Concept
Narrowing Constructions and Cures
Overbreadth
Narrowing Constructions and Cures
A law struck down for overbreadth is not narrowed by the ruling; it becomes wholly unenforceable until a legislature rewrites it or a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.1 That gap between invalidation and repair is why the Court calls overbreadth “strong medicine.” It will strike an entire statute only when the overbreadth is real and substantial, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep, and only when the statute is not susceptible to limitation or partial invalidation.2 The earlier sections addressed the first condition. This one addresses the second: what a court may do to save a law, and who may do it.
Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus is the case in which no rescue was available. The Ninth Circuit had held the airport’s resolution unconstitutional on its face, and the Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds.3 The resolution applied expressly to all “First Amendment activities,” and its words left no room for a narrowing construction.4 A rule that reaches a whole category of speech gives a court nothing smaller to retreat to.
Three questions decide whether a repair works. May a court read the law narrowly enough to cure the problem, and which court? May a narrowed law reach conduct that occurred before the narrowing, when the defendant could not have known the limit? May a court cut out the invalid part and leave the rest standing? The subsections below take them in that order.
The first answer depends on whose law is at stake. Federal courts construe federal statutes, state courts construe state enactments, and the Supreme Court reviewing a state law takes the state court’s reading as it finds it.5 A federal court asked to save a state law therefore looks to what the state’s courts have said, or, when they have had no chance to speak, may abstain or certify the question, instead of announcing a narrowing of its own.6 The Hicks litigation shows the same division on the third question: the Virginia Supreme Court decided, as a matter of state law, that the provisions of the housing authority’s trespass policy could not be separated, and that ruling fixed the question the United States Supreme Court could decide.7
Limiting Constructions
A court that can read an overbroad law narrowly enough to remove the threat to protected speech should do so before it strikes the law. Justice White’s concurrence in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul divides the narrowing work by the kind of law involved. A federal court dealing with a federal statute should construe it to avoid constitutional problems if it is subject to a limiting construction, and a state court is equally free to deal with a state statute the same way.8 A statute that can be limited is therefore not a candidate for invalidation, which is why overbreadth remains a last resort.
A narrowing must be a reading the words can honestly bear. The Court will not accept one that appears to be fabricated for the occasion,9 and it will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements.10 Nor does a defender’s account of what a law was meant to reach change what it says. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the pandering rationale of Ginzburg could not save the Child Pornography Prevention Act’s ban on sexually explicit images advertised or distributed so as to give the impression that minors are engaged in sexually explicit conduct, because the ban reached substantial speech outside that rationale and did not require that the context be part of an effort at commercial exploitation.11
Federal statutes supply the clearest examples of a court doing the narrowing itself. In Yates v. United States the Court held that the Smith Act’s ban on advocating, abetting, advising, or teaching the desirability of overthrowing the government did not apply to mere “abstract teaching,” but only where the audience was urged to action rather than belief. In a later case it performed similar surgery on the Act’s membership clause, which made it a crime to “be or become a member” of a group advocating overthrow “knowing the purposes thereof.” Knowledge alone was not enough; the member had to have a specific intent to further the group’s illegal purposes.12
The federal power has a limit, and the text sets it. The open-ended character of the Communications Decency Act provided no guidance whatever for limiting its coverage, and the Court recalled that it had earlier declined to draw lines between categories of speech covered by an overly broad statute when Congress had sent inconsistent signals about where the lines should fall, because doing so would invade the legislative domain far more seriously.13 The Smith Act decisions found a division the text could support, between belief and action and between knowledge and intent. The Communications Decency Act offered none.
