Concept
Intent to Be Legally Bound
Manifestation of mutual assent and intent to be bound
Intent to Be Legally Bound
Parties who strike a deal often say nothing about whether a court could enforce it, so the law of formation must decide whether that silence matters. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 answers in two clauses. Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.1 Real intention is what a party actually has in mind, and apparent intention is what the party's words and conduct would lead a reasonable person to believe. The first clause dispenses with both, so a contract can form although the parties neither held nor displayed any thought about enforceability. The second clause is the exception, and it applies when the parties communicated that their commitment was to carry no legal weight. Both clauses ask the same question: what did the parties manifest about the legal consequences of the promise?
The general rule follows from the definition of a contract as a promise for whose breach the law gives a remedy.2 Whether the law gives one is a conclusion a court draws from what the parties said and did, and the parties need not announce it in advance. People who order inventory or fix a delivery date are thinking about price and timing, not lawsuits. A rule that demanded visible thought about enforcement would let the party who never mentioned the courthouse walk away, and it would make formation turn on a state of mind that no one could verify. Context does much of the work instead, because transactions entered into in a business context raise a presumption that the parties intended the agreement to be legally enforceable.3
The three subsections that follow take the first clause, then the exception, and then the preliminary agreements in which the parties' manifestations are ambiguous.
No Need to Intend Legal Effect
The first clause of § 21 removes a requirement that many students assume exists: neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential.4 A party who never thought about enforceability, who assumed the deal was too small or too friendly to matter, or who misjudged what courts will do can therefore still make a contract.
In place of legal intent, the law asks whether the parties manifested a commitment. A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify the promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.5 The commitment concerns what will be done, such as delivering goods or paying a price, and it does not concern what a court will do about breach. Legal consequences follow formation and do not precede it. Once a promise and a bargain exist, the law gives a remedy for breach,6 and the simplest remedy is specific performance, an order that the defendant carry out the exchange as agreed. Such relief is often unavailable, sometimes because the defendant cannot perform what was promised.7
The objective test of assent points the same way. A court looks to the reasonable perception of the parties' intent, as conveyed by their words and actions, and not to what each party privately believed it was agreeing to.8 A private belief about the law is one more subjective state of mind, and the objective approach exemplified in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank sets it aside.
One intent remains essential, the intent to engage in the conduct itself. A party's conduct manifests assent only if the party intends to engage in it and knows or has reason to know that the other side may infer assent from it.9 The signer must mean to sign and the speaker must mean to speak, but neither needs to intend, or even understand, the legal effect of doing so.
Two reasons support leaving legal intent out of the test, and they run in different directions. The first concerns the party who receives the commitment. That party sees a handshake, a signature, or a spoken promise and cannot see what the other side privately thinks about courts. If formation required a belief in enforceability, a party who wanted out could say that the thought never crossed that party's mind, an assertion no one can verify, and the recipient's reliance would be left exposed to it.10 The second reason concerns the party who makes the commitment. Legal intent is a belief about the law, and people making deals think about price, quantity, and timing, with either no view about enforceability or a mistaken one. The rule treats that party fairly because anyone who truly wants no legal consequences has a cheap, direct way to say so, the exception taught in the next subsection. The party who wants informality controls the signal and bears the burden of sending it.
Students often ask whether the parties thought of their promise as legally binding, when the question is whether they manifested commitment to an exchange. The clause removes only the legal-intent requirement, and the other requirements stay in place. The conduct must still be intended, as shown above. The statement must still be a commitment, so a remark that merely predicts or hopes, such as a comment that a truck might go for around $3,000, forms nothing, and the defect is the missing promise because legal intent never enters the analysis.11 And the exchange must still be a bargain supported by consideration, a requirement taught elsewhere.12
The harder fact pattern gives the parties words about the law itself.
Silence about legal consequences, as in the sale between Marcus and Dana, leaves the commitment intact. Speech about legal consequences is a different manifestation, and the second clause of § 21 lets it prevent formation. The next subsection asks whether Nadia's remark was clear enough and whether Tomas heard it as she meant it.
The American rule departs from English law. The first Restatement of Contracts expressly rejected the idea that a contract requires an intention by the parties to create or alter their legal relations, and the first clause of § 21 carries that rejection forward.13 English law, by contrast, treats an intention to create legal relations as a requirement of its own, presumed in commercial dealings and rebutted only in very unusual circumstances.14 An exam answer that meets an English-style argument should respond from § 21: the absence of legal intent does not defeat a bargain, and only a manifested intention that the promise not affect legal relations can do that.
