144 S.Ct. 2383 (2024)
But what if a platform's algorithm just presents automatically to each user whatever the algorithm thinks the user will like— e.g., content similar to posts with which the user previously engaged? See ante, at 2404, n. 5. The First Amendment implications of the Florida and Texas laws might be different for that kind of algorithm. And what about AI, which is rapidly evolving? What if a platform's owners hand the reins to an AI tool and ask it simply to remove "hateful" content? If the AI relies on large language models to determine what is "hateful" and should be removed, has a human being with First Amendment rights made an inherently expressive "choice ... not to propound a particular point of view"? Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575, 115 S.Ct. 2338 . In other words, technology may attenuate the connection between content-moderation actions ( e.g., removing posts) and human beings' constitutionally protected right to " decide for [themselves] the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (emphasis added). So the way platforms use this sort of technology might have constitutional significance.
There can be other complexities too. For example, the corporate structure and ownership of some platforms may be relevant to the constitutional analysis. A speaker's right to "decide `what not to say'" is "enjoyed by business corporations generally." Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573-574, 115 S.Ct. 2338 (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ). Corporations, which are composed of human beings with First Amendment rights, possess First Amendment rights themselves. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ; cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706-707, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) . But foreign persons and corporations located abroad do not. Agency for Int'l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc., 591 U.S. 430, 433-436, 140 S.Ct. 2082, 207 L.Ed.2d 654 (2020) . So a social-media platform's foreign ownership and control over its content-moderation decisions might affect whether laws overriding those decisions trigger First Amendment scrutiny. What if the platform's corporate leadership abroad makes the policy decisions about the viewpoints and content the platform will disseminate? Would it matter that the corporation employs Americans to develop and implement content-moderation algorithms if they do so at the direction of foreign executives? Courts may need to confront such questions when applying the First Amendment to certain platforms.
These are just a few examples of questions that might arise in litigation that more thoroughly exposes the relevant facts 2411 *2411 about particular social-media platforms and functions. The answers in any given case might cast doubt on—or might vindicate —a social-media company's invocation of its First Amendment rights. Regardless, the analysis is bound to be fact intensive, and it will surely vary from function to function and platform to platform. And in a facial challenge, answering all of those questions isn't even the end of the story: The court must then find a way to measure the unconstitutional relative to the constitutional applications to determine whether the law "prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep." United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770, 143 S.Ct. 1932, 216 L.Ed.2d 692 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A facial challenge to either of these laws likely forces a court to bite off more than it can chew. An as-applied challenge, by contrast, would enable courts to home in on whether and how specific functions—like feeds versus direct messaging—are inherently expressive and answer platform- and function-specific questions that might bear on the First Amendment analysis. While the governing constitutional principles are straightforward, applying them in one fell swoop to the entire social-media universe is not.
I join the Court's opinion, which correctly articulates and applies our First Amendment precedent. In this respect, the Eleventh Circuit's understanding of the First Amendment's protection of editorial discretion was generally correct; the Fifth Circuit's was not.
But for the reasons the Court gives, these cases illustrate the dangers of bringing a facial challenge. If NetChoice's members are concerned about preserving their editorial discretion with respect to the services on which they have focused throughout this litigation— e.g., Facebook's News-feed and YouTube's homepage—they would be better served by bringing a First Amendment challenge as applied to those functions. Analyzing how the First Amendment bears on those functions is complicated enough without simultaneously analyzing how it bears on a platform's other functions— e.g., Facebook Messenger and Google Search—much less to distinct platforms like Uber and Etsy. In fact, dealing with a broad swath of varied platforms and functions in a facial challenge strikes me as a daunting, if not impossible, task. A function qualifies for First Amendment protection only if it is inherently expressive. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568, 115 S.Ct. 2338 , 132 2410 *2410 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). Even for a prototypical social-media feed, making this determination involves more than meets the eye.
Consider, for instance, how platforms use algorithms to prioritize and remove content on their feeds. Assume that human beings decide to remove posts promoting a particular political candidate or advocating some position on a public-health issue. If they create an algorithm to help them identify and delete that content, the First Amendment protects their exercise of editorial judgment—even if the algorithm does most of the deleting without a person in the loop. In that event, the algorithm would simply implement human beings' inherently expressive choice "to exclude a message [they] did not like from" their speech compilation. Id., at 574, 115 S.Ct. 2338 .
These cases present a complex clash between two novel state laws and the alleged First Amendment rights of several of the largest social media platforms. Some things are already clear. Not every potential action taken by a social media company will qualify as expression protected under the First Amendment. But not every hypothesized regulation of such a company's operations will necessarily be able to withstand the force of the First Amendment's protections either. Beyond those broadest of statements, it is difficult to say much more at this time. With these records and lower court decisions, we are not able to adequately evaluate whether the challenged state laws are facially valid.
That is in no small part because, as all Members of the Court acknowledge, plaintiffs bringing a facial challenge must clear a high bar. See ante, at 2897-2398 (majority opinion); post, at 2418-2419 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). The Eleventh Circuit failed to appreciate the nature of this challenge, and the Fifth Circuit did not adequately evaluate it. That said, I agree with Justice BARRETT that the Eleventh Circuit at least fairly stated our First Amendment precedent, whereas the Fifth Circuit did not. See ante, at 2409 (concurring opinion); see also ante, at 2399-2403 (majority opinion). On remand, then, both courts will have to undertake their legal analyses anew.
In doing so, the lower courts must address these cases at the right level of specificity. The question is not whether an entire category of corporations (like social media companies) or a particular entity (like Facebook) is generally engaged in expression. Nor is it enough to say that a given activity (say, content moderation) for a particular service (the News Feed, for example) seems roughly analogous to a more familiar example from our precedent. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 871 (1969) (positing that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them"). Even when evaluating a broad facial challenge, courts must make sure they carefully parse not only what entities are regulated, but how the regulated activities actually function before deciding if the activity in question constitutes expression and therefore comes 2412 *2412 within the First Amendment's ambit. See Brief for Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University as Amicus Curiae 11-12. Thus, further factual development may be necessary before either of today's challenges can be fully and fairly addressed.
In light of the high bar for facial challenges and the state of these cases as they come to us, I would not go on to treat either like an as-applied challenge and preview our potential ruling on the merits. Faced with difficult constitutional issues arising in new contexts on undeveloped records, this Court should strive to avoid deciding more than is necessary. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) . In my view, such restraint is warranted today.
I agree with the Court's decision to vacate and remand because NetChoice and the Computer and Communications Industry Association (together, the trade associations) have not established that Texas's H. B. 20 and Florida's S. B. 7072 are facially unconstitutional.
