a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption has made performance as agreed impracticable.2 Its opening clause preserves any greater obligation the seller assumed.3 Because both texts use the basic-assumption criterion, the analysis below runs the same way under either.4
Authorities count the conditions differently but ask the same questions. One four-part formulation requires an event after formation that makes performance impracticable (“extreme and unreasonable”) in a way the affected party cannot overcome by reasonable efforts; a basic assumption that the event would not occur; no fault by the affected party in causing it; and no assumption by that party of the risk of it.5 A three-step version asks whether something unexpected happened, whether agreement or custom allocated its risk, and whether it made performance commercially impracticable.6 This chapter sorts the same inquiries into five elements: a supervening event, a basic assumption, an extreme and unreasonable burden, absence of fault, and no assumption of the risk.
The elements are distinct on paper and tangled on the facts. Foreseeability bears on both the basic assumption and the risk, and a claimant's carelessness bears on both fault and the risk. A strong showing on one element therefore rarely settles a claim, and the defense is available only when all are satisfied.7 The risk element most often decides the case: a party that reasonably knew when it contracted that the event could occur, and failed to protect itself, has no excuse.8
Each element can be taken in turn, beginning with the event that must occur after the contract is made.
A Supervening Event
Section 261 reaches only a performance made impracticable by “the occurrence of an event” “after a contract is made.”9 Two requirements follow. Something must happen in the world, and it must happen after the parties form a binding agreement. The doctrine presupposes a valid contract and asks whether a later change of circumstances should relieve a party of a duty it undertook, so timing is the first filter, applied before anyone weighs how heavy the burden has become.10
The category of qualifying events is broad. A fire that destroys a music hall hired for a performance qualifies,11 as does the death of a person whose services the contract requires,12 and so does a government's new regulation or refusal of a permit. In Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City, a city had obligated itself to maintain dunes at the height specified in its contracts with beachfront owners. After the contracts were signed, the state adopted regulations requiring a permit for work on the dunes, and it denied the city's application. The court held that the permit requirement and its denial were supervening events that excused the city, so the owners could not sue for breach.13 Section 264 states the same idea generally: compliance with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order is an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.14
Excuse did not leave the owners empty-handed. A city released from its own side of the bargain had been unjustly enriched by receiving the easements without compensation.15 The court awarded restitution measured by what the city would have paid for the easements had the contracts called for money in place of dune maintenance.16 Discharge ends the duty to perform; the later section on consequences takes up what remains between the parties.
The Restatement also names the three settings in which the principle has traditionally been applied: supervening death or incapacity of a person necessary for performance, supervening destruction of a specific thing necessary for performance, and supervening prohibition or prevention by law.17 Sections 262 and 263 declare that the death or incapacity of a necessary person, and the failure to come into existence, destruction, or deterioration of a necessary thing, are events whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract.18 These are the easy cases, because parties who depend on a particular person or thing ordinarily contract on the understanding that the person will live and the thing will continue to exist.19 The three sections apply the general rule without limiting it. Section 261 states a principle broadly applicable to all types of impracticability, so an event that fits none of the categories can still qualify.20
Timing also separates impracticability from mistake. Suppose a tidal wave sweeps a beachfront cabin into the sea. If the wave comes after the parties sign but before the seller delivers, their shared belief that the cabin existed was true when they agreed, and the wave is a supervening event that may excuse the seller's failure to deliver. If the wave came a few hours before the signing, nothing happened after formation: both parties were mistaken about an existing fact, and the case is one of mutual mistake.21
The two doctrines answer different failures. Mistake concerns a defect in formation. Impracticability has nothing to do with formation; it presupposes a binding contract and asks whether a post-formation change so seriously affects the parties' reasonable expectations that performance should be excused in whole or in part.22 Chronology is therefore a quick way to sort a case, because impracticability should always involve a supervening event.23 Where no event has occurred and the parties simply discover that a fact existing at formation makes performance impracticable, mistake is the defense to analyze, although some cases and the Restatement (Second) let the party assert either.24 A companion rule, taken up under existing impracticability, covers that situation: no duty arises when performance is impracticable at formation because of a fact the party has no reason to know and whose non-existence is a basic assumption of the contract.25
The line also keeps a party from recasting a bad forecast as a defect in the deal. A buyer who contracts on Tuesday and watches the commodity price fall on Thursday has made an error in prediction, because no fact existing on Tuesday was misunderstood.26 A contractor whose bid rested on a subcontractor's incorrect charges has erred about a fact that existed when it bid, so its claim for relief, if any, is for unilateral mistake and not for impracticability.27
A qualifying event is only the entry ticket. A war, a death, or a new regulation after formation discharges nothing until the basic assumption, burden, fault, and risk elements are also met.
