405 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1978)
In 1965 Ronald K. Johnson purchased a new one-family house in Naugatuck from its builder John J. Healy for $17,000.1 During negotiations Johnson asked about the quality of construction and Healy replied that the house was made of the best material, that he had built it, and that there was nothing wrong with it; these statements induced the purchase.2 Healy had been engaged in the real estate business for about thirty years but had built no houses other than this one, a fact not disclosed until after the sale closed.3
Between 1968 and 1971 the house settled unevenly, producing major displacements in foundation walls and substantial damage to the sewer lines.4 The settlement was caused by improper fill placed on the lot before Healy bought it as a building lot in 1963.5 Healy had no actual knowledge of the fill, and the building inspector who approved the construction plans likewise had no notice of any soil defects.
In 1971 Johnson sued Healy alleging misrepresentation and negligence.6 The trial court found for Johnson on the misrepresentation claims, for Healy on the negligence claims, and awarded Johnson $5000 in damages; both parties appealed.7 At the time of construction test borings to determine soil suitability were not customary for residential projects.8
Johnson claimed $882.50 for sewer repairs plus an estimated $27,150 for a new foundation, along with $5112 in additional expenditures incurred between 1965 and 1970.9 The trial court found that the cost of a new foundation would likely exceed the house's original $17,000 purchase price. In late 1971, when Johnson first complained, Healy offered to repurchase the property for the original price plus the repair expenses then represented to total about $5000.10
Whether the builder-vendor's statements about the quality of the new house constituted an express warranty supporting liability for innocent misrepresentation?11
Liability for innocent misrepresentation in the sale of a new home by a builder-vendor rests on principles of warranty under Connecticut law.12 It extends beyond sales of goods to real estate where material representations induce purchase.13 The vendor need not have actual or constructive knowledge of the defect.14
Yes. Healy's statements during the negotiations for the sale of the new house constituted material representations that reasonably induced Johnson to purchase the house.15 The trial court correctly concluded that these statements amounted to an express warranty of workmanlike construction and fitness for habitation.16 Liability for innocent misrepresentation attached even though the defendant lacked knowledge of the defective fill and even though no written warranties appeared in the contract or deed.17
The builder-vendor's statements about the quality of the new house constituted an express warranty supporting liability for innocent misrepresentation.18
Whether the builder-vendor had actual or constructive notice of the subsurface soil conditions for purposes of the negligence claims?19
No. Healy had no actual knowledge of the soil defects that caused the settlement.23 The building inspector approved the construction plans without notice of any soil defects.24 Test borings to determine soil suitability were not customary for residential construction at the time of the project.25 The trial court was not required to accept contrary testimony as persuasive, and its conclusion of absence of notice is supported by the evidence.26 Without notice the negligence claims cannot be sustained.27
The builder-vendor did not have actual or constructive notice of the subsurface soil conditions for purposes of the negligence claims.28
Whether the trial court's $5000 damages award was proper when measured neither by the cost of repairs nor by the difference in value between the property as warranted and as sold?29
Damages for breach of warranty are measured by the difference in value between the property as warranted and as sold.30 Costs of repair are disallowed when they would produce unreasonable economic waste exceeding the original contract price.31 Reliance expenses may serve as a surrogate only when properly allocated to losses incident to the breach.32
No. The trial court correctly refused to award the $27,150 estimated cost of a new foundation because that amount would exceed the original $17,000 purchase price and produce economic waste.33 However the $5000 award, derived by allocating part of the $5112 in expenditures plus the $882.50 sewer repair costs, was erroneous because the expenditures were not shown to be demonstrably incident to the breach and did not accurately approximate the diminution in value.34 The case must therefore be remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of damages measured by the proper standard.35
The trial court's $5000 damages award was not proper when measured neither by the cost of repairs nor by the difference in value between the property as warranted and as sold.36