Concept
Terms of the Contract
Acceptance terms and timing: mirror image rule, mailbox rule, and UCC § 2-207
Terms of the Contract
Once the writings have formed a contract under subsection (1), the question shifts from whether a deal exists to what the deal says. Section 2-207(2) answers it for the terms the reply added: they are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they become part of the contract unless an exception applies.1 The rules belong to Article 2, which applies to transactions in goods.2
The subsection operates only on a reply that is an acceptance. A reply that is a counteroffer forms no contract on the writings, so subsection (2) has nothing to sort. A counteroffer leads to a contract only if the other side accepts it or if performance follows as subsection (3) contemplates.3 Subsection (2) is therefore the second step in the section's sequence, and it assumes that the first step has succeeded.
The wording sounds generous to the offeree, since it says that added terms enter the contract, but the “unless” is a very big one. The exceptions confine the default to relatively unimportant terms in a small range of cases, and in most disputes the offeree does not succeed in adding its terms. The exceptions need not all be satisfied: if any one applies, the added term stays out.4 A student who reads only the opening words of the subsection will predict the wrong result on most problems, which is why the exceptions deserve more attention than the default.
The subsection also has a gap on its face. Subsection (1) lets a reply operate as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered,5 but subsection (2) speaks only of the additional terms.6 What becomes of a term that conflicts with the offer is left open, and the last subsection of this part takes it up. The part proceeds in order: the default and who qualifies for it, then the three exceptions one at a time, then different terms.
Proposals and the Merchant Rule
Section 2-207(2) does its work in two sentences. The first reduces every term the reply added to a proposal for addition to the contract. The second lets a proposal enter the contract without anyone saying yes, but only between merchants and only if none of three exceptions applies.7 The next three subsections take up the exceptions. This one explains why added terms are only proposals and who qualifies for the default.
A reply that is a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance forms a contract on the dickered terms the parties matched, such as goods, quantity, price, and delivery, before anyone has read the fine print.8 Neither side may have noticed the mismatched standard terms, and each is likely to assume it has a deal because the transaction-specific terms agree.9 A term added in the reply therefore tries to change a bargain that already exists, and the other party has not agreed to the change. When a contract is recognized under subsection (1), the additional terms are treated as proposals under subsection (2), which deems them accepted when the transaction is between merchants.10
How the reply words its addition decides whether subsection (2) applies at all. If the acceptance is expressly conditional on the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms, no contract is recognized under subsection (1), and the transaction aborts at that point.11 Language that merely suggests a term does not have that effect. A court may read an acceptance's wording on an additional or different term as only suggestive, or precatory. The result is a contract on the offeror's terms, which the offeror may then modify by accepting the offeree's additional proposal.12
Between merchants, the second sentence reverses the usual fate of an unaccepted proposal: the term enters the contract automatically, and the party resisting it must bring itself within an exception. The default rests on what merchants are expected to know. A merchant offeror understands that acknowledgments commonly carry additions, can read the reply when it arrives, and can object in a sentence, so its silence reasonably signals that routine additions are acceptable. A consumer or occasional buyer has no such sophistication and no trade practice against which to judge whether a term is routine, so the law asks for express agreement before the term binds. Article 2 also leaves untouched any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or other specified classes of buyers,13 and the merchant limitation works in the same protective direction.
Whether both parties are merchants is therefore the first question. A merchant includes a person who deals in goods of the kind involved. The lumber illustration treats Seaman's and Ajax as merchants because Seaman's sells lumber and Ajax builds pianos with it.14 The Code's definition also reaches a person who, by occupation, holds out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved, but not an occasional buyer or seller, even one who has periodically bought such goods. The second sentence applies only when both parties qualify.15 Authors count the barriers differently, some listing merchant status as the first of four and others treating it as a threshold followed by three other barriers, but the sequence is the same either way.16
The result changes when one party falls outside the definition.
