Concept
Elements of Revocation
UCC sale of goods: perfect tender and revocation of acceptance
Elements of Revocation
Section 2-608 lets a buyer undo an acceptance, but only on conditions the buyer must prove one at a time. Subsection (1) permits revocation of acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to the buyer.1 It also demands an excuse for having accepted in the first place. Either the buyer took the goods on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be cured, and the cure did not come seasonably, or the buyer accepted without discovering the nonconformity because the difficulty of discovery or the seller’s assurances reasonably induced the acceptance.2 Subsection (2) adds three conditions. Revocation must come within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it, it must come before any substantial change in the goods that their own defects did not cause, and it takes effect only when the buyer notifies the seller.3
Read together, these provisions yield five requirements, and the buyer must satisfy every one.4 In Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc. the Maryland Court of Appeals called them conditions precedent and fixed the order of proof. The buyer first shows that the goods are nonconforming and that the nonconformity substantially impairs their value to the buyer, and only then does the excuse for accepting come into play.5 The five requirements are these:
- The nonconformity must substantially impair the value of the lot or commercial unit to the buyer.
- The buyer must have an excuse for accepting: a reasonable assumption of cure that went unfulfilled, or acceptance without discovery induced by the difficulty of discovery or the seller’s assurances.
- The buyer must revoke within a reasonable time after it discovers or should have discovered the ground.
- The buyer must revoke before any substantial change in the goods that their own defects did not cause.
- The buyer must notify the seller, because revocation is not effective until the seller is told.
The requirements are cumulative, so the failure of any one defeats revocation, however strong the buyer’s showing on the others. A buyer with a serious defect that no inspection could have revealed still loses the right to revoke if it waits too long or never tells the seller, and it is then left with its claim for damages. The burden rests on the buyer throughout. Section 2-607(4) makes a buyer who has accepted goods prove any breach with respect to them, which for a revoking buyer means proving every requirement for revocation.6
Each requirement serves a different interest. The impairment standard keeps minor defects from unwinding completed sales. The excuse requirement shuts out a buyer who could have refused the goods and chose to keep them. The timing, change-in-condition, and notice requirements protect the seller’s ability to take the goods back in useful condition, the interest the Code defends once goods have been accepted. Impairment comes first.
Substantial Impairment
Substantial impairment is the first showing a revoking buyer must make, and it is where revocation most plainly parts company with rejection. A tender that fails in any respect to conform lets the buyer reject, but revocation demands a greater showing.7 The same minor flaw in goods already accepted supports revocation only if the nonconformity “substantially impairs its value to him.”8 The buyer must also prove a nonconformity in the first place, and that turns on the contract’s terms and the law of warranty: goods as contracted for and as warranted cannot be nonconforming.9
The higher bar tracks what acceptance has changed. The longer a buyer keeps the goods, the likelier its own handling caused or aggravated the defect, the more benefit it has drawn from use, and the more the goods have depreciated.10 Acceptance also makes it harder for the seller to cure the nonconformity or resell the goods.11 A revocation standard as easy as rejection would also give buyers little reason to inspect carefully at delivery.
Two phrases carry the doctrine: “substantially” sets how serious the defect must be, and “to him” sets whose view measures it. Courts convert the pair into a two-step inquiry, stated most clearly in Jorgensen v. Pressnall. The Oregon Supreme Court there said the first step is to determine the value of conforming goods to the plaintiff. That question is subjective in that it looks to the needs and circumstances of the buyer seeking to revoke, not those of an average buyer.12 The second step asks whether the nonconformity in fact substantially impairs that value in light of those needs. That question is objective in that the buyer must offer evidence from which it can be inferred that its needs went unmet because of the nonconformity; the buyer’s own assertion of lost value is not enough.13
The first step follows from the words “to him” and from Official Comment 2, which directs courts to ask whether the nonconformity in fact causes a substantial impairment of value to the buyer, even though the seller had no advance knowledge of the buyer’s circumstances.14 A flaw that is trivial to most buyers can defeat the purpose for which a particular buyer bought the goods, and the seller cannot rely on its ignorance of that purpose. In Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller the buyer ordered a station wagon with a heavy-duty trailer package and extra wide tires, and it was delivered without a spare tire.15 The seller called a missing spare trivial, easy and cheap to supply.16 The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed. The omission substantially impaired the car’s value to Miller, whose work required extensive highway travel and who feared being stranded with a flat and no spare.17 The same reasoning supports a car buyer who is highly allergic to mold: a tiny water leak producing a minute amount of mold lets that buyer revoke even though the vehicle’s market value is hardly diminished.18
The second step keeps the first from swallowing the rule. Colonial Dodge put the buyer’s burden in two parts: the nonconformity must have a special devaluing effect on this buyer, and the buyer’s assessment of it must be factually correct.19 Miller met the second part with evidence beyond his own word. He had ordered a special tire package, his job demanded heavy highway travel, and the dangers facing a stranded motorist are common knowledge.20 In Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey the Washington Supreme Court declined to adopt a largely subjective test. It stressed that substantial impairment is an objective factual determination of the buyer’s particular circumstances, with no room for unarticulated desires.21 Were the buyer’s belief controlling, an accepting buyer could unwind a sale by announcing dissatisfaction, and the any-respect standard that the Code withholds from such a buyer would return by another route.