A state or local enactment is different, because the state’s courts supply its authoritative meaning. The Supreme Court “cannot ignore” a state court’s interpretation of a state provision, “even if it is not one that we would have reached if we were construing the statute in the first instance.”14 In R.A.V. the Minnesota Supreme Court had given the St. Paul ordinance an authoritative construction, and Justice White evaluated the ordinance as construed.15
Accepting a state court’s reading does not end the review, because the presence of a state-court interpretation does not insulate a statute from overbreadth review. The Court has struck laws whose state-court constructions failed to cure the overbreadth, looking to each statute as construed.16 On that test Justice White found the St. Paul ordinance overbroad even as narrowed. Generalized reactions do not strip expression of its constitutional protection, and the mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render it unprotected.17 The majority resolved the case on other grounds. A narrowing therefore helps the state only to the extent that the narrowed law is itself free of protected applications, and a defender cannot simply assume that the category it now claims is unprotected: the Government defending § 48, the federal ban on depictions of animal cruelty, argued that such depictions are unprotected as a class, and the Court disagreed.18
When no court with authority has narrowed the law, the Court does not supply the limit itself or wait for one to emerge from a single prosecution. In Gooding v. Wilson the Georgia courts, unlike the New Hampshire courts in Chaplinsky, had failed to construe the state’s opprobrious-words statute narrowly enough to confine it to fighting words, and the Court voided the statute on its face.19 The reasoning is that, at least when a statute regulates speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a way to rehabilitate it in a single prosecution, the value of protected expression justifies attacks on overly broad statutes without requiring the challenger to show that his own conduct could not be regulated by a narrowly drawn statute.20
A standard such as annoyance shows how little some laws offer to narrow. In the sidewalk-assembly ordinance the Court condemned in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others, so no standard of conduct was specified at all.21
The airport board’s proposed limit shows the same difficulty from the defending side. The petitioners suggested that the resolution was intended to reach only expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes. The Court found that such a limit was of little assistance, because much nondisruptive speech, such as a T-shirt or button carrying a political message, may not be airport related and is still protected.22 The Court noted that it has sometimes used abstention or certification when state courts have not had the opportunity to construe a challenged law, but it found no apparent saving construction in a resolution whose words simply left no room for one.23
Because only an authorized court or a legislature can supply the limit, an overbreadth holding against a state law is provisional. A decision that such a law is overbroad establishes only that it is unconstitutional as authoritatively interpreted by the state’s courts at the time of the decision. A state court remains free to give it a later narrowing construction, and the legislature can rewrite it.24 That follows from the remedy itself, since invalidation leaves the law wholly unenforceable until one of those repairs occurs.25 Whether a repair can reach conduct that preceded it is the next question.
The fourth step is where answers most often stop too soon. A state-court narrowing settles who has spoken on the law’s meaning; it does not settle whether the narrowed law still reaches a substantial amount of protected speech, which is why Justice White found the St. Paul ordinance overbroad even as construed. The fifth step explains why a holding of overbreadth against a state law invites a response from the legislature or the state courts and does not end the state’s interest in the subject.
Retroactive Cures
A narrowing that arrives after the conduct raises the question whether it reaches back to someone who acted, and was convicted, under the broad version of the law. The Court’s answer turns on who made the repair. In Massachusetts v. Oakes a legislature amended a statute after the state’s highest court held it overbroad, and a majority refused to let the amendment end the overbreadth challenge to convictions under the old text.27 In Osborne v. Ohio the state’s highest court narrowed a statute while the defendant’s appeal was pending, and the Court allowed the narrowed statute to apply to earlier conduct so long as the defendant had fair warning.28 The variable that separates the two cases is the institution that performed the repair.
The question matters because overbreadth gives a defendant whose own conduct is punishable a way out: the statute used against that defendant is unenforceable until someone narrows it. A cure that worked backward would give the state what the doctrine withholds, a conviction under a law that was invalid when it was used. Two interests pull against each other. The state wants to keep convictions of people whose conduct it could validly punish, and the doctrine wants lawmakers to draft narrowly the first time, because a broad statute chills speakers for as long as it sits on the books. A retroactive cure serves the first interest and endangers the second, so the answer depends on whether the particular cure threatens the incentive to draft with care.
The Oakes question was whether the legislature’s amendment retroactively cured the overbreadth problem, allowing convictions under the old law to stand if the defendants’ own conduct was unprotected. The Court split 5–4.29 Four Justices saw nothing left to challenge, because the amended statute could no longer chill protected expression. The five-Justice majority disagreed. Overbreadth protects legitimate speech after the fact and also in advance, when a legislature is deciding what to enact. If a later amendment could rescue convictions under the old law, a legislature would risk little by enacting a broad statute and trimming it only when someone challenged it, and speakers would bear the chill in the meantime.30
Osborne came with a cure from a court. Ohio’s statute punished possessing or viewing material showing a minor in a state of nudity, which on its face reached innocent photographs. While the defendant’s appeal was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court limited the statute to nudity that constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic focus on the genitals, and the Court accepted that narrowing as removing the substantial overbreadth. The narrowed statute could reach earlier conduct because it took nothing away from a defendant whose conduct lay in the core that the narrowed law still covered.31
The Court tied the difference from Oakes to incentives. Legislators who can cure their own mistakes by amendment at little cost may draft less carefully, but a judicial narrowing produces no comparable effect, because a legislature cannot be sure that a court will save a statute by narrowing it instead of invalidating it for overbreadth.32 A legislature that amends controls the outcome of the cure and so risks nothing by overreaching. A legislature that writes a broad statute and waits for a court to repair it takes a gamble, and the gamble keeps the pressure to draft narrowly in place.
