Concept
Knowledge and Intent to Accept
Acceptance: bilateral versus unilateral contracts and acceptance by promise or performance
Knowledge and Intent to Accept
An offeree who accepts by performance answers with conduct, and conduct is ambiguous in a way words are not. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 50(2) tests only the outward act: at least part of what the offer requests must be performed or tendered.1 A matching act can still leave the offeree's purpose in doubt. A person who returns a lost dog, mows a lawn, or ships a crate of goods may be acting out of neighborliness, habit, or a duty owed to someone else, with no thought of a posted reward or a quoted price.
That doubt matters because an offeror who asks for an act bargains for it as the price of the offeror's promise, and an act done for some other reason was never given in exchange for that promise. Three rules about the offeree's state of mind answer the problem, and none has a counterpart when the offeree responds in words. The first is knowledge: what the offeree must have known of the offer, and what follows for an offeree who learns of it partway through the performance.2 The second is intent: when an offer invites performance alone, rendering the performance counts as an acceptance unless the offeree manifests an intention not to accept before the offeror performs.3 The third is notice: an offeree who exercises reasonable diligence to tell the offeror, within a reasonable time, that a performance is not an acceptance avoids forming a contract.4
Knowledge comes first because the other two rules assume an offeree who knew of the offer. An offeree who has never heard of an offer cannot be answering it. Once the offeree knows, the law presumes the act was meant as an answer, and it leaves the offeree a narrow way to say otherwise.
Knowledge of the Offer
The knowledge requirement matters only when an offer asks for an act. When an offer asks for a promise, the promise forms the contract, and the moment the offeree began any related activity is ordinarily irrelevant to acceptance.5 When an offer asks for an act, the act alone does not show whether the actor had the offer in mind.
An act that matches the offer's request does not accept it if the actor performed in ignorance of the offer. A performance can serve as the price of the offeror's promise only if the offeree rendered it intending to accept, and a person who has never heard of the offer cannot hold that intention.6 A person who performs the act requested by a newspaper reward without knowing of it likewise had no expectation to protect.7 Performing in the offeror's presence does not close the gap. The performance may seem to convey a promise, but an offer that asked for an act requested no promise, so any promise the conduct conveys is a nullity.8 Courts often reach this result when a reward is offered to the public: anyone who performed the act without knowing of the offer has no contractual claim against the offeror.9
Glover v. Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. shows the baseline at work. An association offered a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of a murderer. The claimant supplied information that led to the murderer's arrest and conviction but did not know of the reward until afterward, and the court denied recovery because the claimant could not have intended to accept an offer the claimant did not know existed. Two features of those facts matter for what follows. The claimant never knew of the offer while performing, and the performance was finished before the claimant learned of it, so nothing remained to complete with knowledge. The result also draws a fairness objection: the knowledge requirement exists to keep a person from being trapped into an inadvertent acceptance, and the claimant, on discovering the reward, wanted the act to count.10
The harder case is an offeree who learns of the offer in the middle of the performance, and the older and modern views divide on it. The older view, reflected in the First Restatement, required that the whole consideration requested be given after the offeree knows of the offer, so a finder who learned of a reward after finding a lost watch but before returning it could not recover.11 The modern view asks only that the offeree complete the performance with knowledge of the offer, and Restatement (Second) § 51 adopts it.12 The modern view tracks what the knowledge requirement is for. An offeree who learns of the offer in time to finish the job, and who finishes it intending to claim the promised payment, has been induced by the offer to complete the performance, and that inducement fits the common understanding of the parties to an offer of this kind.13 The offeree's state of mind at completion still counts, because the offeree must complete the performance with the intention of accepting the offer.14
The late-knowledge rule gives way to a contrary intention of the offeror, which is the exception built into § 51.15 An offeror who prefers the older rule can say so in the offer, and the narrower terms then govern. An offer silent on the point leaves the modern rule in place.
A governmental reward can look like an exception to the baseline. Rewards posted by government bodies have been recognized as giving those who perform an entitlement even when they did not know of the reward, but such entitlements are properly understood as bounty rights created by statute or administrative action, not as contract rights.16 An exam question about a reward therefore starts by asking whether a private offeror made an offer or a public body created a bounty. Only the private offer brings the knowledge requirement into play.
Presumed Intent to Accept
Rendering the performance an offer invites is presumed to be an acceptance: the law assumes that an offeree who did what the offer asked meant to take the offer up. Restatement (Second) § 53(3) supplies the narrow exit from that presumption. Where an offer invites acceptance by performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, rendering the invited performance is not an acceptance if, before the offeror performs the promised return, the offeree manifests an intention not to accept.18 The presumption and its exit answer one weakness of conduct as a response, which is that conduct does not say why it was done.
