Concept
Oaths and Disclosure
Licenses or benefits
Oaths and Disclosure
Government often learns what applicants believe, and whom they have joined, before it decides whether to hire or license them. It asks in three ways: through oaths of loyalty, through questions on applications such as the bar application, and through demands that a person or group disclose its members. Each is a condition on a benefit, because an applicant who will not swear or answer forfeits the job or license.
Two ideas from earlier in the chapter drive the analysis. First, calling a job or license a privilege does not shield a condition on it from review. Second, the association cases fix when government may act on group ties: it may deny public employment, or require an oath about group affiliation, only where the individual actively affiliated with the group, knew of its illegal activities, and specifically intended to further its illegal goals.1 An oath or question that reaches further penalizes association the state could not punish directly.
Together these ideas yield a two-part question that carries through every variation below. The subject question asks whether the thing the applicant must disclaim or disclose would itself be a legitimate ground for denial. If the state could refuse the job on that ground, asking about it burdens nothing the Constitution protects. If it could not, the oath or question works as a penalty on protected association, imposed one step before a dismissal would be. The precision question asks whether the demand is clear and narrow enough for an applicant to tell what it covers. Government may regulate in the area of First Amendment freedoms only with narrow specificity, and a vague law regulating speech can be challenged on its face.2 An oath or inquiry must satisfy both questions, and failing either one invalidates it.
Not every oath fails. The Constitution itself requires oaths, and a promise to support constitutional government has been upheld even though its terms are general.3 The negative oath is the problem case, so the first subsection begins there.
Negative Loyalty Oaths
A negative loyalty oath requires an applicant to swear that he or she has not done something in the past, such as belonging to a particular group. An affirmative oath asks instead for a promise to support the constitutional processes of government in the future.4 The two receive different treatment. Affirmative oaths have traditionally been viewed as permissible despite the inherent vagueness of their terms, and negative oaths have no such tradition behind them.5
A negative oath about membership therefore stands only if the state could itself deny the job for that membership. The state may do so only when the person is an active member of a subversive organization, joined with knowledge of its illegal aims, and specifically intends to further those ends, as opposed to generally supporting the organization's objectives.6 The oath thus applies the association test at the moment of application instead of the moment of dismissal. It also carries the precision requirement, because its words must tell the applicant what they cover.
The oath operates as a condition because of the choice it forces. An applicant who belongs to a covered group but shares none of its illegal aims must give up the job or give up the association, so the oath makes the surrender of a lawful tie the price of the benefit.
Wieman v. Updegraff shows the first limit at work. Oklahoma required its state employees to take a negative oath, and the Court held that the oath violated due process. Denying public employment for subversive association stigmatizes the individual and is unjustified when the member is innocent of the group's illegal and subversive goals.7 An oath that reaches innocent members asks the applicant to disclaim association the state could not punish.
Knowledge alone does not cure the defect. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents the Court held unconstitutional a loyalty program that punished knowing membership in a seditious organization without requiring specific intent.8 The association test explains why: it demands specific intent as a separate element, in addition to active affiliation and knowledge of the group's illegal aims.9 A common error is to treat knowledge as enough.
A second defect operates independently of the first, because an oath can aim at a legitimate subject and still fail for want of notice. A law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted, and a law regulating speech can be attacked on its face even by a person whose own speech is unprotected.10 In Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction the Court unanimously invalidated a Florida statute requiring employees to swear, “I have not and will not lend my aid, support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party.” Such vague and ambiguous wording, the Court reasoned, would inhibit legitimate activity by those whose “conscientious scruples were the most sensitive” and would increase the likelihood of prosecution for ideas antithetical to those held by the general community.11 Baggett v. Bullitt applied the same reasoning to an oath built on the word “subversive,” which it invalidated on its face as unduly vague, uncertain, and broad.
Vagueness presses hardest on the careful. An applicant who cannot tell whether driving a neighbor to a rally, signing a petition, or donating to a candidate counts as lending “aid” or “support” resolves the doubt by avoiding all of it, so the oath deters lawful activity far beyond what it validly reaches. The Court's answer is a demand for precision: “Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.”12
The two statements differ in what the applicant must disclaim, a status in District A and conduct in District B. District B's statement remains subject to the precision question, because it is valid only to the extent that it tracks advocacy the state could itself punish. An oath written to reach advocacy the state could not punish would sweep in protected expression, and one that left its key terms undefined would raise the notice problem of Cramp and Baggett.
