Concept
Threats Improper Through Unfairness
Duress
Threats Improper Through Unfairness
Most pressure in a negotiation takes the form of a lawful threat: an employer will dismiss an at-will employee, a business will decline to renew a contract, a lender will refuse more credit. The law does not call such a threat improper merely because it works. A party may threaten consequences, even dire ones, that it could lawfully pursue without anyone’s agreement.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176(2) marks the point at which a threat of this kind nonetheless becomes improper.
The test has two halves joined by “and.” A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, and one of three further conditions is also met.2 The conditions are that the threatened act would harm the recipient without significantly benefiting the party making the threat, that the threat’s effectiveness was significantly increased by that party’s prior unfair dealing, and that what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.3 A claimant must prove both halves, and neither half suffices alone.
The four categories of § 176(1) condemn a threat by its method: a threatened crime or tort, a threatened criminal prosecution, a bad-faith threat of civil process, and a threatened breach of the duty of good faith.4 Nothing comparable taints the threats that § 176(2) governs, because each concerns something the threatener may lawfully do. The test therefore asks two questions. Unfair terms show that the pressure bought something the bargain did not justify. The further condition supplies a reason to call the pressure illegitimate, which a lopsided price cannot do alone, because a bad bargain is often only a bad bargain. And a troubling condition paired with a fair price leaves the victim with nothing the threatener gained improperly.
On an exam, a threat that fits none of the four categories in § 176(1) is not yet cleared, because § 176(2) is the next place to look. The first subsection below takes up the unfair-terms requirement, which every claim on this track must satisfy, and the next three take the further conditions one at a time.
Unfair Terms Requirement
Section 176(2) opens the second track with a condition that every claim on it must meet: the resulting exchange must not be on fair terms.5 The condition works as a gate. A claimant who cannot show a lopsided exchange never reaches the three further conditions, and a claimant who passes through has completed only half the showing. The gate exists because the threats under § 176(2) are lawful acts, so nothing in the method of pressure marks them as wrongful, and the fairness of the outcome becomes the first evidence that the pressure bought something the threatener had no right to.
Courts measure fairness by the degree of economic imbalance in the transaction. They seldom state it as a rationale, but it shapes how they read the facts, because duress generally will not be found unless the party exercising the coercion has been unjustly enriched.6 One court put the point in a sentence: “where there is adequacy of consideration, there is generally no duress.”7 The sentence needs careful handling, because adequacy plays a different role here than in the doctrine of consideration, where courts generally do not ask whether a promise was bought at a fair price. Under § 176(2) the price is evidence. It shows whether the party who applied the pressure walked away with value the bargain did not justify.
The remedy explains the gate. Remedies for duress aim at cancelling unjust gain.8 When the terms are fair, the pressuring party collected nothing beyond what the exchange was worth, so avoiding the contract would return little to the victim while stripping the other side of the price it paid. The gate also protects ordinary bargaining. Nearly every negotiating position says “agree, or I will do something I am entitled to do,” and a rule that treated each such threat as improper would put every hard bargain in doubt. Requiring unfair terms reserves the doctrine for pressure that produced a lopsided result.
Capps v. Georgia Pacific Corp. shows the posture in which the question often arises. The court, reviewing a motion for summary judgment, began from the rule that its first task was to decide whether genuine issues of material fact existed, and to answer that in a case about a release it had to examine the doctrine allowing avoidance of a release for economic duress.9 Whether an exchange was lopsided turns on what each side gave and received, so a claimant must show the imbalance with facts and cannot assume it from the victim’s distress.
Imbalance carries a claimant through the gate and no further. Absent a wrongful threat, driving a hard bargain is not duress, and that remains true even when one party profits from the other’s financial distress.10 A lender that charges a legal but exorbitant rate to a borrower no other lender will serve has made no threat by insisting that the rate is nonnegotiable, because a party may decline to contract at all unless the other side accepts its terms.11 A harsh price paid by a distressed party is therefore necessary on this track and never sufficient. The claimant must still establish one of the three further conditions, which make the threatened conduct wrongful.
The gate belongs to § 176(2) alone, and carrying it over to § 176(1) is an easy exam mistake. The four categories of § 176(1) are improper whatever the fairness of the resulting exchange.12 The Sweaty Shoppe hypothetical shows the consequence. The terms of the contract there were fair and commercially reasonable, and that did not matter: once the elements of improper threat and inducement are established, Sweaty Shoppe does not have to show that the resulting contract was substantively unfair. Because the terms were not unfair, duress is a better basis for avoidance than unconscionability.13 Where the coercion is extreme, the law’s interest in protecting individual freedom overrides any inquiry into the unfairness of the transaction.14
Harm Without Benefit
Section 176(2)(a) supplies the first of the three conditions. When the exchange is not on fair terms, a threat is improper if the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party making the threat.16 The unfair-terms gate must already be open, because § 176(2) makes a threat improper only if the exchange is unfair and a listed condition is also present.17 Clause (a) then turns to the threatened act itself. It is met only when carrying out that act would hurt the recipient and bring the threatener nothing of significance. An unfair price attached to a threat the threatener would gladly carry out is a hard bargain. A pointless threat attached to a fair price leaves nothing that the threatener took improperly.
