Concept
Statute and Modified Contracts
Statute of Frauds and oral modification
Statute and Modified Contracts
A signed contract rarely stays fixed. Closing dates slip, prices move, and a job runs longer than planned, often through a phone call that leaves nothing on paper. Each change raises a Statute of Frauds question that the original signature does not answer: must the change itself be in writing? The question arises only when the contract falls in a class the statute covers. Two such classes are the contract for the sale of an interest in land1 and, under the UCC, the contract for the sale of goods for $500 or more.2
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 149 answers in two sentences.3 For a contract that modifies but does not rescind an earlier one, the second contract is treated as containing the originally agreed terms as modified. The statute may, however, apply independently of the original terms to a contract modifying a transfer of property.
A modification needs its own rule because it is a new agreement, made after the original writing was signed. That writing records the bargain as it stood on signing day and says nothing about what the parties later told each other. Two difficulties follow. The first is classification. Viewed alone, a change is often too small to look like a sale of land or goods (a closing date moved two weeks, a price trimmed by a few thousand dollars), so a court that asked only what the change concerns would let many changes through. Section 149 avoids that result by testing the contract as it would stand after the change. The second difficulty is a boundary. The rule governs contracts that modify without rescinding, so a court must sometimes decide whether the parties adjusted their deal or ended it and began again, and the answer can change enforceability.
This rule governs form only. Whether a modification is binding in substance is a separate question. At common law a promise that modifies a contract must be supported by consideration, and Article 2 of the UCC drops that requirement for sales of goods.4 A change can therefore satisfy the writing requirement and still fail for want of consideration. The subsections below take up the as-modified test, the qualification for transfers of property, and the line between modification and rescission.
The As-Modified Rule
To decide whether the statute requires a writing for a change, a court first builds the contract as the change would leave it. Under § 149, a later agreement that modifies but does not rescind produces a second contract “treated as containing the originally agreed terms as modified.”5 The court then tests that assembled contract against the statute like any other agreement. If it falls in a covered class, the change needs a writing signed by the party against whom it is enforced. If it falls in none, the parties may change the deal by word of mouth.
The test looks at the whole deal because a modification fixes what the parties are now bound to do, and the writing requirement should follow those obligations. A signed writing that records only the superseded bargain cannot corroborate the new one. The test also cuts the other way: when the contract as changed stays outside every covered class, nothing calls for a writing, however the deal began.
The size of the change does not matter. Standing alone, a $20,000 price adjustment is not a sale of land, and a court that asked only what the change concerns might let it through. The as-modified rule asks about the contract that would exist after the change, and that contract is a land sale for $220,000. The original writing records only the $200,000 deal, so it cannot supply the missing proof of the higher price.
When the statute blocks a change, the change is ineffective, but the parties' conduct can still matter. Take a written sale of goods for $1,500, with delivery due in ten days. An oral agreement to extend delivery by twenty days is an ineffective oral modification, yet if the seller relies on the extension and delays delivery, the buyer has waived the original date.6 The sections below on unenforceable modifications and reliance take up those consequences.
The same test frees changes that leave a contract outside the statute, so the rule does not demand a writing for every modification.
A change can also pull an oral contract into the statute for the first time. Because the contract as modified is the one tested, an agreement that began oral and enforceable can come to need a writing if its new terms place it in a covered class. The one-year provision shows this most cleanly: lengthening the time for performance can push an entire contract beyond a year.
Two limits sit on this test. The words “modifying but not rescinding” confine it to changes that adjust a continuing contract, so a court must sometimes decide whether the parties adjusted or ended their agreement; the last subsection takes up that line.7 The second sentence of § 149 adds a qualification for transfers of property, which the next subsection takes up. The order of operations is fixed: assemble the contract as modified, then ask whether the statute covers it.
Modifications Transferring Property
The second sentence of § 149 gives the statute a second way in. The statute “may, however, apply independently of the original terms to a contract to modify a transfer of property.”9 The first sentence assembles the whole contract as modified, so the classification of the original deal drives the answer. The second sentence looks at the modifying promise alone. If that promise is of a kind the statute covers, it needs a signed writing, whatever the status of the contract it modifies.
Land supplies the clearest example. The land contract provision reaches a contract for the sale of an interest in land,10 so a modifying promise to transfer such an interest comes within the statute on its own terms, even when it modifies an oral contract that is itself outside the statute. Without the independent route, a party could escape the land provision by calling a promise to convey land an adjustment of some unrelated deal.
A modification that moves no property stays under the as-modified analysis, and the contrast shows which fact carried the result in the scene above.
Read the sentence only as far as its words go. It says the statute “may” apply independently, and it speaks of a contract to modify a transfer of property. It does not say that every oral modification needs a writing, or that the original contract's status never matters. Work in two steps. First ask whether the contract as modified falls within the statute. Then ask whether the modifying promise is itself of a covered kind, with an interest in land as the clearest example. The common error is to reason that a change to an enforceable oral contract needs no writing because the original needed none, which treats the first route as the only one.
Modification Versus Rescission
The words “modifying but not rescinding” in § 149 confine the as-modified rule to agreements that adjust a contract that continues to exist.12 A modification keeps the original contract alive and rewrites some of what each side owes, which leaves a deal for a court to reassemble and test against the statute. A rescission discharges the duties on both sides, discharge being any means by which a contractual duty is extinguished. Once a rescission takes effect, no continuing contract remains for § 149 to describe.13 Where the line falls therefore decides whether the as-modified rule applies at all.
At common law, parties may discharge their duties by mutually agreeing to rescind, so long as no third party's vested rights are affected. Where duties remain executory on each side, each party's giving up the right to the other's performance is supported by consideration.14 A rescission need be in writing only if the agreement to rescind would itself produce a transfer of title to land, as the surrender of a long-term interest in property would.15 Outside that exception, an oral rescission is effective even though the contract it cancels was within the statute. State statutes providing that a written contract can be modified only by another writing have usually been read to reach modifications and not rescissions, and at common law a contract that says it can be modified only by a written document can still be rescinded orally.16
The land exception applies the logic of the second sentence of § 149: the statute looks at what the later agreement does, whatever the parties call it.17 A buyer who holds the deed and orally agrees to hand the land back has agreed to a reconveyance, and the reconveyance needs a signed writing by the same measure as the original conveyance. A cancellation of a land contract that remains executory, where no title has passed, leaves nothing to convey and stays within the general rule. Whether an oral surrender of a leasehold suffices is a question for real property law.18
Because an oral rescission is effective and an oral modification of a land contract is not, parties are tempted to recast a modification as a rescission followed by a new contract. The device is familiar from the consideration cases. The common-law rule is that a promise modifying a contract must be supported by consideration,19 and Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc. upheld a new contract as the product of a mutual rescission followed by a valid new agreement. The Restatement (Second), in comment b to § 89, calls that rationale “fictitious” when the rescission and the new contract are simultaneous, as they were there.20 A court has good reason to bring the same skepticism to the statute. If announcing a “rescission” in the same breath as a new price were enough, § 149 could be avoided by the choice of a word.
Even a genuine rescission leaves one further step. A replacement contract is a new agreement, so any statute that reaches it applies to it on its own terms, and discharging the old duties orally supplies no writing for the new promise.
The UCC treats one version of this problem differently for sales of goods. Under § 2-209(2), a signed agreement that excludes rescission other than by a signed writing requires that any rescission be in writing, so the common-law freedom to rescind orally gives way where such a clause appears.21