I cannot agree, however, with the Court's decision to opine on certain applications of those statutes. The Court's discussion is unnecessary to its holding. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 351, n. 12, 125 S.Ct. 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 708 (2005) ("Dictum settles nothing, even in the court that utters it"). Moreover, the Court engages in the exact type of analysis that it chastises the Courts of Appeals for performing. It faults the Courts of Appeals for focusing on only one subset of applications, rather than determining whether each statute's "full range of applications" are constitutional. See ante, at 2397-2398, 2398-2399. But, the Court repeats that very same error. Out of the sea of "variegated and complex" functions that platforms perform, ante, at 2398, the Court plucks out two (Facebook's News Feed and You-Tube's homepage), and declares that they may be protected by the First Amendment. See ante, at 2406 (opining on what the "current record suggests"). The Court does so on a record that it itself describes as "incomplete" and "underdeveloped," ante, at 2398-2399, 2403, and by sidestepping several pressing factual and legal questions, see post, at 2437-2439 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). As Justice ALITO explains, the Court's approach is both unwarranted and mistaken. See ibid.
I agree with Justice ALITO's analysis and join his opinion in full. I write separately to add two observations on the merits and to highlight a more fundamental jurisdictional problem. The trade associations have brought facial challenges alleging that H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072 are unconstitutional in many or all of their applications. But, Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to exercise judicial power only over "Cases" and "Controversies." Accordingly, federal courts can decide whether a statute is constitutional only as applied to the parties before them—they lack authority to deem a statute "facially" unconstitutional.
As Justice ALITO explains, the trade associations have failed to provide many of the basic facts necessary to evaluate their challenges to H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072. See post, at 2438-2439. I make two additional observations.
First, with respect to certain provisions of H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072, the Court assumes that the framework outlined in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 2413 *2413 105 S.Ct. 2265, 86 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), applies. See ante, at 2398. In that case, the Court held that laws requiring the disclosure of factual information in commercial advertising may satisfy the First Amendment if the disclosures are "reasonably related" to the Government's interest in preventing consumer deception. 471 U.S. at 651, 105 S.Ct. 2265 . Because the trade associations did not contest Zauderer 's applicability before the Eleventh Circuit and both lower courts applied its framework, I agree with the Court's decision to rely upon Zauderer at this stage. However, I think we should reconsider Zauderer and its progeny. "I am skeptical of the premise on which Zauderer rests—that, in the commercial-speech context, the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed." Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P. A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 255, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 176 L.Ed.2d 79 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, the common-carrier doctrine should continue to guide the lower courts' examination of the trade associations' claims on remand. See post, at 2431, and n. 17, 2438 (opinion of ALITO, J.). "[O]ur legal system and its British predecessor have long subjected certain businesses, known as common carriers, to special regulations, including a general requirement to serve all comers." Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia Univ., 593 U. S. ___, ___, 141 S.Ct. 1220, 1222, 209 L.Ed.2d 619 (2021) (THOMAS, J., concurring in grant of certiorari) . Moreover, "there is clear historical precedent for regulating transportation and communications networks in a similar manner as traditional common carriers" given their many similarities. Id., at ___ 141 S.Ct., at 1223. Though they reached different conclusions, both the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit appropriately strove to apply the common-carrier doctrine in assessing the constitutionality of H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072 respectively. See 49 F.4th 439, 469-480 (CA5 2022); NetChoice v. Attorney Gen., Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1219-1222 (CA11 2022).
The common-carrier doctrine may have weighty implications for the trade associations' claims. But, the same factual barriers that preclude the Court from assessing the trade associations' claims under our First Amendment precedents also prevent us from applying the common-carrier doctrine in this posture. At a minimum, we would need to pinpoint the regulated parties and specific conduct being regulated. On remand, however, both lower courts should continue to consider the common-carrier doctrine.
The opinions in these cases detail many of the considerable hurdles that currently preclude resolution of the trade associations' claims. See ante, at 2397-2398; ante, at 2409-2411 (BARRETT, J., concurring); post, at 2433-2439 (opinion of ALITO, J.). The most significant problem of all, however, has yet to be addressed: Federal courts lack authority to adjudicate the trade associations' facial challenges.
Rather than allege that the statutes impermissibly regulate them, the trade associations assert that H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072 are actually unconstitutional in most or all of their applications. This type of challenge, called a facial challenge, is "an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a particular application." Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 415, 185 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2d 435 (2015) .
Facial challenges are fundamentally at odds with Article III. Because Article III 2414 *2414 limits federal courts' judicial power to cases or controversies, federal courts "lac[k] the power to pronounce that [a] statute is unconstitutional" as applied to nonparties. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 621, 141 S.Ct. 2373, 210 L.Ed.2d 716 (2021) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). Entertaining facial challenges in spite of that limitation arrogates powers reserved to the political branches and disturbs the relationship between the Federal Government and the States. The practice of adjudicating facial challenges creates practical concerns as well. Facial challenges' dubious historical roots further confirm that the doctrine should have no place in our jurisprudence.
Article III empowers federal courts to exercise "judicial Power" only over "Cases" and "Controversies." This Court has long recognized that those terms impose substantive constraints on the authority of federal courts. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-358, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911) ; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) . One corollary of the case-or-controversy requirement is that while federal courts can judge the constitutionality of statutes, they may do so only to the extent necessary to resolve the case at hand. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," but only because "[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) ; see Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 28 L.Ed. 899 (1885) ("[The Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute ... irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies"). Accordingly, "[e]xcept when necessary" to resolve a case or controversy, "courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action." Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 492, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) ; see United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960) .
These limitations on the power of judicial review play an essential role in preserving our constitutional structure. Our Constitution sets forth a "tripartite allocation of power," separating different types of powers across three co-equal branches. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[E]ach branch [is vested] with an exclusive form of power," and "no branch can encroach upon the powers confided to the others." Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. 244, 250, 138 S.Ct. 897, 200 L.Ed.2d 92 (2018) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the Judicial Branch's case, it is vested with the "ultimate and supreme" power of judicial review. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 12 S.Ct. 400, 36 L.Ed. 176 (1892) . That power includes the authority to refuse to apply a statute enacted and approved by the other two branches of the Federal Government. But, the power of judicial review can be wielded only in specific circumstances and to limited ends—to resolve cases and controversies. Without that limitation, the Judiciary would have an unchecked ability to enjoin duly enacted statutes. Respecting the case-or-controversy requirement is therefore necessary to "preven[t] the Federal Judiciary from intruding 2415 *2415 upon the powers given to the other branches, and confin[e] the federal courts to a properly judicial role." Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 438, 137 S.Ct. 1645, 198 L.Ed.2d 64 (2017) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Facial challenges conflict with Article III's case-or-controversy requirement because they ask a federal court to decide whether a statute might conflict with the Constitution in cases that are not before the court.