The clause rests on a view of what a threat ordinarily is. A party who would profit from doing what it threatens is announcing the course it will take in its own interest unless the deal changes, and that is bargaining, even if the recipient resents it. A threat whose execution would give the threatener nothing has no business purpose of its own. No legitimate interest of the threatener sits on the scale against the recipient’s harm, so the threat does one job only, which is to extract the concession. The general statement of the doctrine describes the same pattern: impropriety reaches threatened behavior that exceeds the legitimate rights of the party applying the pressure, including spiteful or vexatious conduct that would cause the victim distress.18
The benefit that counts is the benefit of carrying out the threatened act. The gain from the victim’s yielding cannot count, because every threatener gains from that, and a test the concession itself satisfied would condemn every threat. The word significantly matters too, since a trivial or incidental gain from carrying out the threat does not supply the business purpose the clause looks for.
The employment cases follow the same logic. A threat to terminate the at-will employment of the victim, or of a relative or close acquaintance of the victim, unless the victim consents to an agreement unconnected with the employment, has been found to support a duress defense.19 Because many courts now bar an employer from firing an at-will employee for improper reasons, a threat to discharge for refusing to assent to an unrelated transaction is very possibly a threat of a wrongful breach and in some circumstances could be a tort.20 The employer’s power to dismiss exists to run the business, and in the clock hypothetical it is wielded to buy a clock.
On an exam, ask what the threatened act would accomplish for the threatener apart from the pressure it creates. A real business gain makes the threat a bargaining position, and clause (a) fails. No gain makes the threat leverage, and clause (a) is met when the terms are unfair. A threat that fails clause (a) is not cleared if the terms are unfair, because clauses (b) and (c) remain, and the next two subsections take them up. Whichever condition succeeds, the claimant must still prove inducement and the absence of a reasonable alternative.21
Prior Unfair Dealing
Section 176(2)(b) supplies the second condition. When the exchange is not on fair terms, a threat is improper if its effectiveness in inducing assent is significantly increased by the threatener’s prior unfair dealing.23 The unfair-terms gate again comes first.24 Where clause (a) examined what carrying out the threat would do, clause (b) looks backward and asks what the threatener did before making it. The claimant must show two things together: unfair dealing by the threatener that came earlier, and a link between that conduct and the threat’s power strong enough to count as a significant increase.
The clause answers a question about where a lawful threat gets its strength. A threat to decline further dealing, or to withhold something the threatener may lawfully withhold, moves a victim only to the extent the victim cannot absorb the consequence, so the victim’s vulnerability does most of the work. When that vulnerability is simply a fact of the victim’s life, the threatener has done nothing wrong by meeting it. When the threatener created or deepened it through earlier unfair dealing, the pressure is the threatener’s own product, and the concession is collected with strength borrowed from the prior wrong. The word significantly keeps the clause from reaching every misstep, since a trivial contribution to the victim’s plight leaves the threat about as effective as it would have been anyway.
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. supplies an example of earlier conduct, as Totem told it. Totem, which operated a tug and barge, alleged that Alyeska had represented that about 1,800 to 2,100 tons of regular uncoated pipe would be loaded in Houston and that perhaps 6,000 or 7,000 tons more would come aboard at later stops along the west coast. When the tug and barge arrived, Totem found 6,700 to 7,200 tons of coated pipe, steel beams, and valves, haphazardly and improperly piled, waiting in the yard. The barge had to be remodeled, extra cranes and stevedores were needed, and loading took thirty days instead of the three Totem had expected. Alyeska also delayed in assuring Totem that it would pay the added expense.25
The court’s own test makes the causal link explicit. Duress exists, it said, where one party involuntarily accepted the terms of another, circumstances permitted no other alternative, and those circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the other party.26 The test is not framed through the Restatement’s clause, but its third element asks the same causal question. Allegations like Totem’s matter under it only if the earlier conduct produced the circumstances that left the claimant with no alternative.
Hackley v. Headley shows a claim failing for want of that link. The only duress Headley could point to lay in the defendants’ failure to meet their pecuniary obligation promptly, at a time when he was pressed with the necessity of meeting his bank paper. The court observed that it was not pretended the defendants had done anything to bring Headley to the condition that made the money so important to him, or that they were in any way responsible for his embarrassment except by failing to pay. It refused to let the validity of the bargain turn on the claimant’s necessities rather than the defendants’ conduct, since a contract valid with a man easy in his circumstances would otherwise become invalid when the other party was pressed.27 The difference between the two cases lies in history. Totem points to conduct that preceded the pressure and allegedly helped create it, while in Hackley the defendants’ only conduct was the failure to pay, and nothing they did explained the claimant’s need.
