Concept
Government Speech and Monuments
Regulation of expressive conduct
Government Speech and Monuments
A city that selects the monuments for its park speaks for itself, and the Free Speech Clause does not regulate what a government says for itself. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum applied that principle to permanent monuments in a public park: even when private donors supplied them, the city may choose among them by content and cannot be made to accept more.1 One limit survives. Government speech escapes free speech review but not the Constitution’s other restraints, the Establishment Clause among them.
The earlier sections of this chapter all set a private actor against a government burden on expression. O’Brien burned his draft certificate and argued that Congress enacted the amendment to abridge speech; the district court rejected the claim, finding no abridgment on the statute’s face and declining to inquire into Congress’s motives.2 He added that the burning was symbolic speech, a communication of ideas by conduct in demonstration against the war and the draft,3 and the Court observed that the amendment punished destruction whether or not the destroyer meant to express a view.4 Johnson burned a flag at a political demonstration during the 1984 Republican National Convention; no one was injured or threatened, though several witnesses were seriously offended.5
The Clark demonstrators slept in Lafayette Park and on the Mall to call attention to the plight of the homeless.6 The Court held that the camping ban could be applied to them.7 It assumed that the sleeping was expressive but reasoned that expression, even when symbolized by conduct, remains subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.8 Such restrictions survive only if justified without reference to content,9 and a regulation enacted to restrain speech because of its content presumptively violates the First Amendment.10 The ordinance in R.A.V. v. St. Paul failed because it reached fighting words only when they addressed specified topics such as race, color, creed, religion, or gender.11 Hurley showed that a private speaker may also refuse to carry others’ messages: parade organizers control the content of their own expressive event, and the state cannot force them to include groups whose messages they do not wish to convey.12
In every one of those cases the Free Speech Clause protected the person the government burdened. Summum inverts the arrangement. The expression belongs to the government, and the plaintiff demands that the government carry a message it has not chosen. Two questions follow: why Summum treated a donated monument as the city’s own speech, and how courts classify expression when the answer is less obvious.
Summum and Park Monuments
Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, Utah, held a number of permanent displays, most of them donated by private groups or individuals, including a Ten Commandments monument given by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971. Summum, a religious organization, asked to erect a stone monument bearing the Seven Aphorisms of Summum, similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument. The city refused, because its practice was to limit monuments in the park to those that directly relate to the city’s history or were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the community. Summum sued, arguing that accepting the Ten Commandments monument while rejecting its own violated the Free Speech Clause. The Tenth Circuit treated the park as a traditional public forum, applied strict scrutiny, and ruled for Summum. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. By accepting donated monuments the city did not create a public forum, and it remained free to reject another proffered monument whose content it did not choose to endorse, because monuments in parks are speech by the government and not by private parties.13
The outcome turns on classification, because the Free Speech Clause restricts regulation of private speech and does not regulate government speech. A government must be able to choose its messages. Every decision to fund a campaign, commemorate an event, or honor a person favors one position over others, and if each citizen could demand that officials carry the opposing view, government could never adopt a position at all. The check on government speech is political: the city answers to the electorate for what it says, and newly elected officials can say something different.
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association shows how far the idea reaches. Private persons designed the beef advertisements, but the Secretary of Agriculture appointed them to a board and controlled which messages the assessment funded, so the Court treated the advertisements as the government’s own speech and subjected them to no First Amendment scrutiny.14 The case also marks a boundary. A government that says “buy more beef” is simply speaking, but one that attributes its message to named private individuals who have not agreed to it invites a claim that it is forcing them to speak and to adopt a particular message.15
Monuments fit the category. Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public, and a monument is by definition a structure designed as a means of expression. Property owners seldom open their land to permanent monuments that convey messages they do not want to be associated with, so observers reasonably read a donated monument as speaking for the owner, and a city park helps define the identity the city projects. Private origin therefore does not decide the question. Donors delivered finished monuments, but the city chose to accept them, took ownership of most of them (the Ten Commandments monument included), selected them to project its image, and kept written criteria for future selections, so it held final approval over what the monuments say. Summum answered that the city should have to adopt each monument’s message through a formal process, but the city’s ownership and the donor’s loss of every prior right signal plainly that the monument speaks for the city. And because a monument rarely carries a single message, a city that accepts one does not necessarily endorse the meaning a donor sees in it.