The test does not demand proof of a large repair bill or a ruined product. The buyers in Jorgensen bought a new mobile home to live in and soon found water and air leaks and defective doors, cabinets, vents, and walls; the seller’s repairs left the serious problems, such as leakage, in place.22 The seller argued that repair costs were small relative to the price and that impairment requires goods useless for the buyer’s purposes.23 The court rejected both arguments. The defects probably could have been repaired at small cost, but the buyers had been deprived of a comfortable home for a substantial period, and revocation is available when impairment is substantial though not complete.24 The buyers even stayed in the unit, on advice of counsel, until about three weeks before trial, and the court still found substantial impairment.25
Werner v. Montana reaches the same result for a sailboat that leaked excessively and was later found to have dry rot. The New Hampshire court held that the trier of fact could find substantial impairment without proof of its dollar amount. Repair cost is only one criterion, the leak was in an essential part of the boat, and the leaking together with the rot could reasonably be found to have severely undermined the buyer’s confidence in the vessel.26 A defect can also destroy value by defeating the goods’ only use. In Atlan Industries, Inc. v. O.E.M., Inc. the plastic warped at the temperatures of a paint-drying oven, painting was a precondition of any use of the material in the computer and office-machine trade, and the court found the goods substantially without value to the ultimate user and to the molder.27 And because the statute measures the value of the lot or commercial unit, the inquiry can be answered for a whole quantity. In AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc. the major incidence of defective lining material substantially impaired the value of entire lots of caps, so the buyer could revoke as to the entire quantity, including caps merely suspected of carrying defective lining.28
The opposite result appears where the defect is fixed or the goods keep doing their job. When the seller can and does readily repair a defect, courts find no substantial impairment, because repair gives the buyer what it bargained for.29 Repair stops working as an answer in three situations: when the seller substitutes a major integral part, such as an engine in a new car; when it repairs a series of defects as they surface and offers only to fix the next; and when even a modest number of repairs leaves the buyer’s confidence in the goods shaken.30 A price reduction the buyer agrees to may compensate for the impairment and bar revocation altogether.31 In Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc. the seller corrected every problem with a used vehicle except a defective axle, and the vehicle served business transportation, pleasure trips to Canada and New Hampshire, and off-road driving on the beach. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court’s finding of no substantial impairment was not clearly erroneous, because whether value has been substantially impaired is a question of fact.32
Productive use weighs on the same side. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Sygitowicz the buyer of a tractor claimed that excessive oil consumption raised the cost of running it. The Washington Court of Appeals looked to the effect of the problem on the productivity of the use and held that thirteen months of extensive use, without a showing that the use was not normally productive, negated substantial impairment.33 The Jorgensen buyers also lived with their defective home for months, so continued use does not by itself defeat impairment. The cases differ in what the defect did to the buyer’s purpose: the tractor kept doing its work at somewhat greater expense, while the leaking home failed to supply the shelter the buyers bought it to provide.
The Code supplies no formula for separating a substantial nonconformity from an insubstantial one, so courts borrow the common-law idea of material breach.34 Some courts describe revocation as engaging a more subjective standard than warranty law, because the remedy reaches goods whose nonconformity substantially impairs value to the buyer and not only goods that are unmerchantable.35 Courts do not speak with one voice about how the two halves fit together. Hays stressed the objective half, while Jorgensen and Web Press joined both, asking first about the needs and circumstances of the particular buyer and then whether, from an objective standpoint, the value of the goods to the buyer has in fact been impaired.36 A majority of courts use that combined test, though they phrase it in different ways.37 The combination has drawn criticism because one inquiry cannot easily be both subjective and objective.38 A sound analysis therefore identifies the buyer’s particular needs, points to facts beyond the buyer’s own word showing those needs went unmet, and checks whether any repair or price adjustment restored the value.
Accepting in Expectation of Cure
Section 2-608(1)(a) lets a buyer revoke when it accepted “on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured.”40 The ground is the other face of § 2-607(2), which says that an acceptance made with knowledge of a nonconformity cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be seasonably cured.41 Together the provisions state one rule in two parts. A buyer who sees the defect and keeps the goods anyway loses the right to revoke for that defect. The one exception covers the buyer whose knowing acceptance rested on a reasonable expectation of repair that the seller then failed to deliver in good time. Lynx states the converse: a buyer cannot revoke when it accepted knowing of the nonconformity but had no reason to assume a cure would follow, or when the seller in fact cured seasonably after acceptance.42
The bar follows from what the buyer did. A buyer who sees a defect at delivery may reject under § 2-601, so keeping the goods is a decision, and the seller may treat it as final. If a buyer could keep goods with a known flaw and later return them for that same flaw, it would hold a free option to wait and see whether the goods disappoint. The exception rests on a different decision. A buyer who accepts because the seller has promised or signaled a repair has agreed to keep goods it expects to be made conforming, which holds down the cost of the breach. It would be perverse to invite buyers into that arrangement and then deny them revocation when repairs fail, because buyers would respond by rejecting at once or refusing repair offers that would usually have made them whole.
