Concept
Governmental Regulation
Impossibility
Governmental Regulation
A promisor can be ready, willing, and physically able to perform and still be barred from doing so, because a legislature or agency has made the promised act unlawful. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 264 treats that predicament as the third classic category of impossibility: if performance of a duty is made impracticable by having to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, the regulation or order is an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.1
The first two categories involved physical loss. A person dies or a thing is destroyed, and performance becomes unavailable to anyone.2 Under § 264 the person and the thing may be untouched, and the promisor may be able to do exactly what the contract describes. What has changed is the legal environment around the act, which the law now forbids or makes impracticable to carry out.
Section 264 follows the pattern of the two sections before it: it names one recurring event and treats the basic-assumption element as met for that event. The strict-liability baseline still governs, so a new regulation releases a promisor only when the rest of the general test is met. The order must follow formation, the party seeking excuse must be free of fault, and the contract must not have placed the risk of changes in law on that party. The subsections below state the rule for supervening orders, mark the points where the excuse stops, and apply the rule to leases, where a use the law once permitted is later prohibited.
Supervening Governmental Orders
The operative words of § 264 are having to comply. A promisor ordered to stop shipping, stop operating, or stop using a building for the contract's purpose faces two enforcers at once, since the government can sanction continued performance and the promisee can sue if performance stops. Excuse spares the promisor that squeeze over a change that neither party controlled.3 The section therefore asks whether obeying the order is what blocks performance. A music hall that the city council later makes unfit for public performance by strengthening its safety regulations answers the question. The hall can still be handed over, but the assumption that it could lawfully be used for the contract's purpose has failed, provided the council's action was unexpected and had not been publicized before the contract was made.4
Foreseeability carries less weight here than in the other categories. Almost any change in law is foreseeable in the sense that legislatures and agencies keep regulating, and a rule that denied excuse whenever regulation could have been imagined would leave § 264 with little to do. The Code makes the point itself. After death and taxes, few things are more foreseeable than government regulation, yet § 2-615(a) excuses a seller whose performance has been made impracticable by "compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid."5 A seller in that position is freed without reference to the section's separate language about contingencies and basic assumptions.6 For governmental orders, then, foreseeability may be irrelevant to the basic-assumption element.7 Other contingencies are treated differently. Their unforeseeability is particularly critical, because, in one court's words, the risk that the seller's supply might fail is on the seller, who "promises to supply a product knowing the conditions of the market."8
A decision about potatoes shows how the risk allocation can split. A supplier promised delivery at a specific time, and state police ordered its truck off the road because of adverse weather. The tribunal accepted that the weather may have been foreseeable and that the supplier, as the promisor, may have carried that risk. It held, however, that the risk of the resulting government interference had not been allocated, so the Code's excuse applied.9 The ruling came from an administrative official, so it is better read as an illustration of the reasoning than as binding authority. A storm that only slowed the truck falls within the risk the supplier may have carried, while the order that stopped it is the event that left the supplier no choice.
The words "whether or not it later proves to be invalid" protect a promisor who obeys in good faith. A promisor facing an order cannot wait for a court to rule on its validity, because disobedience risks sanctions in the meantime, and obedience to an order later struck down would otherwise expose the promisor to damages for conduct the government demanded at the time. In Harriscom Svenska, AB v. Harris Corp., a seller of radio equipment was excused after government regulations on transfers of military equipment to Iran led to a compromise with the United States government that required the seller to stop selling to the plaintiff distributor. The court found it enough that the seller acted in good faith compliance with the government's clear determination to prohibit the sales, and it did not require that the law indisputably prohibit them.10 The Fifth Circuit went further in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., excusing delayed delivery of aircraft when McDonnell Douglas gave military orders priority over commercial orders at the federal government's mere request, without any order.11 Good faith marks the boundary of this protection, and what defeats it, including a party's own part in producing the regulation, is the subject of the next subsection.
