Concept
Hurley and Expressive Events
Regulation of expressive conduct
Hurley and Expressive Events
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston the Court held that private parade organizers may control the content of their event, so a state may not force them to include a group whose message they do not wish to convey. Compelling an unwanted message into a private expressive parade violates the organizers’ right not to speak and to shape what the parade says.1
The holding turns the preceding sections around. In the symbolic-conduct cases, a protester’s act carried a message, and the question was whether the government’s interest had anything to do with it. The claimant in O’Brien had to persuade the Court that burning his registration certificate was “symbolic speech,” a “communication of ideas by conduct.”2 The organizers in Hurley bore no such burden. A parade is expression, and the regulation reached them through an ordinary conduct rule, a ban on discrimination in public accommodations, written with no thought of suppressing ideas.
A neutral rule can still burden a speaker when the conduct it regulates is the speaker’s choice of what an event will say. An organizer who assembles a parade chooses which units march, and the parade’s overall message is distilled from those individual presentations, each perceived by spectators as part of the whole.3 A rule dictating whom the organizer must admit therefore alters the organizer’s own expression, although the lawmakers had no quarrel with any message. This section asks when a conduct rule, applied to a private speaker’s choice of participants, compels the speaker to carry someone else’s message.
The principle beneath that question is older than Hurley. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette recognized that “symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,” and that the First Amendment shields saluting a flag and refusing to salute it.4 Barnette’s fixed star is the rule that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess their faith by word or act.5 Wooley v. Maynard added that “[t]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind,’” so that no individual may be forced to espouse ideological causes with which he disagrees.6
The Free Speech Clause therefore protects the right to refrain from speaking as well as the right to speak, and it presumptively forbids the government to dictate the content of speech or symbolic expression by forcing citizens to express messages they reject. Because such a compulsion dictates content, courts treat it as content-based and apply strict scrutiny.7 Compulsion takes more than one form. A statute can dictate the words on a speaker’s own printed materials, as the 1962 amendment to the federal drug law did when it required manufacturers to print a drug’s “established name” prominently on labels and other printed material.8 The order in Hurley dictated no words at all; it made the speaker carry someone else’s.
Hurley carries these cases from the individual to the organization that assembles an event. Choosing the participants is part of the organizer’s own expression, so a state command to include an unwanted participant is a command to speak. The first subsection follows the Court’s reasoning in order. The second sets Hurley beside decisions in which required access did not compel the host to speak.
Hurley's Parade Holding
A state court ordered a private parade opened to a group its organizers had turned away. The parade’s organizing council (the Council) denied the application of GLIB, the group named in the case, to take part in the 1992 parade, but GLIB obtained a state-court order to include its contingent, which marched “uneventfully” among that year’s 10,000 participants and 750,000 spectators.9 Because a state court applied state law, the First Amendment reached the order through the Fourteenth Amendment. The text of the First Amendment addresses Congress, but in 1925 the Court declared that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom of expression against state infringement.10
The Court did not condemn the statute on its face. The law’s object, on its face, is to secure for gays and lesbians in public accommodations what the old common law promised any traveler at the inn: that, accepting the usual terms of service, they will not be turned away merely on the proprietor’s personal preference.11 The defect lay in the application. Applied to expressive activity “in the way it was done here,” the law’s apparent object was “simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages of their own.”12 The disagreement, the Court explained, “goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.”13 That line separates a refusal to admit people from a refusal to carry a message, and the case turns on it.
A parade communicates, and the protection reaches well beyond banners and songs. The Constitution “looks beyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression,” and the cases shield acts such as saluting a flag (and refusing to), wearing an armband to protest a war, displaying a red flag, and even marching in uniforms displaying the swastika.14 A parade also needs no single distilled message to qualify. A narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of protection; confining protection to a “particularized message,” the phrase from Spence v. Washington, would never reach the paintings of Jackson Pollock, the music of Arnold Schoenberg, or the verse of Lewis Carroll.15 The Spence inquiry therefore sorts isolated acts such as burning a flag; it cannot demand that every expressive event reduce to a slogan.
The organizers’ selection of marching units was itself protected, even though they admitted most applicants. The Court agreed with the state courts that the Council was rather lenient in admitting participants, but “a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.” Nor does protection require a speaker to “generate, as an original matter, each item featured in the communication.”16 A newspaper likewise “is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising,” and its choice of material, “whether fair or unfair,” is an exercise of editorial control on which the state may not intrude.17 The reason lies in how an audience receives a compilation. Spectators perceive each parade unit as part of the whole,18 so whoever controls the selection controls the message.