Express Disclaimers of Legal Effect
The second clause of § 21 states the exception: a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.16 The first clause relieved the parties of any need to announce that they wanted legal consequences, and this clause lets them announce the opposite. Marcus's unspoken indifference to the law changed nothing because it never reached Dana, and a disclaimer differs only in that it reaches the other side. The word "may" deserves attention, because a disclaimer prevents formation only if a reasonable recipient would take its language at face value.
Two reasons support the exception, and they address different parties. The first concerns the party who made the disclaimer. A party who has said in plain words that no obligation is being assumed has used the control that the objective test gives every speaker over what the words convey, and enforcing the deal anyway would impose a duty on someone who took care not to accept one. The law accordingly gives effect to an express rejection of contractual obligation.17 The second reason concerns the recipient. The objective test protects reasonable reliance on what a party signaled,18 and a recipient who has been told not to count on legal enforcement received a signal that pointed away from commitment, so no reasonable reliance remains for the law to protect.
Because a disclaimer works through the recipient's reasonable understanding, it must be communicated, and it must be clear enough to withhold commitment. A reservation kept to oneself prevents nothing, because a party cannot escape a manifested commitment by asserting an unverifiable intention that it not be one.19 A vague or merely friendly remark falls on the same side of the line when a reasonable listener would not hear it as taking the promise out of the law.
Courts treat such language the same way. Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. states the structure: absent an expressed intent that no contract shall exist, mutual assent, even if oral or informal, is enough to bind, so a party who wants to avoid a binding obligation must express an intention not to be bound until a writing is executed.20 In Winston v. Mediafare Entertainment Corp. the Second Circuit listed, as the first factor in deciding whether such an intention exists, whether there was an express reservation of the right not to be bound in the absence of a writing.21 In Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp. the Second Circuit read a memorandum that openly contemplated that the parties might never reach a full and final agreement as expressing their intent not to be bound by the memorandum.22
An exam stem will often say only that a lawyer will draft the paper, and the question is whether that language works as a disclaimer. It does not, unless the parties have made the signing a condition of being bound.
The rule behind that result is that when the parties make clear that a prospective document is only a convenient memorial of their agreement, the agreement binds even though the memorial is never adopted, and a party who refuses to execute it commits a breach.23 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 states the same point and adds that the circumstances may show that the parties were still only negotiating.24 The manufacturer's letter and the restaurant owners' handshake share complete terms and a contemplated writing. They differ in the job the parties gave the signing: in the letter the signature was the event that would bind them, and in the handshake it recorded a binding that had already happened.
Between those poles sits a harder pattern, in which the parties say only that a formal writing will follow and give no further sign of what the writing is for. Whether they intended to be currently bound or intended that no contract would exist until signing is then a question of fact, resolved from all the circumstances.25 The next subsection collects the factors that guide that inquiry. An examinee who sees complete terms and concludes that a contract must exist has skipped the question the clause asks, and so has one who sees a promised formal agreement and concludes that none can. The question is what the parties' words, read as a reasonable recipient would read them, communicated about being bound.
Letters of Intent and Preliminary Agreements
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 supplies the governing idea for negotiations that leave a paper trail but no signed contract: a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.27 The express-disclaimer cases in the last subsection sit at the clear end of that rule. This subsection takes up the murkier middle, where sophisticated parties write a letter of intent, a memorandum of understanding, or an agreement in principle that records what they have settled and says little or nothing about whether the record binds anyone.28 When those manifestations are ambiguous, a court asks whether the parties intended to be bound when they agreed in principle or only if further negotiations succeeded. That is a question of fact, resolved from all the circumstances.29
The law answers case by case because both simple answers would damage something the parties need. Complex ventures often move in stages whose costs cannot be foreseen at the outset, so the parties sign a preliminary document that describes the enterprise, affirms their intention to cooperate, and leaves unresolved matters to be worked out as the needs of the project become clearer.30 If every such document bound the parties, they would stop recording their progress, or would write in studied vagueness, to avoid duties for deals still unsettled. If none bound them, one side could walk away from a deal that both had in fact made, after the other had built plans around it.