Whether the assumption of cure was reasonable depends on what supports it. The most obvious support is the seller’s own statement that it will fix the problem.43 A course of dealing or a usage of trade can also make a cure the expected course, and so can the nature of the goods, as with equipment that needs adjustment after delivery.44 In Beal v. Griffin the buyer of a window-blind cleaning machine noted nonconformities on delivery and was told they would be remedied if the buyer signed an acknowledgment of satisfactory delivery. The buyer could revoke because it accepted only on that assurance.45 Statements that apparent defects will work themselves out or need only a minor adjustment serve the same function and excuse the buyer’s failure to reject or revoke earlier.46 The same reasoning appears at larger scale in ARB (American Research Bureau), Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., where the buyer found pre-production metering equipment inadequate and authorized production only because the seller assured it the problems would be corrected. The D.C. Circuit held that giving the go-ahead did not waive the buyer’s right to conforming goods.47 The court also rejected the seller’s challenges to the master’s finding that the buyer had notified it for purposes of § 2-608.48
Most revocations on this ground follow a seller’s unsuccessful attempts to repair defects the buyer reported.49 In Jorgensen the seller assured the buyers of a new mobile home that any defects would be corrected. After they reported leaks and defective doors, cabinets, vents, and walls, repeated repair requests produced only workmen who were not prepared to make repairs, and a later round of repairs left serious problems such as leakage in place and created new ones.50 The seller argued that the buyers had unreasonably refused further attempts to repair. The Oregon Supreme Court answered that the seller had ample opportunity to cure before the revocation and did not act seasonably, and that a seller does not have unlimited time to cure.51 Sellers in these cases often reply that the buyer kept the goods too long, but a buyer who lets the seller try to repair is minimizing the loss from the breach, so that reply typically carries little weight.52 In Cardwell v. International Housing, Inc. the seller’s repairmen worked on a mobile home for months and the parties kept negotiating, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court declined to hold a twenty-one month interval unreasonable as a matter of law.53 How long a buyer may wait is the subject of the reasonable-time requirement below. For present purposes, repair attempts form part of the case for revocation and do not count against it.
The assumption of cure has to be reasonable, so a buyer’s private hope that a defect will somehow be fixed does not qualify. A buyer who notices the defect, hears nothing from the seller about repair, and keeps the goods has accepted with knowledge and without reasonable expectation of cure. Section 2-607(2) bars revocation for that defect while leaving the buyer’s other remedies, such as damages, in place.54
In the second scene the seller’s statement supplies the reasonable basis for accepting, and the failure of the cure completes the ground. Had the technician arrived the next day and recalibrated the gauge, the nonconformity would have been cured and no ground for revocation would remain, because a seller’s seasonable cure after acceptance ends the claim.55 The Tennessee Court of Appeals applied the same principle in Audio Visual Artistry v. Tanzer, citing a decision that barred revocation where the seller had seasonably cured.56 The word “seasonably” therefore decides many of these cases, and Jorgensen shows that repeated visits that fail to repair the goods do not satisfy it.
This ground differs from the position of a buyer who never discovered the defect. In Preston Motor Co. v. Palomares the buyer’s acceptance of a car was without discovery and was reasonably induced by the seller’s assurances that excessive oil consumption did not indicate a defect. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that such a buyer may revoke without waiting for a cure, seasonable or otherwise, and does not waive the right by letting the seller try to correct the defect.57 Failure of cure therefore belongs to the knowing-acceptance ground in § 2-608(1)(a). The grounds for a buyer who did not discover the defect follow in the next two subsections.
The usual mistake on facts like these is to ask only whether the buyer was promised a repair. A promise matters because it makes the buyer’s reliance reasonable, and the ground is complete only when the cure then fails to arrive in good time.
Latent Defects
Section 2-608(1)(b) gives a buyer who accepted without discovering a nonconformity a second route to revocation, provided the acceptance was “reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller’s assurances.”59 This subsection takes the first inducement, the latent defect: a hidden imperfection that a reasonable inspection would not have revealed.60 The buyer never saw the problem, so it has no knowing acceptance to excuse, as the buyer in the preceding subsection did. The question is why the buyer did not find the defect before taking the goods, and under this branch the answer must be that finding it was hard.
A buyer who inspects as a reasonable buyer would and still cannot find the flaw should not bear its cost, because the seller made the goods or chose their source and is better placed to know what they contain. The same reasoning marks the branch’s limit. If a buyer could skip an easy look at delivery and revoke later, acceptance would become a free option to wait, and the seller would lose the chance to fix cheaply at the start a defect that would have cost little to fix. A buyer whose failure to discover was its own, because a reasonable and readily available investigation would have revealed the nonconformity, therefore cannot revoke.61 That bar reaches a buyer that made only a cursory inspection and ignored its own inspection procedures when a proper inspection would have disclosed the defects.62
A court that treats acceptance as the end of the matter has misread the provision. In Cissell Mfg. Co. v. Park the trial court concluded that § 2-608 does not allow revocation of goods with latent defects after acceptance, and the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with the buyer that this conclusion was wrong.63 Not every defect shows itself on inspection, and a buyer that could not find one despite a thorough look may revoke if it meets the section’s other requirements.64 Revocation exists for the buyer who has already accepted, so a reading that excluded defects found only after acceptance would leave the provision with almost nothing to do.