The acknowledgment is an acceptance, and the clause is a proposal. Rod is not a merchant, because an occasional buyer falls outside the definition even if he has periodically bought such goods. The clause therefore does not become part of the contract unless Rod specifically agreed to modify the contract by adding it.17
The same rule decided a dispute over a computer maker's standard terms, which the maker had enclosed in the box for the buyer to read afterward. A federal court applying Kansas law held that, because the buyer was not a merchant, additional or different terms in the standard terms did not become part of the agreement unless the buyer expressly agreed to them. The maker argued that keeping the computer more than five days showed acceptance of the arbitration provision, but it offered no evidence that the buyer expressly agreed.18
Keeping the computer is the same kind of act as Rod's taking delivery and paying the price. Neither signifies assent to a proposal, because performance is what the dickered bargain already requires, and the section looks for specific agreement to the term itself.19 A rule that read ordinary performance as approval of fine print would hand every proposal to whoever sent it, the last-shot result the section was written to avoid. Performance matters in a different setting. If the reply was a counteroffer because it was expressly conditional, subsection (2) has no contract to work on, and conduct by both parties can create one under subsection (3). That contract consists of the terms on which the writings agree plus supplementary terms from the Code.20
Terms in a written confirmation get the same treatment. Where a confirmation follows a contract already made, the section raises no offer-and-acceptance issue. It simply gives the confirmation's additional or different terms the rule that governs an acceptance's: they become part of the contract only if both parties are merchants and none of the other barriers applies.21 If Tutu, a non-merchant, receives a confirmation from Leo with an added term, the term does not enter unless she specifically agreed to it. The first question is whether the term is new at all, since the facts may show that it adds nothing to the bargain already made.22
On an exam, the merchant question comes before the exceptions. Confirm first that the transaction is a sale of goods, since Article 2 applies to transactions in goods,23 and that subsection (1) found a contract. Then ask whether both parties are merchants. If they are, the term enters by default, and the three exceptions are the only way out. If either is not, the term remains a proposal and stays out unless the other party expressly agreed, and shipping, accepting, and paying do not count as that agreement. A student who meets an added arbitration clause and starts debating materiality has skipped the step that decides whether the default applies at all.
Offer Limits Acceptance
The first exception appears in § 2-207(2)(a): an additional term does not become part of the contract if the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer.25 Paragraph (a) is the exception the offeror controls in advance, because it turns on what the offer says before any reply exists. An offeror that writes into its offer that acceptance is limited to the offer's terms announces at the outset that it will take on nothing the reply adds, so none of the reply's additions gains a foothold.
The reason for letting the offeror speak first lies in how the default works. Without a limit, a merchant offeror that wants to keep the reply's fine print out must read each acknowledgment and send a timely objection under paragraph (c), and an offeror that skips the chore is treated as having let the terms in. Merchants rarely read every acknowledgment that crosses the desk. A limit written into the offer objects once, in advance, and works whether or not anyone reads the reply. It also warns the offeree of the offeror's position before the offeree composes its answer. A seller that needs its own terms can bargain for them or send a reply expressly conditional on the buyer's assent, and a seller that does neither cannot claim surprise when its additions are excluded.
The limit also makes the second exception unnecessary. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., Judge Posner explained that the additional terms that come in are those the offeror would be unlikely to object to, because they fill out the contract in an expectable fashion and so do not alter it materially.26 Materiality therefore estimates what the offeror would probably have accepted. An express limit records what the offeror said it would accept, so nothing remains to estimate, and even a trivial added term is excluded.
The lumber order in the previous subsection sat on the other side of the line. Nothing in it limited acceptance, so the interest charge entered by default, and a single sentence in the order would have kept it out.
The limit controls terms and leaves formation alone. A reply that matches the offer on goods, quantity, price, and delivery, and that is not expressly conditional on the offeror's assent to its own terms, is still a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance under subsection (1).27 A contract forms on the dickered terms even though the offer demanded acceptance on its own terms only. A court that found no contract merely because the reply varied the offer would be restoring the mirror image rule that the section replaced. A reply that presses its additions only by suggestion does not stop formation either, since a court may read such language as precatory and find a contract on the offeror's terms.28 Which form carries the language decides its effect: limiting language in the offer excludes terms under paragraph (a), and conditional language in the reply stops formation on the writings under subsection (1).
Paragraph (a) protects only the offeror, so the first task is to decide which document is the offer. That is a common-law question, because general offer-and-acceptance law applies unless the Code displaces it.29 The answer can surprise a drafter. At an auction, a bid is the offer and the fall of the hammer is the acceptance.30 A seller's price quotation that is only an invitation to make offers is not the offer, so limiting language printed on it protects nothing when the buyer's purchase order turns out to be the offer.
