Concept
Facial Challenges and Standing
Vagueness
Facial Challenges and Standing
A vagueness claim can end in one of two rulings. A statute vague on its face fails the constitutional test for any conduct; a statute vague as applied fails it only for the specific conduct before the court, and some conduct remains to which the statute can readily be applied.1 The test is the same either way: the statute must give adequate notice of what conduct is forbidden and must provide adequate enforcement standards.2 A court decides both kinds of challenge as a question of law, because constitutional liberties are not submitted to a jury.3 What differs is how far the defect runs and who may point it out. Vagueness in a speech regulation, like overbreadth, typically produces facial invalidation, while a statute found vague as a matter of ordinary due process typically is invalidated only as applied to a particular defendant.4 The subsections below show how Morales departs from that pattern, why a challenger whose own conduct is clearly covered cannot ordinarily rely on vagueness as to others, and where the speech cases loosen that limit.
Morales and the Facial Attack
City of Chicago v. Morales supplies the leading statement of when vagueness supports a facial attack on a criminal law. The Chicago ordinance contained no mens rea requirement (no requirement that the person act with a particular mental state, such as knowledge or intent), and it infringed constitutionally protected rights. When vagueness permeates the text of such a law, the Court explained, the law is subject to facial attack.5 The protected right was the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes, which the Court placed within the “liberty” guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the “right to remove from one place to another according to inclination.”6
Each feature raises the cost of vagueness. A scienter requirement can soften it: in one I.C.C. regulation case the Court upheld an indictment because the statute punished only knowing violations, although Justice Jackson answered in dissent that scienter, as traditionally defined, cannot cure vagueness in a statute or regulation.7 A criminal law with no mens rea requirement has no such cushion, and a law that burdens protected liberty makes a wrong guess costly, because the person who guesses wrong loses a constitutionally protected freedom. (Scienter requirements receive fuller treatment below.)
Justice Breyer's concurrence explains why a defect of this kind reaches every application. Because every application of the ordinance represented an exercise of unlimited discretion, the ordinance was invalid in all its applications.8 On his view, a statute that delegates too much discretion to a police officer is invalid in all its applications even where the officer uses that discretion wisely.9 The city might still apply some other law to these defendants in light of their conduct, but it could no more apply this ordinance than it could apply a statute declaring, “It is a crime to do wrong,” even to the worst of murderers.10 Coates worked the same way. That ordinance could not constitutionally be applied whether or not the particular defendants' conduct was indisputably “annoying” or of a sort that a more specific ordinance could prohibit. So too in Morales: the city might have enacted a different ordinance, or the state court might have read this one differently, but this ordinance cannot constitutionally be applied to anyone.11
The dissents resist on two fronts. One argues that the concurrence cannot have it both ways. The vagueness that makes notice inadequate is the very vagueness that gives the officer too much discretion, and a law that gives the officer clear guidance in all cases gives the public clear guidance in all cases as well. The concurrence, on this view, affirms the unquestioned rule that a criminal statute too vague to give adequate notice to some violators may still be enforced against those whose conduct is clearly covered (citing Parker v. Levy) while asserting that a statute delegating too much discretion is invalid in all its applications.12 Another dissent attacks facial invalidity itself. Respondents could still claim that the ordinance was vague as applied to them, and the ultimate demonstration that facial invalidity was inappropriate, it argued, is that some respondents could not even win an as-applied challenge on the majority's own criteria. Jose Renteria, for example, admitted membership in the Satan Disciples gang and was observed by the arresting officer loitering on a street corner with other gang members.13
The disagreement concerns how far the enforcement ground reaches. If lack of enforcement standards is a defect separate from notice, as the concurrence treats it, it can doom a law everywhere even though notice fails only for some people. If notice and enforcement are one defect, as the dissent treats them, the defect stops where clear coverage begins. Morales came out for the facial attack, so the dissent matters chiefly as the best statement of the clear-core limit, which the next subsection takes up.