A Basic Assumption
The second element asks what the parties took for granted when they contracted. Under § 261, the non-occurrence of the supervening event must have been a basic assumption on which both parties made the contract, and UCC § 2-615(a) uses the same criterion.29 The assumption need not have been spoken. It must have been a central motivation of the deal, and it must be patent enough from the circumstances and the apparent purpose of the contract that it is reasonable to treat it as an assumption on which the contract was made.30
The element works as a device for implying a term. In Taylor v. Caldwell, the contract was for the hire of a music hall that burned down after the contract was made and before the time for performance. No express term qualified the owner's obligation to provide the hall, yet the court found the hall's continued existence a basic assumption and implied a term that its destruction excused performance.31 The cases that satisfy the element most readily are built around a particular person or thing. There, the parties ordinarily contract on the understanding that the person will live and the thing will continue to exist, so a later death or destruction, without fault, discharges the duty.32
Market movement is the assumption most often invoked and most often rejected. A party who watches prices move the wrong way says the movement was a surprise that defeated what the contract assumed. The Restatement answers by classification: fluctuations in market conditions, including rises and falls in prices and costs, are risks that parties normally assume, and such changes, without more, do not meet the basic-assumption requirement.33 The logic is built into a fixed-price promise. The basic reason to contract now for a later purchase and sale of goods is to protect oneself against price fluctuations; both parties know that prices will change, and that may be why they made the contract. Even a substantial change in prices therefore does not excuse performance.34 Ferguson v. Ferguson applied the rule to a collapse in housing prices and refused to excuse a former husband who could not do what his divorce settlement required.
Foreseeability is a factor and not a bar. Some courts feel that a party who can foresee an adverse event must contract for protection against it, but most hold that relief should not be denied simply because the event may have been foreseeable.35 The Restatement treats foreseeability as only one factor in deciding whether impracticability is available.36 One court explained why recognizing a risk does not settle the matter: “Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation,” because parties are not always able to provide for the possibilities they are aware of, sometimes because they cannot agree and often simply because they are too busy.37 Death shows the point. It is foreseeable and could be addressed in the contract, yet the death of a service provider commonly excuses performance.38
A foreseen risk is still evidence. Where the parties contracted with the understanding that the Peruvian mines might well close, the closing is not a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption, and a fixed-quantity, fixed-price promise allocates the risk of shortage to the seller.39
Satisfying this element establishes only what the contract covers. Risk allocation is usually the predominant consideration, so a party that expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of an event loses even if its non-occurrence was a basic assumption.40 Commercial practice and the parties' positions bear on that assumption, as the discussion of risk below explains.41
Extreme and Unreasonable Burden
The third element asks how much the event changed the job. Section 261 requires that performance be “made impracticable,”43 and that is a lower threshold than literal impossibility. The Code's seller-excuse section covers impracticability and so expands prior law in states that had required performance to be objectively impossible.44 The threshold is still high: the burden must be “extreme and unreasonable.”45 The shift away from strictness has a long history; one study of the seventeenth-century case Paradine v. Jane carries the title A Hard Case Making Bad Law.46
Higher cost alone does not meet the standard. Fluctuations in cost are risks that parties normally assume.47 In the leading gravel case, the court said it did not mean to suggest that a defendant could excuse itself by showing that performance had become more expensive than anticipated or would entail a loss.48 Another court agreed that, although it might overstate matters to say increased cost never constitutes impracticability, relief requires more variation between the expected cost and the cost of performing by an available alternative than a claim resting on added expense alone presents, since the promisor is presumed to have accepted some degree of abnormal risk.49