A limit protects nothing when the reply is a counteroffer that the other side then accepts by performing. In a dispute over repair services, GE's final price quotation was a counteroffer rejecting Princess's purchase order. Princess accepted it by giving GE permission to proceed, by not objecting to GE's confirmatory letter, and by paying GE's price of $231,925 instead of the $260,000 in its own order.31 At common law, an offeror who proceeds under a contract after receiving a counteroffer accepts the counteroffer's terms by performance.32 The quotation capped damages at the contract price and excluded consequential damages and lost profits, so the jury's award of $4,577,743 showed that it had relied on Princess's purchase order or some other contract.33
When both sides send forms that reject each other's terms and then perform anyway, subsection (1) finds no contract in the writings, and conduct recognizing a contract supplies one under subsection (3). Its terms are those on which the writings agree, together with supplementary terms from other provisions of the Code.34 Neither form gains primacy over the other.35 A staffing dispute shows the pattern. MPS quoted labor on a form with a clause barring Dresser-Rand from hiring MPS employees, and Dresser-Rand's purchase order took specific exception to the clause. For five years MPS kept supplying employees and kept sending a contract containing the clause, and Dresser-Rand kept refusing to sign but always paid.36 When a reply forms no contract under subsection (1), the contract that conduct creates includes only the terms on which the parties' forms overlap.37
The third step does the real work in problems that pair limiting language with a conditional reply, because the same performance leads to subsection (3) when the reply fails that step and to paragraph (a) when it passes.
Material Alteration
Section 2-207(2)(b) supplies the second exception: an additional term proposed in an acceptance does not become part of the contract if it materially alters it.39 The first exception lets the offeror shut out every addition by saying so in the offer. Paragraph (b) applies when the offer said nothing of the kind, and it looks at the added term itself. The reason follows from how the merchant rule works. Between merchants the statute admits an added term because the offeror did not object, so the offeror's silence has to be read as consent. Silence can fairly carry that meaning only for terms the offeror would have expected to see, since an offeror cannot be taken to have agreed to something it had no reason to anticipate. Paragraph (b) marks the point at which the presumption of consent runs out.
Courts state the test in slightly different ways. The Official Comment speaks of surprise or hardship to the offeror. Many courts reduce the inquiry to whether a term causes hardship as a result of surprise,40 and some read the Comment's two words as elements that must both be present and are weighed in combination, despite the word “or.”41 The common thread is expectation. The terms that come in are those the offeror would be unlikely to object to because they fill out the contract in an expectable fashion.42 Surprise is therefore the lead question, and hardship usually follows from it. The usual error is to ask whether the term is important to the party that proposed it, or large in dollars, when the question is whether the other party can fairly be presumed to have consented.
Union Carbide shows how the breadth of a term bears on expectation. The seller's clause on taxes could be read narrowly, as letting the seller add the applicable sales tax to the agreed price, or broadly, as making the buyer liable for back taxes, interest, and even fraud penalties years after delivery because the seller had blundered in computing its own liability. The court called the broad reading semantically permissible but economically implausible.43 The consequence for paragraph (b) is that when an offeree's added term works a material alteration, the acceptance is still effective, but the term is not, and the contract is enforceable minus the term the offeree tried to add.44
Official Comments 4 and 5 list examples of clauses on each side of the line.45 Comment 4 treats as material alterations a clause negating standard warranties such as merchantability or fitness, a clause demanding exact quantities where trade usage allows leeway, a clause letting the seller cancel whenever the buyer misses an invoice, and a clause requiring complaints within an unreasonably short time. Comment 5 treats as ordinary a force majeure clause, a requirement that complaints be made within customary limits, a reasonable interest charge on overdue accounts, and a limitation of remedies stated in a reasonable manner. The first group shifts significant risk to the other side or removes a protection it holds by default. A warranty disclaimer, for example, strips away implied warranties such as merchantability and fitness that the Code supplies when the parties are silent.46 The second group fills routine gaps in bounded, predictable ways.