To bring a facial challenge under our precedents, a plaintiff must ordinarily "establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) . In the First Amendment context, we have sometimes applied an even looser standard, called the overbreadth doctrine. The overbreadth doctrine requires a plaintiff to establish only that a statute "prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech," "relative to [its] plainly legitimate sweep." United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) .
Facial challenges ask courts to issue holdings that are rarely, if ever, required to resolve a single case or controversy. The only way a plaintiff gets into a federal court is by showing that he "personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, the only remedy a plaintiff should leave a federal court with is one "limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) . Accordingly, once a court decides whether a statute can be validly enforced against the plaintiff who challenges it, that case or controversy is resolved. Either the court remedies the plaintiff's injury, or it determines that the statute may be constitutionally applied to the plaintiff.
Proceeding to decide the merits of possible constitutional challenges that could be brought by other plaintiffs is not necessary to resolve that case. Instead, any holding with respect to potential future plaintiffs would be "no more than an advisory opinion —which a federal court should never issue at all, and especially should not issue with regard to a constitutional question, as to which we seek to avoid even non advisory opinions." Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 77, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Unsurprisingly, facial challenges are at odds with doctrines enforcing the case-or-controversy requirement. Pursuant to standing doctrine, for example, a plaintiff can maintain a suit in a federal court—and thus invoke judicial power—only if he has suffered an "injury" with a "traceable connection" to the "complained-of conduct of the defendant." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003 . Facial challenges significantly relax those rules. Start with the injury requirement. Facial challenges allow a plaintiff to challenge applications of a statute that have not injured him. But see Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 10, 144 S.Ct. 18, 217 L.Ed.2d 155 (2023) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) ("To have standing, a plaintiff must assert a violation of his [own] rights"). In fact, under our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a plaintiff need not be injured at all; he can challenge a statute that lawfully applies to him so long as it would be unlawful to enforce it against others. See 2416 *2416 United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 769, 143 S.Ct. 1932, 216 L.Ed.2d 692 (2023) .
Facial challenges also distort standing doctrine's redressability requirement. The Court has held that a plaintiff has standing to sue only when his "requested relief will redress the alleged injury." Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 1003 . With a facial challenge, however, a plaintiff seeks to enjoin every application of a statute—including ones that have nothing to do with his injury. A plaintiff can ask, "Do [I] just want [the court] to say that this statute cannot constitutionally be applied to [me] in this case, or do [I] want to go for broke and try to get the statute pronounced void in all its applications?" Morales, 527 U.S. at 77, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (opinion of Scalia, J.) . In this sense, the remedy sought by a facial challenge is akin to a universal injunction —a practice that is itself "inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief and the power of Article III courts." Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 713, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 201 L.Ed.2d 775 (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring) ; see Department of Homeland Security v. New York, 589 U.S . ___, ___ - ___ 140 S.Ct. 599, 600-601, 206 L.Ed.2d 115 (2020) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in grant of stay); FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367, 402, 144 S.Ct. 1540, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2024) (THOMAS, J., concurring) .
Because deciding the constitutionality of a statute as applied to nonparties is not necessary to resolve a case or controversy, it is beyond a federal court's constitutional authority. Federal courts have "no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act." Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) . Resolving facial challenges thus violates Article III.1
Adjudicating facial challenges also intrudes upon powers reserved to the Legislative and Executive Branches and the States. When a federal court decides an issue unnecessary for resolving a case or controversy, the Judiciary assumes authority beyond what the Constitution granted. Supra, at 2414-2415. That necessarily alters the balance of powers: When one branch exceeds its vested power, it becomes stronger relative to the other branches. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 500, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) .
Moreover, by exceeding their Article III powers, federal courts risk interfering with the executive and legislative functions. Facial challenges enable federal courts to review the constitutionality of a statute in many or all of its applications—often before the statute has even been enforced. In practice, this provides federal courts a "general veto power ... upon the legislation of Congress." Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 357, 81 S.Ct. 250 . But, the Judicial Branch 2417 *2417 has no such constitutional role in lawmaking. When courts take on the supervisory role of judging statutes in the abstract, they thus "assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly [they] do not possess." Mellon, 262 U.S. at 489, 43 S.Ct. 597 .
Comparing the effects of as-applied challenges and facial challenges makes this point clear. With an as-applied challenge, the Judiciary intrudes only as much as necessary on the will "`of the elected representatives of the people.'" Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) . Assuming a court adheres to traditional remedial limits, a successful as-applied challenge only prevents application of the statute against that plaintiff. The Executive Branch remains free to enforce the statute in all of its other applications. And, the court's decision provides some notice to the political branches, enabling the Executive Branch to tailor future enforcement of the statute to avoid violating the Constitution or Congress to amend the statute.
Facial challenges, however, force the Judiciary to take a maximalist approach. A single plaintiff can immediately call upon a federal court to declare an entire statute unconstitutional, even before it has been applied to him. The political branches have no opportunity to correct course, making legislation an all-or-nothing proposition. The end result is that "the democratic process" is "short circuit[ed]" and "laws embodying the will of the people [are prevented] from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution." Ibid.
In a similar vein, facial challenges distort the relationship between the Federal Government and the States. The Constitution "establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457, 111 S.Ct. 2895, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) . The States retain all powers "not delegated" to the Federal Government and not "prohibited by [the Constitution] to the States." Amdt. 10. Facial challenges can upset this division by shifting power from the States to the Federal Judiciary. Most obviously, when a state law is challenged, a facial challenge prevents that State from applying its own statute in a constitutional manner. But, facial challenges can also force federal courts to appropriate the role of state courts. To analyze whether a statute is valid on its face, a court must determine the statute's scope. If a state court has yet to determine the scope of its statute (a common occurrence with facial challenges), the federal court must do so in the first instance. Facial challenges thus increase the likelihood that federal courts must interpret novel state-law questions—a role typically and appropriately reserved for state courts.
In addition to their constitutional infirmities, facial challenges also create practical problems. The case-or-controversy requirement serves as the foundation of our adversarial system. Rather than "sit[ting] as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research,'" federal courts serve as "arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.'" NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147, n. 10, 131 S.Ct. 746, 178 L.Ed.2d 667 (2011) (quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (CADC 1983) (opinion for the court by Scalia, J.) ). This system "assure[s] that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved ... in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 2418 *2418 United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) .
Facial challenges disrupt the adversarial system and increase the risk of judicial error as a result. A plaintiff raising a facial challenge need not have any direct knowledge of how the statute applies to others. In fact, since a facial challenge may be brought before a statute has been enforced against anyone, a plaintiff often can only guess how the statute operates—even in his own case. For this reason, "[c]laims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation," Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, and "factually barebones records," Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) . Federal courts are often called to give "premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy." Raines, 362 U.S. at 22, 80 S.Ct. 619 . In short, facial challenges ask courts to resolve potentially thorny constitutional questions with little factual background and briefing by a party who may not be affected by the outcome.
