Concept
Two Independent Grounds
Vagueness
Two Independent Grounds
City of Chicago v. Morales sorts vagueness doctrine into two separate tests. Following Kolender v. Lawson, the Court explained that vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons: the law may fail to give ordinary people notice of what conduct it prohibits, or it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.1 Kolender's formulation already contained both halves. Morales pulled them apart and treated each as a ground that can carry a holding on its own.
The two grounds are independent because they protect different people from different harms. The notice ground looks to the person who must obey the law and asks whether someone of ordinary understanding can tell beforehand what it forbids. The enforcement ground looks to the officers, prosecutors, and factfinders who apply the law and asks whether its text gives them enough guidance that they do not decide for themselves what the crime is. Either failure suffices. A challenger need not prove both, and a law that passes one test may still fall on the other.
The Court followed that structure in its own opinion. It first considered whether the ordinance provides fair notice to the citizen, and it then discussed the ordinance's potential for arbitrary enforcement.2 This section proceeds in the same order.
Fair Notice
The notice ground asks whether a penal statute defines the offense with enough definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.3 Morales put the point through Giaccio v. Pennsylvania: a law fails the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain about the conduct it prohibits.4 Notice does its work before an act. A person who wants to obey must be able to find the line of forbidden conduct in advance and stay on the lawful side of it. In Morales the line went missing at the point that mattered most, the definition of the offense itself.
The word “loiter” was not the difficulty. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that the term may have a common and accepted meaning, but the ordinance defined loitering as remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose, and that definition left the citizen guessing.5 The Court asked what a citizen standing in a public place with a group would actually know. If she were talking to another person, would she have an apparent purpose? If she were frequently checking her watch and looking expectantly down the street, would she?6 A purpose lives in the mind of the person who holds it, and the word “apparent” makes liability depend on what an onlooker infers from outward behavior. The citizen can know her own reasons perfectly well and still have no means of knowing whether a stranger in uniform will see them.
The Court was precise about where the vagueness sat. The city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize every instance in which a citizen stands in public with a gang member, so the vagueness that dooms the ordinance does not come from uncertainty about the normal meaning of “loitering.” It comes from uncertainty about which loitering the ordinance covers and which it leaves alone.7 The Illinois Supreme Court had likewise stressed that the law failed to separate innocent conduct from conduct threatening harm.8
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville shows the same flaw entering from a different direction. The Jacksonville ordinance itself named ordinary behavior, treating as vagrants “persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object” and “habitual loafers.”9 A law built on such categories leaves a citizen unable to tell blameless behavior from forbidden behavior, because the categories name things that innocent people do every day. The two cases differ in their point of entry. In Papachristou the listed terms were everyday activities; in Morales the everyday word “loiter” became uncertain only when the ordinance attached an observer-dependent qualifier to it.
A loitering law looks different when it ties remaining in place to something more. State courts have upheld ordinances that criminalize loitering combined with some other overt act or evidence of criminal intent, and they have uniformly invalidated laws that do not join loitering with a second specific element of the crime.10
The second element moves the question from what an observer will infer to a fact within the citizen's own knowledge. That shift supplies the advance line that bare loitering cannot supply, and it shows why the city's goal of reaching gang intimidation never required the definition it chose.
The city's principal answer to the notice objection was that loiterers are not sanctioned until they ignore an officer's order to disperse, so the order supplies the notice the definition lacks. In the city's words, “whatever problem is created by a law that criminalizes conduct people normally believe to be innocent is solved when persons receive actual notice from a police order of what they are expected to do.”11 The answer has surface appeal, since a person who is told to move understands what is being asked. The Court nonetheless found it unpersuasive for two reasons, one about when the order comes and one about what the order says.12
The timing reason follows from the purpose of fair notice, which is to let ordinary citizens conform their conduct to the law, since no one may be required “at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.”13 A loiterer is not sanctioned unless he disobeys a dispersal order, but loitering is the very conduct the ordinance is designed to prohibit, and an officer may issue the order only after that conduct has already occurred.14 An order that follows the conduct cannot give advance warning, and it cannot retroactively tell the person where the line between permitted and prohibited applications lay. If the loitering was in fact harmless and innocent, the order is itself an unjustified impairment of liberty.15 Notice operates by letting a person change what he is about to do. An order that arrives while someone already stands on the corner changes nothing about the earlier choice to stand there; it announces only that an officer has judged that choice to be covered.