Because the merchant rule works as a presumption about the parties' intent, the party resisting the term must prove that it materially alters the contract. In Bayway Refining Co. v. Oxygenated Marketing & Trading A.G., the Second Circuit so held and noted that nearly every court to consider the question agrees. The allocation follows the general rule that a party relying on a statutory exception proves it, and it matters because materiality is decided on evidence. Pointing at the clause and calling it harsh will not do. A concession ends the dispute at once. In one case the seller admitted that terms enclosed with its acknowledgment letter materially altered the contract, and the court held that they were merely proposals that did not become part of it.47
Arbitration clauses show how fact-dependent the inquiry is. They are so commonly included in boilerplate that the question of their impact in an acceptance comes up periodically.48 The results vary. In one case the court held that the buyer had not made an adequate showing of surprise and hardship, even though no course of dealings or discussion in negotiations had alerted the buyer to the arbitration provision.49 The author of the lumber illustration, by contrast, would treat a term that changes the manner in which disputes are settled as surprising, hardship-causing, and therefore a material alteration. If so, Seaman's term drops out of the contract.50 Arbitration appears in neither Comment's list, so the outcome rests on trade practice and the surrounding circumstances, and evidence that such clauses are common in the trade can defeat a claim of surprise.
The wording of the clause is the same in both scenes, and only the trade differs. That pairing tracks the Comments' contrast between a requirement that complaints be made within customary limits, which is routine, and one that demands complaints in an unreasonably short time, which is material.
A finding of material alteration removes the term and leaves the contract in place. The reply was a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance that was not expressly conditional, so subsection (1) formed the contract on the dickered terms, and paragraph (b) decides only which extra terms ride along.51 The offeror can still welcome an excluded term, because a contract on its own terms remains open to modification if it accepts the offeree's additional proposal.52 A term that survives paragraph (b) is not yet safely in the contract, because paragraph (c) still lets the offeror object.
Objection to New Terms
The third exception keeps an additional term out of a contract between merchants when “notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.”54 The first exception asked what the offer said, and the second asked whether the term would surprise a reasonable merchant. Paragraph (c) asks what the offeror actually did about the term. An offeror that objected before the reply arrived, or that objects within a reasonable time after learning of the term, keeps it out, whatever the term's weight.
The structure of the section leaves the offeror in control. A contract exists on the offeror's terms, and the offeror decides whether to modify that contract by accepting the offeree's additional proposal.55 Between merchants, failing to object within a reasonable time is how the offeror accepts. That is fair only if silence can reasonably be read as agreement, and silence means something only from a party who had a chance to speak. Paragraph (c) gives the offeror that chance. The exception has two parts: when the objection may come, and what it must say.
On timing, the text reaches an objection already given and one given afterward. An advance objection is written into the offer, typically as a sentence in a purchase order stating that additional or different terms in any reply are objected to. It serves merchants well because an offeror that receives many acknowledgments cannot read each one, and a sentence written once speaks to every reply that follows. An objection after the fact must come within a reasonable time after notice of the term is received. The clock starts when the offeror receives notice, since an offeror cannot object to a proposal it has not seen, and what counts as reasonable depends on the circumstances of the sale.
The other side of the window is what happens when it closes without an objection. Formation and terms are decided by different rules, so the contract exists from the exchange of writings while the question which added terms belong to it can stay open for a time. A term that survives the other exceptions joins the contract once a reasonable time passes without objection.
The second part concerns what the objection must say, and an offeror can fail here even though it has spoken. Paragraph (c) speaks of notification of objection to the added terms. In the lumber illustration, Ajax's order calls for arbitration, Seaman's acknowledgment calls for adjudication in court, and the two sides then perform.56 A clause in the offeror's own form states what the offeror wants its contract to say. It does not tell the offeree that the offeror has read the reply and refuses what it found there. An offeree that sees only a conflicting clause cannot tell whether the offeror noticed the new term, cares about it, or would walk away over it, and the exception exists to supply that information before the offeree relies on the deal. An offeror that wants paragraph (c)'s protection should say so explicitly.
That failure does not end the analysis, because the exceptions operate independently. Seaman's court clause still faces paragraph (b), and a term that changes how disputes are resolved is a natural candidate for surprise, which would exclude it even though paragraph (c) gave Ajax no help.57 The illustration also pits one party's arbitration clause against the other's court clause, so it raises the question how subsection (2) treats different terms, which the last subsection takes up.
The two lumber scenes differ in a single sentence, the one by which Ajax spoke to the added term, and that sentence is all paragraph (c) requires. Silence cuts against an offeror in a second way. An offeror that has seen the same clause arrive repeatedly and never objected is a poor candidate to call the next arrival a surprise, because prior dealings that alert a party to a term bear on surprise.58 An offeror that wants protection builds its objection into the standard form that accompanies every order.
