416 U.S. 430 (1974)
Lonnie Gooding resided in an apartment at 1419 Chapin Street NW in Washington, D.C.1
On February 11, 1971, an Assistant United States Attorney submitted an application to a United States Magistrate for a warrant to search Gooding's apartment for evidence of violations of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a).2 The application was supported by the sworn testimony and affidavit of a Metropolitan Police Department vice squad officer.3 The officer stated that he had reason to believe Gooding was concealing property in violation of federal law.4 The affidavit concluded that he was positive narcotics were being secreted in the apartment.5
The Magistrate issued the search warrant on the same day.6 It directed members of the Metropolitan Police Department to search the premises.7 The warrant authorized execution at any time in the day or night with a reference to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c).8
The warrant was executed at 9:30 p.m. on February 12, 1971, by District of Columbia police officers.9 They seized a substantial quantity of contraband narcotics.10 Gooding was subsequently indicted on April 6, 1971, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for violations of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174.11
Gooding moved to suppress the seized evidence on the ground that the nighttime search did not comply with provisions of the D.C. Code.12 The District Court granted the motion to suppress after concluding that D.C. Code Title 23 applied to the search.13 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed that determination.14 The panel members agreed that 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) controlled the search and that its requirements had been satisfied.15
The case was argued on February 25, 1974, and decided on April 29, 1974.16
Whether the search of petitioner's apartment was governed by 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) or by provisions of the District of Columbia Code?17
When a search warrant application alleges a federal narcotics offense, is submitted by a federal prosecutor to a United States Magistrate, and leads to a federal indictment, the nationwide federal statute 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) governs the search rather than local District of Columbia Code provisions, even if the executing officers are local police.18
Yes. The Assistant United States Attorney filed the application alleging a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) before a United States Magistrate.19 The supporting affidavit referenced only federal law.20 Gooding was indicted solely for federal offenses under 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174.21 Although Metropolitan Police Department officers executed the warrant, the federal statutory scheme controls because Congress intended 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) to apply to federal drug searches without requiring separate local procedural overlays.22
The search of petitioner's apartment was governed by 21 U.S.C. § 879(a).
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan And Marshall, Jj.
Justice Douglas contended that D.C. Code §§ 23-521 to 23-523 should govern the search.23 Those provisions were enacted to regulate all search warrants executed by District of Columbia police officers.24 They restrict nighttime searches to cases with specific justification.25
This implements a policy against unnecessary nighttime intrusions characteristic of a police state.26 The D.C. Code provisions became effective after 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) and were intended to apply comprehensively without exception for federal narcotics cases in the District.27
Whether 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) requires a special showing for the issuance of a search warrant executable at night?28
Under 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) a search warrant for controlled substances may be served at any time of the day or night if the issuing judge or magistrate is satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that grounds exist for the warrant and for its service at such time.29 This requirement is satisfied by a showing of probable cause that the contraband is likely to be on the premises at the time of the search without any additional special showing.30
No. The officer's affidavit established probable cause by describing a continuing traffic in drugs from the apartment and a prior controlled purchase confirming availability.31 This satisfied the statutory requirement that the contraband would be present at the time of the nighttime search.32 Legislative history confirms that Congress did not intend to impose any greater showing than under the predecessor statute 18 U.S.C. § 1405.33 Courts had uniformly read that statute to require only probable cause for the warrant itself.34
21 U.S.C. § 879(a) does not require a special showing for the issuance of a search warrant executable at night beyond probable cause that the property will be on the premises at the time of the search.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan And Marshall, Jj.
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the search should have been governed by the D.C. Code provisions in Title 23 rather than 21 U.S.C. § 879(a).36 He emphasized that the D.C. Code provisions were enacted as part of the Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act to provide comprehensive regulation of search warrants in the District, including restrictions on nighttime executions to those with specific justification.37 This policy was intended to protect against unnecessary nighttime intrusions that are more characteristic of a police state.38
Although 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) became effective earlier, the later D.C. Code provisions were meant to apply to all searches executed by local police officers without carving out an exception for federal narcotics cases.39 He agreed with the District Court that the existence of the federal statute does not remove such cases from the explicit requirements of the D.C. Code.40
Joined by Douglas And Brennan, Jj.
Justice Marshall argued that 21 U.S.C. § 879(a) on its face imposes two distinct requirements.41 One is probable cause for the warrant and the other is cause for its service at night.42 The statute must be read to demand additional justification for nighttime searches.43
This protects the heightened privacy interest in the home during nighttime hours.44 His reading is consistent with longstanding congressional policy and Fourth Amendment principles that treat nighttime intrusions as especially severe.45 The majority's interpretation eviscerates the final clause of the statute by reading it out of existence.46