Concept
The Right Not to Speak
Public school students
The Right Not to Speak
The Court held in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette that a State may not compel schoolchildren to salute the flag or recite the pledge of allegiance, because the First Amendment protects the right not to speak as well as the right to speak. Barnette anchors the rest of this part of the chapter. Tinker and the decisions that followed it ask when a school may stop a student from voicing an opinion; Barnette asks whether a school may require a student to voice one. The same constitutional text answers both questions, but the disputes arise in opposite postures, and a student who has mastered the first can still miss the second on an exam.
The postures differ because the two kinds of government action do different things to the individual. A ban removes a channel of expression and leaves the student's mind alone. A compelled salute uses the student's own voice and body to declare a belief the student may not hold, so the State makes the student the carrier of its message. Because the demand takes over the speaker's expression instead of silencing it, the analysis starts earlier than it does in Tinker: a court asks first whether official authority has power to impose the affirmation at all, and only then how heavily the demand burdens the student.
The subsections below take the case in order. They show how the West Virginia requirement operated, why a salute counts as speech, why the State's interest in national unity cannot justify compulsion, and what it meant for the Court to overrule its own decision three years after issuing it. The last three then follow the principle past the flag salute: to license plates, to the line between teaching and compelling, and to school pressure that carries no formal penalty.
Barnette Facts and Holding
The Court's holding is short. A State's making the flag salute and pledge of allegiance compulsory in the public schools violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 The holding is easier to retain once you see how much machinery West Virginia built around the salute, so the facts come first.
West Virginia acted in the shadow of an earlier defeat for the objectors. After the Court's 1940 decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, the legislature amended its statutes to require every school to teach history, civics, and the federal and state constitutions in order to foster the “ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism,” and it directed the State Board of Education to prescribe the courses. On January 9, 1942, the Board went beyond instruction. Its resolution, whose recitals were taken largely from the Gobitis opinion, made the salute “a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools,” required all teachers and pupils to participate, and declared that refusal would be “regarded as an act of insubordination” to be “dealt with accordingly.” The salute the Board finally prescribed was the stiff-arm gesture, with the right hand raised and the palm turned up, while the pupil repeated the pledge.2
The penalties arrived in layers, and the layers turned a ceremony into a compulsion. A child who failed to conform was deemed insubordinate and expelled, and a statute denied readmission until the child complied. Meanwhile the expelled child counted as “unlawfully absent” and could be proceeded against as a delinquent, and the parents or guardians were liable to prosecution, with a fine of up to $50 and up to thirty days in jail on conviction. Officials also threatened to send the children to reformatories maintained for criminally inclined juveniles.3 Compulsory attendance ties the layers together: a family that wanted to avoid the salute could not simply keep the child out of the public school when absence was itself unlawful. The Court described the situation in just those terms, saying that the State asserted power to condition access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at the same time to coerce attendance by punishing both parent and child.4 That pairing leaves no real choice, and the contrast with a voluntary benefit becomes important when we reach the college-training case below.
The challengers were Jehovah's Witnesses, a body that teaches that the obligation imposed by the law of God is superior to laws enacted by temporal government. Their beliefs include a literal reading of Exodus 20:4 and 5, which forbids making or bowing down to any graven image; they regard the flag as an “image” within that command, so they refused on religious grounds to salute it.5 They pressed the claim in the teeth of fervent wartime patriotism and persecution.6 They sued in federal district court, for themselves and others similarly situated, to enjoin enforcement of the laws and regulations against them. A three-judge court restrained enforcement, the Board appealed directly to the Supreme Court, and the Court affirmed.7
The Court took care to note what the case lacked. The Witnesses' refusal collided with no right asserted by any other person, it did not interfere with the right of others to take part in the ceremony, and their behavior was peaceable and orderly, so the sole conflict was between authority and the rights of the individual.8 The absence of a competing private right matters because most speech disputes require the State to referee where one person's rights end and another's begin. When no one else is harmed by the refusal, the State has no protected third party to point to, and it must justify its power to demand the profession of belief itself.