The clearest application is S & R Metals, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America). A steel service center bought 5,500 metric tons of commercial quality SAE 1010 hot rolled steel, which arrived in 644 coils and was accepted.65 By industry custom the steel must bend flat upon itself without visible cracks, but the bend test destroys or substantially harms the coil tested and is expensive, and buyers do not customarily run it on delivery. A tendency to fail the test cannot be seen with the eye.66 The flaw surfaced only when a customer complained, after the service center had resold about 35 percent of the shipment. The Ninth Circuit held that the buyer satisfied § 2-608 because the defect was latent and difficult to discover before acceptance.67 The court’s own observation about the remaining steel shows why: testing it would itself have substantially reduced its value, so the only inspection that could reveal the flaw would have damaged the very goods the buyer meant to sell.68
Trade custom supplies much of the content of a reasonable inspection. The molder in Atlan tested samples of plastic only to see whether they would mold well, as was common in the industry, and the plastic did mold well. The seller argued that the molder should also have sent molded samples to its own customer, whose painting and baking would have exposed the warping. The court answered that such a step might be a sensible contract term but that the law does not require a buyer to run more tests than are common in the industry, and it denied the seller’s claim for the price.69 The difficulty that counts is not always technical. In Colonial Dodge the space for the spare tire lay under a fastened panel, out of view, and the Michigan Supreme Court held that this concealment satisfied the requirement of difficult discovery, so the buyer’s failure to notice the omission before accepting did not bar revocation.70 A reasonable inspection covers what is in view and does not require a buyer to take apart what the seller has fastened shut.
The buyer in EPN-Delaval, S.A. v. Inter-Equip, Inc. stands on the other side of the line. It ordered hemispherical steel heads and received elliptical ones. The shape might have been hard to discern while the heads sat on a flatcar at the border, where the freight forwarder lacked the expertise to tell the shapes apart. But once the heads reached the buyer’s plant in Mexico, its quality control staff, located only twenty miles away, would have discovered the nonconformity without difficulty had they inspected.71 The court therefore held that the buyer could not show that difficulty of discovery induced its acceptance after the heads reached Mexico, and it rejected the revocation theory, in addition to the timing problem described below.72
Set side by side, the two cases show that the inquiry follows what inspection is reasonable for this buyer and these goods. The steel defect could be found only by a test that destroyed the goods and that the trade did not run on receipt, while the shape of the heads could be found by anyone who looked, and the buyer had staff on hand to look. The nature of the defect, the complexity of the goods, and the sophistication of the buyer all bear on how hard discovery was,73 and trade custom, as Atlan showed, fixes how far a buyer must go. A merchant buyer will seldom persuade a court that an obvious defect was hidden from it, while a buyer facing a defect that only a destructive or uncustomary test could reveal has a strong argument that discovery was difficult.
The statute measures timing from when the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for revocation, so the same reasonable-inspection standard returns when the reasonable-time requirement is applied.74 The second inducement, the seller’s assurances, applies where what kept the buyer from looking was something the seller said, and the next subsection takes it up.
Seller’s Assurances
Section 2-608(1)(b) offers a second way for a buyer who accepted without discovering a nonconformity to excuse that acceptance: the acceptance must have been “reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller’s assurances.”76 The preceding subsection took up the first inducement, which asks about the goods. This one takes up the second, which asks about the seller. The statute makes two demands of an assurance. It must have induced the acceptance, so that the buyer’s failure to find the defect traces to what the seller said or did, and the inducement must have been reasonable, so that a sensible buyer in that position would have relied on it. Satisfying this ground gives the buyer an excuse for having accepted and nothing more. Substantial impairment, timely revocation, the absence of a substantial change in the goods, and notice all remain to be proved.
The line between the two inducements decides how a problem should be analyzed. Difficulty of discovery is a fact about the goods and the inspection: would a reasonable look by this buyer have revealed the defect? An assurance is a fact about the seller’s conduct: did the seller say or do something that led the buyer reasonably to look no further? Vermont’s court has said that such assurances must be of the sort that “induce the buyer to delay discovery.”77 A defect that careful inspection would have turned up therefore defeats a buyer who relies only on difficulty of discovery, yet the same defect can support revocation when the seller’s words gave the buyer a sound reason to skip the inspection. The reason lies in who created the ignorance. Acceptance ordinarily closes the door to rejection because the buyer had the chance to look and chose to keep the goods. When the seller’s own statements kept the buyer from looking, the silence is no longer a free choice, and a buyer thrown off guard in that way has a basis for revoking.78
The clearest application is Morrisville Comm’n Sales, Inc. v. Harris. The seller represented at auction that a cow was healthy and ready to be a milker. The buyer relied on that representation and did not inspect the cow’s mouth. A few days later she discovered that the cow was toothless, could not eat the commercial grains vital to lactation, and so was not ready to be a milker. The seller took the cow back, resold her for substantially less, and sued the buyer for the difference.79 The Vermont Supreme Court found the nonconformity in the disparity between the cow’s condition and the seller’s contrary representation, then checked the remaining requirements one at a time. Revocation came within a reasonable time after discovery, the buyer promptly notified the seller, she relied on the representation and so did not inspect the mouth, and the cow had not changed substantially.80 Looking into a cow’s mouth is neither expensive nor technical, so the buyer’s case does not depend on difficulty of discovery. It depends on a representation that spoke directly to the cow’s condition and gave the buyer a reason not to look.
