Concept
Intimate and Expressive Association
Freedom of association
Intimate and Expressive Association
A state orders a group to admit someone the group does not want, and the group answers that the Constitution lets it choose its own members. Roberts v. United States Jaycees shows that this answer can rest on either of two foundations, because the Court observed that its decisions have used the phrase “freedom of association” in two distinct senses.1 In the first, the Court protects the choice to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships against undue state intrusion, because such relationships safeguard the individual freedom central to the constitutional scheme; association of this kind is a fundamental element of personal liberty. In the second, the Court protects the right to associate in order to engage in activities the First Amendment protects (speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion) and treats that right as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.2
Because the foundations differ, the Court considered the application of Minnesota’s statute to the Jaycees separately under each: first as a burden on the members’ freedom of intimate association, then as a burden on their freedom of expressive association.3 The first foundation protects a person’s ability to define identity through close ties to others, and the second protects the collective voice a group uses to advocate. A membership claim can therefore be weak under one branch and strong under the other, so the first task is to sort the claim into the right branch. The Jaycees lost under both, for different reasons. Their chapters were too large and unselective to count as intimate associations, and Minnesota’s interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justified the burden on the members’ expressive freedom.4 The next two subsections take the branches in that order.
Intimate Association: The Family as the Model
Intimate association protects a narrow class of relationships, those that resemble the family. The Court secures the choice to enter into and maintain them against undue state intrusion because of the role such relationships play in safeguarding the individual freedom central to the constitutional scheme.5 The protection is intrinsic: it attaches to the relationship as a fundamental element of personal liberty, where the expressive branch is instrumental, valued as a means of preserving other liberties.6 The Court adds that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others, so shielding those ties from unwarranted state interference safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.7 When a relationship qualifies, the protection can let a group resist governmental action that would force it to disband or to accept unwanted members, which is why the branch surfaces in membership disputes.8
The relationships that best exemplify these concerns are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family: marriage, childbirth, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation with one’s relatives.9 Marriage is the clearest case. In Griswold v. Connecticut the Court described a right of privacy “older than the Bill of Rights,” a coming together “intimate to the degree of being sacred,” and an association that promotes “a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.”10 A marriage has no message for the law to protect. The interest at stake is the bond itself.
Family relationships involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few others with whom a person shares a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, along with distinctively personal aspects of life. For that reason they are distinguished by relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only relationships with these qualities are likely to reflect the considerations behind treating association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.11 Each attribute tracks the depth of the bond. A few members make deep commitment possible, selectivity makes the bond a chosen one, and seclusion keeps the critical parts of the relationship among its participants. Exclusion of others is therefore an essential characteristic of these relationships, which is why claims under this branch arise when a group is told to admit someone.12
A court decides an intimate-association claim by placing the relationship on a spectrum. Determining the limits of state authority over a person’s freedom to enter a particular association unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where the relationship’s objective characteristics locate it between the most intimate and the most attenuated of personal attachments.13 The Court declined to mark the significant points on that terrain with precision. It noted only that relevant factors may include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics pertinent in a particular case.14 Because the list is illustrative, no single factor operates as a gate and no count of satisfied factors decides the claim. The factors are evidence of how closely a group resembles the family.
The middle of the spectrum is where the doctrine is least settled, and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas shows why. The ordinance there let any number of persons related by blood or marriage share a household but limited unrelated persons to two, and the dissent argued that it discriminated on the basis of a personal lifestyle choice about household companions.15 The majority, as the dissent described it, answered that associational interests were untouched because residents remained free to entertain whomever they chose; the dissent called that no answer.16 The liberty interest in family integrity reaches only relationships based on ties of blood, adoption, or marriage, and the would-be roommates in Belle Terre fell outside it, yet some nonfamily groups can still claim the freedom of intimate association.17 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, which concerns the sharing of homes, begins by observing that people usually share their homes only with friends and family but sometimes need to take in a stranger.18
The Jaycees chapters sit at the attenuated end of the spectrum. The undisputed facts showed large, basically unselective groups: the Minneapolis chapter had approximately 430 members and the St. Paul chapter about 400.19 Much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of the association also involved the participation of strangers to that relationship. The Court concluded that the chapters were neither small nor selective and lacked the distinctive characteristics that might protect the members’ decision to exclude women.20 Each fact maps onto an attribute: the headcounts go to smallness, the open door to selectivity, and the participation of outsiders to seclusion.