The flag, the pledge, and the school are the same in both arrangements; the difference lies in compulsion backed by sanctions. The Court accepted that a State may require pupils to study history and the structure of government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, and that officials may foster national unity by persuasion and example.9 What Barnette forbids is the demand that a child affirm a belief on pain of expulsion. The Witnesses brought the case, but the decision protects every child who refuses to participate, whatever the reason.10
The vote was six to three. Justice Jackson wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. Black and Douglas filed a concurrence explaining why they had changed the view they took in Gobitis, and Murphy filed one of his own. Justice Frankfurter dissented, with Justice Roberts joining him, and Justice Reed filed a separate dissent.11 Stone, who had dissented in Gobitis, saw his view prevail: the majority quoted him on the State's power to require instruction in history and government.12 Frankfurter's dissent makes the case for judicial deference, and the subsections below show why the majority thought the Bill of Rights placed this subject beyond a legislature's reach.
The Salute as Compelled Speech
The First Amendment speaks of speech, and a raised hand or a recited pledge is a gesture performed in a classroom, so the first question in Barnette is whether a salute counts as speech at all. The Court answered that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance: symbolism is “a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas,” and a flag used to symbolize a system, idea, institution, or personality is “a short cut from mind to mind.”13 Causes, nations, and political parties knit the loyalty of their followers to a flag or banner, a color or design; the State announces rank and authority through crowns, uniforms, and black robes; the church speaks through the cross and the altar. A rule that protected a person's words but left the matching gesture to the State's discretion would let the government compel by sign what it could not compel by speech, so the protection has to reach both.
Stromberg v. California supplies the precedent on the other side of the flag. A decade earlier the Court had held that displaying a red flag as a symbol of peaceful opposition to organized government was protected by the free speech guaranties; in West Virginia the State used a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as presently organized and required the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it bespeaks.14 The same principle therefore covers the person who displays a banner of dissent and the person who declines to display one of assent, and the Court has not retreated from treating certain acts as symbolic speech.15
The salute does more than send a message. It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas the flag bespeaks, and so to profess a belief.16 The West Virginia regulation left unclear whether pupils were to give up their contrary convictions and become unwilling converts to the ceremony, or whether they could satisfy it by simulating assent with words they did not mean and a gesture barren of meaning. Either reading is troubling. If simulated assent suffices, the ceremony extracts a hollow declaration and teaches the pupil to say what is not in his mind. If real assent is expected, the State demands a conviction that no ceremony can produce, and from the outside it cannot tell which it has obtained. To sustain the requirement, the Court said, it would have to hold that a Bill of Rights that guards the individual's right to speak his own mind left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.17
Because compelling a statement intrudes further than forbidding one, the justification required rises with the intrusion. The Constitution tolerates suppression of an opinion only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action the State is empowered to prevent and punish, so, the Court reasoned, involuntary affirmation “could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.”18 A prohibition leaves the pupil's mind to himself, while a command to affirm makes the pupil the author of a statement he may reject, so a showing too weak to justify the lesser step cannot justify the greater one. West Virginia made no such showing: it invoked the power of compulsion without alleging that a pupil's remaining passive during the ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify even an effort to muffle expression.19 Later decisions repeat the point, calling it always demeaning to force free individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable and citing Barnette for the rule that a command of involuntary affirmation requires even more urgent grounds than a demand for silence.20 A later subsection traces how that demand grew into the strict scrutiny the Court now applies to compelled speech.
Barnette's holding does not depend on religion, and the structure of the Court's argument shows why. Gobitis had assumed that the State could impose the flag salute on schoolchildren generally and had examined only a claim by religious objectors to be excused from an accepted rule.21 Barnette examined the power itself. The Court said the issue does not turn on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held: religion supplied the Witnesses' motive for enduring the discomforts of bringing the case, but many citizens who do not share their views also hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty.22 It added that no inquiry into whether nonconformist beliefs exempt anyone from the duty to salute is needed unless the Court first finds power to make the salute a legal duty.23 An exemption analysis takes the duty as valid and asks who may be excused from it. A speech analysis asks whether the duty may exist at all, and an answer of no resolves the question for every pupil at once. That is why the case counts as a free speech decision and not a free exercise decision, even though the children refused for religious reasons.24
Two concurring opinions show how the same result can rest on different footing. Justices Black and Douglas, who had joined the Gobitis majority, said the statute fails to accord full scope to the freedom of religion secured to the Witnesses by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.25 Their opinion starts from the Witnesses' faith, so it is a religious-freedom opinion, and by itself it would not reach a pupil like Marcus. Justice Murphy joined the Court's opinion and wrote separately to state the speech principle in its plainest form: freedom of thought and religion against state action includes both the right to speak freely and “the right to refrain from speaking at all,” except insofar as essential operations of government require otherwise for the preservation of an orderly society, as in compelling testimony in court.26 Murphy's formulation carries its own boundary, and that boundary is the part a student can misapply.