The problems with facial challenges are particularly evident in the two cases before us. Even though the trade associations challenge two state laws, the state actors have been left out of the picture. State officials had no opportunity to tailor the laws' enforcement. Nor could the legislatures amend the statutes before they were preliminarily enjoined. In addition, neither set of state courts had a chance to interpret their own State's law or "accord [that] law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions." Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184 . Instead, federal courts construed these novel state laws in the first instance. And, they did so with little factual record to assist them. The trade associations' reliance on our questionable associational-standing doctrine is partially to blame.2 But, the fact that the trade associations raise facial challenges has undeniably played a significant role. With even simple fact patterns, a court has little chance of determining whether a novel, never-before-enforced state law can be constitutionally enforced against nonparties without resorting to mere speculation. For cases such as these, where the constitutional analysis depends on complex, fact-specific questions, the task becomes impossible.
Facial challenges are particularly suspect given their origins. They appear to be the product of two doctrines that are themselves constitutionally questionable, vagueness and overbreadth.
At the time of the founding, it was well understood that federal courts could hold a statute unconstitutional only insofar as necessary to resolve a particular case or 2419 *2419 controversy. See supra, at 2394-2395. The Founders were certainly familiar with alternative systems that provided for the free-floating review of duly enacted statutes. For example, the New York Constitution of 1777 created a Council of Revision, composed of the Governor, Chancellor, and New York Supreme Court. See Hansen, 599 U.S. at 786, 143 S.Ct. 1932 (THOMAS, J., concurring) . The Council of Revision could object to "any measure of a [prospective] bill" based on "not only [its] constitutionality... but also [its] policy." Id., at 787, 143 S.Ct. 1932 . If the Council lodged an objection, the Legislature's only options were to "conform to [the Council's] objections, override them by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, or simply let the bill die." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In our Constitution, the Founders refused to create a council of revision or involve the Federal Judiciary in the business of reviewing statutes in the abstract. "Despite the support of respected delegates... the Convention voted against creating a federal council of revision on four different occasions. No other proposal was considered and rejected so many times." Id., at 789, 143 S.Ct. 1932 (citation omitted). Instead, the Founders created a Judiciary with "only the authority to resolve private disputes between particular parties, rather than matters affecting the general public." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). They considered judges "of all men the most unfit to have a veto on laws before their enactment." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, they refused to enlist judges in the business of reviewing statutes other than "as an issue for decision in a concrete case or controversy."3 Ibid.
For more than a century following the founding, the Court generally adhered to the original understanding of the narrow scope of judicial review. When the Court first discussed the concept of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison , it made clear that such review is limited to what is necessary for resolving "a particular cas[e]" before a court. 1 Cranch at 177 ; see also supra, at 2394-2395. And, in case after case that followed Marbury, the Court reiterated that federal courts have no authority to reach beyond the parties before them to facially invalidate a statute.4
2420 *2420 As best I can tell, the Court's first departure from those principles was the development of the vagueness doctrine. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 616-620, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (describing history of vagueness doctrine). Before and at the time of the founding, American and English courts dealt with vague laws by "simply refus[ing] to apply them in individual cases." Id., at 615, 135 S.Ct. 2551. After the unfortunate rise of "substantive" due process, however, American courts began striking down statutes wholesale as "unconstitutionally indefinite." Id., at 617, 135 S.Ct. 2551. This Court first adopted that approach in 1914, see International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284, and has since repeatedly used the vagueness doctrine "to strike down democratically enacted laws" in the name of substantive due process, Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 148, 210, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) ; see Johnson, 576 U.S. at 618-621, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) . As I have explained, I doubt that "our practice of striking down statutes as unconstitutionally vague is consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clause." Dimaya, 584 U.S. at 206, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) ; see Johnson, 576 U.S. at 622, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) .
The vagueness doctrine was the direct ancestor of one subset of modern facial challenges, the overbreadth doctrine. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 385, 140 S.Ct. 1575, 206 L.Ed.2d 866 (2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine "developed as a result of the vagueness doctrine's application in the First Amendment context"). In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940), the Court deemed an antipicketing statute "invalid on its face" due to its "sweeping proscription of freedom of discussion." Id., at 101-106, 60 S.Ct. 736. The Thornhill Court did so "[w]ithout considering whether the defendant's actual conduct was entitled to First Amendment protection," instead invalidating the law because it "`swept within its ambit ... activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press.'" Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 383, 140 S.Ct. 1575 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (quoting Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97, 60 S.Ct. 736 ; alteration omitted).
Thornhill 's approach quickly gained traction in the First Amendment context. In the years to follow, the Court "invoked [its] rationale to facially invalidate a wide range of laws" concerning First Amendment rights—a practice that became known as the overbreadth doctrine. Sineneng-Smith, 2421 *2421 590 U.S. at 383, 140 S.Ct. 1575 . Under that doctrine, a court can invalidate a statute if it "prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech," "relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."5 Williams, 553 U.S. at 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830 . The Court has never attempted to ground the overbreadth doctrine "in the text or history of the First Amendment." Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 384, 140 S.Ct. 1575 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) . Instead, the Court has supplied only "policy considerations and value judgments." Ibid.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines' method of facial invalidation eventually spread to other areas of law, setting in motion our modern facial challenge doctrine. For several decades after Thornhill, the Court continued to resist the broad use of facial challenges. For example, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), the Court emphasized that "[c]onstitutional judgments, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants brought before the Court." Id., at 611, 93 S.Ct. 2908. In that vein, the Court characterized "facial overbreadth adjudication [as] an exception to our traditional rules of practice." Id., at 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908. But, the Court eventually entertained facial challenges more broadly where a plaintiff established that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."6 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 . Just as with the overbreadth doctrine, the Court has yet to explain how facial challenges are consistent with the Constitution's text or history.
Given how our facial challenge doctrine seems to have developed—with one doctrinal mistake leading to another—it is no wonder that facial challenges create a host of constitutional and practical issues. See supra, at 2395-2399. Rather than perpetuate our mistakes, the Court should end them. "No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) . Because that requirement precludes courts from judging and enjoining statutes as applied to nonparties, the Court should discontinue the practice of facial challenges.
The Court has recognized the problems that facial challenges pose, emphasizing that they are "disfavored," Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, and "best when infrequent," Sabri, 541 U.S. at 608, 124 S.Ct. 1941 . The Court reiterates those sentiments today. Ante, at 2397, 2408-2409. But, while sidelining facial challenges provides some measure of relief, it ignores the real problem. Because federal courts are bound by Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, holding a 2422 *2422 statute unconstitutional as applied to nonparties is not simply disfavored—it exceeds the authority granted to federal courts. It is high time the Court reconsiders its facial challenge doctrine.