The same group in the same park illustrates the distinction. A park remains a traditional public forum for speeches and other transitory expressive acts. Summum’s members could hold a rally in Pioneer Park or hand out leaflets there, and the city could not exclude them because it disliked their message; it could impose only time, place, and manner limits justified without reference to content,16 and the city had made no effort to abridge those rights. A rally is Summum’s own speech, so forum rules govern it. A permanent monument that the city has selected is the city’s speech, and forum doctrine, which applies to events in parks and not to permanent monuments, does not govern it.17
Forum analysis also fits permanent monuments badly for a physical reason. Forum doctrine presupposes property that can accommodate many speakers without defeating its essential function. Orators finish and leafleters go home, so a park can host very many of them over the years, but monuments endure, monopolize the land they occupy, and permanently displace other uses of the space. If cities had to stay viewpoint neutral in choosing donated monuments, they would face clutter or pressure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments, and most parks would have little choice but to refuse all donations. Summum’s own proposal, content-neutral limits on time, place, and manner, would have left France’s 1884 gift of the Statue of Liberty a choice between declining it and finding comparable space for other statues of similar size and nature, a Statue of Autocracy offered by an imperial government included. Where forum analysis would almost inexorably close the forum, it is out of place.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette is not to the contrary. A private group there sought to erect a cross for 16 days on public property already opened to similar temporary displays, and temporary displays suit the forum model in a way permanent monuments rarely do. The Court also left room for forum analysis where a town creates a monument on which every resident may place the name of a person to be honored or some other private message, because a town that does that has invited private speech. The line follows control of the message. A city that selects each monument has spoken, and a city that hands every resident a blank space has invited others to speak.
Government speech is free of the Free Speech Clause, but not of every restraint. The Establishment Clause, the limits that law, regulation, or practice place on public officials’ advocacy, and the government’s accountability to the electorate all remain. Summum decided no Establishment Clause question, because Summum pursued only its free speech claim, and whether the Ten Commandments monument violates that Clause stayed open.
The concurrences show where the open questions lie. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, noted that the city’s actions might still be constrained by the Establishment Clause, and Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote that the city “ought not fear that today’s victory has propelled it from the Free Speech Clause frying pan into the Establishment Clause fire.” Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, would not treat every public monument as government speech and observed that the interaction of government speech with Establishment Clause principles had not begun to be worked out. He proposed asking whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be government speech,18 a test he likened to the one for spotting forbidden government endorsement of religion.19 Justice Breyer joined the opinion on the understanding that government speech is a rule of thumb, and he warned that courts must apply categories such as “government speech” and “public forum” with an eye toward their purposes, lest free speech doctrine become “a jurisprudence of labels.”20 He added that a city choosing monuments solely on political grounds unrelated to their themes might well violate the First Amendment.
Sorting Government From Private Speech
Classification decides everything after it. If the expression is the government’s, the government may favor one viewpoint over another and the Free Speech Clause has no role. If the expression is private, the government must stay viewpoint neutral when it excludes a speaker. The sorting is hard because private hands often design, fund, or propose what the government displays, and Summum itself conceded that some situations make it hard to tell whether a government is speaking for itself or providing a forum. Later opinions call the method a “holistic inquiry designed to determine whether the government intends to speak for itself or to regulate private expression,” and they weigh three kinds of evidence: the history of the expression, the public’s likely perception of who is speaking, and the extent to which the government actively shapes or controls it. Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans distilled those factors from Summum, and Shurtleff v. City of Boston later made them the dispositive mode of analysis.
Each factor serves the reason government speech escapes the Free Speech Clause. When government speaks, the electoral process checks what it says, so a citizen who dislikes a message can vote against the officials responsible for it. That check works only if voters can tell that the message is the government’s and the government actually decides what the message is. History and public perception go to the first condition, since a kind of expression the state has long used, and that the public associates with the state, will be credited to the state. Control goes to the second, because a government that approves whatever is offered has chosen no message for which anyone can hold it to account.