Fair warning did not end Osborne’s case. The Court reversed the conviction because the jury had not been instructed in accord with the narrowed statute, and it held that the conviction violated due process.33 The two inquiries ask different questions. Fair warning asks whether the defendant’s conduct could be punished under the narrowed law at all. The instruction asks whether the factfinder actually found what the narrowed law requires. A jury told that simple nudity sufficed may have convicted without finding a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on the genitals, and a conviction that may rest on a finding the narrowed offense does not recognize cannot stand.
An exam stem that reports a narrowing after the conduct is asking who did the narrowing. If a state court did, apply the narrowed law to the earlier conduct, confirm that the defendant had fair warning, and then check what the jury was told. If the legislature did, the old text remains the law being tested, and a defendant whose own conduct is unprotected can still prevail by showing that the old law was substantially overbroad. Fair warning is also not the last step in the judicial case, because a narrowing that was never put to the factfinder leaves the conviction exposed.
Severance and Partial Invalidation
When only part of a law is invalid, a court can sometimes remove the offending words and leave the rest in force. Narrowing works on a law’s meaning; severance works on its text. In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union the Communications Decency Act reached any communication that was “obscene or indecent,” and the Court severed the term “or indecent” and left the rest of that provision standing.35 The challengers did not contest the statute’s application to obscene speech, which can be banned entirely. The restriction on obscene material also had a textual manifestation separate from the restriction on indecent material, which the Court had held unconstitutional.36 The cut was possible because the words themselves marked where the valid part ended and the invalid part began.
Severance is one application of a broader default. When a law reaches too far, the normal rule is partial rather than facial invalidation, so that a statute may be declared invalid to the extent it reaches too far and otherwise left intact.37 Overbreadth is the exception that suspends a whole law, and severance is one way a court keeps that exception from consuming more than it must. A legislature enacts a law as a set of choices, and a court that removes only the words the Constitution forbids leaves the remaining choices in place.
The rest of the Reno opinion shows where the technique stops. After severing two words, the Court held that the challenged provisions could be saved by textual surgery in no other respect.38 A severability clause requires textual provisions that can be severed, and the Court followed the clause by leaving the constitutional textual elements intact in the one place where they were, in fact, severable.39 Elsewhere the statute’s open-ended character gave no guidance for limiting its coverage. Where no word marks the line, a court would have to decide for itself what the legislature wanted to keep, and that decision belongs to the legislature. A clause telling courts to preserve valid applications therefore cannot manufacture a seam where the drafters wrote none.
A separate opinion in the same case would have sustained the “indecency transmission” and “specific person” provisions to the extent they applied to communications where the sender knows that all of the recipients are minors.40 That disagreement concerned whether a usable line existed, not whether partial invalidation is ever available.
Who performs the cut depends on whose law is at issue, the same division that governs narrowing. Whether the provisions of a state enactment are severable is a matter of state law. In Virginia v. Hicks the Virginia Supreme Court faulted an unwritten requirement that demonstrators and leafleters obtain advance permission and declared the entire trespass policy void, including the written rule that a person who returns after a barment notice is subject to arrest. In doing so it implicitly decided that all components of the policy stand or fall together.41 The United States Supreme Court treated that determination as settled and framed the federal question accordingly: because the state court had struck down the entire policy, the issue was whether the entire policy was substantially overbroad.42 A federal court cannot announce that one provision of a state enactment stands apart from the rest.
An exam stem that mentions a severability clause usually tests whether the clause has anything to act on. The first question is whether the invalid part is a separable word or provision, as “or indecent” was beside “obscene.” If it is, the court may excise it and enforce the remainder. If the defect runs through the text, no clause can help, and the court will not rewrite the law. For a state law, the severability answer belongs to the state’s courts.