GLIB’s own participation was expressive too. A contingent marching behind its banner “would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual,” and its presence would suggest that people of those orientations have as much claim to “unqualified social acceptance” as heterosexuals.19 The organizers might disbelieve those facts, object to that acceptance, or have some other reason for keeping the message out. “[W]hatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”20
That choice is why the order fails. Because every participating unit affects the message the organizers convey, a law dictating that a particular group be included “alter[s] the expressive content” of the parade.21 On the state’s approach, any contingent of protected individuals with a message would have a right to participate in the organizers’ speech, and everyone the law protects who wished to add a demonstration of their own would help shape the parade. That use of state power violates “the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”22 The protection does not belong to the press alone. Business corporations and ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression enjoy it too, because its point is the point of all speech protection: to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.23
The respondents invoked Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, where the Court applied only intermediate scrutiny to rules requiring cable operators to set aside channels for designated broadcast signals. They argued that the Council, like a cable operator, was merely “a conduit” for the parade’s participants “rather than itself a speaker.”24 The Court called the metaphor inapt, because GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as the result of the Council’s customary determination that GLIB’s message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well.25 Cable viewers, by contrast, ran little risk of assuming that the broadcast stations on a cable system convey messages the operator endorses, given cable’s long history as a conduit for broadcast signals.26 A second difference concerns what the government was protecting. A cable system is a franchised channel with a monopolistic opportunity to shut out speakers, and the government’s interest in Turner was “not the alteration of speech, but the survival of speakers.”27 GLIB, by contrast, presumably would have had a fair shot, under neutral criteria, at a parade permit of its own, so the respondents had not shown that the Council could “silence the voice of competing speakers.”28 The Court expressly left open how much weight the likelihood of misattribution carries.29
No state purpose saved the order. Applied to a parade, the statute’s object was to make speakers modify their expression as the law’s beneficiaries choose, and the respondents identified no other legitimate interest.30 A broader aim, a society free of the corresponding biases, fared no better. If that is the point of applying the law to expressive conduct, the Court said, it is “a decidedly fatal objective.”31 The very idea “that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.” The law “is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior,” but it “is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”32 The compelled-disclosure cases make a parallel demand: significant encroachments on First Amendment rights “cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest,” and the State’s subordinating interests “must survive exacting scrutiny.”33
Hurley is the compelled-speech counterpart of the flag-burning principle. Government may not suppress an expressive choice because it disapproves the message, and it may not conscript one for the same reason.
Treat the fourth step as a consideration, not an element, since Hurley declined to decide the precise significance of misattribution. The first three steps explain why the same statute can be applied lawfully in one setting and unlawfully in another. The fourth is where later decisions cut the principle back, and the next subsection takes them up.
The restaurant order and the parade order rest on one statute and differ in what the regulated party is doing when the statute reaches it. Selling meals is commerce open to the public on standard terms, the function the old inn rule served. Choosing marching units is composing a message for an audience. The label a court attaches often decides a First Amendment case. In Roth, one word, “prurient,” spelled the difference between sex and obscenity, and so between material the Constitution sanctions and material subject to criminal penalty.34 A court facing a statute that is valid on its face should therefore ask what the statute is being used to make the private party do.
When Hurley Does Not Apply
Hurley marked the edge of its own holding when it explained why the Council was not a mere conduit. GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as the product of the Council’s customary judgment about which units to admit, so the order fell on a speaker closely tied to the message being communicated.36 The principle that follows is narrower than a general right to refuse outsiders. A state may require a private host to open property or a channel to other speakers, so long as the outsiders’ words do not become part of what the host itself is saying. The decisions on both sides of that line yield four questions, best weighed together:
- Is the host itself speaking through the space or channel, so that what it admits becomes part of its own message?
- Would observers likely attribute the admitted speaker’s message to the host?
- Can the host realistically disavow that message?
- Does the government prescribe a message or grant access because of viewpoint, or does it apply a neutral rule?