(with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch join)
The holding in these cases is narrow: NetChoice failed to prove that the Florida and Texas laws they challenged are facially unconstitutional. Everything else in the opinion of the Court is nonbinding dicta.
I agree with the bottom line of the majority's central holding. But its description of the Florida and Texas laws, as well as the litigation that shaped the question before us, leaves much to be desired. Its summary of our legal precedents is incomplete. And its broader ambition of providing guidance on whether one part of the Texas law is unconstitutional as applied to two features of two of the many platforms that it reaches—namely, Facebook's News Feed and YouTube's homepage—is unnecessary and unjustified.
But given the incompleteness of this record, there is no need and no good reason to decide anything other than the facial unconstitutionality question actually before us. After all, we do not know how the platforms "moderate" their users' content, much less whether they do so in an inherently expressive way under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the majority is undeterred. It inexplicably singles out a few provisions and a couple of platforms for special treatment. And it unreflectively assumes the truth of NetChoice's unsupported assertion that social-media platforms —which use secret algorithms to review and moderate an almost unimaginable quantity of data today—are just as expressive as the newspaper editors who marked up typescripts in blue pencil 50 years ago.
These as-applied issues are important, and we may have to decide them before too long. But these cases do not provide the proper occasion to do so. For these reasons, I am therefore compelled to provide a more complete discussion of those matters than is customary in an opinion that concurs only in the judgment.
As the Court has recognized, social-media platforms have become the "modern public square." Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 107, 137 S.Ct. 1730, 198 L.Ed.2d 273 (2017) . In just a few years, they have transformed the way in which millions of Americans communicate with family and friends, perform daily chores, conduct business, and learn about and comment on current events. The vast majority of Americans use social media, 7 and the average person spends more than two hours a day on various platforms.8 Young people now turn primarily to social media to get the news,9 and for many of them, life without social media is unimaginable.10 2423 *2423 Social media may provide many benefits— but not without drawbacks. For example, some research suggests that social media are having a devastating effect on many young people, leading to depression, isolation, bullying, and intense pressure to endorse the trend or cause of the day.11
In light of these trends, platforms and governments have implemented measures to minimize the harms unique to the social-media context. Social-media companies have created user guidelines establishing the kinds of content that users may post and the consequences of violating those guidelines, which often include removing nonconforming posts or restricting noncompliant users' access to a platform.
Such enforcement decisions can sometimes have serious consequences. Restricting access to social media can impair users' ability to speak to, learn from, and do business with others. Deleting the account of an elected official or candidate for public office may seriously impair that individual's efforts to reach constituents or voters, as well as the ability of voters to make a fully informed electoral choice. And what platforms call "content moderation" of the news or user comments on public affairs can have a substantial effect on popular views.
Concerned that social-media platforms could abuse their enormous power, Florida and Texas enacted laws that prohibit them from disfavoring particular viewpoints and speakers. See S. B. 7072, 2021 Reg. Sess., § 1(9) (Fla. 2021) (finding that "[s]ocial media platforms have unfairly censored... Floridians"); H. B. 20, 87th Leg., Called Sess. (Tex. 2021) (prohibiting the "censorship of ... expression on social media platforms" in Texas). Both statutes have a broad reach, and it is impossible to determine whether they are unconstitutional in all their applications without surveying those applications. The majority, however, provides only a cursory outline of the relevant provisions of these laws and the litigation challenging their constitutionality. To remedy this deficiency, I will begin with a more complete summary.
I start with Florida's law, S. B. 7072, which regulates any internet platform that does "business in the state" and has either "annual gross revenues in excess of $100 million" or "at least 100 million monthly individual platform participants globally." Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(g) (2023). This definition is broad. There is no dispute that it covers large social-networking websites like Facebook, X, YouTube, and Instagram, but it may also reach e-commerce and other non-social-networking websites that allow users to leave reviews, ask and answer questions, or communicate with others online. These may include Uber, Etsy, PayPal, Yelp, Wikipedia, and Gmail. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22-555, pp. 54-56, 69, 76-79, 155; Brief for Wikimedia Foundation as Amicus Curiae 6; Brief for Yelp Inc. as Amicus Curiae 4, n. 4.
To prevent covered platforms from unfairly treating Floridians, S. B. 7072 imposes the following "content-moderation" and disclosure requirements:
Content-moderation provisions. "Content moderation" is the gentle-sounding 2424 *2424 term used by internet platforms to denote actions they take purportedly to ensure that user-provided content complies with their terms of service and "community standards." The Florida law eschews this neologism and instead uses the old-fashioned term "censorship." To prevent platforms from discriminating against certain views or speakers, that law requires each regulated platform to enforce its "censorship... standards in a consistent manner among its users on the platform." Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b). The law defines "censorship" as any action taken to: "delete, regulate, restrict, edit, alter, [or] inhibit" users from posting their own content; "post an addendum to any content or material posted by a user"; or "inhibit the ability of a user to be viewable by or to interact with another user." § 501.2041(1)(b).
To prevent platforms from attempting to evade this restriction by regularly modifying their practices, the law prohibits platforms from changing their censorship "rules, terms, and agreements ... more than once every 30 days." § 501.2041(2)(c). And to give Floridians more control over how they view content on social-media websites, the law requires each platform to give its users the ability to "opt out" of its content-sorting "algorithms" and instead view posts sequentially or chronologically. § 501.2041(2)(f).12
Although some platforms still have employees who monitor and organize social-media feeds, for most platforms, "the incredible volume of content shared each day makes human review of each new post impossible." Brief for Developers Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae 4. Consequently, platforms rely heavily on algorithms to organize and censor content. Ibid. And it is likely that they will increasingly rely on artificial intelligence (AI), a machine learning tool that arranges, deletes, and modifies content and learns from its own choices.
In addition to barring censorship, the Florida law attempts to prevent platforms from unfairly influencing elections or distorting public discourse. To do this, it requires platforms to host candidates for public office and journalistic enterprises.13 §§ 501.2041(2)(h), (j). For the same reasons, the law also prohibits platforms from censoring posts made by or about candidates for public office. § 501.2041(2)(h).
Disclosure provisions. S. B. 7072 requires platforms to make both general and individual disclosures about how and when they censor the speech of Floridians. The law requires platforms to publish their content-moderation standards and to inform users of any changes. §§ 501.2041(2)(a), (c). And whenever a platform censors a user, S. B. 7072 requires it to: (1) notify the user of the censorship decision in writing within seven days; (2) provide "a thorough" explanation of the action and how the platform became aware of the affected content; and (3) allow the user "to access or retrieve all of the user's information, content, material, and 2425 *2425 data for at least 60 days." §§ 501.2041(2)(d), (i), (3).
