Concept
Access to Government Proceedings
Freedom of the press
Access to Government Proceedings
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia is the leading decision on whether the First Amendment opens a government institution to the public and the press. It recognized that the First Amendment implicitly guarantees a right to attend criminal trials, and the decisions that followed allow a court to close a proceeding only on specific findings of an overriding interest to which the closure is narrowly tailored.1 The word implicitly carries weight. No phrase in the First Amendment mentions attending a trial, so the right rests on what the guarantees of speech and press would lose without it.
Earlier sections of this chapter treated the First Amendment as a shield: the press asked a court to stop the government from punishing publication or compelling disclosure. Access claims turn the shield into a sword, and the Court has been slow to hand it over.2 Two questions arise. Does the First Amendment give anyone a right of access to government proceedings and papers, and if so, does the press hold a preferred right? The Court has answered only in two settings. The public has a right of access to court proceedings, but the press has no preferred right there. The public has no right of access to prison inmates and facilities, and the press has no special right there either.3 In both settings the press stands where the public stands, as the public's surrogate.4
Classify what the press wants before doing anything else. A criminal trial carries a constitutional presumption of openness; nearly everything else leaves the press with only what the public gets. The subsections below take the baseline first, then the trial exception, then the standards that decide when a judge may override the presumption.
No General Right of Access
Branzburg v. Hayes, the subpoena case from the last section, also states the baseline for every claim that the press may enter or obtain what the government controls: the First Amendment has generally been held not to guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.5 The Court cited Zemel v. Rusk for the point and then showed what it means. The press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, from the Court's own conferences, from executive sessions of other official bodies, and from the meetings of private organizations, and it has no constitutional right to enter the scene of a crime or disaster when the public is kept out.6 In every example the door is closed to the public, and the press gets no more than the public gets.
The baseline is narrower than it first sounds. It does not mean that newsgathering lacks protection: Justice White accepted in Branzburg that 'newsgathering is not without its First Amendment protection,' because without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.7 Nor does it make the press an ordinary speaker in every setting. A law that treats the press differently draws stricter scrutiny, which is why the Court invalidated a use tax imposed only on the paper and ink used in publishing, absent a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that differential taxation was needed to achieve.8 What the baseline denies is a special claim to information that the public itself cannot obtain.
The reason lies in the direction of the claim. A court can answer a penalty by ordering the government to stop. An access claim asks the government to supply something, so a court that recognized the right would have to decide which institutions, which records, and which tools of reporting the Constitution demands. Legislatures handle that job better, because freedom of information acts and open meeting laws can be drawn with specificity and can balance competing interests. Any special right for the press also raises the problem of deciding who counts as the press.9 The Constitution contains no Freedom of Information Act, so the government can generally restrict access to its own documents.10
The Court applied the baseline to inmates in Pell v. Procunier. It upheld rules prohibiting interviews with individual inmates, reasoning that the Constitution does not impose on government 'the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not available to members of the public generally.'11 Justice Stevens later stressed what that case involved: there had been 'substantial press and public access' to the institution, and the media claim that failed was an additional right 'to interview specifically designated inmates.'12
Houchins v. KQED, Inc. tested the rule on a jail. A television station sued for access, and after it filed suit the jail began monthly public tours of parts of the facility, with cameras, tape recorders, and interviews with inmates forbidden.13 The Court, dividing 3-1-3 with Justices Marshall and Blackmun not participating, held the lower court's order improper in part.14 The three opinions show how much turned on one vote:
- Chief Justice Burger, writing for himself and Justices White and Rehnquist, treated Pell and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. as controlling and concluded that the First Amendment contains no right of access to sources of information within government control. Until the political branches decree otherwise, he wrote, the media have no right of special access to the jail different from or greater than the public's.15
- Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, dissented because Pell was distinguishable.16
- Justice Stewart cast the decisive vote. He agreed with Burger that the Constitution 'does no more than assure the public and the press equal access once government has opened its doors,' but he read equal access to mean access equal in substance and not merely in form.17 Burger seemed to treat equal access as access identical in all respects. Stewart wanted more flexibility to accommodate the practical distinctions between the press and the general public, and that approach supported limited relief for the station.18
Stewart's logic explains why identical terms can still fall short. A visitor on a jail tour sees the facility directly, but a television reporter who must convey it to viewers who cannot visit needs a camera and a recorder. Terms that suit a visitor can therefore be unreasonable for a journalist if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification. The press still gets no access to an area that is closed to the public. Stewart's view adds only the ability to use the access the public already has in the form that reporting requires.