The Clear-Core Limit
The limit on facial attacks comes from Parker v. Levy: one to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness, and one who has received fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct is not entitled to attack the statute because its language would not give similar warning about other conduct within its broad ambit.15 The defendant there was a commissioned officer who publicly urged enlisted personnel to refuse orders that might send them into combat. His conduct was unprotected under even the most expansive notions of the First Amendment, and the possibility that protected conduct lurked at the fringes of the articles, even after the military appeals court narrowed them, did not suffice to invalidate them at his behest.16
The reason lies in what the notice ground protects. Fair notice spares people from guessing at the boundary of forbidden conduct, and a defendant who could tell from the text that the conduct was forbidden did not have to guess, so that defendant has no notice injury to assert. Facial relief for such a defendant would rest on the interests of other people and would disable a law that works as written against those whose conduct lies in its core. A common mistake is to treat any complaint that a statute is unclear at its edges as a basis for facial invalidation. The question is whether the law is vague as to the conduct actually at issue.
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project the same limit defeated a pre-enforcement challenge to a federal ban on material support to a foreign terrorist organization. The plaintiffs wanted to train members of a designated organization in peaceful dispute resolution and in petitioning bodies such as the United Nations, and they argued that the ban on “training” and “expert advice or assistance” was vague.17 The challenge failed because their proposed conduct fell squarely within the statutory terms, and a party challenging a statute purely for vagueness must show that it is vague as to the precise conduct the party has engaged in or proposes to engage in, not as to hypothetical circumstances involving others.18 The statutory language was a far cry from open-ended terms such as “annoying or offensive conduct.” Close cases can be imagined under virtually any statute, and they do not make a law vague, because the vagueness that voids a criminal law is uncertainty about what the incriminating fact is, not difficulty in deciding whether that fact has been proved.19
The noise-ordinance cases show the other side of the line. Courts often uphold anti-noise ordinances that prohibit disturbances that “unreasonably” bother other persons, even when the ordinance makes no reference to decibel levels.20 An ordinance of that kind is imprecise at its edges but leaves a core of plainly covered conduct, while an ordinance like the one in Coates, which specified no standard of conduct at all, leaves none.21 In Morales the dissents pressed the clear-core limit, and the concurrence answered that an ordinance resting on unchecked discretion has no clearly covered core to which the limit could attach.22
Who May Raise Vagueness
The sources are most generous to speech claimants. A facial challenge to a speech regulation may be brought even by a person whose own speech is unprotected, and success usually means that the law is invalidated entirely, not merely as to certain applications.24 The reason is the chilling effect. Where a statute's literal scope is capable of reaching protected expression, the vagueness doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity, because vague statutes lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone and to restrict their conduct to what is unquestionably safe, and free speech may not be so inhibited.25 A statute can be specific yet overbroad, or vague yet not overbroad, but vagueness of this kind, like overbreadth, creates a chilling effect and produces rulings of facial invalidity.26
A second route to facial relief does not depend on speech. A litigant may invalidate a law on its face if it is vague in all its possible applications, and Coates is the example: the ordinance specified no standard of conduct at all, so it had no core of proscribable conduct to which it could constitutionally be applied.27 Morales carries that logic to a scheme of standardless enforcement.28
Even in the speech setting, the cases are not uniform. The open question arises when a litigant's own conduct is unquestionably within a law's core and the litigant seeks to invalidate it because it might be vague to others. In Young v. American Mini Theatres the Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a zoning law that was unquestionably applicable to the challengers' own speech, because it was not persuaded that the law would significantly chill other protected speakers. Justice White, concurring in Smith v. Goguen, argued that anyone of reasonable comprehension would realize that sewing a flag on the seat of one's pants is contemptuous of the flag.29
Overbreadth supplies the general third-party exception that vagueness lacks. The overbreadth doctrine creates a special First Amendment exception to the normal rule of standing, which bars a litigant from asserting the constitutional rights of third parties, by allowing an individual as to whom the law may constitutionally apply to challenge it on its face, because as applied to others it violates the First Amendment.30 That exception does not apply to vagueness challenges.31 This is why Justice Breyer conceded that Morales is unlike the overbreadth cases and rested facial relief on a right the defendants hold themselves: the right to be free from the officer's unchecked discretion.32
That concession also reconciles Morales with the general pattern that due process vagueness is typically remedied only as applied. Morales was exceptional because the text offered no standards at all, so the defect was present in every case. The as-applied form remains the ordinary one. In Gentile, a court rule that gave lawyers inadequate guidance for its safe harbor was void for vagueness as applied in that lawyer's case, although other conduct could readily be covered by it.33