The wording reason adds a second flaw. The ordinance directs the officer to order the loiterers to disperse and remove themselves from the area, and that phrasing leaves open how long the group must stay apart, how far each person must go, and whether people who walk around the block and meet again face arrest or merely another order.16 The Court compared the problem to Connally v. General Construction Co., where the terms “neighborhood” and “locality” were elastic and could be satisfied by areas measured by rods or by miles.17
Borrowing from Coates v. Cincinnati, the Court described the ordinance as vague “not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.”18 A legislature may not “set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders” and leave it to the courts to say who could rightfully be detained.19 The distinction between an imprecise standard and no standard matters because ordinary imprecision does not void a law: courts often uphold anti-noise ordinances that bar noise that “unreasonably” disturbs others.20 Chicago's ordinance supplied no comparable standard for its central term, since it made liability turn on whether a purpose was “apparent” to the officer on the scene.21 The later section on the limits of the doctrine returns to this distinction.
Justice Scalia's dissent attacks the timing reason directly. In his view the ordinance punishes only one act, the refusal to promptly obey an order to disperse, and that act must be accompanied by wrongful intent.22 He regards a dispersal order as a command whose meaning no one doubts, and he treats the objection that it does not say how far to disperse as scarcely requiring a response, because the objection would invalidate many presidential proclamations ordering insurgents to disperse.23 The disagreement turns on where notice is measured: at the moment the order is given, or at the moment before the loitering begins. The plurality's reply is its two reasons taken together, since the command arrives only after the contested conduct and is itself less definite than the dissent assumes.
Scalia's reading imports a wrongful-intent requirement, which raises the question whether a mental-state element can cure vagueness. The sources answer skeptically. In the Boyce case the Court upheld an indictment under a statute that punished only knowing violation of an I.C.C. regulation, reasoning that the regulation would apply only where the driver knew of a safer route and deliberately took the more dangerous one or willfully neglected to inquire about a safer one.24 Justice Jackson's dissent answered that scienter, as traditionally defined, cannot cure vagueness in a statute or regulation.25 The reason is that scienter attaches to knowledge of the consequences of one's acts and not to knowledge of the existence or meaning of the criminal law, so uncertain statutory language is not clarified by adding a scienter element.26 The later section on scienter requirements develops the point.
The status of this reasoning needs to stay in view when you cite it. Part IV speaks only for a plurality of the Court. Justice Kennedy concurred on notice, observing that the predicate of a dispersal order does not eliminate doubts about the adequacy of notice, because a citizen engaged in a wide array of innocent conduct is unlikely to know when an officer's knowledge of the affiliations of the people around him will bring an order, and may be unable to assess what an officer will conceive to be a lack of apparent purpose.27 Justice Scalia's dissent notes that the O'Connor and Breyer concurrences rest exclusively on the enforcement ground.28 The notice holding therefore carries less weight than the enforcement holding that the next part takes up.
Arbitrary Enforcement
Part V of Morales, which speaks for a majority of the Court, holds that the ordinance also violates “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”30 Kolender had called this requirement the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine, and Justice O'Connor repeated that ranking in her Morales concurrence.31
The ranking makes sense once you ask what each ground protects. Notice protects the person who wants to obey, yet even a person with full notice stays exposed when the law supplies no standard, because a law without one permits what Kolender called a standardless sweep that lets police, prosecutors, and juries pursue their personal predilections.32 The enforcement ground is also the one on which the O'Connor and Breyer concurrences rest exclusively, which makes it the most secure part of the Morales holding.33
A separation-of-powers account explains why the guidelines requirement matters. When a statute gives no guidance, the choice about what is forbidden passes from the legislature to whoever applies the statute. Justice Gorsuch, concurring in Sessions v. Dimaya, described the doctrine as a corollary of the separation of powers: it requires that the legislature, and not the executive or judicial branch, define what conduct is sanctionable and what is not.34 A statute that gives neither the person subject to it nor the jury that would try him a basis to judge safely and certainly the result is likewise unduly vague.35 Because Morales asks about the ordinance's potential for arbitrary enforcement, the inquiry reads the wording of the law and not the record of how officers behaved, so a challenger need not prove that any officer acted from bad motive.36
The Chicago ordinance contained no such guidelines.37 In any public place in the city, persons who stand or sit in the company of a gang member may be ordered to disperse unless their purpose is apparent.38 The principal source of the discretion was the definition of loitering as remaining in one place with no apparent purpose, a standard the Court called inherently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is apparent to the officer on the scene.39 Justice O'Connor sharpened the point: anyone standing on the street has some purpose, even if only to stand, so the ordinance lets police choose which purposes are permissible.40 Justice Breyer likewise called the “no apparent purpose” limitation no limitation at all, since an officer must read it as meaning no apparent purpose except for something, and the officer supplies the something.41
The Court also treated the Illinois Supreme Court's reading as fixed. That court interpreted the definition as giving police absolute discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering, and the United States Supreme Court has no authority to construe a state enactment more narrowly than the State's highest court does.42 The power to determine the meaning of a statute carries with it the power to prescribe its extent and limitations, so the final word on what a state law means belongs to the state's highest court. Here that court's reading cut against the city, and the Supreme Court took it as given.
