461 U.S. 171 (1983)
Thaddeus Zywicki engaged in leafletting on the public sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building on three separate occasions between May 1978 and February 1980.1 In May 1978 he distributed reprints of a Senator's letter to the Washington Post editor regarding the removal of unfit judges.2 A Supreme Court police officer advised him that 40 U.S.C. § 13k barred the distribution of leaflets on the Court grounds, which encompass the sidewalk, and Zywicki departed without incident.3
Subsequently in January 1980 Zywicki returned to distribute pamphlets about forthcoming meetings and events for the oppressed peoples of Central America.4 Upon being approached by an officer and warned of potential arrest for violating the leafletting prohibition, he left the area.5
In February 1980 Zywicki appeared again, this time handing out materials concerning oppression in Guatemala.6 Although he had been advised by counsel that a local court had limited the statute's reach to conduct intended to influence judicial administration, an officer again threatened arrest, and Zywicki left after noting the presence of newspaper vending machines on the same sidewalk.7
On March 17, 1980, Mary Grace stood on the sidewalk displaying a large sign inscribed with the full text of the First Amendment.8 A Court police officer instructed her to move across the street, explaining that Title 40 prohibited her conduct and that arrest would follow if she did not cease, leading Grace to leave the grounds.9
Zywicki and Grace initiated the present action on May 13, 1980, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.10 They requested injunctive relief against continued enforcement of 40 U.S.C. § 13k along with a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its face.11 The District Court dismissed the complaint on August 7, 1980, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies.12 The Court of Appeals reversed that dismissal and invalidated the statute on its face.13 After the Government appealed, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1982.14
Whether 40 U.S.C. § 13k prohibits the display of signs and the distribution of leaflets on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building?15
Section 13k makes it unlawful to display any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement in the Supreme Court Building or grounds.16 Section 13p defines the grounds to extend to the curb of each of the four streets enclosing the block on which the building is located.17
Yes. The conduct of Thaddeus Zywicki in distributing leaflets on three occasions falls squarely within the prohibition.18 Leaflets qualify as devices designed to bring public notice to movements or ideas.19 Mary Grace's display of a sign containing the text of the First Amendment likewise constitutes a device under the statute.20 The definition in 40 U.S.C. § 13p includes the sidewalks as part of the grounds.21 There is no basis to exclude the sidewalks from statutory coverage.22
Section 13k does prohibit the specified activities on the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building.23
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Justice Stevens concluded that Zywicki's leafletting did not constitute the display of a device.24 A typical passerby would not have learned the message from the display alone.25 Only after the material left Zywicki's possession would the message have become intelligible.26
He also determined that Grace's sign was not designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.27 The term movement was understood in a specific way when the statute was drafted.28 As a matter of statutory interpretation and judicial restraint, Stevens would avoid the constitutional question.29
He would hold that neither appellee violated the statute.30
Whether 40 U.S.C. § 13k violates the First Amendment when applied to such expressive activities on those sidewalks?31
Public sidewalks are traditional public forums where the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations that are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.32 An absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.33
Yes. Although the sidewalks are public forums, the total ban imposed by the statute on picketing and leafletting does not sufficiently serve the interests of protecting the Court building.34 The ban also fails to maintain order and decorum.35 The sidewalks are indistinguishable from other public sidewalks in the city.36 There is no indication that the activities would interfere with the administration of justice or create the appearance of outside influence on the Court.37 The statute therefore cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction.38
The sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds are public forums.39 They have historically been held open to the public for expressive activities.40 They are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C. There is no fence or other indication to persons stepping from the street that they have entered a special enclave. Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection.41 It will not lose its historically recognized character simply because it abuts government property dedicated to another use.42
The government interests asserted are not substantially served by a total ban on the public sidewalks.43 Those interests include protection of persons and property.44 They also include maintenance of proper order and decorum.45 There is no suggestion that the appellees' activities obstructed access.46 There is no suggestion that the activities threatened injury.47 There is no suggestion that the activities interfered with the orderly administration of the building.48 The public would not draw a different inference from a lone picketer on the sidewalks around the building than from a similar picket across the street.49 Accordingly the prohibition lacks a sufficient nexus to the asserted justifications.50 It is unconstitutional as applied to the sidewalks.51
The statute violates the First Amendment as applied to the public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building.52
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Justice Marshall would hold the statute unconstitutional on its face.53 The statute imposes a blanket prohibition on the display of any flag, banner, or device.54 It does so without distinguishing the sidewalks from the rest of the premises.55
It also fails to limit its reach to expressive activities intended to interfere with the administration of justice.56 Every citizen lawfully present in a public place has a right to engage in peaceable and orderly expression.57 That expression must not be incompatible with the primary activity of the place.58
The statute sweeps within its ambit a broad range of expression protected by the First Amendment.59 It creates a continuous and pervasive restraint through the threat of sanctions.60