To ensure compliance with these provisions, S. B. 7072 authorizes the Florida attorney general to bring civil and administrative actions against noncomplying platforms. § 501.2041(5). The law allows the Florida Elections Commission to fine platforms that fail to host candidates for public office. Fla. Stat. § 106.072(3) (2023). And the law permits aggrieved users to sue and recover up to $100,000 for each violation of the content-moderation and disclosure provisions, along with actual damages, equitable relief, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. § 501.2041(6).
To protect platforms, the law provides that it "may only be enforced to the extent not inconsistent with federal law," including § 203 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. § 501.2041(9). Section 230(c)(2)(A) of that Act shields internet platforms from liability for voluntary, good-faith efforts to restrict or remove content that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
Days after S. B. 7072's enactment, NetChoice filed suit in federal court, alleging that the new law violates the First Amendment in all its applications.14 As a result, NetChoice asked the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction against any enforcement of any of its provisions before the law took effect.
Florida defended the constitutionality of S. B. 7072. It argued that the law's prohibition of censorship does not violate the freedom of speech because the First Amendment permits the regulation of the conduct of entities that do not express their own views but simply provide the means for others to communicate. See Record in No. 4:21-CV-00220 (ND Fla.), Doc. 106, p. 22 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) ( FAIR )). And, in any event, Florida argued that NetChoice's facial challenge was likely to fail at the threshold because NetChoice had not identified which of its members were required to comply with the new law or how each of its members' presentation of third-party speech expressed that platform's own message. Record, Doc. 106, at 30, 58-59; id., Doc. 118, pp. 5, 24-25. Without this information, Florida said, it could not properly respond to NetChoice's facial claim. Id., Doc. 122, pp. 4-5. Florida requested a "meaningful opportunity to take discovery." Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22-277, p. 154. NetChoice objected. Record, Doc. 122.
Despite these arguments, the District Court enjoined S. B. 7072 in its entirety before the law could go into effect. Florida appealed, maintaining, among other things, that NetChoice was "unlikely to prevail on the merits of [its] facial First Amendment challenge." Brief for Appellants in No. 21-12355 (CA11), p. 20; Reply Brief in No. 21-12355 (CA11), p. 15.
With just one exception, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It first held that all the regulated platforms' decisions about "whether, to what extent, and in what manner to disseminate third-party created content to the public" were constitutionally protected expression. NetChoice v. Attorney 2426 *2426 Gen., Fla., 34 F.4th 1196, 1212 (2022) . Under that framing, the court found that the moderation and individual-disclosure provisions likely failed intermediate scrutiny, obviating the need to determine whether strict scrutiny applied. Id., at 1227.15 But the court held that the general-disclosure provisions, which require only that platforms publish their censorship policies, met the intermediate-scrutiny standard set forth in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) . 34 F.4th at 1230 . The Eleventh Circuit therefore vacated the portion of the District Court's order that enjoined the enforcement of those general-disclosure provisions, while affirming all the rest of the injunction. Id., at 1231.
Around the same time as the enactment of the Florida law, Texas adopted a similar measure, H. B. 20, which covers "social media platform[s]" with more than 50 million monthly users in the United States. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 120.002(b) (West 2023). The statute defines a "`[s]ocial media platform'" as an "[i]nternet website or application that is open to the public, allows a user to create an account, and enables users to communicate with other users for the primary purpose of posting information, comments, messages, or images." § 120.001(1). Unlike Florida's broader law, however, Texas's statute does not cover internet-service providers, email providers, and websites that "consis[t] primarily of news, sports, entertainment, or other information or content that is not user generated but is preselected by the provider." § 120.001(1)(C)(i).
To ensure "the free exchange of ideas and information," H. B. 20 requires regulated platforms to abide by the following content-moderation and disclosure requirements. Act of Sept. 2, 2021, 87th Leg., 2d Called Sess., ch. 3.
Content-moderation provisions. H. B. 20 prevents social-media companies from "censoring" users—that is, acting to "block, ban, remove, deplatform, demonetize, de-boost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to, or otherwise discriminate against"—based on their viewpoint or geographic location within Texas.16 , 17 , 18 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 143A.001(1), 143A.002(a)(1)-(3) (West Cum. Supp. 2023). However, the law allows platforms to censor speech that: federal 2427 *2427 law "specifically authorize[s]" them to censor; speech that the platform is told sexually exploits children or survivors of sexual abuse; speech that "directly incites criminal activity or consists of specific threats of violence targeted against a person or group because of race, color, disability, religion, national origin or ancestry, age, sex or status as peace officer or judge"; and speech that is otherwise unlawful or has been the subject of a user's request for removal from his or her feed or profile. §§ 143A.006(a)-(b).
Disclosure provisions. Like the Florida law, H. B. 20 also requires platforms to make general and individual disclosures about their censorship practices. Specifically, the law obligates each platform to tell the public how it "targets," "promotes," and "moderates" content. §§ 120.051(a)(1)-(3). And whenever a platform censors a user, the law requires it to inform the user why that was done. § 120.103(a)(1).19 Platforms must allow users to appeal removal decisions through "an easily accessible complaint system;" resolve such appeals within 14 business days (unless an enumerated exception applies); and, if the appeal is successful, provide "the reason for the reversal." §§ 120.101, 120.103(a)(2), (a)(3)(B)-(b), 120.104.
Users may sue any platform that violates these provisions, as may the Texas attorney general. § 143A.007(d). But unlike the Florida law, H. B. 20 authorizes only injunctive relief. §§ 143A.007(a), 143A.008. It contains a strong severability provision, § 8(a), which reaches "every provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word in th[e] Act, and every application of [its] provisions."
As it did in the Florida case, NetChoice sought a preliminary injunction in federal court, claiming that H. B. 20 violates the First Amendment in its entirety. In response, Texas argued that because H. B. 20 regulates NetChoice's members "in their operation as publicly accessible conduits for the speech of others" rather than "as authors or editors" of their own speech, NetChoice could not prevail. Record in No. 1:21-CV-00840 (WD Tex.), Doc. 39, p. 23. But even if the platforms might have the right to use algorithms to censor their users' speech, the State argued, the question of " what these algorithms are doing is a critical, and so far, unexplained, aspect of this case." Id., at 24. This deficiency mattered, Texas contended, because the platforms could succeed on their facial challenge only by showing that " all algorithms used by the Platforms are for the purposes of expressing viewpoints of those Platforms." Id., at 27. And because NetChoice had not even explained what its members' algorithms did, much less whether they did so in an expressive way, Texas argued that NetChoice had not shown that "all applications of H.B. 20 are unconstitutional." Ibid. ; see also id., Doc. 53, at 13 (arguing that NetChoice had failed to show that "H. B. 20 is ... unconstitutional in all its applications" because "a number" of NetChoice's members had conceded that the law did " not burden or chill their speech").
