457 U.S. 596 (1982)
Globe Newspaper Company, publisher of The Boston Globe, attempted to cover a criminal trial in the Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, Massachusetts, after reporting on November 8, 1979, that two girls ages nine and ten had been raped in a Dedham courthouse restroom.1 A suspect was arrested and arraigned, and Globe sent a reporter to the probable cause hearing, which was closed to the press and public under Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 278, § 16A.2 The underlying trial involved a defendant charged with forcible rape and forced unnatural rape of three girls who were minors at the time of trial—two aged sixteen and one aged seventeen.3
In April 1979, during preliminary motion hearings, the trial judge ordered the courtroom closed by placing a sign marked "closed" on the door and directing personnel to turn away entrants.4 Globe moved to intervene for the limited purpose of asserting access rights, to revoke the closure order, and to hold hearings on future orders, but the trial court denied the motions on its own initiative and excluded the press and general public during the entire trial.5 The defendant objected to the exclusion, and the prosecution noted for the record that the order was issued on the court's motion rather than the Commonwealth's request.6
Globe immediately sought injunctive relief from a justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which conducted a hearing the next day; the Commonwealth, on behalf of the victims, waived any rights it might have to exclude the press, yet relief was denied.7 The rape trial proceeded to acquittal of the defendant.8 Globe appealed to the full Supreme Judicial Court, which dismissed the appeal as moot due to trial completion but reached the merits, construing section 16A to require closure only during minor victims' testimony while upholding the statute.9
Globe appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.10 On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court adhered to its construction of the statute, found an exception to the tradition of open trials in sexual assault cases involving minors, and upheld the mandatory closure rule as serving genuine state interests that would be defeated by case-by-case determinations.11 Globe again sought review, and the U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.12
Whether the controversy is moot under Article III of the Constitution because the underlying criminal trial has concluded?13
Under Article III section 2, federal jurisdiction extends only to actual cases or controversies, but an exception applies when the underlying dispute is capable of repetition yet evading review.14
No. The established facts demonstrate that Globe Newspaper Company, as publisher of a newspaper serving the Boston metropolitan area, can reasonably be assumed to face another closure order under section 16A in the future because criminal trials are typically short in duration.15 The trial in this case concluded with acquittal before full appellate review could occur, satisfying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review standard.16
The facts further show that Globe immediately sought injunctive relief after the trial court denied its motion to intervene.17 The Supreme Judicial Court reached the merits despite mootness because the issues were significant and capable of repetition.18 This procedural history confirms that similar disputes will recur without opportunity for plenary review.
The controversy is not moot within the meaning of Article III.19
Whether Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, chapter 278, section 16A, as construed to require mandatory exclusion of the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of minor victims in sex-offense trials, violates the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment?20
The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the press and public a right of access to criminal trials that may be overcome only by a compelling governmental interest narrowly tailored to serve that interest through case-by-case determinations rather than mandatory rules.21
Yes. The established facts show that section 16A mandates closure during minor victims' testimony without permitting the trial court to weigh factors such as the victims' age, maturity, desires, or the public nature of their names, as occurred when the Commonwealth waived exclusion rights and the victims expressed conditional willingness to testify openly.22 The state's compelling interest in protecting minor victims from trauma does not justify the mandatory rule.23 A case-by-case approach would accommodate the interest while preserving access.24 The facts illustrate that closure might have been unnecessary here.25
The facts further establish that the trial court closed the entire proceeding on its own motion despite the defendant's objection and the prosecution's clarification that the order was not requested by the Commonwealth, demonstrating the statute's overbreadth.26 Public access enhances the integrity of factfinding and serves as a check on the judicial process, values that the mandatory closure undermines without sufficient justification.27
Section 16A violates the First Amendment.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.29 She emphasized that the decision does not preclude all courtroom closures during minor victim testimony.30 She stressed that trial courts may order closure upon making specific findings considering the victim's age, maturity, desires, the nature of the crime, and whether testimony would be impaired, with findings detailed enough for appellate review.31
This approach diverges from the majority by underscoring that individualized determinations remain available under the First Amendment framework established in Richmond Newspapers.32
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Burger dissented, joined by Justice Rehnquist.33 He argued that the majority expansively interpreted Richmond Newspapers and ignored the long history of excluding the public from sexual assault trials involving minors.34 Historical practice showed closure in such cases, undermining the claimed unbroken tradition of openness.35
He contended that the statute's minimal impact on access, given availability of transcripts, was outweighed by the compelling interest in protecting child victims from trauma and encouraging reporting of crimes.36 Burger viewed the decision as an improper invasion of state authority to safeguard citizens.37 He would have upheld the statute as a reasonable means to protect minor victims from the severe psychological damage that public testimony can cause.38
Justice Stevens dissented on separate grounds.39 He contended that the Court improperly expanded the capable-of-repetition exception to review a statute never applied in a live controversy after the state court narrowed its construction.40 He argued that the facial challenge was premature and advisory because no partial-closure order with specific findings had been entered.41
Stevens maintained that review should await concrete facts to balance access rights against victim protection interests rather than deciding in the abstract.42