Assurances take varied forms, and the cases show how varied. In Steel Bar Service, Inc. v. Connors Steel Co. the buyer accepted replacement steel without testing its carbon content, relying on the seller’s carbon-content tags, and much of the steel later proved to exceed the contract limit. The Ohio Court of Appeals treated the tags as the seller’s assurances and found the buyer’s reliance reasonable, because the seller had itself accepted the return of the first shipment on the strength of the tags alone.81 An express warranty works the same way. A buyer of a rug warranted as stain free who learns the warranty was false only when a spill stains the rug after installation fits § 2-608(1)(b), and the seller replaced the rug when the buyer revoked.82 A tag on the goods, a written warranty, and a spoken description look different, but each gave the buyer a sound reason to go no further.
Because this ground rests on the buyer’s ignorance, the buyer does not have to wait for a cure. In Preston the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a buyer whose acceptance was reasonably induced by the seller’s assurances may revoke without waiting for a cure, seasonable or otherwise, and does not waive that right by letting the seller try to correct the defect.83 The contrast with the knowing-acceptance ground follows from the facts each assumes. A buyer who saw the defect and kept the goods in the expectation of repair has to show the repair failed, while a buyer who never saw the defect has nothing to wait for.
The inducement must also be reasonable, and that requirement keeps ordinary sales talk out of the statute. Mere puffing by the seller is not an assurance under § 2-608(1)(b).84 General praise gives no sensible buyer a reason to relax an inspection, so a buyer who skips the look after hearing it has acted on its own judgment. If enthusiasm alone were enough, every sale would carry a built-in route to revocation after acceptance, and the higher standard the Code sets for an accepted tender would collapse into the any-respect standard of rejection. The working question is whether the seller’s words spoke to the condition later found wrong in a way a reasonable buyer would take as a reason to delay or forgo discovery. A cow described as healthy and ready to milk and steel tagged with its carbon content each speak to the very characteristic at issue.
The usual exam error is to treat any favorable remark by the seller as an assurance, when the statute asks whether the buyer was reasonably induced to delay discovery.
Reasonable Time
Section 2-608(2) imposes the first timing condition: revocation “must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it.”86 The sentence carries two instructions. One fixes when the period starts, and the other leaves its length to the circumstances, because the statute names no number of days. The period starts at discovery, actual or constructive, not at delivery or acceptance. A hidden defect cannot start time running against a buyer who has no way of knowing about it, and a clock that began at delivery would hollow out the latent-defect branch of § 2-608(1)(b), which exists for that very buyer. The words “should have discovered” give the seller a matching protection: a buyer cannot postpone the start by declining to look at what a reasonable buyer of those goods would have examined.
The length of the period then depends on the Code’s general rule for reasonable time. In Cardwell the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated it this way: a reasonable time for taking any action “depends on the nature, purposes and circumstances of such action.”87 The action here is the undoing of a completed sale, which explains why courts decline to fix a number. A knitting-machine buyer and a mobile-home buyer face different problems of discovery and repair, so the time that fits each depends on the goods, the defect, and what passed between buyer and seller after delivery. Because reasonableness is generally a question of fact, a court is slow to declare a delay unreasonable as a matter of law.88
The period for revocation usually runs longer than the periods for other buyer responses. Official Comment 4 says the reasonable time “should extend . . . beyond the time in which notification of breach must be given, beyond the time for discovery of non-conformity after acceptance and beyond the time for rejection after tender.”89 The reason is that revocation is generally resorted to only after attempts at adjustment have failed.90 A buyer who lets the seller try to fix the goods is doing what the Code hopes a buyer will do, since repair keeps the deal alive and holds down the loss. A rule that charged weeks spent on repair against that buyer would teach buyers to reject at once or to revoke on the first defect, and the cooperative cure the Code favors would give way to a race to the courthouse.
The extra time has a limit, which explains why the period is only “reasonable.” The longer a buyer keeps and uses the goods, the likelier it is that some conduct of its own accounts for the nonconformity.91 The standard therefore bends in two directions. It gives a patient buyer room to let repairs run their course, and it presses a buyer who has simply kept the goods to act once the ground for revocation is known or knowable.
Courts apply the standard through four recurring circumstances, the same ones they use for rejection and notice of breach.92
- The difficulty of discovering the defect, which can postpone the date the buyer should have found it.
- The terms of the contract, including any agreement that shortens or fixes the period.
- The perishability of the goods.
- The parties’ course of performance between the sale and the revocation, including repair attempts and the buyer’s complaints.
Each circumstance moves either the date on which the buyer should have known or the cost the seller bears for waiting. A defect that only a destructive test would reveal pushes the constructive discovery date later, and perishable goods compress the period, since every day of delay costs the seller resale value. The parties may shorten the period by agreement, and a contract term of that kind records what each side expected.93 Course of performance carries the most weight when the seller has been trying to repair, because the delay then reflects the seller’s own efforts and not the buyer’s inattention.
A buyer that holds the goods in silence marks the unfavorable end of the range. In EPN-Delaval the court found that the buyer should have discovered the wrong shape shortly after the heads reached its plant in Mexico and should have revoked within weeks, not months.94 The buyer’s quality control staff worked nearby, so it could not show that difficulty of discovery induced its acceptance after the heads arrived. In Euroworld, Inc. v. Blakey the party that took delivery of the engines did not inspect them until four months later and gave no notice of any problem until nine months after the agreement, and the court treated that delay as signifying acceptance.95 In both cases the buyer’s own inaction filled the interval, so the interval counted against the buyer.