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard marks the excusing end. The Howards took only 50,131 cubic yards of gravel from Mineral Park's land, because that was all that was accessible and removable. The remainder lay under water and, the court found, would have cost them ten to twelve times as much to dredge and haul away.50 The court reasoned that where the difference in cost is so great, and has the effect of making performance impracticable, the situation is no different from a total absence of earth and gravel.51
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States marks the failing end. A charter indicated the termini of a voyage, from Galveston to Bandar Shapur, Iran, but not the route. The ship sailed on a course that would have taken her through the Suez Canal, and on November 2, 1956, the Egyptian government obstructed the canal with sunken vessels and closed it to traffic.52 The court held that the added expense of an available alternative did not make performance impracticable. It required more variation between expected cost and the cost of performing by that alternative than the case showed, because the promisor could be presumed to have accepted some abnormal risk and urged impracticability on added expense alone.53 The added cost was about $43,000, under 15 percent of the $305,000 contract price.54
The two cases mark the poles without supplying a formula. In Mineral Park the cost of the only remaining method was a multiple of what the parties expected; in Transatlantic an available alternative cost a modest fraction of the price more. Courts excuse performance on this ground only very occasionally, and the ordinary claim, resting on added expense alone, looks like the carrier's.55
The element also asks whether the obligor has a reasonable way through. A party that can overcome the effects of the event through reasonable efforts has not made the showing.56 The efforts demanded have limits. In one gas-supply dispute, the seller argued that the buyer could have forestalled new governmental regulations and kept taking gas under the contract. The court replied that doing so would increase pollution, which public policy would not accept, and it appeared to count that social cost, together with the buyer's increased costs, in finding impracticability.57
Whose burden counts is a separate question. The party seeking excuse bears the burden of proving impracticability and must show that the task could not be accomplished.58 The test is objective. A hall owner whose building was merely damaged by fire cannot claim excuse if a reasonable owner could have restored it in time, because this owner's subjective inability or disinclination does not support the defense.59 The rule follows from what a promise communicates: a promise to do an act carries the representation that the promisor has the usual skills and resources to accomplish it, so the promisor assumes the risk of its own shortcomings.60 The insolvent promisor who cannot make a scheduled payment shows the rule in its plainest form: the duty is not discharged, whatever the reason for the insolvency.61
Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co. shows both sides of that line in one opinion. Dunbar, a molasses supplier, had never entered a supply contract with the refinery on whose output it relied, and the refinery's supply fell short. The Court assumed that Dunbar would have been discharged had the refinery been destroyed, the sugar crop failed, war ravaged the refinery, or the refinery itself breached a contract with Dunbar. None of those events occurred.62 A supplier that could have assured its supply by contracting with the refinery and failed to do so loses even if it is literally unable to perform. The shortfall is its own fault, and its inability is subjective and not objective.63
Meeting this element satisfies one condition of five. The obligor must still show that it acted without fault and did not bear the risk, and the Dunbar facts show how closely subjective inability shades into both.
Absence of Fault
The fourth element appears in the opening words of the rule: § 261 discharges a duty only where performance is made impracticable “without his fault.”65 The requirement is implicit in the Code's seller-excuse provision and explicit in some of the cases. If one of the links in the causal chain that made performance impracticable is the seller's fault, the seller cannot claim the protection of § 2-615.66 The premise is that the event came from outside the obligor's control; an obligor who helped produce the obstacle cannot present it as one.