To clarify these and other "threshold issues," Texas moved for expedited discovery. Id., Doc. 20, at 1. The District Court granted Texas's motion in part, but after one month of discovery, it sided with NetChoice and enjoined H. B. 20 in its entirety 2428 *2428 before it could go into effect. Texas appealed, arguing that despite the District Court's judgment to the contrary, "[l]aws requiring commercial entities to neutrally host speakers generally do not even implicate the First Amendment because they do not regulate the host's speech at all—they regulate its conduct." Brief for Appellant in No. 21-51178 (CA5), p. 16. The State also emphasized NetChoice's alleged failure to show that H. B. 20 was unconstitutional in even a "`substantial number of its applications,'" the "bare minimum" showing that NetChoice needed to make to prevail on its facial challenge. E.g., Reply Brief in No. 21-51178 (CA5), p. 8 (quoting Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615, 141 S.Ct. 2373, 210 L.Ed.2d 716 (2021) ).
A divided Fifth Circuit panel reversed, focusing primarily on NetChoice's failure to "even try to show that HB 20 is unconstitutional in all of its applications.'" 49 F.4th 439, 449 (2022) (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) ). The court also accepted Texas's argument that H. B. 20 "does not regulate the Platforms' speech at all" because "the Platforms are not speaking' when they host other people's speech." 49 F.4th at 448. Finally, the court upheld the law's disclosure requirements on the ground that they involve the disclosure of the type of purely factual and uncontroversial information that may be compelled under Zauderer. 49 F.4th at 485.
NetChoice contends that the Florida and Texas statutes facially violate the First Amendment, meaning that they cannot be applied to anyone at any time under any circumstances without violating the Constitution. Such challenges are strongly disfavored. See Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 452, 128 S.Ct. 1184 . They often raise the risk of "premature interpretatio[n] of statutes' on the basis of factually barebones records." Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) . They clash with the principle that courts should neither "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it'" nor "`formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'" Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347, 58 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) . And they "threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution." Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 451, 128 S.Ct. 1184 .
Facial challenges also strain the limits of the federal courts' constitutional authority to decide only actual "Cases" and "Controversies." Art. III, § 2. "[L]itigants typically lack standing to assert the constitutional rights of third parties." United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 769, 143 S.Ct. 1932, 216 L.Ed.2d 692 (2023) . But when a court holds that a law cannot be enforced against anyone under any circumstances, it effectively grants relief with respect to unknown parties in disputes that have not yet materialized.
For these reasons, we have insisted that parties mounting facial attacks satisfy demanding requirements. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), we held that a facial challenger must "establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid." "While some Members of the Court have criticized the Salerno formulation," all have agreed "that a facial challenge must fail where the statute has a 2429 *2429 "plainly legitimate sweep."'" Washington State Grange, 552 U.S. at 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184 . In First Amendment cases, we have sometimes phrased the requirement as an obligation to show that a law "prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech'" relative to its "`plainly legitimate sweep.'" Hansen, 599 U.S. at 770, 143 S.Ct. 1982 ; Bonta, 594 U.S. at 615, 141 S.Ct. 2373 ; United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292-293, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) .20
NetChoice and the Federal Government urge us not to apply any of these demanding tests because, they say, the States disputed only the "threshold question" whether their laws "cover expressive activity at all." Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22-277, at 76; see also id., at 84, 125; Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22-555, at 92. The Court unanimously rejects that argument—and for good reason.
First, the States did not "put all their eggs in [one] basket." Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22-277, at 76. To be sure, they argued that their newly enacted laws were valid in all their applications. Ibid. Both the Federal Government and the States almost always defend the constitutionality of all provisions of their laws. But Florida and Texas did not stop there. Rather, as noted above, they went on to argue that NetChoice had failed to make the showing required for a facial challenge.21 Therefore, the record does not support NetChoice's attempt to use "the party presentation rules" as grounds for blocking our consideration of the question whether it satisfied the facial constitutionality test. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22-555, at 92.
Second, even if the States had not asked the lower courts to reject NetChoice's request for blanket relief, it would have been improper for those courts to enjoin all applications of the challenged laws unless that test was met. "It is one thing to allow parties to forfeit claims, defenses, or lines of argument; it would be quite another to allow parties to stipulate or bind [a court] to the application of an incorrect legal standard." Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879 (CA10 2009) ; see also Kairys v. Southern Pines Trucking, Inc., 75 F.4th 153, 160 (CA3 2023) ("But parties cannot forfeit the application of controlling 2430 *2430 law'"); United States v. Escobar, 866 F.3d 333, 339, n. 13 (CA5 2017) ( per curiam ) ("A party cannot waive, concede, or abandon the applicable standard of review'" (quoting Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250, 257, n. 3 (CA5 2015) )).
Represented by sophisticated counsel, NetChoice made the deliberate choice to mount a facial challenge to both laws, and in doing so, it obviously knew what it would have to show in order to prevail. NetChoice decided to fight these laws on these terms, and the Court properly holds it to that decision.
I therefore turn to the question whether NetChoice established facial unconstitutionality, and I begin with the States' content-moderation requirements. To show that these provisions are facially invalid, NetChoice had to demonstrate that they lack a plainly legitimate sweep under the First Amendment. Our precedents interpreting that Amendment provide the numerator (the number of unconstitutional applications) and denominator (the total number of possible applications) that NetChoice was required to identify in order to make that showing. Estimating the numerator requires an understanding of the First Amendment principles that must be applied here, and I therefore provide a brief review of those principles.
The First Amendment protects "the freedom of speech," and most of our cases interpreting this right have involved government efforts to forbid, restrict, or compel a party's own oral or written expression. Agency for Int'l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213, 133 S.Ct. 2321, 186 L.Ed.2d 398 (2013) ; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) . Some cases, however, have involved another aspect of the free speech right, namely, the right to "presen[t]... an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons" for the purpose of expressing a particular message. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 570, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) . As used in this context, the term "compilation" means any effort to present the expression of others in some sort of organized package. See ibid.
An example such as the famous Oxford Book of English Poetry illustrates why a compilation may constitute expression on the part of the compiler. The editors' selection of the poems included in this volume expresses their view about the poets and poems that most deserve the attention of their anticipated readers. Forcing the editors to exclude or include a poem could alter the expression that the editors wish to convey.
Not all compilations, however, have this expressive characteristic. Suppose that the head of a neighborhood group prepares a directory consisting of contact information submitted by all the residents who want to be listed. This directory would not include any meaningful expression on the part of the compiler.