Set Pell beside Houchins and the hinge is what the press asked for relative to the public. In Pell the press sought interviews with designated inmates, a channel the public could not use in the same way, and it lost.19 In Houchins the station, on Stewart's view, sought to see and record areas that the jail had opened to the public, and it won limited relief. Houchins pairs a three-Justice opinion with a narrower vote that decided the outcome. A student who cites Burger's opinion for the flat rule that the Constitution requires no access at all has relied on the view of three Justices and missed the one that controlled. A related problem, the use of material obtained through civil discovery, arises in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart and is taken up below with discovery protective orders.
Access to Criminal Trials
The baseline meets its most important exception at the criminal trial. Justice Stewart marked the difference: in conspicuous contrast to a military base, a jail, or a prison, a trial courtroom is a public place.21 A claim to attend a trial therefore asks the government only to stop excluding people from a public place, and it asks for nothing new.
Richmond Newspapers began with a closure that no one in the courtroom opposed. At the start of a murder defendant's fourth trial, defense counsel moved to close the courtroom, explaining that persons in the audience might discuss testimony during recesses and so influence the jurors. The prosecutor stated that he had no objection, and the judge, acting under a Virginia statute, ordered the courtroom cleared.22 The closed trial resumed the next day. By its end the court had struck the Commonwealth's evidence and found the accused not guilty.23
The Sixth Amendment could not carry the newspaper's claim. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, which involved a pretrial suppression hearing, had held that the Amendment's public-trial guarantee is personal to the accused and creates no public right of access enforceable by the press or the public.24 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Gannett, found nothing in the structure, text, or history of the Sixth Amendment to support 'any correlative right in members of the public to insist upon a public trial.' He left open whether the First Amendment guaranteed access, assuming that it might in some situations and finding that the trial judge had given any such right appropriate deference.25
That reasoning leaves a gap. When the accused wants secrecy and the prosecutor agrees, no one who holds a Sixth Amendment right objects, and the judge's approval completes the closure. The practical effect followed quickly, because a great number of closure orders issued in the year after Gannett.26 Justice White later wrote that the Richmond case would have been unnecessary had Gannett read the Sixth Amendment to forbid excluding the public from criminal proceedings except in narrowly defined circumstances. The Court had rejected that view of four Justices, so the First Amendment question had to be addressed.27 Doubt about whether Gannett remains good law followed, because the Court has since consistently recognized a First Amendment right of access to court proceedings.28
The plurality answered the First Amendment question in two steps. It first met the State's argument that the Constitution nowhere explicitly guarantees a public right to attend trials. Caution is appropriate before reading in unwritten rights, the plurality said, but the Court has recognized unarticulated rights implicit in enumerated guarantees when those rights are indispensable to the enjoyment of express protections. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the First Amendment, because without the freedom to attend, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.29 The label does not matter, whether we call the right one of 'access' or a 'right to gather information.' The explicit rights to speak and publish about what happens at a trial would lose much of their meaning if access to observe the trial could be foreclosed arbitrarily.30 The Court has also explained the press's role in that structure: attendance at court once provided a common pastime, but today the press and electronic media often function as surrogates for the public, reporting what citizens would otherwise observe firsthand.31
The decision's authority is easier to judge once you see how its support divided. The Chief Justice announced the judgment and wrote an opinion that Justices White and Stevens joined, so it is a plurality opinion and not an opinion of the Court.32 Justice Powell took no part, the other Justices in the majority concurred in the judgment in separate opinions, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.33 That count makes seven Justices for the judgment, although no single rationale commanded a majority. The separate opinions each added something:
- Justice White joined the Chief Justice's opinion on the First Amendment issue and added that the agreement of the trial judge and the parties, without more, cannot constitutionally close a trial.34
- Justice Stewart would have extended the right to civil trials as well as criminal ones, subject to reasonable limits.35
- Justice Brennan grounded the right in the First Amendment's role in a republican system of self-government, which depends on citizens who can effectively participate and contribute.36 He tested a claim of access two ways: whether a tradition of public entry to the proceeding exists, and whether access matters to that very process.37 Trials satisfy both, he reasoned, because public access checks possible abuse of judicial power and aids factfinding by bringing forward witnesses the parties do not know. He found the Virginia statute, which authorized closure at the unfettered discretion of the judge and parties, invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.38
- Justice Blackmun would have rested the right on the Sixth Amendment. He complained that the Court had eschewed that route for a potpourri of other sources, and that the standard of closure was uncertain because the plurality spoke of 'an overriding interest articulated in findings,' Justice Stewart reserved 'reasonable limitations,' and Justice Brennan presented his own framework.39
- Justice Rehnquist, dissenting alone, objected that the Court was gradually taking over decisions about how justice is administered in each of the fifty states, a task he thought no Court of nine Justices could manage.40
Applied to the fourth trial, the rule gave a simple result. The judge made no findings to support closure, made no inquiry into whether alternatives would ensure fairness, and recognized no public or press right to attend.41 A trial, unlike a pretrial suppression hearing, offers a range of alternatives to closure, among them excluding or sequestering witnesses, sequestering jurors, and granting continuances.42 The defense's worry that spectators would carry testimony to jurors during recesses is the kind of problem that sequestering the jurors answers. The operative rule is that, absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.43 Findings do real work. They force the judge to name the interest being protected, they give an appellate court something to review, and they separate a closure the record justifies from one that merely suits the participants.