Step three decides cases in which the oath names a group, and step five decides cases in which the oath relies on a label no one has defined. An oath can pass one step and fail the other, so a correct answer on the subject of the oath does not finish the analysis.
Oaths to Support the Constitution
The Constitution prescribes oaths of its own, which gives the support-the-Constitution oath a firmer footing than any other loyalty requirement in this chapter. The body of the Constitution requires such oaths, including the presidential oath,16 and Article VI, clause 3, binds state and federal officers to support the Constitution. In Connell v. Higginbotham the Court relied on that provision to uphold the first section of a Florida oath, a pledge to support “the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida.” The pledge demands no more of public employees than is required of all state and federal officers, and its validity, the Court said, “would appear settled.”17 A concurring opinion agreed that the clause was clearly constitutional.18 The doctrine is accordingly settled that government workers may be required to swear to support and defend the Constitution.19
This oath passes both questions from the introduction. On the subject question it gives the state nothing to examine, because a promise to support the Constitution names no group, asks about no past association, and requires no statement of belief. It asks for a commitment about future conduct, which is the defining feature of an affirmative oath.20 On the precision question, the negative-oath cases found danger in loose labels for disfavored groups, which left careful applicants guessing which lawful activities to give up. A promise to support a document anyone can read contains no list of covered associations, so a careful applicant has nothing to steer around. The terms remain general, yet affirmative oaths have traditionally been upheld despite that generality.21
The Florida oath in Connell shows both sides of the line in one document. Besides the promise to support the Constitution, it contained a clause disclaiming belief in the overthrow of government by force or violence. The Court held that this second portion could not stand, because it fell within the decisions forbidding summary dismissal from public employment without the hearing or inquiry that due process requires.22 A promise and a disclaimer thus came out differently within a single oath, which is why each clause needs its own analysis.
A court may also save an oath that is arguably vague or overbroad by construing it narrowly, and Cole v. Richardson showed a greater willingness to do so.23 Construction works best on a clause phrased as a promise about what the employee will do. A clause that asks what the applicant is or was returns the analysis to the negative-oath rules above.
Signing a valid oath does not enlarge what the state may later do to the signer's speech. In Bond v. Floyd the Court said that although the state has an interest in requiring its legislators to swear to a belief in constitutional processes of government, the oath gives it no interest in limiting its legislators' capacity to discuss their views of local or national policy.24 Bond could not have been convicted for his statements consistently with the First Amendment, and his position as an elected legislator did not change the situation.25 The oath secures a commitment to constitutional processes. It supplies no license to treat criticism of policy as a breach of that commitment.
When an exam stem sets out the text of an oath, the first question is which way it faces. A pledge to support or uphold the Constitution looks forward and asks nothing about belief or association, so it is valid. Each remaining clause must still be tested separately, because one form can combine a valid promise with an invalid disclaimer, as the Florida oath did. A clause that requires the applicant to disclaim a group, a past tie, or a belief returns the analysis to the previous subsection, where the state must show that the thing disclaimed could itself be a ground for denial.
Bar Admission Questions
A license to practice law is a benefit the state controls, so the questions a bar committee asks about an applicant's associations work like the oaths above: an applicant who will not answer cannot be admitted. The Court set an outer limit early. An applicant cannot be excluded merely because he is a Republican or a member of a particular church, and officers of a state cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet permissible standards or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.28
Bar cases arise in two contexts. In one, the state denies admission based on inferences of disloyalty drawn from specific incidents in the applicant's past. In the other, it denies admission because the applicant refused to answer questions probing past political associations.29 This subsection concerns chiefly the second context.
