531 U.S. 198, 121 S. Ct. 696, 148 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2001)
Paul Glover served as Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union during the 1980s and early 1990s.1 After a first trial ended in a hung jury, a second jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois convicted Glover of labor racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion.2
The presentence investigation report recommended grouping the convictions under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 3D1.2.3 The Government objected to grouping the money laundering counts with the others.4 Following a hearing the District Court ruled against grouping.5 This ruling increased Glover's offense level by two levels and produced a Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months.6 The court sentenced Glover to 84 months' imprisonment.7
Glover's counsel on appeal to the Seventh Circuit did not challenge the grouping ruling and instead raised other claims.8 After oral argument, another Seventh Circuit panel decided United States v. Wilson, which permitted grouping of money laundering offenses under some circumstances, but the court affirmed Glover's conviction and sentence one and a half months later.9
Glover then filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to contest the grouping determination at sentencing or on appeal.10 The District Court denied the motion on the ground that an increase of 6 to 21 months did not amount to prejudice, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether an increase of 6 to 21 months in a defendant's prison sentence resulting from an alleged error in a Sentencing Guidelines determination constitutes prejudice under Strickland v. Washington?13
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant must show both deficient performance and prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors the result would have been different.14 Lockhart v. Fretwell does not supplant this test by requiring proof that the outcome was unreliable or fundamentally unfair when counsel's error deprived the defendant of a substantive or procedural right.15 Any amount of additional jail time carries Sixth Amendment significance.16
Yes. The established facts show that Glover's counsel did not contest the government's objection to grouping the money laundering counts under Guidelines section 3D1.2 either at the sentencing hearing or on appeal to the Seventh Circuit.17 Had grouping occurred the range would have been 63 to 78 months, creating an increase of 6 to 21 months.18
Because the Seventh Circuit's demand for a substantial or fundamental increase misreads Lockhart and because any actual jail time is constitutionally significant, the facts establish Strickland prejudice.19
An increase of 6 to 21 months in prison time constitutes prejudice under Strickland v. Washington.20