A successful objection removes the term and leaves the contract in place. The reply was a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance that was not expressly conditional, so subsection (1) formed the contract on the dickered terms, and the offeror's objection decides only whether one more term joins it.59 The objection should be kept apart from the offeree's expressly conditional acceptance. That condition belongs to the offeree and decides whether the writings form a contract at all, while the offeror's objection decides which added terms ride along once a contract exists.
A multiple-choice question on added terms tests two skills at once: knowing the rule and reading the facts closely.60 The facts usually decide it: who sent the offer, what the reply said, whether both parties are merchants, and when the objection came.
Different Terms
Because the text treats additional and different terms differently, every problem on this subject begins with classification. A rough guideline is that a term is different if it varies or contradicts something the offer provides for, and additional if it adds new matter the offer does not cover. Ajax's arbitration clause set against Seaman's court clause yields a different term. An Ajax order silent on forum, met by an acknowledgment that adds arbitration, yields an additional one.62 The guideline does not always settle the matter, because silence can carry a term. When Boilerplate's order says nothing about disputes and the seller's acknowledgment adds a clause confining suit to Pennsylvania courts, the clause looks additional. Yet the offer's silence is usually read to allow suit in the courts of an appropriate state other than Pennsylvania, so the clause conflicts with an implied term and is different.63 Classification therefore depends on how the offer is read, and a careful answer says which way the term falls and why.
A second preliminary check asks whether the reply insists on the term at all. If its wording on a different term is only suggestive, a court may read it as precatory and find a contract on the offeror's terms, and the conflict disappears.64 When the reply does insist on the term, courts have answered the question in three ways, and the answer varies by jurisdiction.
The first approach follows the text. Because subsection (2) refers only to additional terms, nothing in the section admits a different term from the acceptance into the contract, so the term drops out and the contract stands on the offeror's terms.65 The reasoning has a logical core as well: a different term is hard to treat as a proposal for addition when the offer already contains a contrary term, since two terms on the same subject cannot both be part of one contract. On the lumber facts, Ajax gets arbitration. The cost is that whoever sent the first form wins, and no compelling reason supports that result when neither side reads the other's paper.
The second approach treats subsection (2)'s silence about different terms as a slip and applies the subsection to different terms as if they were additional. The Official Comment itself says that whether additional or different terms become part of the agreement depends on subsection (2), and the line between the two kinds of terms is hard to draw. Under this approach the acceptance's conflicting term is a proposal, and between merchants it must clear paragraphs (a) through (c).66 In the lumber illustration, Ajax's order contains no express limit, and its own arbitration clause is not an objection to court adjudication. But a clause that changes how disputes are settled is a plausible material alteration, so Seaman's term drops out and arbitration governs.67
The third approach, the knockout rule, cancels the conflict. The offer's term and the acceptance's term both drop out, and a Code gap filler or trade usage supplies whatever the contract needs on that subject.68 Contracts lawyers call such gap-filling rules default rules, and the Code supplies many of them, including the warranties of title, merchantability, and fitness and the rules on inspection.69 The rationale is neutrality. A conflicting term suggests that the offeree did not really agree to the offeror's version, yet both parties wanted a contract, so the dispute is best resolved by a neutral term and not by either side's unbargained boilerplate. An offeror that wants its own terms can say so by expressly limiting acceptance under paragraph (a). On the lumber facts, both clauses fall out and court adjudication governs, not because Seaman's form called for it but because courts are the forum that applies when the parties leave a gap. The Seventh Circuit applied the knockout rule in Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries, a dispute over conflicting warranty terms.
Authorities describe knockout as the prevailing view,70 but jurisdictions differ. Because the Code's formation rules do not compel a particular result, it is fair to ask which approach produces the more desirable one.71 Two cautions keep the knockout rule in proportion. Nothing in the express text authorizes it. Courts borrow, by analogy, the result that subsection (3) reaches for a contract formed by conduct, where only the terms on which the forms overlap come in.72 Subsection (3) applies only when the writings fail to form a contract, so it is not the source of the rule when a contract has formed under subsection (1). The second caution is that knockout may leave both sides with a default rule that neither chose.
The usual exam error is to run paragraphs (a) through (c) on a contradicting term without saying which approach permits that step, or to cite subsection (3) as the source of the knockout rule for a contract that already formed on the writings. Naming the approach is what makes the answer defensible, because each rests on a different reading of the same text.