A buyer whose wait is explained by the seller’s repair efforts stands at the other end. In Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry Co. the buyer bought ten knitting machines for $153,550. Soon after the first two arrived it complained that they ran slowly, made low-quality fabric, and leaked oil, and the seller’s repeated repair attempts failed until the buyer wrote on May 23, 1967 to revoke acceptance.96 The trial judge held the two-year delay unreasonable as a matter of law. The appellate court reversed, because reasonableness depends on the nature, purpose, and circumstances of the action, and the seller’s repeated repair attempts may have lulled the buyer into continuing to use the machines and make payments in the belief that the defects would be cured.97 Other courts agree. In Cardwell the mobile-home buyers told the seller of defects soon after moving in, the seller’s repairmen worked on the home for about nine months, and the buyers’ complaints and their attorney’s negotiations went on afterward, so the court could not call a twenty-one month delay unreasonable as a matter of law.98 In Ybarra v. Modern Trailer Sales, Inc. the New Mexico court said it could not hold nearly four years from contract to suit unreasonable as a matter of law, because the buyers had patiently endured the defects to give the seller time to cure them and had kept protesting throughout.99
The seller’s assurances produce the same extension. In Sumner v. Fel-Air, Inc. the buyer of an airplane learned shortly after delivery that title paperwork was missing, yet kept making monthly payments and revoked about a year later. The Alaska Supreme Court held that a seller’s assurances that a defect will be cured generally extend the reasonable time, and because the delay resulted directly from the seller’s repeated promises that the paperwork was coming, the seller could not rely on it.100 The assurance need not be a spoken promise. In Smith v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. a federal court treated the warranty to repair defects, together with ten returns of the truck for repair, as enough for a trier of fact to find the revocation timely, since a seller’s assurance, there implicit in the warranty, may extend the time.101
Bair v. A.E.G.I.S. Corp. shows what separates the two groups. The Florida court found a two-year delay reasonable for a boat buyer who inspected soon after delivery, promptly reported the leak, complained continually until the revocation, and was led to believe the seller would repair the boat. It distinguished an earlier satellite-system buyer who kept the system for about a year and a half and paid in full once it worked to his satisfaction.102 Two-year waits succeeded in Fablok and Bair while delays of months failed in EPN-Delaval and Euroworld, so the calendar predicts little. The successful buyers share a continuing record of complaint and a seller whose repairs or promises accounted for the wait, and the unsuccessful buyers share silence. Because the extension rests on the buyer’s reasonable reliance, a buyer who goes on waiting after repairs have plainly failed and complaints have stopped looks much more like the silent buyers.
Timing is one of three conditions in § 2-608(2). The condition that the goods not change substantially before revocation, and the requirement that the buyer notify the seller, come next.
No Substantial Change in the Goods
Section 2-608(2) adds a condition about the goods themselves: revocation must occur “before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects.”104 Reasonable time asks how long the buyer waited. This clause asks what happened to the goods while it waited, so a buyer can satisfy one and fail the other. Revocation returns the goods to the seller, so the condition in which they come back matters to the party who must take them. The official comment states the aim as “substantial justice in regard to the condition of the goods restored to the seller.”105
Acceptance has already weakened the seller’s position. A buyer who keeps goods makes it harder for the seller to cure the nonconformity or resell them, which is why revocation is allowed only on stricter terms.106 A seller that regularly handles a type of goods can usually repair, resell, or return them to commerce, but only if they come back in the form in which they were sold. Once the buyer has altered them, that advantage tends to disappear, and forcing altered goods back would hand the seller a loss that the buyer’s own handling created.107 The clause therefore sorts changes into two groups: those produced by the buyer’s handling or outside events, which bar revocation, and those produced by the goods’ own defects, which do not.
Processing is the plainest example of the first group. In Intervale Steel the buyer stamped all of the steel into parts before trying to undo the sale, and the court held revocation unavailable because a substantial change in condition had occurred that the steel’s own defect had not caused.108 The court added that it would misapply the Code to let the buyer’s rejection stand when the buyer could not have revoked its acceptance on the same facts.109 Resale and use work the same way. In Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co. the buyer first sought to revoke after the controllers had undergone a substantial change in condition. Only 7,260 of the 42,947 controllers had come back from the buyer’s customers, so the buyer could not hold the rest for the seller, a separate problem taken up later in this chapter.110 Cutting fabric, manufacturing goods into parts, reselling them, and using them after modifying them and maintaining them poorly belong in the same group.111
The buyer’s fault does not decide whether a change bars revocation. A buyer of fabric who learns of a defect only after cutting the cloth cannot revoke, even if it was not negligent in missing the defect sooner. The same holds for changes outside the buyer’s control, such as a fire that no defect in the fabric caused: the buyer cannot revoke by offering the seller the burned remains.112 The seller’s loss is the same whether the buyer was careless or unlucky, so the clause looks to the condition of the goods and leaves blame aside. The buyer also carries the burden of showing that the change falls within the exception. In Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp. the buyer returned 122 machines in used, improperly maintained condition and had modified 106 of them. The Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court erred in treating the revocation as timely, because the buyer had not shown that the changed condition resulted exclusively from the machines’ own defects.113
The exception for changes caused by “their own defects” applies the same reasoning in reverse. A seller whose goods fail from their own flaw cannot object that the failure left them in worse shape, since it would profit from deterioration its own product produced. A defective steering mechanism that makes a driver lose control after only 468 miles and leaves the car demolished is the standard illustration: the car’s condition has changed enormously, yet the defect caused the change, so it does not bar revocation.114 A machine with a faulty engine that starts a fire and destroys the machine falls in the same place.115 The fabric destroyed by an unrelated fire and the machine destroyed by its own engine end up as ashes alike, and the cause of the fire decides whether the buyer keeps the right to revoke. Royal Typewriter shows what the buyer must prove: it must trace the change to the defects, and a showing that defects may have contributed leaves it short.