The announcement that a formal writing will follow does not tell a court which situation it faces, because a signed document can do either of two jobs. At one pole, the parties make clear that they intend no legal consequences until a final record is executed, and there is no contract until then. At the other, the writing is only a convenient memorial, and the agreement binds even though the memorial is never adopted.31 The second job is common, because parties may want a formal writing only to lessen the risk of later misunderstanding or to satisfy a third party such as a lender.32 The first is typical of a negotiated acquisition, where it is understood that nothing binds either side until the parties exchange signed copies of the final agreement.33
Each step gathers evidence of one thing, which is how a reasonable person in the other party's position would read what was said and done. The parties' own statements come first because they speak to binding effect directly. Performance counts because conduct speaks: a party who hands over goods and accepts payment has behaved as though the deal were concluded. Settled terms matter because a court can enforce only a bargain definite enough to let it determine the parties' rights and obligations.35 The more terms the parties have agreed on, the likelier a court is to find that they meant to be bound, and significant open terms may tip the balance toward finding that they were still negotiating. Custom, size, and complexity set the background against which silence about binding effect is read. Where agreements of the type are usually committed to writing, a reasonable person expects a writing.36 No single step controls. The ultimate test asks whether the recipient knew or had reason to know that the other party did not intend to conclude a bargain until a further manifestation of assent.37
Weighing those considerations yields one of three results, and the result fixes what each side may demand:
- A binding contract, when the parties reached complete agreement, including agreement to be bound, on every issue they thought needed negotiation, so that the document is preliminary only in form and either side may demand performance of the transaction.38
- A binding commitment to negotiate, when the parties committed themselves to a contract on agreed major terms while recognizing that other terms remained open, so that either side may demand good-faith negotiation of those terms toward a final contract within the agreed framework but may not demand the transaction itself.39
- No commitment, when the parties were still bargaining and either could withdraw, which is the unenforceable agreement to agree.40
The middle outcome exists because the choice can look binary and is not. In Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. the question was framed as whether a letter of intent bound the parties to a construction contract or left them free, and a concurring justice pointed to a third possibility: that the letter bound the parties to negotiate in good faith while reserving the right to terminate if they could not agree.41 A party who has joined a framework on major terms has led the other side to plan around it, so the law may restrain abrupt withdrawal, yet forcing the full transaction would bind a party to terms never settled. Enforcing the process the parties committed to, and leaving the final bargain to be reached, fits that situation. Where the parties expected to agree on the missing terms but did not say what happens if they fail, the question is whether the agreement has open terms sufficiently definite to be enforceable or is a mere unenforceable agreement to agree.42 The mechanics of good-faith bargaining and of recovery for reliance are taught elsewhere.
The indications in that scene lean toward no binding sale. The sale of a business is a valuable and complex exchange that parties would normally expect to document in a full signed writing, the salary term was left open on purpose, and the parties expected further unidentified issues to surface when Faith's attorney drafted the comprehensive contract, some of which could be significant and contentious. Nothing in the facts shows a prior course of dealing or any performance that would indicate the parties were treating the sale as done. These are indications only. Oral agreement on every apparently material term and Molly's implicit assurance that no obstacles remained support the opposite argument that the sale was already binding, and they could also support the intermediate finding that Molly may not simply walk away without bargaining over the open issues in good faith. Because the circumstances point both ways, a court would treat intent as a fact question to be resolved on evidence and would not read the answer off the oral understanding.43
Jannusch v. Naffziger falls on the other side of the line, and the facts that moved it are the considerations in the checklist. The buyers took possession of the equipment and other items that made up a seasonal business called Festival Foods, used them as their own, and paid part of the $150,000 price. The price was fixed and the items specified, so nothing remained but performance, and the court observed that parties who are only discussing a purchase do not hand over the goods and let them be kept for a substantial period.44 The trial court had given weight to the buyers' statement that they were "in no position to sign anything" without loan money or an attorney. The loan was later approved, though, the buyers consulted an attorney, and they kept operating the business, so the contemplated writing was no obstacle to enforcement.45 The court concluded that there was an agreement to sell Festival Foods for $150,000 and that the buyers breached it.46 Treating the deal as a sale of goods, the court applied UCC Article 2, under which a contract for sale may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties that recognizes the existence of such a contract, and an agreement may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.47 Article 2 tolerates disagreement as well as gaps. When merchants plainly have a contract but their forms conflict, the live question is which of the conflicting terms becomes part of it, a question that § 2-207(2) addresses and a later unit takes up.48
Both deals contemplated a formal writing, so that fact cannot be what separates them. In the sale from Molly to Faith, nothing else suggests a concluded bargain, and the open salary term and the expected further issues point away from one. In Jannusch, performance and settled essential terms pointed the other way and left the contemplated writing as a formality. An examinee who sees a mention of a formal document and declares that no contract exists has skipped the checklist, and so has one who sees most terms agreed and declares a contract without asking what the parties said about being bound.
The drafting lesson follows from how much turns on intent. In Quake the letter of intent left unclear whether its issuers were bound, the court faulted that lack of clarity, and it sent the case back for trial on the parties' intention.49 Ambiguity can serve short-term practical ends, but it invites litigation and obligations that an issuer never meant to assume. A drafter who wants a letter to bind, or not to bind, should say so plainly, and a recipient should remain alert to the likelihood that such a letter lacks contractual force.50