Concept
Webb v. McGowin and Material Benefit
Promise for a benefit previously received
Webb v. McGowin and Material Benefit
Webb v. McGowin tests the past-consideration barrier with facts about as sympathetic as a case can offer. Webb, a workman at a lumber mill, was about to drop a heavy pine block from an upper floor when McGowin, the company's president, suddenly appeared directly beneath it. Webb went over the side with the block to divert its fall, saved McGowin from death or serious injury, and crippled himself in the process.1 McGowin then promised to pay Webb $15 every two weeks for life, and he paid regularly until he died. His executors stopped the payments, arguing that the promise lacked consideration.2
The executors had a strong argument under ordinary exchange analysis. Contract doctrine looks for an element of exchange, and the Restatement notes that a proposal of a gift is not an offer because it lacks one.3 The rescue was also finished before McGowin said a word, so his promise could not have induced it, and no inducement means no consideration and no contract.4 The court nonetheless found strict application of that rule very unjust, particularly because McGowin's payments until his death showed that he seriously meant to honor his promise.5 It reversed the order sustaining the demurrer, a pleading challenge that tests whether the complaint states a claim if its allegations are true.6
The court reached its result by qualifying the general rule. A later promise is enforceable, it said, where the promisor, “having received a material benefit from the promisee, is morally bound to compensate him for the services rendered and in consideration of this obligation promises to pay.” The promise is then “an affirmance or ratification of the services rendered carrying with it the presumption that a previous request for the service was made.”7 The court added a second support: McGowin was benefited, Webb was injured, and “[b]enefit to the promisor or injury to the promisee is a sufficient legal consideration for the promisor's agreement to pay.”8 That formulation asks what the promisor gained or the promisee lost. It does not ask whether either was sought in exchange for the other, so it fits a rescue that no one bargained for. The holding thus rests on three things: a material benefit to the promisor, a moral obligation to compensate it, and a later promise that the court treats as confirming an earlier request.
Webb extended an older line of cases. 9 Mills v. Wyman framed the older rule narrowly: a moral obligation supports a later promise only where a legal obligation once existed, as with a debt barred by the statute of limitations or discharged in bankruptcy. Mills also refused to bend, declaring that the rule against enforcing a bare promise “is universal in its application, and cannot be departed from to suit particular cases in which a refusal to perform such a promise may be disgraceful.”10 Webb reasoned from the narrow exceptions courts had developed for discrete situations like these to a broader doctrine, under which moral obligation can overcome the past-consideration problem.11
The two cases differ on who received the benefit. In Webb the promisor himself was the beneficiary of the rescue, whereas in Mills he was not.12 Read together, the decisions suggest that moral obligation can support a promise without traditional consideration only if the promisor was personally benefited or enriched by the promisee's sacrifice, so that the promisee has a just and reasonable claim to compensation. Webb is as clear a case of enrichment and sacrifice as one could imagine.13
The court also stressed that no gift was involved. “[T]he services rendered by appellant were not gratuitous,” it said, and it found proof in McGowin's agreement to pay and Webb's acceptance of payment.14 That proof is thin, because both events came after the rescue and say little about what Webb intended when he acted. The allegation nevertheless mattered. The case came up on a demurrer, so the court had to accept as true that Webb had not conferred the benefit gratuitously, an allegation the complaint apparently grounded in the fact that Webb was working at the mill when he acted.15 Webb therefore holds that a complaint alleging a non-gratuitous benefit to the promisor states a claim. It says little about a bystander who acted from pure goodwill.
The presumed prior request is where the reasoning breaks down. A request supports consideration because it shows that the promisor sought the performance as the price of his promise. McGowin had asked for nothing: he appeared suddenly beneath a falling block, and Webb acted in an instant to save him.16 Treating the later promise as a prior request asserts a fact that the events in the complaint do not support, and a rule that works only by asserting what the court knows to be untrue is a legal fiction. The court created fictions about implied previous requests to satisfy the requirement of consideration,17 and it also deemed the detriment contemporaneous with the promise.18 The sequence problem remains underneath these labels, because an act completed long before the promise cannot have been induced by it.19
What does the work in Webb is McGowin's personal receipt of a material benefit for which Webb could justly demand compensation. Once that is established, the moral obligation and the presumed request add nothing.20 The court could have said so directly, holding that a promise to pay for a benefit received is enforceable as a distinct obligation, separate from bargained-for exchange, whenever the promisee materially benefited the promisor without intending a gift and the promisor then promised to pay.21 Webb thus reached the right result for the wrong reason, and a few other courts have followed its suspect reasoning.22 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts took the direct route in §86. It adopted Webb's expansion without the fiction and made the earlier benefit the basis of a distinct cause of action,23 an approach the next section develops.24
Harrington v. Taylor refused enforcement on facts that closely resemble Webb's. A wife fleeing her husband's assault took refuge in the plaintiff's house. The husband forced his way in, and in the struggle the wife knocked him down and raised an ax to strike him. The plaintiff intervened, and the blow severely mutilated her hand while saving the husband's life. He later promised orally to pay for her damages and then refused. The North Carolina Supreme Court held the promise unenforceable, reasoning that a humanitarian act voluntarily performed supplies no consideration, however much gratitude might move the husband to help her.25
Set the two decisions side by side and look for the variable that moved the result. In each, the promisor was the person whose life was saved, the rescuer suffered a permanent injury, the promise followed the rescue, and the promisor or the promisor's estate eventually refused to pay. The benefit to the promisor, the size of the sacrifice, and the timing of the promise therefore cannot separate the outcomes. What differs is whether the benefit was conferred as a gift. Webb's complaint alleged non-gratuitous services, and the court accepted that on demurrer. The Harrington court treated the intervention as a voluntary humanitarian act.26 Whether that variable truly reconciles the cases is open to argument. A court inclined toward Harrington could call almost any rescue voluntary, since rescuers rarely act for pay, while a court inclined toward Webb could read a promise to pay as evidence that the rescue was no gift. That instability explains why a cleaner formulation was needed. Run in sequence, the questions sort all three cases: Mills fails because the promisor received no benefit,27 Harrington fails because the court saw a voluntary humanitarian act, and Webb succeeds because the promisor was himself saved and the complaint alleged that the services were not gratuitous.