A state may require answers about group membership only through questions narrowly focused on whether the applicant actively affiliated with a group, knew of its illegal objectives, and specifically intended to further them, because those same elements limit what the state may punish or treat as a ground for denial.30 The rule has a two-sided logic. A question that asks only about knowing, intent-bearing affiliation exposes nothing the state could not act on, so compelling an answer adds no penalty on protected association, and an applicant who refuses is blocking a legitimate investigation. A question that reaches bare membership works the other way. An applicant who once joined a lawful but unpopular group must either reveal the tie and risk denial for it or refuse and lose the license anyway. Either way, protected association becomes the price of admission, and specificity is what keeps a question on the first side of that line.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California shows the state's side of the line. The Court upheld a denial of admission to an applicant who refused to answer questions about his associations, explaining: “[W]e regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.”31 A denial may not rest on arbitrary or irrelevant information, but there is no privilege to refuse legitimate information, and the state may deny the application to prevent any frustration of its investigation.32 Read with the association test, the decision supports a denial for refusal only when the question asked was properly narrowed.
Two companion decisions show how a committee goes wrong and how it can go right. In Baird v. State Bar of Arizona the Court held that a state could not deny admission to an applicant who refused to answer a question reaching membership in any organization advocating violent overthrow of the government, a question that took no account of the applicant's knowledge or intent. In Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond the Court upheld a different New York system, which asked first whether the applicant had joined a group knowing that it advocated violent overthrow and asked about the applicant's intent to further that aim only if the answer was yes. Both inquiries concern violent overthrow and both come from bar committees, so subject matter does not separate them. Specificity does: the Wadmond questions track the elements of the association test, and the Baird question does not.33 An applicant who never knowingly joined such a group answers no at the first step and is never asked about intent. One who did join is asked only about the intent that would make the affiliation punishable.
A committee that demanded a list of every organization the applicant had ever joined would face the objection that defeated the teacher affidavit discussed in the next subsection: the list reaches ties with no bearing on fitness.34 The state can learn what it legitimately needs through a narrower question.
Steps three and four do the sorting. An answer built on the topic of the question will miss the point, because the Baird question and the Wadmond question both concern violent overthrow. What separates them is that one asks about a status while the other asks about knowledge and intent.
Compelled Disclosure of Membership
The oath and bar cases ask what government may require applicants to say about their own affiliations. A neighboring line asks what government may require a group to disclose about its members, and its leading case is NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. A state could not compel the NAACP to reveal the names of everyone on its membership rolls, especially because compelled disclosures had already been followed by reprisals against individuals.38 The state action analysis mattered. The retaliation would come from private persons, but the state's disclosure requirement would have facilitated it.39
The disclosure demand burdens a right with firm roots. Association is implied in the right of assembly, which is in turn implied from the First Amendment's express guarantees, and it is more than the right to attend a meeting: “it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group, or affiliation with it or by other lawful means.”40 A person's associations are protected from direct and indirect interference by the government.41 A corollary, recognized in Bates v. Little Rock, is that an association may conceal its members' names from the state when disclosure would likely deprive individuals of personal liberty, unless the state demonstrates a “controlling justification” for the information.42
The review that follows is demanding. Compelled disclosure significantly encroaches on First Amendment rights, so a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest cannot justify it.43 The state's subordinating interests must survive exacting scrutiny, a requirement the Court traces to NAACP v. Alabama, and there must be a “substantial relation” between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed, a requirement the Court traces to Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee.44 The Court applied that review in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta to invalidate a state requirement that charities disclose donor information, because the requirement was not narrowly tailored.
The same concern governs an individual who must list affiliations as the price of a job. In Shelton v. Tucker the Court declared unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that conditioned the employment of every teacher in a state-supported school or college on the annual filing of an affidavit listing, without limitation, every organization to which the teacher belonged or regularly contributed money over the previous five years.45 The Court conceded that fitness for teaching depends on many factors, including conduct outside the classroom, but held that compelling a teacher to list every organization with which he or she associates clearly violates the freedom of association.46 Breadth does the harm. A teacher who must report every tie cannot predict which one will be held against the teacher, so the cautious course is to give up associations of every kind, lawful ones included.
Disclosure is permitted when the demand tracks what government could itself penalize. The two-step question upheld in Wadmond reached only knowing, intent-bearing affiliation, which is why it exposed no protected association.47 Some inquiries into knowing membership in the Communist Party are also permitted, because that membership is sui generis in being linked to the foreign threat of violent overthrow of the government (Barenblatt v. United States).48 Both the Wadmond question and the Shelton affidavit concern fitness for public service, so topic does not separate them. Breadth does: one asks about ties the state could punish, and the other sweeps in every tie. Where the demand reaches lawful association, the state must satisfy exacting scrutiny.