Concept
Roberts and Antidiscrimination Laws
Freedom of association
Roberts and Antidiscrimination Laws
A state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination can justify forcing a large, unselective civic organization to admit women, even when the organization also engages in protected expression. That was the holding of Roberts v. United States Jaycees: applying the Minnesota Human Rights Act to compel the Jaycees to accept women as regular members did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 The right to associate for expressive purposes is real but not absolute. It yields to regulations that serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.2 Roberts runs the chapter's tools in sequence: intimate association first, then expressive association, then the state's justification.
The dispute began inside the organization. In 1974 and 1975, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters began admitting women as regular members, and both chapters came to have a substantial proportion of women among their members and directors. That put them in violation of the national organization's bylaws for about ten years. The national organization responded with sanctions: it denied their members eligibility for state or national office or awards programs, and it refused to count their membership in computing votes at national conventions.3 The ensuing complaints alleged that the exclusion of women from full membership, which the bylaws required, violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The Act makes it an unfair discriminatory practice to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, or sex. It defines such a place as a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind whose goods, services, or privileges are made available to the public.4
The court of appeals ruled for the Jaycees. It found that applying the statute would produce a “direct and substantial” interference with the group's associational freedom, because it would necessarily bring “some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast” and would attach penal sanctions to those responsible for the membership policy. It also held that the state's interest was not compelling enough to outweigh that interference: the organization is not wholly “public,” the state had asserted its interest selectively, and the antidiscrimination policy could be served in ways less intrusive of First Amendment freedoms.5 The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court rejected the intimate-association claim first. Except for restrictions on gender and age, membership was completely unselective, and the local chapters had several hundred members each.6 Chapters that are neither small nor selective, and whose central activities involve the participation of strangers, lack the distinctive characteristics that could protect a decision to exclude women.7 The posture sharpened the point. The local chapters, which had the better claim to be considered intimate associations, had chosen to admit women; only the more impersonal national organization objected.8 A claim that exclusion protects the closeness of a group is hard to credit when the members who are closest chose the opposite.
That left the expressive claim, which had real substance. A “not insubstantial part” of the Jaycees' activities constituted protected expression on political, economic, cultural, and social affairs: the national and local organizations had taken public positions on a number of diverse issues, and members regularly engaged in civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities worthy of constitutional protection.9 The Court therefore asked how far applying the statute to compel the admission of women infringed the group's freedom of expressive association.10 The Jaycees lost on both questions the standard poses: the state's interest was compelling, and the burden on the group's message was slight.
The standard is not a lax one, and the disclosure cases show why. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, the Court held that imprisoning an NAACP official for refusing to comply with a legislative committee's request for a membership list violated the First Amendment.11 The Court has long recognized that significant encroachments on First Amendment rights cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest; the state's interests must survive exacting scrutiny.12 Roberts likewise required a compelling interest, not merely a legitimate one.13
Minnesota met that requirement. The Court was persuaded that the state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justified the impact of the statute on the male members' associational freedoms.14 The burden, moreover, was slight. The record gave no basis for concluding that admitting women as full voting members would impede the Jaycees' ability to engage in its protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views, and the organization already invited women to share its views and philosophy and to take part in much of its training and community activities. A claim that admission would impair a symbolic message conveyed by denying women the vote was, in the Court's words, “attenuated at best.”15
The Jaycees' strongest argument was that women might hold different attitudes on issues such as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, so that voting women would shift the organization's positions or change their effect. The court of appeals had accepted that applying the statute would necessarily bring “some change in the Jaycees' philosophical cast.”16 The Supreme Court found that the Jaycees relied solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and perspectives of men and women, and, absent a showing far more substantial, it declined to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies the contention.17 The refusal makes sense of the burden requirement. A bare assertion that the excluded class would think differently proves nothing, and it would let every excluding group make the same claim. Even if enforcement did abridge some protected speech, the Court found the effect no greater than necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate purposes.18
Rotary and New York State Club
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte applied the same reasoning to service clubs and reached the same result. The local clubs ranged from fewer than twenty members to nearly a thousand, turned over about ten percent of their membership each year, and sought publicity instead of carrying on their activities in private, so the Court found no violation of the right to intimate association.19 As in Roberts, it found no significant impact on the clubs' expressive activities and held that any “slight infringement” was justified by the state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination.20 As the Court described it, California's Civil Rights Act did not require the clubs to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace. Nor did it require them to abandon their classification system or to admit members who failed to reflect a cross section of the community.21
New York State Club Association v. City of New York presented the same conflict as a facial challenge, which asks a court to strike down a law as written and not as applied to one club. The city ordinance prohibited discrimination in clubs with more than 400 members that regularly serve meals and regularly receive payment from nonmembers for facilities or services furthering trade or business, and the Court unanimously rejected the attack. The ordinance did not on its face significantly diminish the ability of individuals to form associations that advocate public or private viewpoints, and any overbreadth could be addressed in case-by-case challenges to particular applications. A club that can show forced inclusion would severely intrude on its expressive purpose therefore keeps an as-applied claim, because the right of expressive association prevails over equality interests when severely intruded upon.22
The two decisions differ in posture. Rotary resolved one club's claim on its own facts, while New York State Club held that a law could stand as written because its text did not significantly burden expressive association. Leaving the rest to later challenges is practical: a club's expressive purposes, and what forced inclusion would do to them, appear only when a court looks at that club and not at the text of the law.
When Exclusion Could Win
These decisions do not hold that every exclusionary group must lose. The Court has indicated that freedom of association would protect a right to discriminate only in two situations: when the group is an intimate association, or when the discrimination is integral to its expressive activity.23 Each follows from the framework. A small, selective, secluded group resembles the families and close friendships the intimate branch protects, and a group whose message consists of its exclusionary principle would be changed by forced inclusion in a way the Jaycees could not show for themselves. Courts will test such claims skeptically, since the Court is resistant to inflated claims about the expressive nature of associational activity. But when the right of expressive association is severely intruded upon, it will prevail over equality interests.24
Roberts thus marks one end of the spectrum. The Jaycees were large, unselective, and unable to show that admitting women would alter their message, so equality prevailed. In later cases the Court was more receptive to expressive association claims in discrimination cases, beginning with Hurley, the subject of the next section.25 Compelled membership is not the only way a state can bind a person to a group; the chapter's last section turns to compelled payment. There the Court held in Janus that requiring non-union members of a unit represented by a public-sector union to pay an agency fee violated the First Amendment.26 It also rejected the line between chargeable and non-chargeable expenditures, which “has proven to be impossible to draw with precision.”27