The constitutional law of compelled speech remains complex, uncertain, and unsettled.27 Government compels speech in many settings, among them testimony in court, entries on tax forms, and answers on school exams, so the principle cannot forbid every demand that a person speak. Barnette marks the line by what the demand requires of the speaker. The vice lies in forcing citizens to “confess by word or act their faith” in an orthodoxy of politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.28 A pupil who answers a roll call or an exam question communicates something, but neither act asks the pupil to affirm a belief or an attitude of mind. A pledge recited as the pupil's own words does ask for that affirmation, which is why the salute falls on the protected side of the line. The subsection on teaching versus compelling develops this boundary.
Rejecting the Unity Rationale
West Virginia defended the salute with an end that nobody disputes, and Barnette begins by granting it. National unity is an end that officials may foster by persuasion and example, so the live problem is whether the compulsion the Board employed is a permissible means of achieving it.30 That framing answers the heart of Gobitis, which had reasoned that national unity is the basis of national security, that the authorities may select appropriate means to attain it, and that compulsory measures toward unity are therefore constitutional.31 Barnette accepted the premise about the end and rejected the conclusion about the means.
Separating end from means is the analytic move to carry out of this subsection. A court that asks only whether the government's goal is worthy will uphold nearly every regulation, because governments almost always act in the name of goals that sound worthy. The constitutional question is whether the tool the government chose is one the Constitution lets it use, and in Barnette the goal passed while the tool failed. The same two-part inquiry returns later in the chapter when the goal is shielding children from harmful speech, another goal that courts accept as legitimate, and the discussion there again turns on the means.
Compulsion fails as a means of unity because coercion escalates against dissenters without producing agreement. The Court pointed to the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity, the Inquisition, and the Siberian exiles as efforts to compel coherence that ended in futility, and it warned that those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters; compulsory unification of opinion achieves only “the unanimity of the graveyard.”32 West Virginia's scheme already displayed the first rungs of that ladder, with expulsion, delinquency proceedings, and prosecution of parents attached to a ceremony a child declined to perform.
Gobitis had offered a second reason for deference: courts have no marked competence in this field, and the contest belongs to public opinion and the legislature. Barnette answered that the very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy and place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, so that the rights to free speech, a free press, and freedom of worship depend on the outcome of no election.33 The mechanism is easy to trace. A right that a majority could remove by vote would protect only the opinions the majority already tolerates, and those are the opinions that never need protection. The Court added that its duty to apply the Bill of Rights does not depend on possessing marked competence in the field where the invasion occurs.34 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey later invoked Barnette for the same limit. The rule that government may adopt either position where reasonable people disagree “assumes a state of affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected liberty,” and a State therefore may not compel or enforce one view or the other about saluting or defiling the flag.35
The reasoning rests on the structure of self-government. We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent; authority is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority.36 From that premise came the “fixed star” passage: no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein, and the Court could think of no circumstance that would permit an exception.37 Compelling the salute and pledge, the Court concluded, transcends constitutional limitations on the authorities' power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit that the First Amendment reserves from all official control.38
Barnette supports that reading, because it said the validity of an asserted power to force a citizen to profess a statement of belief or join a ceremony of assent presents a question of power that must be considered independently of any idea about the ceremony's utility.39 A district that pursued the same unity through civics and history instruction, patriotic examples, and ceremonies students may join or skip would be using the means the Court left open, and no student's affirmation would be demanded.
The principle did not stay inside the schoolhouse. In Texas v. Johnson, a protester at a 1984 demonstration outside the Republican National Convention in Dallas unfurled an American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire, and Texas convicted him under a statute against desecrating a venerated object.40 The State defended the conviction by asserting an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity, the same interest the Court had already found insufficient to support a criminal conviction under a flag-misuse statute in Spence.41 The Court answered with the bedrock principle that government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable, and it declined to make an exception for the flag.42 Johnson drew directly on Barnette, repeating the fixed-star passage as one of the society's defining principles.43
Johnson also reproduces the end-versus-means structure. The Court did not deny that a State may value the flag; its objection was to the means. Punishing a person for the idea his treatment of the flag conveys is the pattern of discrimination against ideas or viewpoints that the Court has long used as its archetype for triggering strict scrutiny,44 and it is the very power Barnette denied: the power to prescribe what shall be orthodox.45 The two cases face opposite directions, because Barnette concerned a demand that a child affirm a belief and Johnson concerned punishment of expression that denied one. Each applies the same limit on the government's authority over orthodoxy, and each leaves the State free to pursue unity through its own voice.