Because not all compilers express a message of their own, not all compilations are protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the First Amendment protects only those compilations that are "inherently expressive" in their own right, meaning that they select and present speech created by other persons in order "to spread [the compiler's] own message." FAIR, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. 1297 ; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 2431 *2431 U.S. 1, 10, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ( PG&E ) (plurality opinion). If a compilation is inherently expressive, then the compiler may have the right to refuse to accommodate a particular speaker or message. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573, 115 S.Ct. 2338 . But if a compilation is not inherently expressive, then the government can require the compiler to host a message or speaker because the accommodation does not amount to compelled speech. Id., at 578-581, 115 S.Ct. 2338 .
To show that a hosting requirement would compel speech and thereby trigger First Amendment scrutiny, a claimant must generally show three things.
First, a claimant must establish that its practice is to exercise "editorial discretion in the selection and presentation" of the content it hosts. Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998) ; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574, 115 S.Ct. 2338 ; ante, at 2399-2400. NetChoice describes this process as content "curation." But whatever you call it, not all compilers do this, at least in a way that is inherently expressive. Some may serve as "passive receptacle[s]" of third-party speech or as "dumb pipes"22 that merely emit what they are fed. Such entities communicate no message of their own, and accordingly, their conduct does not merit First Amendment protection.23 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) .
Determining whether an entity should be viewed as a "curator" or a "dumb pipe" may not always be easy because different aspects of an entity's operations may take different approaches with respect to hosting third-party speech. The typical newspaper regulates the content and presentation of articles authored by its employees or others, PG&E, 475 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 903, but that same paper might also run nearly all the classified advertisements it receives, regardless of their content and without adding any expression of its own. Compare Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730, with Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973) . These differences may be significant for First Amendment purposes.
The same may be true for a parade organizer. For example, the practice of a parade organizer may be to select the groups that are admitted, but not the individuals who are allowed to march as members of admitted groups. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-574, 115 S.Ct. 2338 . In such a case, each of these practices would have to be analyzed separately.
Second, the host must use the compilation of speech to express "some sort of 2432 *2432 collective point"—even if only at a fairly abstract level. Id., at 568, 115 S.Ct. 2388. Thus, a parade organizer who claims a First Amendment right to exclude certain groups or individuals would need to show at least that the message conveyed by the groups or individuals who are allowed to march comport with the parade's theme. Id., at 560, 574, 115 S.Ct. 2338 . A parade comprising "unrelated segments" that lumber along together willy-nilly would likely not express anything at all. Id., at 576, 115 S.Ct. 2338 . And although "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection," compilations that organize the speech of others in a non-expressive way ( e.g., chronologically) fall "beyond the realm of expressi[on]." Id., at 569, 115 S.Ct. 2338 ; contra, ante, at 2401-2402.
Our decision in PruneYard illustrates this point. In that case, the Court held that a mall could be required to host third-party speech ( i.e., to admit individuals who wanted to distribute handbills or solicit signatures on petitions) because the mall's admission policy did not express any message, and because the mall was "open to the public at large." PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 87-88, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) ; 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 590, 143 S.Ct. 2298, 216 L.Ed.2d 1131 (2023) . In such circumstances, we held that the First Amendment is not implicated merely because a host objects to a particular message or viewpoint. See PG&E, 475 U.S. at 12, 106 S.Ct. 903 .
Finally, a compiler must show that its "own message [is] affected by the speech it [is] forced to accommodate." FAIR, 547 U.S. at 63, 126 S.Ct. 1297 . In core examples of expressive compilations, such as a book containing selected articles, chapters, stories, or poems, this requirement is easily satisfied. But in other situations, it may be hard to identify any message that would be affected by the inclusion of particular third-party speech.
Two precedents that the majority tries to downplay, if not forget, are illustrative. The first is PruneYard, which I have already discussed. The PruneYard Court rejected the mall's First Amendment claim because "[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition [were] not likely [to] be identified with those of the owner." 447 U.S. at 87, 100 S.Ct. 2035 . And if those who perused the handbills or petitions were not likely to make that connection, any message that the mall owner intended to convey would not be affected.
The decision in FAIR rested on similar reasoning. In that case, the Court did not dispute the proposition that the law schools' refusal to host military recruiters expressed the message that the military should admit and retain gays and lesbians. But the Court found no First Amendment violation because, as in PruneYard, it was unlikely that the views of the military recruiters "would be identified with" those of the schools themselves, and consequently, hosting the military recruiters did not "sufficiently interfere with any message of the school." 547 U.S. at 64-65, 126 S.Ct. 1297 ; contra, ante, at 2406 ("[T]his Court has never hinged a compiler's First Amendment protection on the risk of misattribution.").24
2433 *2433 B
A party that challenges government interference with its curation of content cannot win without making the three-part showing just outlined, but such a showing does not guarantee victory. To prevail, the party must go on and show that the challenged regulation of its curation practices violates the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny.
Our decision in Turner makes that clear. Although the television cable operators in that case made the showing needed to trigger First Amendment scrutiny, they did not ultimately prevail on their facial challenge to the Cable Act. After a remand and more than 18 months of additional factual development, the Court held that the law was adequately tailored to serve legitimate and important government interests, including "promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) . Here, the States assert a similar interest in fostering a free and open marketplace of ideas.25
With these standards in mind, I proceed to the question whether the content-moderation provisions are facially valid. For the following three reasons, NetChoice failed to meet its burden.
First, NetChoice did not establish which entities the statutes cover. This failure is critical because it is "impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers." Williams, 553 U.S. at 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830 . When it sued Florida, NetChoice was reluctant to disclose which of its members were covered by S. B. 7072. Instead, it filed declarations revealing only that the law reached "Etsy, Facebook, and YouTube." Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 22-277, at 32. In this Court, NetChoice was a bit more forthcoming, representing that S. B. 7072 also covers Instagram, X, Pinterest, Reddit, Gmail, Uber, and other e-commerce websites. Id., at 69, 76; Brief for Respondents in No. 22-277, at 7, 38, 49.26 But NetChoice has still not provided a complete list.
NetChoice was similarly reluctant to identify its affected members in the Texas case. At first, NetChoice "represented ... that only Facebook, YouTube, and [X] are affected by the Texas law." Brief for Appellant in No. 21-51178 (CA5), at 1, n. 1. 2434 *2434 But in its brief in this Court, NetChoice told us that H. B. 20 also regulates "some of the Internet's most popular websites, including Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, TikTok, Vimeo, X (formerly known as Twitter), and YouTube." Brief for Petitioners in No. 22-555, p. 1. And websites such as Discord,27 Reddit,28 Wikipedia,29 and Yelp30 have filed amicus briefs claiming that they may be covered by both the Texas and Florida laws.
prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech' relative to its plainly legitimate sweep.'" Id., at 770, 143 S.Ct. 1932 . ↩trespass upon the domain of the legislature' led them to confine the judiciary to pure jurisprudence'" (quoting 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 75 (M. Farrand ed. 1911))). ↩