An airport-rule case shows the same limit from another angle. Because the rule came from a state government, the final word on its interpretation could only come from the state courts, and yet the Court declined to wait for them to narrow it.43 So many interpretations seemed possible that the Court doubted the state courts could settle on a clear one without deciding a whole series of cases, and the narrowing reading the airport proposed was itself overbroad and vague.44
Chicago argued that the text itself already limited the officer's discretion, and the Court found each of the three claimed limits insufficient. The three arguments and their answers run as follows:
- The ordinance does not apply to people who are moving, but that excludes only activity that would not be loitering under any possible definition, and it says nothing about how much discretion officers have in choosing which stationary persons to disperse.45
- No arrest may follow unless a dispersal order is disobeyed, but that gives the officer no guidance on whether the order should issue at all, and the inherently subjective no-apparent-purpose standard governs that decision.46
- No order may issue unless the officer reasonably believes a loiterer is a gang member, and that does limit the authority to disperse, yet the ordinance still reaches friends, relatives, teachers, counselors, and even strangers who happen to talk with a gang member.47
The third limit came closest to working, and the Court said how it might have. The reasonable-belief requirement would no doubt have sufficed if the ordinance applied only to loitering with an apparently harmful purpose or effect, or possibly if it applied only to persons reasonably believed to be gang members.48 Justice O'Connor agreed that the requirement might have cured the vagueness had the ordinance been limited to such persons, but the Illinois Supreme Court did not construe it that way.49 Justice Breyer added that the requirement limits how many people the law covers while leaving untouched the range of conduct police may prohibit.50 The Court also pointed to an irony: the most harmful gang loitering usually has an obvious purpose, such as advertising control of territory or concealing drug sales, so the definition excludes much of the intimidation that prompted the ordinance while sweeping in harmless idling.51
The police department's General Order 92-4 fared no better. The Court agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that rules confining enforcement to designated areas could not supply the missing limit, because they would give no defense to a loiterer arrested elsewhere in the city, and no one who knowingly stood with a well-known gang member could safely assume an order would not come, however harmless the loitering.52 The designated areas were also never released to the public.53 A guideline that lives inside the department, can be changed by the department, and cannot be invoked by the citizen is not a guideline in the law, so it cannot stand in for the standards the legislature failed to write.
Earlier cases show the same defect in other settings. In Kolender the California statute required a person who loitered or wandered on the streets to provide credible and reliable identification when an officer asked, but it never said what would satisfy that demand, so compliance turned on the officer's satisfaction.54 The State itself explained that a jogger without identification might be made to answer questions about his route or might pass simply by reciting his name and address, depending on the officer.55 The Jacksonville ordinance in Papachristou shows the defect from the enforcement side: it listed categories such as wanderers and habitual loafers and gave the officer no standard for deciding who belonged in them.56
The pattern recurs in modern ordinances. In Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, a municipal code provision barred using a vehicle as “living quarters,” and a twenty-one-officer task force was assigned to use it to cite and arrest homeless people who used their cars that way.57 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that the provision was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it gave insufficient notice of the conduct it penalized and promoted arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.58 A provision enforced by a unit directed at one population shows how vague text leaves room for the selective use the doctrine exists to prevent.
None of this means a criminal law fails whenever an officer must use judgment. Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence rests only on the enforcement ground, accepted that some police discretion is necessary for officers to perform their peacekeeping duties, and the objection is to a law that permits a standardless sweep.59 Criminal statutes need not define offenses with extreme particularity, so a penal law is not void merely because it leaves some room for judgment.60 She stressed that Chicago may be able to draft a narrower ordinance aimed at conduct with a harmful purpose.61
The dissents contest whether the ordinance left the police too free. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, wrote that the police inevitably must exercise discretion, that the reasonable-belief requirement strikes an appropriate balance, and that officers are trusted to apply amorphous standards like probable cause and reasonable suspicion; he added that arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is best addressed if and when it arises.62 Justice Scalia, for his part, described the majority as relying only secondarily on the enforcement ground.63 He thought the criteria for a dispersal order could hardly be clearer, since the reasonable-belief requirement resembles a probable-cause standard and the General Order makes that requirement explicit.64 He also found the majority's label of subjectivity backward, because it treats a person's lack of purpose as objective and the absence of an apparent purpose as subjective.65 The two sides agree that police need some discretion. Their dispute is whether “no apparent purpose” gives an officer something to apply.
The worry about unguided official discretion reaches beyond loitering. It also underlies licensing cases such as Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., which the study of prior restraints treats in full, and the next part of this chapter turns to why speech raises the precision a law must meet.