The inquiry also guards against a danger the Court named in Matal. If registering a trademark turned the mark into government speech, the same reasoning could reach other registration systems such as copyright, and the government could silence disfavored viewpoints by affixing a seal of approval to private speech.22 The worry echoes the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which rests on the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly.23 That view prevailed over the argument that the greater power to deny a benefit includes the lesser power to impose conditions on its receipt.24
Summum shows all three factors pointing the same way. Governments have long used monuments to speak, and observers reasonably read a donated monument as speaking for the property owner. Pleasant Grove decided which donations to accept, took ownership of most of them, and kept final approval over what the park said. The monuments’ private origin did not change the result, because donors delivered finished works and the city’s decision to accept and display them made the message the city’s.
Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans applied the same factors to a more everyday object. The Sons of Confederate Veterans proposed a specialty license plate featuring a Confederate battle flag, and the Texas board that approves specialty designs rejected it because many members of the public found the design offensive. By a 5 to 4 vote the Court held that the plates are government speech. License plates have long communicated messages from the states, such as state mottos, and the public regards the plates as government connected; indeed, the purpose of submitting a design was probably to convey the impression of government approval.25 The state also manufactured and owned the plates, often designed them, and kept direct control over the messages they carried.26 The dissenters dismissed the perception analysis, pointing to the vast diversity of specialty plates and the unlikelihood that anyone thought the state endorsed all of them.27 Justice Souter’s Summum test, which asks what a reasonable and fully informed observer would understand, anticipates the perception factor and shows why it is the easiest of the three to contest.28
Shurtleff v. City of Boston reached the opposite result on a display that looks similar on its surface. Boston’s City Hall has three flagpoles: the first flies the American flag, the second the Massachusetts flag, and the third was open to private groups for short flag-raising ceremonies on the plaza. Between 2005 and 2017 the city received 284 requests to raise a flag and granted all 284, until Harold Shurtleff’s group, Camp Constitution, asked to raise a Christian flag and the city refused out of concern for the Establishment Clause. The Court unanimously held the flag raisings to be private speech. It found history and public perception inconclusive and treated control as decisive: Boston took no part in selecting the flags or crafting their messages, whereas Pleasant Grove had picked its monuments and the Texas board had controlled plate designs. Because Boston had not spoken for itself, excluding a flag for its religious viewpoint was impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
Walker and Shurtleff differ mainly on control. A board that may refuse designs, and refuses them to protect the state’s image, has chosen what the state will show. A city that has never said no has chosen nothing and is lending a pole. Ownership of the property and a plausible public association with the government were present in both cases, so neither could separate them. The government’s selectivity did.
Matal v. Tam marks the outer edge of the doctrine. Simon Tam, lead singer of The Slants, sought to register the band’s name as a trademark and was refused under a Lanham Act clause barring marks that disparage persons. The government argued that registered trademarks are government speech, and the Court rejected the argument: “Trademarks are private not government speech.”29 The reasons track the control factor. The government does not dream up the marks or edit those submitted for registration.30 Except as the challenged clause requires, an examiner may not reject a mark for the viewpoint it appears to express, and does not ask whether that viewpoint is consistent with government policy or with other registered marks.31 If a mark meets the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-neutral requirements, registration is mandatory,32 and no higher official reviews the decision to register unless it is challenged.33 Treating registration as government speech would mean that the federal government is “babbling prodigiously and incoherently,” expressing contradictory views and endorsing a vast array of products. The Court distinguished Walker because the state manufactured and owned the plates, often designed them, and kept direct control over their messages,34 and it described Walker as likely marking the outer bounds of the doctrine.
Classification decides which body of doctrine governs next. If the expression is the government’s, the Free Speech Clause drops out, although the Establishment Clause and the electorate still constrain what the government may say. Examinees often treat the source of the design or the funding as decisive, yet private donors supplied the monuments in Summum and private groups proposed the plate designs in Walker, and both still counted as government speech because the government chose what to display. Nor does an approval step show control: the trademark office approved every mark it registered without selecting any message.35