The presumption is not absolute. Justice Stewart noted that a trial courtroom must be quiet and orderly, that every courtroom has a finite capacity, and that fair-trial demands may sometimes justify limits on the unrestricted presence of spectators.44 Lower courts have recognized the privacy and safety of victims and witnesses, the identity of undercover agents, and national security as interests that can justify limited closure.45
Three errors recur on exams. The first treats consent as enough: when the accused moves to close, the prosecutor agrees, and the judge grants the motion, the closure still fails unless the judge found an overriding interest and tailored the order, because the right belongs to the public and the participants' agreement does not answer the constitutional question. The second names the Sixth Amendment as the source of the public's right, when that right belongs to the accused and the public's right comes from the First Amendment. The third reads Richmond as a ban on closure, when it creates a presumption of openness that adequate findings can overcome. A careful answer also notes that the lead opinion was a plurality.
Closure Standards After Richmond
Richmond left open how weighty the closing interest must be and how closely the closure must fit it. Justice Blackmun had flagged the problem, because the opinions framed the standard in different words.48 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court supplied the answer. A Massachusetts statute required courts to exclude the press and public whenever a minor victim of a sex offense testified, and the Court held that the mandatory exclusion violated the First Amendment.
The Court began with the two features that define the right's reach: a historic tradition of openness for the proceeding, and the contribution of public access to how the proceeding functions.49 It accepted that protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minor victims is a compelling interest. The statute still failed, because a judge deciding case by case whether a particular victim needs closure would serve that interest as well as a rule closing every such trial. Globe called its holding narrow: in individual cases the First Amendment may permit excluding the press and public during a minor victim's testimony, but 'a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional.'
Narrow tailoring explains why the Court attacked the form of the rule even after accepting the importance of the interest. A statute that closes every case settles in advance a question whose answer depends on the child: the child's age, the nature of the testimony, and the likelihood of harm all vary. An individualized finding protects the child who needs protection and leaves the rest of the testimony open, so it reaches the state's goal at a smaller cost to public access.
The later cases applied the same presumption to proceedings other than the trial and sharpened what a judge must find before closing one:
- Richmond Newspapers (1980) recognized a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials.50
- Globe (1982) invalidated the mandatory closure rule and identified tradition and contribution to functioning as the keys to the right's reach.51
- Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984), called Press-Enterprise I, extended the presumption of openness to voir dire.52
- Waller v. Georgia (1984) held under the Sixth Amendment that a suppression hearing could not be closed in its entirety when the asserted privacy interest reached only part of it.53
- Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1986), called Press-Enterprise II, extended the right to preliminary hearings and set the findings required to close one for the sake of a fair trial.54
- El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico (1993) invalidated a rule that kept preliminary hearings closed unless the defendant chose otherwise.
- Presley v. Georgia (2010) held that the Sixth Amendment requires a court to consider reasonable alternatives to closing voir dire even when no party offers any.
