Concept
The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Licenses or benefits
Unconstitutional Conditions on Benefits
The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Government may not buy a constitutional right with a benefit. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, it cannot make the receipt of a benefit depend on the recipient’s surrender of constitutional rights, especially First Amendment rights; a television station that receives public funds, for example, cannot be forced to refrain from endorsing political candidates.1
The Supreme Court has called the doctrine well settled. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, a takings case, it stated the rule this way: government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right (there, the right to just compensation when property is taken for a public use) in exchange for a discretionary benefit, where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.2 The closing clause matters. The Court tied the doctrine to a mismatch between the benefit offered and what the person is asked to surrender, a theme that returns below.
In the speech cases, the benefit may be a tax exemption, a funding grant, or a subsistence program such as welfare or medical care, and the doctrine forbids making the surrender of expression or association the price of receiving it.3
The leading case is Speiser v. Randall, in which a state denied a tax exemption to claimants who engaged in certain forms of speech. The Court held that the denial penalized them for the speech, because its deterrent effect was the same as if the state had fined them.4 The state defended the denial in the vocabulary of privilege, a word tax law uses for its own purposes (an excise is a tax imposed on an activity or the exercise of a privilege).5 Because a tax exemption is a “privilege” or “bounty,” it argued, its denial may not infringe speech. The Court called that argument plainly mistaken: denying an exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily coerces claimants to refrain from the speech.6
The state’s position rests on an inference from the greater power to the lesser: if it need not grant the exemption at all, it may grant it on any terms. The doctrine rejects that inference because it would let government accomplish indirectly what it may not do directly. Without the doctrine, government could use its control over benefits to, in effect, “buy up” people’s constitutional rights by conditioning welfare, medical care, and similar benefits on their surrender.7 Speiser answers the inference with an observation about deterrence: losing an exemption chills speech about as reliably as a fine does.8
The working question is whether the condition operates as a penalty on protected activity. In the speech cases the Court sorts denials of benefits into penalties and mere nonsubsidies: government may not use the leverage of a subsidy to induce recipients to refrain from speech they would otherwise engage in with their own resources, but it may refrain from paying for speech with which it disagrees.9 The same distinction runs through the Court’s cases on public space, public education, and public employment, and it is an attempt to resolve a conundrum, not a mechanical formula.10
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington shows a nonsubsidy. The Court upheld a tax rule that in effect conditioned a very valuable tax benefit on the recipient’s forgoing lobbying, saying that Congress “has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.” It found no indication that the statute was meant to suppress ideas or had that effect, and it concluded that a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right and so draws no strict scrutiny.11 The value of the benefit alone, then, did not make the condition a penalty.
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the Court came out the other way. Congress had barred any noncommercial educational broadcasting station that received a grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting from editorializing, and the Court declared the statute unconstitutional: government could not condition funds on the stations’ relinquishing their right to editorialize.12
Two other cases applied the doctrine and split. In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld a federal law restricting recipients of federal funds from engaging in abortion-related activities. It reasoned that government had made a presumptively valid decision on how to allocate limited resources, that choosing not to fund the exercise of a fundamental right imposed no penalty, and that the restrictions were designed to ensure that all funds furthered the program’s objectives.13 In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court invalidated a restriction on welfare-law challenges by recipients of federal legal services funds.14 Whether a meaningful distinction separates the two is a question to carry into the funding-conditions sections of this chapter.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission adds a requirement of fit. Writing about land-use permits, the Court offered a speech hypothetical. A state may ban shouting fire in a crowded theater, and the ban can meet even stringent standards for regulating speech because it protects public safety. If the state then granted dispensations to anyone willing to contribute $100 to the treasury, the payment would be a lesser restriction than the ban, yet it would fail, because an unrelated condition swaps the safety rationale for a purpose that may be legitimate but cannot sustain the ban.15 A condition substituted for a prohibition keeps its constitutional propriety only if it furthers the end that justified the prohibition. It must answer to the justification for the direct rule it stands in for.
The same logic reaches beyond expression. In Koontz, the Court called Nollan and Dolan a “special application” of the doctrine, one that protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation when owners apply for land-use permits.16 Permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the coercion the doctrine prohibits, the Court explained, because government often has broad discretion to deny a permit worth far more than the property it would like to take. By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over a public right-of-way, for example, government can pressure the owner into giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just compensation.17 This chapter stays with expression and association.
The doctrine also differs from the law of prior restraints. Court orders that prevent speech and licensing systems that preclude speech without a permit infringe expression and must meet First Amendment standards.18 A conditions claim has a different object. The claimant needs no permit to speak; the complaint is that government has withheld a benefit, like the exemption in Speiser, because of what the claimant said or joined.
The Court has not applied the doctrine evenly. A dissent in Dolan objected that the majority’s entire explanation of the doctrine was a single sentence, and that the doctrine, though old, “has for just as long suffered from notoriously inconsistent application” and has never operated as an overarching principle with equal force regardless of the rights and powers at stake.19 The doctrine’s strength has also shifted over time. At one time any conditioning of governmental benefits drew strict scrutiny; the Court later narrowed the doctrine, and denials of benefits to people who exercised protected liberties against the government’s wishes were often upheld under rational basis review.20 Related doctrines sometimes carry the load. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, which concerned an Illinois law requiring nonmember public employees to pay a fee for a union’s collective bargaining, the Court deployed the compelled speech doctrine to overturn Abood.21
Because no single test predicts every outcome, the sections that follow take the contexts one at a time, beginning with the right-privilege distinction that Speiser rejected.