Fault takes several forms. A party that creates the impracticability by its own voluntary act receives no excuse.67 A seller who fails to pick fruit before a hard freeze damages it cannot invoke § 2-615, because the omission is one of the links in the chain that ruined the crop.68 A seller of specific goods who fails without good cause to deliver on the due date loses the defense if the goods are destroyed afterward, because of contributory fault.69 A promisor enjoined from performing may use the defense, but not if its own wrongful conduct was responsible for the injunction, and a consent decree or other negotiated settlement does not necessarily settle who was at fault.70
Fault reaches omissions as well as acts. Comment 5 to § 2-615 gives a stranded seller no excuse unless the seller has “employed all due measures to assure himself that his source will not fail.” In Kama Rippa Music, the court required a party pleading impossibility to show that it took virtually every action within its power to perform.71 Those standards explain why a failure to take available precautions counts as fault: the claimant's inaction becomes a link in the causal chain just as a wrong would. Viscount Simon once mused that a court might some day have to decide whether a prima donna is excused by a complete loss of voice if her condition was caused by her carelessness in not changing her wet clothes after being out in the rain.72
A supervening regulation looks like the purest outside event, yet the Code protects compliance with a governmental regulation or order only where the compliance is “in good faith,” whether or not the regulation later proves invalid.73
The hardest recurring dispute arises when a person's own conduct contributes to a death. In CNA International Reinsurance Co. v. Phoenix, the insurers argued that impossibility requires an event that is fortuitous and unavoidable and that neither party's fault produced, and that the doctrine could not apply because the death resulted from an intentional, massive overdose of illegal drugs. The trial court ruled that even if the death was a suicide or the result of an intentional, self-inflicted act, the doctrine applied.74
The comment to § 262 explains the caution courts show. Where the obligor must perform personally, death or incapacity makes performance objectively impracticable, since no one else can perform. The obligor's fault will prevent a disability from discharging the duty, but it is often so difficult to foresee the effect of conduct on health that fault in bringing about the disability must be clear before it blocks discharge. The same comment shows what clear fault looks like for an organization. When a legislature requires a corporation to dissolve, its duty to employ a secretary for five years is discharged, but when the dissolution is voluntary or the result of insolvency, the duty survives and the corporation is liable for breach.75
These authorities concern personal-services contracts, and they do not relax the rule elsewhere. The unpicked fruit, the late delivery, and the neglected duty to secure a source each involve conduct tied to the performance owed, and each loses the defense. Fault also overlaps with the fifth element. A claimant who clears the fault element must still show that it did not bear the risk of the event, and the builder in the fire hypothetical shows why: nothing suggested the builder started the fire, yet control of the site and the chance to take precautions could place the risk on the builder.
Assumption of Risk
Even when an event was unexpected, arose without the claimant's fault, and made performance extremely burdensome, discharge fails if the claimant took on the risk of that event. Both governing texts say so. The Code's seller-excuse provision applies “[e]xcept so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation,” and § 261 discharges a duty only “unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”77 The comment to § 261 adds that the principle yields to a contrary agreement: a party may assume a greater as well as a lesser obligation, and may even undertake to achieve a result whatever supervening events occur, in which case non-performance is a breach although such an event caused it.78 Risk allocation is therefore usually the predominant consideration, and a party that expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of an event loses even if every other element is met.79
The element rests on a judgment about who should bear a loss the contract did not assign. A grower who agrees before the season to sell a crop that blight then destroys is ordinarily discharged. The grower has every incentive to avoid the blight, so if it occurs it probably could not have been prevented, and the grain elevator, which buys from many growers not all hit in the same season, is better placed to buffer the risk.80 Courts also have a practical reason to leave allocation to the parties. The parties are better able to allocate the risk of changed circumstances at the time of negotiation than courts are after a risk has materialized, and courts have difficulty verifying that the prerequisites for excuse are met.81
