Concept
Conditions and Their Excuse
Excuse of conditions
Excuse of Conditions
Conditions and Their Excuse
Some contractual duties are owed outright, and others are owed only if something happens first. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 224 defines a condition as "an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract becomes due."1 Each phrase of that definition does work. The event must be uncertain, which is why a promise to pay next Tuesday is unconditional: Tuesday is certain to arrive, so the passage of time cannot be a condition.2 The event must also precede the duty, as when a fire insurer must pay only if the insured house burns, even though the insured never promises that it will.3 The closing clause, "unless its non-occurrence is excused," makes room for everything else in this chapter. A condition problem therefore asks two questions in order: did the event occur, and if it did not, does the law treat the duty as arising anyway?
A condition is not a promise, and the difference determines what nonperformance means. The insured pays premiums, and the insurer owes nothing until the house burns. Yet the burning is no one's promise. It is the condition precedent to the insurer's duty to pay.4 When a condition is not satisfied, nonperformance is not a breach. The distinction between conditions and promises nonetheless often blurs in practice.5
Conditions are also sorted by where they come from. A fact operates as an express condition when the parties intended it to and said so in words. It operates as a condition implied in fact when that intention can reasonably be inferred from conduct other than words. It operates as a constructive condition when a court believes the parties would have intended it had they thought about it, or that justice requires it.6 Most of the examples below involve express conditions. One point of vocabulary: the Restatement (Second) reserves the word "condition" for events that must occur before a duty arises, traditionally called conditions precedent. It treats events that terminate a duty, traditionally called conditions subsequent, separately as an "event" under § 230. Courts, even those that generally follow the Second Restatement, still often use the traditional labels.7
Courts hold parties to an express condition as written, and that is the baseline against which every excuse doctrine operates. The litigation in enXco shows what is at stake. enXco sued NSP for breach of contract and lost on summary judgment. On appeal it argued that temporary impracticability and disproportionate forfeiture kept the court from strictly enforcing the relevant condition precedent, and the court of appeals affirmed.8 The excuse doctrines are therefore arguments a party must be prepared to win, not automatic rescues.
Maxton Builders v. Lo Galbo shows literal enforcement on small facts. The buyers' contract let them cancel upon written notice to the seller within three days if the real estate taxes exceeded a stated figure. The buyers' attorney telephoned the seller's counsel the day after the contract was made and also mailed a certified letter, which reached the seller on the sixth day. The court held that a written notice required by a contract is ineffective unless actually received within the stated time. The seller's side knew within a day that the buyers wanted out, but the condition called for written notice received in three days, and near compliance does not satisfy an express condition. The point is not harsh formalism for its own sake. A party who makes performance depend on an event has bargained for that protection, and a court that accepted a near miss would move the line the parties drew.
A house purchase conditioned on the buyer's obtaining mortgage financing shows how failure and excuse differ. Suppose the buyer applies in good faith to several lenders and every lender refuses. The condition has simply failed, the duty to purchase never arose, and declining to close breaches nothing. Now suppose the buyer makes no effort whatever to obtain a loan. A court may hold the financing condition excused because of the buyer's bad faith, and the same refusal to close is now a breach, since an excused condition leaves the duty unconditional.9
In both versions no loan exists on the closing date, and the buyer's words at the closing table are identical. Only the reason the condition failed differs, and that reason decides whether the duty to buy ever arose. A conditional promise ripens into a duty of immediate performance if its condition is fulfilled or excused.10 Excuse doctrines, then, ask who is responsible for the failure and whether enforcing it would be fair, not merely whether the event occurred.
One standard list names at least six ways a condition may be legally excused:
- a proper tender that the other party rejects;
- failure of a prior condition;
- anticipatory repudiation, voluntary disablement, or prospective inability of the other party to perform;
- waiver or estoppel;
- impossibility of performing the condition; and
- a judicial order to avoid a forfeiture.11
Prevention and repudiation share a formula in the Restatement (Second). Where a party's breach by non-performance contributes materially to the non-occurrence of a condition of one of its duties, the non-occurrence is excused.12 The same is true where the party's repudiation contributes materially to the non-occurrence.13 Impracticability, the last ground, draws on the Restatement's general discharge rule. Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without its fault by an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, its duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.14 The sections that follow take each ground in turn.