884 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989)
Appellee Arcadian Corporation is a New York corporation that manufactures and sells fertilizer.1 Appellant Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. is a Delaware corporation incorporated in 1986 by appellants Judas Azuelos and Eli Sivan as a vehicle for the purchase of Arcadian's phosphate fertilizer business.2
Azuelos, a citizen and resident of France, represented the Office Togolais Des Phosphates, the governmental entity in Togo that mines, markets, and exports phosphate rock.3 Sivan, a citizen of Israel and resident of the United Kingdom, was a businessman engaged in buying and selling Togolese phosphate rock on the world market.4
In June 1986, the parties signed a four-page memorandum of understanding outlining areas of agreement concerning the assets to be purchased, the purchase price, and an option for Arcadian to purchase up to 20% of API.5 The memorandum set deadlines for further action, all subject to the approval of Arcadian's board and appellants' ability to obtain financing.6 After further negotiations, the parties signed a one-and-a-half page memorandum on November 6, 1986, that incorporated the June memorandum by reference.7
The November 6 memorandum specified the purchase price, the timing and amounts of the payments, the fixed assets to be purchased, and a closing date of not later than May 31, 1987.8 It outlined a framework of negotiation for the purchase of Arcadian's finished product inventory at closing at a mutually agreeable market value, with phosphate stores to be purchased at closing at Arcadian's book value.9 The November 6 memorandum also stated that a binding sales agreement will be completed by December 31, 1986.10
By November 14, 1986, the Arcadian board unanimously approved the November memorandum, and OTP also approved it.11 The parties then confirmed by Telex their respective approvals and took steps to consummate the transaction, including establishment of API offices at Arcadian headquarters and Arcadian's obtaining lenders' consents.12 On November 26, 1986, API tendered a cash deposit of $687,500 as required, and Arcadian executed an escrow agreement for the deposit.13
On December 17, 1986, Arcadian agreed in writing that its option for 20% minority participation in API could be reduced by API to as low as 5% to enable API to secure financing.14 API incurred expenses of over $100,000 to install fenders at Arcadian docking facilities in Geismar, Louisiana.15 API obtained a bank commitment for the $7 million required for its cash payment toward the $13.75 million purchase price and entered into a long-term rock supply contract with OTP.16 In January 1987, Arcadian commissioned a survey which designated which portions of the land and buildings were to go to API and which to remain with Arcadian.17
As reflected in the minutes of the Arcadian board meeting of February 26, 1987, the market for phosphates changed dramatically with market prices of diammonium phosphate going up 25% in four to five weeks.18 The board minutes noted that API was pushing for an early closing and attempting to lock up financing as soon as possible. Major issues and concerns still existed from Arcadian's point of view and needed to be resolved.19 After extended discussion it was the consensus of the board that Arcadian could not proceed with the joint venture as originally contemplated and must have majority ownership and management of the venture.20 When Arcadian informed API of its change of position from agreeing to own 5% to 20% of the joint venture to wanting to own 50%-plus and returning the down payment, this suit ensued.21 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to Arcadian on February 27, 1989.22 This appeal is from a judgment in a diversity suit involving claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel.23
Whether the November 6, 1986 memorandum constituted a binding contract for the sale of Arcadian's phosphate fertilizer business?24
To determine whether a preliminary manifestation of assent was a binding preliminary agreement of the second type, courts consider several factors.25 These include whether the intent to be bound was revealed by (1) the language of the agreement; (2) the context of the negotiations; (3) the existence of open terms; (4) partial performance; and (5) the necessity of putting the agreement in final form, as indicated by the customary form of such transactions.26 The language of the agreement is the most important factor.27 There is a strong presumption against finding binding obligation in agreements which include open terms, call for future approvals, and expressly anticipate future preparation and execution of contract documents.28
No. The language of the November memorandum shows that Arcadian did not intend to be bound.29 The November 6 memorandum contained two references to the possibility that negotiations might fail and referred to a binding sales agreement to be completed at some future date.30 The November 6 memorandum stated that a binding sales agreement will be completed by December 31, 1986. The November 6 memorandum outlined provisions if negotiations for the sale failed including repayment of capital expenditures and refund of deposit.31
These provisions indicate that the parties anticipated further steps before a binding contract would exist.32 The language is the most important factor and reveals no intent to be bound at the memorandum stage.33 The context also shows open terms like inventory at mutually agreeable market value and equity participants subject to mutual agreement.34
The November 6, 1986 memorandum did not constitute a binding contract for the sale of Arcadian's phosphate fertilizer business.35
Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the breach of contract claims arising from the November 6, 1986 memorandum?36
Yes. Since in this case intent can readily be determined by examining the November memorandum, summary judgment was perfectly appropriate even though there was considerable partial performance.39 The established facts show that the parties signed the November 6 memorandum after board approvals by telex and took steps including establishment of API offices at Arcadian headquarters and tender of the cash deposit of $687,500.40 Yet the unambiguous language of the memorandum controls and permits resolution as a matter of law without trial.41
Summary judgment was appropriate on the breach of contract claims arising from the November 6, 1986 memorandum.42
Whether summary judgment was appropriate on the promissory estoppel claim based on Arcadian's conduct during negotiations?43
In New York, promissory estoppel has three elements. These are a clear and unambiguous promise, a reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, and an injury sustained by the party asserting the estoppel by reason of his reliance.44 Summary judgment is inappropriate if the allegations raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant made a clear unambiguous promise to negotiate in good faith, whether the plaintiffs reasonably and foreseeably relied on that promise in entering into expenditures and collateral contracts, and whether the plaintiffs thereby sustained an injury.45
No. Appellants' allegations raise genuine issues of material fact as to whether Arcadian made a clear unambiguous promise to negotiate in good faith, whether appellants reasonably and foreseeably relied on that promise in entering into expenditures and collateral contracts with suppliers or others, and whether appellants thereby sustained an injury.46 The established facts show that after the November 6 memorandum Arcadian agreed in writing that its option for 20 percent minority participation could be reduced to as low as 5 percent.47 API incurred expenses of over $100,000 to install fenders, obtained a bank commitment for $7 million, and entered into a long-term rock supply contract with OTP.48 Arcadian commissioned a survey designating portions of land and buildings.49
Yet when market prices rose 25 percent in four to five weeks, Arcadian changed position to demand majority ownership and returned the down payment, thereby creating triable issues on the estoppel elements.50
Summary judgment was not appropriate on the promissory estoppel claim based on Arcadian's conduct during negotiations.51