Concept
Hurley and Speaker Autonomy
Freedom of association
Hurley and Speaker Autonomy
A parade is not a club, and that difference is what Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston adds to Roberts. In Roberts, a public accommodations statute reached the Jaycees: Minnesota’s Human Rights Act forbids denying anyone the “full and equal enjoyment” of a place of public accommodation because of sex, and it defines such a place to include any business, recreation, or entertainment facility whose services are offered to the public.1 In Hurley, a Massachusetts public accommodations law was applied to a private St. Patrick’s Day parade, to require its organizers to include a gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-American group known as GLIB.2
The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, a private organization that customarily organized the parade, had refused to admit GLIB, which wanted to march as a unit of its own.3 The group invoked the state law against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the state courts ordered it admitted.4 A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Justice Souter held that a state may not require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group whose message the organizers do not wish to convey.5
The two cases differ in what the state’s order touched. In Roberts, compelled admission “did not trespass on the organization’s message itself”; in Hurley, admitting the contingent would alter the message the parade presented.6 Hurley therefore rests on the sponsors’ right to control their own expression, not on any claim about whom they may exclude as members, and the dissent in Dale presses that distinction.7 Still, the majority in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale called Hurley illustrative of how forced inclusion can burden a group’s expression, so the reasoning below reaches well beyond parades.8
The Court began by treating the parade as expression. Spectators line the streets, Justice Souter observed; marchers in costumes and uniforms carry flags and banners with all sorts of messages (“England get out of Ireland,” “Say no to drugs”); bands and pipers play, floats roll by, and Boston television broadcasts the whole show.9 Protection does not depend on a narrow, easily stated message, for such a test would strip the paintings of Jackson Pollock and the music of Arnold Schoenberg of their protection, and the Council did not forfeit protection by being lenient about whom it admitted.10 A private speaker also keeps its protection when it combines many voices, and the Court compared the choice of contingents to a newspaper’s choice of material for its pages.11 Rumsfeld later placed the parade in the same category as a newsletter and a newspaper’s editorial page, each expressive in a way that law-school recruiting is not.12 The comparison supplies the mechanism: a parade speaks through the units that compose it, so choosing the units is how its organizers compose their message.
The contingent the state wanted admitted was itself expressive. GLIB had formed to march in this parade, to celebrate its members’ identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish immigrants, and in the previous year it had marched behind a shamrock-strewn banner bearing its name.13 A contingent under that banner would bear witness that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and it would suggest that people of those orientations have as much claim to unqualified acceptance as heterosexuals of Irish descent.14 Every participating unit affects the message the organizers convey. The order therefore forced the Council to change the expressive content of its own parade; in effect, it declared the sponsors’ speech itself a public accommodation.15 Without a limit, any contingent of protected individuals bearing a message could claim a place in the parade, and everyone the statute protects who wished to add a demonstration of his own would shape what the organizers communicated.16 The Court held that this use of state power violates the fundamental rule that “a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”17
Autonomy over a message includes the choice of what to leave out. The Council had decided to exclude a message it did not like, and that decision invoked its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.18 The Court did not ask why the Council disliked the message. As Hurley put it, in the passage Dale quotes, “whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”19
The sponsors’ objection ran to a message, and the Court took care to say so. The organizers did not wish to exclude GLIB’s members because of their sexual orientations; they objected to the banner under which GLIB wanted to march.20 They had no desire to exclude individual gay people from the parade, so the real question was not who marched but what message the marchers would convey.21 The dissent in Dale draws the same line from the other side: Hurley separated GLIB’s members, who marched as a unit to express their views about their own sexual orientation, from gay individuals who might march without intending to express anything about their sexuality.22 That line sets Hurley apart from the Jaycees and Rotary cases, where the sole issue was membership.23 The claim that prevailed was a claim against carrying a message, and no one was being turned away for being gay.
Autonomy is engaged most clearly when the audience will credit the host with the message. A parade is no mere conduit for the speech of others: spectators know that the organizers customarily decide which units march, and they are therefore likely to read a contingent’s inclusion as the sponsors’ judgment that its message deserves communication and even support.24 The Court found it relevant, in just this sense, that GLIB’s message “would likely be perceived” as the organizers’ own speech.25 The sponsors also have no easy way to dissociate themselves. Justice Souter noted that a shopkeeper can easily disavow leafleters’ message but that “disclaimers would be quite curious in a moving parade.”26
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins lies on the other side of that line. California’s courts, applying the state constitution’s guarantee of free expression, required a private shopping center to let pamphleteers distribute literature, and the Supreme Court rejected the owners’ claim that the access forced them to associate with views they did not hold.27 The reasons all concern the owners’ own message. The center was a business open to the public, so the owners were unlikely to be identified with the pamphleteers; the state dictated no message for the owners to display; and nothing prevented the owners from disavowing the leaflets.28 Those facts leave a shopping center owner’s speech undisturbed, whereas in a parade the sponsors’ speech is the very thing being rearranged.29
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission draws the same line from the winning speaker’s side. The Court invalidated an order requiring a privately owned utility to carry a hostile advocacy group’s inserts in its billing envelopes, and it distinguished PruneYard because the shopping center owners had not objected to the content of the pamphlets and the access there was not content-based.30 The same inquiry, whether accommodating another’s message affects the host’s own, later led the Court to uphold a requirement that law schools host military recruiters. Recruiting lacks the expressive quality of a parade, and nothing about it suggests that the schools agree with the recruiters’ speech.31 That case, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, is taken up later in this chapter.
Hurley also departs from Roberts in its procedure. Having found a substantial intrusion on the parade’s expressive rights, the Court ended its analysis without any mention of the compelling interest test and without a glance at the state’s interests.32 Dale returns to the interest-weighing steps, as a later section shows. The shortcut does not make every expressive claim a winner. Hurley, Dale, and Rumsfeld together show a Court resistant to inflated claims that an association’s activity is expressive; yet where an expressive association’s rights are severely intruded upon, they prevail over equality interests.33
The second and third steps carry the weight in the decided cases, because they separate the parade from the shopping center. Both orders compelled access to a private actor’s space, but the parade’s sponsors faced attribution of a banner’s message to themselves, and the shopping center’s owners did not.