Press-Enterprise I carried the logic of Globe to jury selection. A unanimous Court held that the presumption of openness attached to voir dire, because selecting jurors is part of the trial itself and history showed that jury selection had traditionally been open.55 The standard it announced is the one later cases repeat: the presumption of openness 'may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'56 The trial court failed that standard twice. It articulated no findings with the needed specificity, and it considered no alternatives to closing voir dire and suppressing the entire transcript, so nothing showed that either step was necessary to protect the anonymity of the prospective jurors or the defendants' fair trial right.57
Juror privacy can still justify closing a very limited part of voir dire, but the Court described a procedure that keeps closure a last resort. The judge tells prospective jurors that they may ask to raise a sensitive matter privately. When a juror asks, the judge first decides whether there is a valid basis for the concern and then decides whether to excuse the juror or order limited closure.58
Press-Enterprise II took the same approach to a pretrial proceeding. A nurse charged with murdering twelve patients moved to close the preliminary hearing. A California statute required such proceedings to be open unless closure was necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, and the magistrate granted the unopposed motion. The 41-day hearing proceeded in secret, and the magistrate refused to release the transcript and sealed the record.59 The Court held 7-2 that a First Amendment right of access applied to the transcripts of the preliminary hearing.60 It reached that result by asking the two questions Globe identified. Has the proceeding historically been open, and does public access contribute to its proper functioning?61 The same reasoning would seem to reach bail and suppression hearings, but not the historically closed grand jury proceeding.62
Once the right attaches, closure requires specific findings on the record. When the interest is the accused's right to a fair trial, the proceeding may be closed only if the findings show, first, a substantial probability that the right will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, that reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect it.63 The first finding ties closure to a real risk that closing the hearing would actually avert, which rules out a generalized worry that publicity might hurt. The second recognizes that ordinary trial management often reaches the same danger without shutting the door. For pretrial proceedings the alternatives include extensive voir dire to identify biased jurors, continuances, and a change of venue. During trial they include admonitions to the jurors and sequestration.64 Sheppard v. Maxwell lists much the same tools: change of venue, postponement to let public attention subside, searching questioning of prospective jurors, and emphatic instructions to jurors, with sequestration always available.65 Most of these tools act on the jury or the venue and leave the courtroom open. Sheppard also points to a tool aimed at the sources of prejudice, restricting extrajudicial statements by lawyers, parties, witnesses, and court officials, which later sections take up.66
These requirements rest on a refusal to rank the competing rights. The authors of the Bill of Rights did not assign priorities between the First and Sixth Amendments, and the Court has declined to rewrite the Constitution by establishing a priority that applies in all circumstances.67 Closure doctrine therefore demands case-specific findings and does not adopt a rule that either the press or the accused always prevails.
A blanket rule fails at the pretrial stage for the reason it failed in Globe. In El Vocero the Court invalidated a Puerto Rico rule that made preliminary hearings private unless the defendant chose otherwise, holding that the established tradition of open preliminary hearings controlled and that the concern about prejudice had to be addressed case by case. A rule that makes secrecy the default reverses the presumption of openness.
Two Sixth Amendment decisions run parallel to these First Amendment cases, and the difference lies in whose right is asserted. In Press-Enterprise I the newspaper asserted the public's right of access, while in Waller and Presley the accused asserted his own right to a public trial.68 Waller held that a suppression hearing may not be closed over the defendant's objection unless the party seeking closure shows an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced by an open hearing, the closure is no broader than necessary, the court considers reasonable alternatives, and the court makes adequate findings. Applying that test, the Court found that the privacy interests of non-parties in intercepted telephone conversations did not justify closing the entire hearing, since playing the tapes took only two and one-half hours of a seven-day hearing.69 The facts show what 'no broader than necessary' demands: the privacy interest reached a small slice of the hearing, so any closure had to match that slice.
Presley applied the same reasoning to jury selection. The trial judge ordered the defendant's uncle out of the courtroom during voir dire, fearing that he might speak with prospective jurors. The state supreme court upheld the exclusion because the defendant had offered no alternatives, and the Supreme Court reversed 7-2, holding that trial courts must consider alternatives to closure even when the parties do not offer them. The allocation follows from who orders the closure. The judge controls the seating, the instructions to jurors, and the order of proceedings, so the judge is best placed to find a less restrictive step.
Two limits keep the presumption from reaching every proceeding and every form of coverage. The first follows from the tradition question. There is no public right of access to grand jury proceedings, which have traditionally been conducted in secret,70 and the Court recognized the grand jury as the historically closed exception.71 The second concerns what the right protects. It secures a place in the audience and not a camera: the First Amendment does not give the press a constitutional right to televise a criminal trial, although a state may allow cameras even over the defendant's objection.72
An exam stem in which the legislature has declared closure mandatory for a sympathetic class of witnesses invites the answer that the compelling interest settles the case. It does not, because the statute fails the tailoring step when it leaves no room for a case-specific determination. The same stem should not be read to forbid closing child testimony altogether, since a judge's findings for a particular child can support a limited closure. A second stem has a defendant who objects to excluding a relative but proposed no alternative, and it invites the answer that the defendant forfeited the point, when the court itself must consider reasonable alternatives. A third trap confuses the two sources of the right: the public and press invoke the First Amendment, the accused invokes the Sixth, and the findings demanded in each line are close cousins.