An offeror who promises a runner $1,000 for entering and finishing the New York Marathon cannot tell from the finish whether the runner raced for the prize, for exercise, or for some mix of reasons.19 Because the act is ambiguous in that way, the traditional view made the offeree's own state of mind relevant. The trier of fact could hear evidence of the offeree's subjective intention to accept or not to accept, on the theory that an unclear manifestation can be cleared up by asking what the actor meant.20 A runner who persuaded the trier of fact that the prize was in mind recovered, and so did a runner with several motives, since it was enough that the offer was some part of the reason for the performance.
The Restatement (Second) replaces that inquiry with a presumption. Intent to accept is presumed unless the offeree's words or conduct indicate the contrary, and testimony about the offeree's private intention is irrelevant.21 The change removes a contest no one could judge well. The old method turned on whether the trier of fact believed an offeree who testified after the dispute arose, with a stake in the answer, about a mental state no one else saw. The presumption gives the offeror a rule that can be applied from the outside: the offeror asked for an act, received it, and owes the promised payment unless the offeree said or did something visible to the contrary. It also puts the burden of clearing up the ambiguity on the one party able to clear it up, since only the offeree knows why the act was done and only the offeree can announce that it was not an acceptance. A runner who raced for exercise and for the prize stands where a runner who raced for the prize alone stands.
The presumption presupposes knowledge. An actor who never heard of the offer is outside it, as Glover showed in the preceding discussion, and the presumption does nothing to fill that gap. What it removes is the question whether an offeree who knew of the offer secretly meant to answer it.
An offeree who knew of the offer and did not mean to accept can overcome the presumption by manifesting that intention before the offeror performs the offeror's promise, and an effective disclaimer keeps the performance from operating as an acceptance.22 Two features define the reach of that exit. The disclaimer must be a manifestation, meaning words or conduct the offeror can perceive, so the private resolve the older method would have admitted from the witness stand has no effect. It must also come before the offeror performs. While that promise is unperformed, the offeror can act on the disclaimer by withholding payment or dealing with someone else. Once the offeror has paid on the footing that the act was the agreed price, § 53(3) no longer reaches a statement of non-acceptance. The exit protects an offeree who performed for a reason unrelated to the offer, such as a favor to a neighbor or a duty owed to a third person, from being treated as a party to a bargain the offeree never wanted.
Section 53(3) reaches only an offer that invites performance alone. Where an offer lets the offeree choose between promising and performing, § 62 treats the tender or beginning of the invited performance as an acceptance, and the part-performance sections below take up that rule.23 A neighboring protection in § 53(2) is not confined to performance-only offers and turns on notice within a reasonable time, which is the next topic.24
An exam stem on this point usually hands the offeree an attitude, such as a runner who ran only for fitness or a finder who never cared about the reward, and asks whether a contract formed. The attitude matters only if the offeree communicated it to the offeror before the offeror paid. Otherwise intent is presumed, and a claimant who knew of the offer and completed the performance has accepted, however many reasons moved the performance.
Notice of Non-Acceptance
An offeree who performs but does not want the performance to count as an acceptance can say so, and Restatement (Second) § 53(2) states how quickly and how carefully. Except as stated in § 69, the rendering of a performance does not constitute an acceptance if within a reasonable time the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the offeror of non-acceptance.26 The rule answers the weakness traced above. An offeree who does what an offer requests looks like an offeree who has taken the offer up, and an offeree who acted out of friendship, or who wants no part of the offer's terms, can correct that appearance only by telling the offeror.
The rule has three working parts, and each has its own reason. The offeree must give notice within a reasonable time, because an offeror who has seen the performance and heard nothing must decide whether a bargain has been made. A rule without a deadline would let the offeree wait to see whether disclaiming was worth the trouble while the offeror stayed unsure whether a contract existed. The offeree must also use reasonable diligence, which looks at what the offeree does to reach the offeror: a prompt message sent by a channel the offeror is likely to see qualifies, while a private resolve or a remark to a bystander tells the offeror nothing. Finally, the message must say what the rule names, that the performance is not an acceptance, so a note that merely mentions the work does not do the job.
Section 53(3) runs on a different clock. It applies where the offer invites performance alone, and it lets the offeree disclaim at any time before the offeror performs the offeror's promise.27 Section 53(2) measures time by what is reasonable, adds the diligence requirement, and does not repeat the limit to performance-only offers.28
The opening words of § 53(2) flag an exception. Section 69 deals with acceptance by silence, and where it applies, the notice rule of § 53(2) does not control; that topic belongs to a later reading. The Code applies similar logic to sales of goods: a seller who ships non-conforming goods avoids accepting the buyer's order by seasonably notifying the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation.29
Ravi and Marta said the same thing, and only the timing and the delivery differed. A stem on this point usually supplies a disclaiming offeree, so the analysis asks when the notice went out, what the offeree did to deliver it, and whether § 69 applies. The offeree's reason for performing does not enter into it.