Concept
Rejecting the Right-Privilege Distinction
Licenses or benefits
Rejecting the Right-Privilege Distinction
For a long time a government that withdrew a job, a tax exemption, or unemployment compensation could answer a First Amendment objection with a single word: privilege. Sherbert v. Verner retired that answer. "[I]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."1 The sentence records a reversal, and the rule against trading constitutional rights for benefits could not operate until the old label lost its force. This section traces the old view, the reasons the Court gave it up, the replacement as Sherbert states it, and the limits that keep the replacement from becoming a claim to government largesse.
Justice Holmes gave the old view its best-known form while still a judge on the Massachusetts high court. A police officer, he wrote in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, "may have a constitutional right to talk politics but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman," and so "the servant cannot complain as he takes the employment on the terms on which they are offered to him."2 The aphorism proved so quotable that it stayed influential for too long. Its theory is that public employment is a privilege: the employee accepts the job on the government's terms, and the employer's being the government changes nothing. Adler v. Board of Education applied that theory to a teacher dismissed under a New York statute that disqualified from public school employment anyone who advocated governmental overthrow by force or violence. The Court found no violation of speech or association, because employment was then not a constitutional "right," and employees who rejected the state's terms were free to keep their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.3
The Court abandoned the privilege theory because it ignored what a conditional benefit does to the person who must choose. Speiser v. Randall put the point directly: to deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain speech "is in effect to penalize them for such speech," and the deterrent effect "is the same as if the State were to fine them for this speech." The Court called "plainly mistaken" the argument that a tax exemption, being a "privilege" or "bounty," may be denied without infringing speech.4 The workplace setting sharpens the danger. If government could penalize or inhibit expression through its control of the public workplace, it could "produce a result which [it] could not command directly."5
Numbers add a practical reason. The public sector's workforce, federal, state, and local, is now enormous, and a hands-off judicial policy toward the constitutional claims of public employees "would leave too large a slice of the populace with no constitutional protection."6 Public jobs still carry First Amendment stakes. In Janus v. AFSCME the Court deployed the compelled speech doctrine to overturn Abood, a decision about an Illinois scheme that made a union the exclusive bargaining agent for all public employees, nonmembers included, and required nonmembers to pay a fee for collective bargaining and related activities.7
The word "privilege" answers only whether a person was entitled to a benefit. It never answered whether the government's reason for withholding the benefit is one the Constitution allows, and decisions in one setting after another supplied that missing question. Wieman v. Updegraff held that an Oklahoma oath violated due process, because it required employees to swear they belonged to none of the prohibited organizations whether or not they knew of those groups' actual activities. Denying public employment for such association stigmatizes the individual and cannot be justified when the member is innocent of the group's illegal and subversive goals.8 Another oath fell for a related reason: its second portion came within decisions, such as Slochower v. Board of Education, that bar summary dismissal from public employment without the hearing or inquiry due process requires.9 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners overturned a refusal to admit an applicant to the bar solely because of past associations. In United States v. Robel the Court invalidated a federal ban on members of Communist-action organizations working in defense facilities, regardless of the sensitivity of the position. The statute treated the cryptographer and the cook alike, and the Court held it overbroad instead of balancing interests.10
Perry v. Sindermann stated the general principle. Even though a person has no single "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and the government may deny it for any number of reasons, "there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely," and one of them is a basis that infringes the person's constitutionally protected interests, especially freedom of speech.11 The Court has repeated the point in a variety of contexts: "the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right." Applying it in Perry, the Court held that a public college would violate a professor's freedom of speech if it declined to renew his contract because he was an outspoken critic of the administration.12 Torcaso v. Watkins and McDaniel v. Paty extended the same logic to belief. Justice Brennan wrote that "freedom of belief protected by the Free Exercise Clause embraces freedom to profess or practice that belief, even including doing so to earn a livelihood."13 Both cases rejected the government's argument that a public job or office is a mere "privilege" to which the state may attach conditions that would otherwise violate the First Amendment.14
The First Amendment rule is easy to blur with the due process question of entitlement, which asks something different. In Board of Regents v. Roth the state had created no entitlement qualifying as a property interest. In Perry the Court found one in a school Faculty Guide that could reasonably be read to create a de facto tenure system, and property interests can arise from "mutually explicit understandings" that support a claim of entitlement.15 The due process inquiry asks whether a person may demand protection for a claimed interest. The First Amendment inquiry asks why the government acted, which is why a claimant with no entitlement can still prevail when a benefit is withheld because of protected speech.16
Sherbert shows the principle at work. The claimant's religion forbade work on her Saturday day of worship, and the South Carolina court's construction of its unemployment statute, defended on the ground that benefits were a privilege and not her "right," left her a choice: follow the precepts of her religion and forfeit benefits, or abandon one of those precepts in order to accept work.17 The Court held that governmental imposition of such a choice burdens the free exercise of religion in the same way a fine imposed for her Saturday worship would.18
Sherbert is a free exercise decision that borrowed its rule from a speech case. The Court answered the state's gratuity argument with Speiser: conditions on public benefits cannot be sustained if they operate, whatever their purpose, to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Speiser had struck down a condition that limited a tax exemption to those who affirmed loyalty to the granting state. Although the state owed no one the exemption, conditioning even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred expression and threatened to "produce a result which the State could not command directly."19 The holding itself was narrow: South Carolina could not constitutionally apply its eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon her religious convictions respecting the day of rest. The Court saw no Establishment Clause problem, because extending benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects only governmental neutrality toward religious differences.20
The same opinion marks the edge of the rule. The Court disclaimed any constitutional right to unemployment benefits for all persons whose religious convictions cause their unemployment, and it said it was not requiring any state to adopt a particular scheme of unemployment compensation.21 The limit follows from what triggers the claim. The doctrine protects a person from being penalized, through the loss of a benefit the government provides or offers, for protected activity. It gives no one a right to demand a benefit the state has not offered. Without a denied or conditioned benefit, there is no pressure to measure.
A second limit concerns the activity itself. The unemployment cases in the Sherbert line involved conduct that no law prohibited, and in Employment Division v. Smith the Court called that distinction critical. If a state may validly prohibit the conduct, there is "no federal right to engage in that conduct," and the state "is free to withhold unemployment compensation" from those who engage in work-related misconduct, "despite its religious motivation."22 Where no right to the conduct exists, losing the benefit penalizes nothing the Constitution protects.
Even a claim that clears both limits wins only scrutiny of the condition, because rejecting the privilege label opens the condition to review without deciding the result. When the government acts as employer, the review takes account of the interests on both sides. Pickering v. Board of Education describes the task as arriving at a balance between the employee's interest, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern and the state's interest, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.23