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte reached the same result for a club whose local units ranged from fewer than twenty members to nearly a thousand, turned over about ten percent of their membership each year, and sought publicity rather than carrying on their activities in private.21 The Court rejected the claim that state-ordered admission of women violated the group’s right of intimate association.22 The description shows the factors working together. Some units were small, but the clubs also turned over members and courted publicity instead of seclusion.
Context can shrink the protection even for a relationship that qualifies. In the prison setting of Overton v. Bazzetta, the Court’s determination to “accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators” makes it probably unlikely that even a more focused challenge would in the end succeed.23
Expressive Association: Group Effort for Protected Ends
The second branch protects the right to associate in order to engage in the activities the First Amendment itself protects: speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.26 Where intimate association is valued for the relationship, this branch is valued for what the group makes possible, and the Constitution guarantees it as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.27 The Court accordingly understands a right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends to be implicit in the right to engage in protected activities.28
A group can invoke this branch only if it engages in expression. The protection is not reserved for advocacy groups, but to come within it a group must engage in some form of expression, whether public or private.29 The threshold follows from the derivative character of the right: association is protected because it carries protected activity, so a group that does none has nothing for the right to attach to. The Jaycees cleared the threshold easily. The national and local organizations had taken public positions on a variety of issues, and members regularly engaged in civic, charitable, lobbying, and other protected activities.30 The Court therefore called the right plainly implicated.31
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Roberts states the contrast sharply. She would treat an association as commercial, and subject its membership to rationally related state regulation, when and only when its activities are not predominantly of the type the First Amendment protects. Only an association predominantly engaged in protected expression is one whose regulated membership will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one collective voice. “An association must choose its market.” Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree, it loses the complete control over its membership that it would enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.32
Roberts classed the Minnesota Act as an infringement of “the last type” of burden on association: an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of the group, as distinct from the penalties on membership and the compelled disclosure discussed earlier in this chapter. By requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Act worked such an infringement.33
The Court called forced membership the clearest example, for there can be “no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire.”34 The harm runs through the group’s message. Members decide what the group stands for, so adding members the group did not choose may impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that brought them together, and freedom of association therefore presupposes a freedom not to associate.35 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale the Court stated the point as a test: forced inclusion of an unwanted person infringes the group’s expressive association if the person’s presence affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.36 The word significant does real work, because a group merely unhappy with a new member, without any effect on what it can say, has not shown the intrusion that triggers the right.
The right to associate for expressive purposes is not absolute. Infringements may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.37 Each clause screens out something different. The compelling-interest requirement keeps the state from overriding a group’s autonomy for ordinary policy reasons. The requirement that the interest be unrelated to the suppression of ideas keeps the state from using membership rules to attack a message it dislikes. The less-restrictive-means requirement forces the state to choose the path that leaves the most associational freedom intact. Together they make up the heightened scrutiny the Court generally applies when reviewing government burdens on the right to associate for purposes of political expression.38 The disclosure cases phrase a similarly demanding test in other words: the State’s subordinating interests must survive exacting scrutiny, with a substantial relation between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.39 The standard does not settle the outcome in advance. In Roberts the Court found that Minnesota’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justified the impact on the male members’ associational freedoms.40
The second and third steps are where the cases divide. In Roberts the Court was skeptical that admitting women would change the content or impact of the organization’s speech, and in any event found any effect on protected speech “no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s legitimate purposes.”44 Rotary reached the same two conclusions: it found no significant impact on the clubs’ expressive activities and held that any “slight infringement” was justified by the state’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination.45 Later sections turn to groups whose messages courts did find at risk.
The maxim that freedom of association presupposes a freedom not to associate invites over-reading as a veto that every private group holds over its membership. The maxim describes what forced inclusion can do to a group’s expression. The right is engaged only to the extent unwanted members affect that expression, and even then it yields to a compelling interest pursued by sufficiently narrow means. The Jaycees show the sequence: forced admission of unwanted members intruded on their internal affairs and engaged the right, and they still lost at the justification stage.46