Concept
Silence and Duty to Disclose
Unilateral mistake
Silence and Duty to Disclose
Consider a variation on the facts of Johnson v. Healy. Healy sells a new home to Johnson, knowing that improper fill under the foundation has left the house defective. Johnson reasonably does not know of the defect, and Healy says nothing about the home's quality. Johnson cannot claim mutual mistake, because Healy was not mistaken about the foundation and the false belief was therefore not shared. Johnson can still avoid the contract, because Healy had a duty to disclose the defect.1
That result explains why this section sits inside the unilateral-mistake material. The usual mistake defense needs a mistake shared by both parties, and a one-sided mistake raises the question whether the line between mutual and unilateral mistake can be defended at all. It also raises the question of how closely unilateral mistake resembles misrepresentation.2 Nondisclosure is where those questions meet, because it gives a party who is alone in error a path to avoidance that does not depend on the other side sharing the error.
The duty is an exception, though, and contract law recognizes a defense for nondisclosure only in four narrow categories.3 They are:
- A representation that was true when made has become a misrepresentation (or become fraudulent or material) because of later events.
- A party knows that the other is mistaken about a basic assumption of the deal, and the nondisclosure amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.
- A party knows that disclosure would correct the other party's mistake about the contents or effect of a writing.
- A party must disclose because of a relation of trust and confidence with the other.
Only the second category turns on mistake, and it is the one that explains Johnson. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161(b), a party who knows the other is mistaken about a basic assumption of the deal must speak when silence "amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing." In its essence, the rule creates a duty to disclose where one party knows that the other is operating under a mistake and basic norms of honesty and fairness require disclosure.4 The rest of this section asks where that duty begins and where it ends.
Two policies fix its boundaries. The first favors speaking when the other party cannot find out for itself. Disclosure reduces transaction costs, because the uninformed party need not undertake a costly and ultimately useless investigation to uncover a defect that the other party already knows. A licensing rule built on this logic applies only when the licensee cannot reasonably ascertain the material defect.5 Johnson is in exactly that position, and Healy could end Johnson's ignorance with a single sentence.
The second policy favors silence when the knowledge was earned. Contract rules, and certainly not the modest doctrine of mistake, should not reduce or eliminate the rewards of those who invest in gathering information.6 Suppose a purchaser commissions a geological survey and concludes that a farm holds valuable copper and sulfur deposits. The purchaser offers a price that reflects only the land's value for farming, says nothing about the survey, and the farmer accepts. The farmer cannot avoid the sale for mistake. The purchaser performs a socially valuable service by doing the survey and has to be rewarded for its time and effort. It may seem slightly repellent that the reward comes from the farmer, but there appears to be no ready alternative: a rule that made the purchaser share the discovery would discourage investment in research, and we would end up with more lettuce and tomatoes but less copper and sulfur than we want.7 In the vocabulary of risk, a court may allocate the risk of the farmer's mistake to the farmer when it finds that reasonable in the circumstances.8
An owner who could have checked stands in a different position. In Sherwood v. Walker, the Walkers sold a cow named Rose. Even on the dissent's view of the facts, the buyer, Sherwood, only thought that Rose could be made to breed and had no hard facts about her condition. Even with such facts, Sherwood probably owed no duty to disclose, because the Walkers, as Rose's owners, reasonably should have ascertained the facts for themselves.9 The line between the Walkers and Johnson is the uninformed party's ability to protect itself. Johnson could not detect the fill beneath the foundation, while the Walkers could have learned what their own cow could do.
Nondisclosure and the added unilateral showing under § 153(b) often arise on the same facts, but they are separate routes. Section 153(b) asks whether the other party had reason to know of the mistake or whether its fault caused the mistake.10 That inquiry looks at what the other party knew or should have known and does not ask whether it owed a duty to speak. The duty-to-disclose route asks whether the silent party knew of the other's mistake about a basic assumption and whether its silence offended good faith. The overlap is easy to see in Johnson's case, because the case for rescission grows stronger if Healy knew or reasonably should have known that Johnson was unaware of the defect.11 A party who sees an error and keeps quiet to seize on it also weakens its own claim to protection. In the construction-bid setting, an experienced prime contractor that should have recognized a bid as too low would have no legitimate reliance interest and might even be guilty of fraudulent nondisclosure for keeping silent and seizing on the error.12
The two routes can part ways. In DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Services, Inc., salespeople on a cruise ship sold a diamond far below its value after mistaking a per-carat price for the total. The buyers saw how low the price was and said nothing. The store's nondisclosure theory failed because the store could readily have learned the diamond's value itself, the same reasoning that probably relieved Sherwood of any duty to the Walkers.13 The store still avoided the sale for unilateral mistake, because that route asks whether the buyers had reason to know of the error, and buyers who recognized how far below value the price sat satisfy that showing.14 A claimant who loses on nondisclosure should therefore test the § 153(b) route before giving up.
The silent party's conduct is only half of the inquiry, because the mistaken party's own conduct counts too. The more serious its negligence (gross negligence, recklessness, or dereliction of a duty owed to the other party), the likelier a court is to put the risk of the mistake on the party who could have avoided it by taking greater care, and carelessness can also tip the balance of the equities.15 Fault does not bar avoidance on its own, however. It bars avoidance only when it amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing, the same yardstick that governs the silent party's duty.16 The next section takes up that bar.