131 N.E. 887 (N.Y. 1921)
On August 31, 1917, Louis Schwartzreich entered into a written employment contract with Bauman-Basch, Inc. The agreement provided that Schwartzreich would commence work as a designer of coats and wraps on November 22, 1917, and continue for twelve months at a weekly salary of ninety dollars.1
In October 1917, Schwartzreich was offered a higher salary by another concern. An officer of the defendant company learned of this and spoke with the plaintiff, ultimately offering him one hundred dollars per week to stay with the company.2
On October 17, 1917, the parties executed a new contract in the same terms as the original but with the increased salary of one hundred dollars per week.3 Simultaneously, the plaintiff returned his copy of the first contract, the signatures on which were torn off, and the defendant’s officer indicated that the new agreement replaced the old one.4
Schwartzreich worked for the defendant until December 1917, at which point he was discharged. He brought suit seeking damages based on the October 17 contract.5
The trial court submitted the case to the jury, which rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial justice then set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Term reversed this action and reinstated the jury’s verdict and the judgment for the plaintiff.6
Whether a contract of employment can be set aside or terminated by the parties to it and a new one made or substituted in its place?7
A contract may be canceled by mutual consent and a new one made in its place. The determining factor is the rescission by consent. Provided this is the expressed and acted upon intention, the time of the rescission, whether a moment before or at the same time as the making of the new contract, is unimportant.8
Yes. On August 31, 1917, Louis Schwartzreich entered into a written employment contract with Bauman-Basch, Inc. The agreement provided that Schwartzreich would commence work as a designer of coats and wraps on November 22, 1917, and continue for twelve months at a weekly salary of ninety dollars. In October 1917, Schwartzreich was offered a higher salary by another concern. An officer of the defendant company learned of this and spoke with the plaintiff, ultimately offering him one hundred dollars per week to stay with the company.
On October 17, 1917, the parties executed a new contract in the same terms as the original but with the increased salary of one hundred dollars per week. Simultaneously, the plaintiff returned his copy of the first contract, the signatures on which were torn off, and the defendant’s officer indicated that the new agreement replaced the old one. Schwartzreich worked for the defendant until December 1917, at which point he was discharged. He brought suit seeking damages based on the October 17 contract.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury, which rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial justice then set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Term reversed this action and reinstated the jury’s verdict and the judgment for the plaintiff. The evidence most favorable for the plaintiff sustains a finding that the first contract was destroyed, canceled, or abrogated by the consent of both parties.9 This occurred when the new contract was signed and the old copy returned with signatures removed.10
This mutual consent to rescind supplied the consideration for the new agreement.11
A contract of employment can be set aside or terminated by the parties to it and a new one made or substituted in its place.12
Whether it is competent to end one contract and make another at the same time?13
Both transactions can take place at the same time. Reason and authority support the conclusion that both transactions can take place at the same time.14
Yes. The parties executed the new contract and canceled the old one simultaneously on October 17, 1917.15 The plaintiff gave his copy of the old contract back to Mr. Bauman at the moment the new contract was signed.16 Mr. Bauman stated that the plaintiff did not need the old contract anymore because the new one took its place.17 The trial justice correctly charged the jury that if the old contract was canceled by mutual consent prior to or at the time of the new contract, consideration existed for the October 17 agreement.18
The jury found for the plaintiff on this factual question.19 The evidence supports that finding. The Court of Appeals therefore affirmed the judgments below that upheld the verdict.20
It is competent to end one contract and make another at the same time.21