Concept
The Pickering Balancing Test
Public employment
The Pickering Balancing Test
Pickering v. Board of Education is the case the Court itself treats as the useful starting point when it explains its public-employee speech doctrine.1 A teacher wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school board's handling of earlier bond issue proposals and its allocation of money between the schools' educational and athletic programs, and the board discharged him because of those public statements.2 The Court held that his exercise of the right to speak on issues of public importance “cannot furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”3 The route to that holding was a balance of two interests. This unit follows it in four parts: the balance itself, the reasons the teacher won, two refinements on false statements and private speech, and the order of questions that later cases ask.
The Balance Itself
The Court framed the task as one of weighing: “The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”4
The teacher's side of the scale rests on the settled rule that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. The First Amendment protects their right, in certain circumstances, to speak as citizens addressing matters of public concern.5
The employer's side rests on interests that differ significantly from those the State has in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general.6 A citizen who enters government service must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom, and the government as employer has far broader powers than the government as sovereign.7 Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions, because without it there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services. In Connick's words, government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.8
Those interests do not give the employer a free hand. A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity's operations.9 Once speech pertains to a matter of public concern, the government must provide evidence that the speech actually impairs efficiency or effectiveness in the workplace; this two-part test is sometimes called the Pickering/Connick balancing test.10 The employer must therefore tie its interest to the actual workplace rather than invoke efficiency in the abstract. Connick, discussed below, speaks of action a supervisor reasonably believed would disrupt the office, and the later section on weighing the employer's interest returns to how much the employer must show.11
Why the Teacher Won
The Court found that the teacher's letter had not been shown, and could not be presumed, to have impeded his proper performance of his daily classroom duties or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.12 It therefore concluded that “the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.”13 That comparison decides the case. An employer's distinctive interest is efficiency, and when nothing shows that the speech harmed efficiency, the employer holds only the interest any government has in quieting a critic.
Three features of the letter explain why the board had nothing to put on its side of the scale. It criticized the school system as a whole and said nothing about the operation of the school that employed him or about his own performance as a teacher.14 It involved no impairment of the ability of superiors to maintain discipline and posed no threat of disharmony among coworkers, and the teacher's relationship with the board was not the kind of close working relationship for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to proper functioning.15 And it threatened no harm to the professional reputation of the school administrators, because the letter had generally been greeted by apathy and disbelief.16 Discipline, harmony, loyalty, and reputation are the interests an employer can place on its side of the scale, and the board in Pickering had none to offer.
The scale tips the other way when those interests are at risk. In Connick, an assistant district attorney circulated a questionnaire to colleagues. The Court concluded that it “touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense” and was “most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy.” Given that limited First Amendment interest, the supervisor did not have to put up with “action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships.”17 Even the one questionnaire item that did involve a matter of public concern, pressure to work in political campaigns, called for greater deference to the employer's judgment because of the close working relationships in the district attorney's office.18 A teacher whose letter touched no close working relationship wins the balance; an office employee whose questionnaire was largely grievance and endangered those relationships loses it. The next two sections show how Connick reached that result.
False Statements and Private Speech
The letter in Pickering contained some factual inaccuracies, and the Court still protected it. It held that “absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”19 The Court drew that standard from its treatment of citizens who criticize public officials, the actual-malice rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.20 The practical effect is that holding a government job does not make criticism riskier than it would be for an outside critic: an employee who honestly errs on a point of fact keeps the protection, while one who lies or recklessly disregards the truth does not.
Private speech to the employer can be protected as well. The Pickering opinion did not rely on the fact that the letter was published in a newspaper, and it indicated that the teacher's comments, if made privately, would have been entitled to the same protection.21 Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District confirmed the point. A public school teacher there was dismissed after she made statements to her principal about the school's racially discriminatory policies, and the Court held that First Amendment protection applies when a public employee arranges to communicate privately with the employer rather than to express views publicly.22
The first inquiry asks whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, not whether the audience was the public.23 Givhan removes publicity as a precondition and leaves the weighing in place. The time, manner, and place of the expression remain relevant to whether discipline is justified, as the Connick questionnaire, prepared, distributed, and completed during working hours, shows, and close working relationships can still call for greater deference to the employer.24
The Sequence Ahead
Students often start with the balance because it is Pickering's best-known sentence, but the first inquiry decides whether the balance is reached at all. An employee whose speech was not that of a citizen on a matter of public concern has no First Amendment cause of action based on the employer's reaction, however weak the employer's justification may be.26 The next sections therefore take up the public-concern threshold, then the weighing of the employer's interest, then the official-duties limit on what counts as speech “as a citizen,” and finally how an employee proves that the employer acted because of the speech.
A school setting alone does not make a case a Pickering case. Morse v. Frederick, for example, is discussed in terms of whether it develops a new exception to Tinker, and its majority did not rest on the Fraser exception for inappropriately vulgar speech in a school setting.27 That is a separate line of school-speech doctrine, and the employee-speech balance in this unit should be kept apart from it.