No single factor is a formula. Hurley itself declined to decide the precise significance of misattribution,37 and the cases below show the factors operating together.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins marks the permissive side of the line. The Court sustained a state law requiring shopping-mall proprietors to let visitors solicit signatures on political petitions, without any showing that the owners would otherwise keep the petitioners from reaching an audience.38 Hurley later explained the result. The proprietors ran “a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please,” the solicitations would “not likely be identified with those of the owner,” and the proprietors could “expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand.”39 The owner, moreover, “did not even allege that he objected to the content of the pamphlets,” so the principle of speaker’s autonomy “was simply not threatened.”40 A shopping center open to the public does not compose a single message from the people who pass through it. A parade does, because spectators perceive each unit as part of the whole.41
The identification factor depends on setting, and Justice Powell’s separate opinion in PruneYard shows how. If customers could mistake the access speaker’s message for the owner’s, the owner would face a choice: permit the mistaken impression, and so be “compelled to affirm someone else’s belief,” or disavow the message and be “forced to speak when he would prefer to remain silent.” The mere freedom to dissociate, he concluded, “cannot restore his ‘right to refrain from speaking at all.’”42 The majority treated the ability to disavow as evidence that identification was unlikely. The separate opinion adds that disavowal carries its own cost when identification is likely.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission marks the opposite pole. The Court later described the access rules in that case and in Tornillo as compelling counterspeech in response to speech of a particular content, which is why they were treated as content-based and drew strict scrutiny.43 Those rules were activated by something the host itself said, so they exacted a content-based penalty,44 and they forced the host “to alter [its] own messages to respond to” the material it was required to carry.45 PruneYard differs on each point: its owner never objected to the content of the pamphlets, so nothing threatened the owner’s own speech.46 A rule of the Pacific Gas kind burdens the host’s message, not merely its property.
The standard of review follows from how the access rule is triggered. In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC the Court held that Tornillo and Pacific Gas & Electric did not control a rule that cable operators carry local broadcast stations, because the must-carry rules were content-neutral in application. No particular message spoken by the operators activated them, so they exacted no content-based penalty.47 The rules also would not force operators to alter their own messages in response to the programming they had to carry,48 and given cable’s history as a conduit, there was little risk that viewers would think the operator endorsed the stations it carried.49 The Court applied only intermediate scrutiny.50 The sorting mirrors the gatekeeping question from earlier in this chapter. A law that compels speech of a particular content, or counterspeech in response to it, is content-based and draws strict scrutiny, while a law that compels speech for reasons unrelated to content draws, at most, the intermediate scrutiny of O’Brien and Ward.51
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) applies the same logic to law schools. The compelled-speech violation in each earlier case “resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate,” and the expressive nature of a parade was central to Hurley.52 The law schools said that giving military recruiters equal access impaired their own expression by forcing them to associate with the recruiters. The Court answered that “just as saying conduct is undertaken for expressive purposes cannot make it symbolic speech, so too a speaker cannot ‘erect a shield’ against laws requiring access ‘simply by asserting’ that mere association ‘would impair its message.’”53 The Solomon Amendment, the Court added, does not force a law school “to accept members it does not desire.”54 That language marks the contrast with Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, where the Court held that New Jersey could not apply its public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to accept an avowed gay scoutmaster, because the compelled addition of a member would significantly burden the organization’s expression.
The wedding-vendor disputes press hardest on the attribution factor. The usual test for expressive conduct asks whether reasonable observers would agree that the conduct communicates as the actor believes, and the actor’s own understanding is not enough. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, it seemed doubtful that reasonable observers would share the baker’s understanding of his cakes, including his belief that each cake carried his own approval of the wedding.55 A law forbidding the discriminatory denial of goods or services is, moreover, arguably a content-neutral regulation with at most an incidental effect on expression, which draws a relatively lenient balancing test.56 The presumptive protection against compelled speech reaches religious objectors, among others, although the law in this area remains complex, uncertain, and unsettled.57 The claim succeeded in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, where the Court held that Colorado could not use its anti-discrimination act to require a designer of original, customized wedding websites to create websites expressing views she rejects. A cake and a website both come from vendors serving the public. The difference lies in the factors: the website is the vendor’s own expression, and viewers would attribute its message to her.
Conditions on a government benefit change the analysis. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez a student group invoked Dale to resist a law school’s requirement that recognized student organizations accept all comers, and the Court rejected the claim 5 to 4. The policy applied to every group whatever its message, so it was viewpoint neutral, and it governed access to a limited public forum instead of prohibiting the group’s speech. A command that changes a host’s own message draws strict review, while a viewpoint-neutral term for receiving a benefit draws far less.
Moody v. NetChoice presents the parade question for social media. A platform that passively transmits everything its users post resembles the cable operator or the shopping center. A platform that selects and arranges others’ posts into a feed it presents as its own product resembles the newspaper editor, whose choice of material is an exercise of editorial control on which the state may not intrude.58 On an exam, run the four factors on the platform’s facts instead of treating the platform setting as a separate rule.