All of this concerns an order that arrives after the contract is made, and the date matters as it did in the timing discussion earlier in this chapter. A prohibition that takes effect after formation makes a valid contract impracticable and discharges the duties under it. A prohibition already in force when the parties agreed means their agreement called for what the law forbade, so no valid contract was formed and nothing remains to discharge.
The order supplies one element only. A promisor who is merely inconvenienced by regulation, or who helped bring it about, falls outside the rule, as the next subsection explains.
Limits on Regulatory Excuse
Courts have been more receptive to excuse based on supervening governmental action than to excuse based on war, natural disaster, or market change, but they still confine it.13 The label in § 264 settles only the basic-assumption element.14 The claimant must still show that performance was forestalled and not merely inhibited, and the claimant must not have induced the regulation it relies on.15 Four limits follow, and each rests on one idea: a regulation can excuse only when it is a genuine outside event, because otherwise the promisor is pleading a predicament it helped create.
The first limit is causal. The regulation itself, and not the claimant's own conduct, must make performance impracticable.16 One seller claimed excuse for complying with a federal regulation without mentioning that its own representatives had lobbied for that regulation.17 The omission mattered, because active lobbying for a regulation may preclude excuse.18 A rule the claimant worked to bring about is not an outside event. The claimant used its influence to put the obstacle in place, while the promisee, who had no voice in the rulemaking, would absorb the cost. Mere cooperation and early compliance stand on different footing. In International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc., the Tenth Circuit excused a potash miner that had contracted to buy natural gas when the miner could no longer burn gas in the quantities anticipated at contracting and still meet new state emission standards, despite the miner's ready cooperation with the state and its early compliance.19 The line falls between shaping the rule and obeying it. Lobbying seeks to decide what the regulation will say, while cooperation and compliance respond to a rule the government has already decided to impose.
The second limit asks whether the claimant could have avoided the regulation's effect. A seller that could have escaped the effect of a government regulation is not freed by it, because the impracticability then traces to the seller's choice to stay exposed.20 Another seller was not excused where its agreement called for it to stay apprised of regulations and it knew of new ones but did not notify its buyers.21 The contract had assigned that seller the job of watching the regulatory environment, so its own failure to act on what it knew was one link in the chain, and the obstacle was not wholly external. The same logic runs through the absence-of-fault element taught earlier in this chapter: a party whose own conduct helped produce the impracticability cannot invoke the excuse.
The third limit concerns how much the regulation actually does. Performance must be forestalled, and it is not enough that the regulation inhibits performance by making it harder, costlier, or less attractive.22 A regulation that leaves the promisor able to deliver as agreed, at a higher price, leaves the strict-liability baseline in place, and claims driven by cost belong to the impracticability doctrine taken up later in this chapter. Take-or-pay contracts mark the line. Llano excused the miner because the new emission standards left it unable to take gas in the contemplated quantities, but other courts hold that when the actual purchasing and taking of goods under a take-or-pay contract becomes impracticable, excuse is not normally available.23 The stricter view reasons that a buyer who has promised to pay whether or not it takes the goods can often still pay, and payment is the core of the promise. The same stringency appears when the claim is frustration of purpose. That doctrine addresses a change in circumstances that makes one party's performance virtually worthless to the other,24 and a lessee's claim failed in Mel Frank because the court required that performance be rendered "virtually worthless."25
The fourth limit applies to orders reached through negotiation, commonly called consent orders. Some courts deny excuse unless the claimant's fault was not a contributing factor in the order's issuance, so a negotiated order raises a fault question that a plain imposed order does not.26 When the Commodity Futures Trading Commission entered a consent order prohibiting certain petroleum futures contracts, a seller was held not to have established the defense as a matter of law, because it had not vigorously resisted the agency.27 Harriscom, discussed above, came out the other way, even though the seller there also reached a compromise with the government.28 The label consent therefore does not decide the case. The question is whether the claimant's own conduct contributed to the order, and a party that gave way to the agency without a fight has trouble describing the order as something that happened to it.
The claimant carries the burden of proving impracticability, so a promisor who merely points to a new regulation has not yet made out the excuse.29 Because each limit asks whether the regulation or the claimant is the true source of the obstacle, the analysis runs best as a sequence of questions once the regulation's existence is established.