Not every alteration is a substantial change. Courts read the clause to reach detrimental changes, those that reduce the goods’ value to the seller. If a buyer’s change has no effect on value or increases it, the seller is not harmed.116 In Village Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Porter the buyer noticed the exterior paint of a mobile home cracking and peeling and painted it, then revoked her acceptance because of defects in the home’s title. The seller argued that the painting was a substantial change. The Texas Court of Appeals rejected the argument, explaining that the requirement exists to “protect the seller from changes which deteriorate or take away from the value of the goods sold.”117 The jury had found that the painting raised the home’s value by $1,000, so the seller was left better off. The result and the steel decision differ in the direction of the change. Stamping steel into parts removed it from the form and market in which the seller dealt, while painting a home made it worth more to any later buyer. A change that leaves the seller no worse off, such as accident damage the buyer has fully repaired, does not bar revocation either.118 In Sumner a mechanic’s lien on an airplane was held not to be a material deterioration because it could be completely discharged by paying the amount due.119
A buyer who tries in good faith to make the goods work has also not changed them substantially. In ARB (American Research Bureau), Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc. the D.C. Circuit held that damage naturally flowing from attempts to make complex equipment work was not a substantial change within § 2-608(2).120 The reason follows from what the Code hopes buyers and sellers will do. Working the bugs out of equipment is the kind of adjustment the parties should be encouraged to attempt, and a rule that turned every attempt into a forfeiture would make a cooperative buyer pay for its cooperation. Continued use while awaiting a cure does not necessarily amount to a substantial change either.121 In Smith the buyer had driven a truck more than 48,000 miles. The court recognized that trucks depreciate with use but refused to hold as a matter of law that this truck had changed enough to defeat revocation, noting that the seller needed more evidence than an odometer reading.122
Two habits of analysis keep this clause from being misapplied. The question is whether a detrimental change of substance occurred and, if so, whether the goods’ own defects caused it. The buyer’s carelessness and the goods’ resemblance to what was delivered are beside the point. The clause is also separate from the reasonable-time requirement. The Illinois court in Basselen v. General Motors Corp. observed that a buyer who wrecks a car driving it off the lot could revoke at once and still have changed the car substantially, while a buyer who seals a car away for twenty years may have changed nothing and still revoke too late.123 A revocation problem therefore needs a separate answer to each condition.
Notice of Revocation
The final sentence of § 2-608(2) makes revocation an act the buyer must communicate: it “is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.”125 Until the notice reaches the seller, the sale stands as an accepted one, however firmly the buyer has decided that the goods are unacceptable. A buyer that resolves privately in January to give the goods back and says so only in March has revoked in March, so the reasonable-time requirement is measured by when notice is given. In Lynx the Maryland Court of Appeals treated notification within a reasonable time as a prerequisite to rejection under § 2-602, to a claim of breach under § 2-607, and to revocation under § 2-608, and it added that no such notice is effective until the buyer notifies the seller.126
The rule exists because revocation asks the seller to take back goods from a sale both sides had treated as complete. A seller that has not been told cannot retrieve the goods while they are still in useful condition, inspect them, offer to repair or replace them, or adjust the price, and a seller that first hears of the problem in a lawsuit has lost every one of those chances. Official Comment 5 names the governing considerations for the notice’s content: good faith, prevention of surprise, and reasonable adjustment.127 Lynx drew a working standard from them. The notice should inform the seller that the buyer has revoked, identify the particular goods, and set forth the nature of the nonconformity, because such notice corroborates the buyer’s good faith and gives the seller an opportunity to make a substitute performance that maintains good will or avoids litigation.128
The statute prescribes no form, so the question in each case is what the buyer’s communication actually told the seller, and three notices need to be kept apart. Notice of breach under § 2-607(3)(a) tells the seller that the transaction has gone wrong and preserves the damages claim, but it says nothing about returning the goods. Notices of rejection and of revocation both demand more, because each must inform the seller that the buyer does not wish to keep the goods.129 Comment 5 makes the same point by saying that more will generally be necessary than the mere notification of breach required by § 2-607.130 The reason is a difference in what the seller must do next. A seller told only that something is wrong may reasonably assume the buyer will keep the goods and claim damages, while a seller told that the goods are coming back must decide whether to cure, collect, or contest.