The broader economic-duress cases press the same causal question, and the next major section takes them up, including Judge Posner’s opinion in Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co.
On an exam, the question this clause poses is one of history: what did the threatener do before the threat, and did that conduct create or deepen the weakness the threat exploits? A student who notes that the victim was desperate has described the victim, and the clause asks about the threatener. Earlier misconduct that cannot be tied to the victim’s inability to resist falls short, and so does earlier misconduct paired with fair terms. A claimant who satisfies the clause has established only the improper-threat element, so inducement and the absence of a reasonable alternative must still be shown.28 Clause (c), taken up next, is the catch-all for threats that are otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.29
Illegitimate Use of Power
Section 176(2)(c) supplies the last condition: when the exchange is not on fair terms, a threat is improper if what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate ends.31 Clauses (a) and (b) each describe a specific pattern, and clause (c) is the catch-all for wrongful pressure that fits neither. The unfair-terms gate still controls, so a claimant who cannot show a lopsided exchange never reaches the question whether a power was used illegitimately.32
The clause draws its content from the idea of abuse of a right. In one court’s words, a threat is wrongful if it is “an abuse of the powers of the party making the threat; that is, any threat the purpose of which was not to achieve the end for which the right, power, or privilege was given.”33 Every power a bargainer holds, whether to fire, to withhold a performance, or to decline to renew, exists to serve a function, and a threat to use it is legitimate when the demand advances that function. The inquiry is the fit between the power and the demand. Impropriety in this broad sense reaches threatened behavior that goes beyond the legitimate rights of the party applying the pressure or that abuses those rights.34
An open-ended clause is needed because a mismatched demand charges the victim a price for the absence of an act the holder had no legitimate reason to perform. The holder of a power may use it for its proper purpose without anyone’s consent. When the holder offers to forgo it in return for something unrelated, the holder collects value the power was never meant to produce, and the victim pays because the threatened loss is real. A closed list could not capture this, because the levers available to people in positions of power are as varied as the relationships that create power.
The employer’s power to dismiss at-will employees shows the principle at work. An employer who threatens to fire employees unless they sign an arbitration agreement or a covenant not to compete has threatened a lawful act and made a demand about the employment itself, and such a threat generally does not support a finding of duress.35 Both agreements set the terms on which the employment continues, so the power to end the relationship is being used for the kind of end it serves. An employee offered the choice between being fired for cause and resigning is in a similar position, and the resignation usually cannot be avoided, unless the threat to fire was made for bad-faith reasons or came with threats to ruin the employee’s reputation.36 A bad-faith reason or a threat to ruin a reputation supplies an end the power to dismiss was never given to reach.
An employer who tells the same at-will employees that they will be fired unless they sell their shares in the corporation to the employer has used the identical power for a different end. Dismissal is lawful, but the shares have nothing to do with anyone’s job, so the threat abuses the employer’s rights, and an employee who yields may recover the shares if the trier of fact finds that the threat coerced the sale.37 A threat to terminate an at-will employee, or a relative or close acquaintance of the employee, unless the victim consents to an agreement not connected with the employment has likewise been found to support a duress defense.38 Wrongful-discharge decisions reinforce the result. Because many courts now bar an employer from firing an at-will employee for improper reasons, a threat to discharge for refusing an unrelated transaction may amount to a threatened wrongful breach and, in some circumstances, a tort.39 A claimant may sometimes place such a threat in a § 176(1) category and avoid the unfair-terms showing altogether, while clause (c) does its own work where the discharge would be lawful in itself and the wrong lies in the purpose it serves.
A catch-all raises the worry that every threat becomes suspect, and the doctrine answers with firm boundaries. The unfair-terms gate controls first, so a fair exchange ends the inquiry however unrelated the demand may seem. The remaining elements also stand: the threat must have induced the assent and left the victim no reasonable alternative.40 What counts as a reasonable alternative is a question of fact, and an available legal remedy, or a market source of similar goods, services, or funds, may supply one.41 The clause also leaves alone consequences a party may lawfully pursue without anyone’s agreement. An employee who has become indispensable may threaten not to renew an employment contract unless the employer agrees to a substantial raise, a person with a colorable tort claim may threaten to sue unless the tortfeasor settles, and a party may refuse to contract at all unless the other side accepts its proffered terms.42 Each of those demands concerns the very thing the threatened power controls. A refusal to pay under a contract until a good-faith dispute is settled or adjudicated is likewise not duress, and a refusal to settle is not a wrongful threat.43
The fourth step carries most of the exam risk. An unrelated demand met at a fair price leaves the gate closed, and the claim ends there however suspicious the demand looks.