Concept
Analyzing a Condition
Licenses or benefits
Analyzing a Condition
Two principles pull against each other in every conditions case. Government may not deny a benefit on a basis that infringes a person’s freedom of speech, even if the person has no entitlement to the benefit; yet government is not required to subsidize activities it does not wish to promote.1 The Court has conceded that deciding which principle controls “is not always self-evident.”2 A fixed sequence of questions makes the choice manageable, because it tests whether the condition actually burdens protected activity. A condition that makes a person surrender speech to keep a benefit is such a burden,3 and a law that substantially burdens speech must meet heightened scrutiny unless it regulates an unprotected category.4
Each earlier section of this chapter answered one piece of the problem, and the pieces fit together as a five-step sequence that runs from the benefit to the level of scrutiny.
The first two steps fix what is being burdened. The benefit may be a job, a license, a tax exemption, or a grant, and the person need not have a right to it. In Speiser, California argued that a veterans’ property tax exemption was a mere “privilege” or “bounty” it could condition on a declaration that the claimant did not advocate forcible overthrow of the government, and the Court rejected the argument.5 The wording of the demand does not matter either. In the land-use cases, a permit “approved if” the owner turns over property is treated the same as a permit “denied until” the owner does so, because the Court has long refused to attach significance to the distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.6 The protected activity at step two may be speech, association, belief, or silence. Silence belongs on the list because the First Amendment protects the right not to speak, and a state cannot compel schoolchildren to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance as the price of attending school. In Janus, the Court used the compelled speech doctrine to overrule Abood, which had allowed Illinois to require nonmember public employees to pay a fee to the union that bargained for them.7
Step three carries the most weight, because it decides whether withholding the benefit works as a penalty. Government need not supply most benefits, so the useful question is whether it could have reached the activity directly. Where the activity falls within an unprotected category, regulation is allowed, and conditioning a benefit on abandoning it burdens nothing the Constitution protects.8 Where the activity is protected, the condition does indirectly what the First Amendment forbids directly, since denying an exemption to claimants who engage in certain speech is “in effect to penalize them for such speech.”9 The same step explains the oath cases. A promise to support the Constitution gives step three nothing to examine, because such a generic commitment to constitutional processes is not impermissibly vague or overbroad and does not chill protected expression. An oath disclaiming membership in a lawful group asks the applicant to surrender an association that government could not punish, so it fails.
A condition that looks like a penalty must still be separated from a mere refusal to subsidize. The Court has tried to resolve the conundrum by distinguishing denials that operate as penalties from those that operate as nonsubsidies. Government may not use the leverage of a subsidy to induce recipients to refrain from speech they would otherwise engage in with their own resources, but it may refrain from paying for speech with which it disagrees.10 That distinction runs parallel to the ones the Court has drawn for public space, public education, and public employment.11
Step four turns on whose speech the benefit supports. Government may hire people to present its own views, so an advertising company retained for a military recruiting campaign cannot complain of viewpoint discrimination if it would rather broadcast pacifist messages at government expense. Government cannot, however, condition a completely unrelated benefit on speech activities, and it cannot deprive someone of food stamps or a property tax exemption because of political views.12 The hard cases lie in between, where government subsidizes only private speech with a specific type of content.13 Even there, government may selectively fund a program to encourage activities it believes to be in the public interest without funding an alternative program. In doing so it has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.14
Step five borrows its standard from the direct regulation. A law that significantly burdens speech must meet heightened scrutiny unless it reaches an unprotected category, which means strict scrutiny for content-based rules and intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral ones.15 Where the benefit is a subsidy, the funding line narrows the question. A condition that assures the money is used to further the program’s objectives defines the program,16 while a condition that induces recipients to give up speech they would otherwise engage in with their own resources reaches beyond it.17 Two features of the facts help locate a condition on that line, because what counts as a distortion seems to depend on two factors. The first is whether the condition affects only the use of government funds or also hinders other speech activities by recipients. The second is the Court’s sense of the program’s “normal” functioning, which turns in part on how the program is defined.18
The grant upheld in Rust v. Sullivan runs the same steps to the opposite result. The Court there treated the decision not to fund anything in connection with abortion as permissible because abortion counseling fell outside what government had decided to fund. Government was not restraining doctors from performing abortions or even advocating abortion; it was refusing to fund those activities in its federally funded projects.19 Purpose-based limits of this kind are familiar elsewhere. The Interior Department, for example, may promulgate rules for the use of the national parks “in accordance with the purposes for which they were established,” and so permits camping only in campgrounds designated for that purpose.20 Both the license and the grant involve a benefit and an activity touching expression, so steps one and two cannot separate them. The answers diverge at steps three through five. The license reaches an activity government could not punish, while the grant reaches only the use of public money, which government may confine to its program’s purposes.
The doctrine is applied unevenly, and no single test predicts every outcome. A dissent in Dolan observed that the doctrine has long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application and has never operated as an overarching principle with equal force regardless of the rights and powers in question.21 The Court once subjected any conditioning of governmental benefits to strict scrutiny, then narrowed the doctrine, so that discriminatory denials of benefits to those who exercised protected liberties were often upheld under a rational basis standard.22 Matching a new fact pattern to the nearest decided case is therefore the less reliable route. Two organizing questions carry across every context. The first asks whether government could have regulated the activity directly. The second asks what role government is playing, and whether the condition defines what it pays for or says, or leverages the benefit to reach protected activity beyond that role. Answering both, and naming the step at which the answer turns, yields a defensible analysis even when decided cases point in different directions.