The first place to look for an allocation is the contract itself. Parties to sales contracts often include elaborate force majeure clauses allocating the risk that performance will be impossible or impracticable.82 At the far end of the spectrum, a promisor may agree to perform come “Hell or high water,” and the promise then binds.83 Courts construe force majeure clauses narrowly, so a disruption outside the clause's terms is unlikely to be added by analogy.84 General words covering any occurrence beyond a party's control are often cut down by the specific events listed after them under the rule of ejusdem generis. An unlisted event, such as the act of a cartel, then excuses only if it is very similar to the listed ones, and a drafter who wants the list to be illustrative may write “including but not limited to” in place of “including.”85
The same list that protects a party can also limit it. The danger in crafting a list is that a court will find the party impliedly assumed the risk of anything not stated there.86
Silence about an event does not leave the question open, because the form of the contract can carry an implied allocation. A fixed-price contract is almost certainly not subject to an impracticability defense because of increased costs.87 A seller's agreement to a fixed quantity at a fixed price allocates the risk of shortages to the seller.88 Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co. shows the buyer's side. NIPSCO had signed a long-term fixed-price fuel contract, and the state commission only prevented it from using its monopoly position to make consumers bear the risk that it assumed in signing. NIPSCO could not complain of force majeure, because the risk that came to pass was one it voluntarily assumed.89
A contract tied to a particular source can come out the other way when the source fails. Where a sole source is a basic assumption, a seller that has contracted with that source is excused if the source does not deliver, absent the seller's assumption of the risk or its own fault.90 Selland Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. King illustrates that rule. What separates it from the fixed-price cases is whether the contract assigned the risk that actually materialized: a fixed price places market risk on the parties who accepted it, while a deal built on a named source puts the source's failure outside the seller's bargain unless the seller assumed it.
Allocation can also appear outside the written terms. The risk of the unexpected occurrence may have been allocated by agreement or by custom,91 and courts do conclude from the surrounding circumstances that a party assumed a risk. Custom and usage matter most when they describe a party's role: a middleman is expected to lock up a source of supply before committing to a resale, and an auto dealer should not commit to supply a vehicle the manufacturer does not make.92
When the text and the price term leave the point open, the comment to § 261 lists the circumstances that bear on whether a party impliedly assumed a greater obligation.93 They can be run as questions about who was best placed to deal with the risk:
- Could the claimant have inserted a clause shifting the risk? That depends on how standardized the agreement was, how far the other party supplied its terms, and how often such language appears in the trade.
- Is the claimant a middleman with many sources, able to spread the risk across many customers by slight price adjustments, or a producer with a limited source and few outlets?
- Would commercial practice lead a party in the claimant's position to insure or otherwise secure itself against the risk?
- Was the event reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made?
The first factor asks whether the claimant had the means to protect itself. A claimant that wrote the terms, or works in a trade where risk-shifting language is routine, could have bargained for protection, while one that accepted the other side's standard form had less room to do so. The second factor grades the omission by role: a supplier's failure to shift a supply risk counts for more against a middleman than against a producer with a single source and no comparable opportunity. That is why the supplier in Dunbar, which had not contracted with the refinery, could not be excused when the refinery's supply fell short.94 The third factor treats an established practice of insuring as a reason to leave the risk with the party that would ordinarily insure.95
Foreseeability, the fourth factor, is evidence of allocation and not proof of it. If the event was not reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made, the claimant can hardly be expected to have provided against it. If the event was foreseeable or even foreseen, the opposite conclusion does not follow automatically, because the practical difficulty of agreeing on every conceivable term may excuse a failure to address improbable contingencies.96 Failure to deal with an improbable or insignificant contingency, even if foreseen, need not amount to an assumption of the risk, and a promisor may explain why the contract is silent, for instance that the other party dominated the bargaining and imposed a standard form.97 Yet a promisor who contracts with an abnormal risk in view can legitimately be presumed to have accepted some degree of it, as the carrier was in Transatlantic.98
The inquiry therefore proceeds in layers. The express terms come first, including whatever a list omits, then the implications of the contract's form, then trade usage and the surrounding circumstances, with foreseeability weighed as evidence throughout. A clause that names an event as ending the duty outright works differently, because the contract itself supplies the discharge and no court has to fill a gap. The next section takes up that kind of term.