The buyers in Connecticut Investment Casting Corp. v. Made-Rite Tool Co. and Allis-Chalmers each gave notice of breach and treated it as notice of revocation. The Made-Rite buyer told the seller of two breaches, the late delivery and 179 nonconforming latches, and the court found nothing that could be construed as notice of revocation, because the buyer’s conversations pressed the seller to deliver and its actions were to rework the latches.131 The Allis-Chalmers buyer telephoned the dealer a few days after the purchase to complain that the tractor burned too much oil. The Washington court held that notice of breach is not equivalent to notice of revocation, because the latter, though it need not take any particular form and may be implied by conduct, must inform the seller that the buyer does not wish to keep the goods.132 The buyer later delivered the tractor back, which the court said might amount to revocation implied by conduct, but its pleadings showed that its concern was breach of warranty and damages, so recovery was confined to damages and the revocation defense failed.133
A communication also fails when the seller could read it as a complaint and nothing more. In Lynx the buyer’s only letter said that its cash flow had been interrupted “due in part to a quality problem” at the sellers. The court held the letter equivocal, found that it identified no contract, sale, or transaction, and refused to construe it as a rejection, a notice of breach, or a revocation.134 Testimony that a machine was returned because it was “unsatisfactory” was likewise too vague to carry the buyer’s burden.135 A buyer who takes goods back for repair has said just as little about giving them up. In Coxall v. Clover Commercial Corp. the buyer returned a used car once for repairs and did not go back although the problems persisted, and the court found no revocation because he testified to no statement or conduct communicating that he wanted to call off the deal.136 A trip to the repair shop is what a buyer who means to keep the car would also make, so the act cannot carry the weight of a revocation.
The notices that succeed tell the seller the one thing the equivocal ones leave out. In Cissell the buyer’s letter described the dryers’ defects in detail, stated that the buyer was attempting to “reject acceptance,” demanded that the seller remove the machines, and asked for damages, and the Colorado Court of Appeals held it adequate.137 The trial court had faulted the buyer for failing to give a “formal” notice. The appellate court answered that the Code requires no formal notice and that the test is whether the notice fairly apprises the seller that the buyer wants to give the goods back and receive a substitute or money in return.138 The buyer’s mislabel did no harm, because the letter’s content, not its vocabulary, told the seller what the buyer wanted. In Smith the buyer’s letter identified the defects that remained unremedied and stated, “you are hereby notified that Mr. Smith revokes his acceptance of the captioned vehicle.” The defendants’ attack went to its timing and to the condition of the truck, not to the content of the notice.139 Courts do not insist on magic words. The New Mexico court observed in Ybarra that an ordinary buyer probably learns of the remedy of revocation only after consulting a lawyer in desperation, and it required only that the buyer give a sufficient indication of revocation that the seller cannot be surprised.140
The standard also bends with the identity of the buyer, since Comment 5 makes the content requirements less stringent for a non-merchant.141 The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied that leniency in Cardwell, where counsel for the mobile-home buyers wrote that the buyers wanted a new home to replace the one they occupied and would not be satisfied until they received it.142 The court conceded that the letter perhaps lacked the clarity expected of a trained counselor in a commercial transaction, yet it held that a jury could reasonably read it as a revocation, because the seller had “reason to know” from the letter and the circumstances that the buyers had revoked.143 A buyer who asks for a replacement is offering to give back the goods in return for a substitute, which is the formulation Cissell used.
Conduct can carry the message when it is read together with what came before. In Sumner the buyer told the seller in December 1976 that it would cancel the contract if the bill of sale did not arrive, the bill of sale never came, and the buyer stopped its monthly payments after April 1977. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the finding that the stopped payments gave adequate notice, because notice of revocation may be oral or written, may take any form, and is enough if it informs the seller that the buyer is dissatisfied with the goods and does not wish to retain them. The seller conceded he knew by May 1977 that the buyer no longer wanted the plane.144
The stopped payments succeeded in Sumner because the buyer had already announced that it would cancel, and the scanner firm’s missed payments succeed in nothing because they follow no such announcement. Conduct after the notice can also undo it. A buyer must revoke unequivocally and, once it has given notice, must avoid any action indicating that it has reaccepted the goods, and whether post-revocation conduct amounted to reacceptance is a question for the trier of fact.145 A buyer that keeps using the goods after revoking, without seeking replacements to cover with adequate dispatch, risks losing the remedy.146 What a buyer may do with the goods after revoking is taken up in the discussion of holding and using the goods below.
A lawsuit is a poor substitute for notice. Lynx holds that a buyer that first asserts revocation in its pleadings defending the seller’s suit, with no antecedent notification, loses the defense for want of the condition precedent.147 Ybarra marks the narrow case where service of process arrives in time. The seller argued that first learning of the revocation from the process server defeats notice, and the court agreed that this will be true in most instances but held it untrue there. Service had been preceded by a continuing series of complaints and negotiations about the defective mobile home and by repeated failures to cure, so the process server bore only the formal tidings of revocation.148 The two decisions differ in what the seller already knew. The Lynx seller had received no antecedent notification tied to its contracts, so the pleading was a surprise, while the Ybarra seller had been negotiating over the same defects and had failed to cure them, so the revocation surprised no one, which is the test Comment 5 sets.
Because the buyer of accepted goods bears the burden of establishing the breach, the buyer must also prove what it told the seller and when. In New England Precision Grinding, Inc. v. Simply Surgical, LLC the buyer offered no evidence that it ever communicated an intent to revoke and none of the date on which it revoked, and it had continued to demand parts after voicing dissatisfaction with earlier shipments, so the Massachusetts Appeals Court found no effective revocation.149 A buyer that cannot point to a letter, a call, or conduct that told the seller the goods were coming back cannot rely on the seller’s having guessed it. Once effective notice is given, § 2-608(3), taken up in the next section, gives the buyer who justifiably revokes the same rights and duties with regard to the goods as if it had rejected them.150