Two errors recur on this element. The first treats every new regulation as an automatic excuse because § 264 calls it a basic assumption, although that label settles one element and the four limits still apply. The second denies excuse because regulation was foreseeable, although foreseeability may be irrelevant to this category.30
Supervening Illegality in Leases
A lease shows the regulatory excuse at work in a recurring setting, and the lease rule applies the principle of § 264 that a governmental regulation or order making performance impracticable is a basic-assumption event.32 Many leases restrict the tenant to one particular use of the premises, and a later law prohibits that use. The majority of jurisdictions hold that the tenant's liability for rent then terminates and the landlord is entitled to recover possession.33 The reasoning appears in Greil Bros. v. Mabson. Later impossibility ordinarily does not discharge a promisor, but the rule has exceptions, and one covers performance that becomes impossible by law, through a change in the law or an act of governmental authority.34 The timing sort taught earlier still applies. The prohibition must arrive after the lease is signed, because a use already forbidden at signing leaves no valid lease to discharge.
The use restriction is what makes discharge fit. A tenant confined to one use has bargained for the right to do that one thing on the land, and both sides signed on the shared assumption that the use would stay lawful. When a statute removes it, the tenant holds a leasehold that cannot be used in the only way the lease allowed, which is the failed basic assumption that § 264 describes. The courts that grant relief do not agree on a label. Their theories include impossibility of performance, a finding that the lease became illegal, and an implied agreement between landlord and tenant not to do an illegal act.35 A more accurate name, though still imprecise, is frustration of purpose, because it is usually the tenant's purpose that is frustrated and not the landlord's.36 Frustration of purpose is taught in a neighboring section, and these lease cases sit on the border between that doctrine and impossibility.
The majority rule has a limit that keeps it from reaching every lease touched by regulation. The frustration must be almost complete, which means the main use to which the tenant is restricted must be the one that is prohibited. A lease that permits several uses, only one of which is prohibited, continues unabated.37 The prohibition-era cases show where the line falls. In Industrial Development Land Co. v. Goldschmidt the lease provided that the premises should not be used other than as a saloon, and when national prohibition made the sale of alcoholic beverages illegal, the court excused the tenant from further performance.38 No use the lease authorized survived. Grace v. Croninger arose from the same national ban but involved a lease for a saloon and cigar store, with provision for subleasing part of the space for bootblack purposes. Prohibition destroyed the lease's main purpose, yet the lessee was not excused, because the premises could still be used for bootblack and cigar store purposes.39 The same legal event produced opposite results, so the event does not decide the case. What decides it is whether any use the lease itself authorized survives.
Lloyd v. Murphy applies the same line and states the standard: even more clearly for leases than for ordinary contracts, frustration depends on the total or nearly total destruction of the purpose for which, in the contemplation of both parties, the transaction was entered into.40 The court there found that the premises sat on a main traffic artery and were adapted to many commercial purposes, that the lessors had waived the lease's use restrictions, and that the lessee continued its business at two other locations.41 That requirement echoes the point from the previous subsection that a regulation must forestall performance and not merely inhibit it. Without it, any tenant whose rent had turned into a bad bargain could point to a regulation that touched the business and walk away, and the risk of a worse market would shift to a landlord who never agreed to carry it.
A minority of jurisdictions views the lease primarily as a conveyance of an interest in land. The tenant still holds that interest after the law bars its use, so the tenant bears the risk of any change in the law.42 J.J. Goodrum Tobacco Co. v. Potts Thompson Liquor Co. illustrates that view.
The usual error is to end the tenant's rent duty because the law touched the business the tenant had in mind. The majority rule asks what the lease itself permitted, so a tenant whose lease allows other lawful, valuable uses stays bound even when the favorite use is gone, just as the surviving cigar-store and bootblack uses kept the lessee bound in Grace. The opposite error forgets that jurisdictions divide, so an answer should state the majority result and note the minority view. Check, too, for express lease language allocating the risk of a change in law, since a clause that does so will control.