Overruling Gobitis
Barnette overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis only three years after the earlier decision, and the opinion presents the reversal first as a change in the question the Court asked. Gobitis, the majority observed, had assumed (as the arguments in both cases did) that the State holds power to impose a flag salute on schoolchildren in general, and had examined only a claim of religious immunity from a rule it never questioned. Barnette announced that it would “examine rather than assume existence of this power.”47 The footnote to that passage quotes Gobitis itself, which treated the dispute as one over whether, “though the ceremony may be required, exceptional immunity must be given to dissidents.”48
The choice of question carries so much weight because each framing assigns the burden to a different party. Gobitis reasoned that religious liberty has never excluded legislation of general scope that is not directed against the doctrinal loyalties of particular sects, and that conscientious scruples have not relieved anyone from obedience to a general law not aimed at religious belief.49 Once a court accepts that premise, the salute is a valid rule and the objectors are petitioners asking for an exception. A presumptively valid rule usually defeats a request for judicial grace, so every dissenter must persuade the court that a private scruple outweighs a legislative judgment. Barnette shifted the burden to the State by asking whether official authority may command the ceremony at all. Having answered no, the Court did not need to ask whether nonconformist beliefs would exempt anyone, since that question arises only if the State first has power to make the salute a legal duty. The same passage adds that the issue does not turn on religious views or their sincerity, which is why the holding protects every objecting pupil and not only Jehovah's Witnesses.50
Justice Frankfurter's dissent made the case for the old framing in three arguments that deserve a fair statement. The first is judicial restraint: the power to nullify legislation prevents the full play of the democratic process, and that undemocratic aspect is the best reason for the greatest caution in using it.51 He added that the “liberty” secured by the Due Process Clause gave the Court no authority to deny West Virginia a legitimate legislative end, the promotion of good citizenship, by the means it had chosen.52
The second argument is institutional. A court can only strike down; it cannot modify or qualify a law or make exceptions to a general requirement, and it strikes down not merely for a day.53 A legislature, by contrast, can draft an exemption and answer to the voters for it.
The third is the analogy to Hamilton v. Regents, where a student at a state university could not refuse courses that offended his religious scruples. Frankfurter argued that the voluntariness distinction fails, because under Pierce v. Society of Sisters a State cannot require children to attend its public schools, so West Virginia, like California in Hamilton, merely imposed the conditions it deemed necessary for developing future citizens on those who use its public schools.54 He also invoked history: “Five times has the precise question now before us been adjudicated,” he noted, and four times the Court had unanimously found the requirement within state power, dismissing the first three appeals for want of a substantial federal question.55 Always before, he observed, the Court had overruled decisions only to widen legislative authority it had earlier narrowed, never to restrict the powers of democratic government.56
The majority answered the Hamilton argument on the facts it had laid out. Where a State extends college facilities to pupils who voluntarily enroll, without compelling attendance, it may prescribe military training as part of the course, because those who take advantage of the opportunity may not refuse its conditions on grounds of conscience; but in Barnette “attendance is not optional,” and the State separately holds power to raise a militia and impose service on its citizens.57 The two sides also read the record differently. Frankfurter described a case about compelling participation by those who choose to attend public school, with no punishment of children or parents before the Court.58 The majority described a State that conditions access to public education on a prescribed sign and profession while coercing attendance by punishing both parent and child.59 A college student who objects gives up an optional opportunity, whereas the West Virginia pupil faced expulsion and the prosecution of the family, and the majority treated that coercion as the feature Hamilton lacked. Frankfurter's Pierce point shows that the voluntariness line can be contested, yet it is the line the majority drew.
On restraint and accommodation, the majority replied that the Bill of Rights withdraws certain subjects from majority control, as the previous subsection explained, and that even suppressing an opinion requires a clear and present danger.60 The opinions pass each other because they apply different yardsticks. Frankfurter asked only whether a State could pursue a legitimate end, good citizenship, by the means it chose. The majority asked whether the salute could be justified by any danger the State may prevent, and it found no allegation that a pupil's remaining passive during the ritual creates one. The first standard is open-ended and treats earlier judicial approval as evidence that the legislature was reasonable. The second is definite, and it takes the force out of a count of earlier approvals, because a reasonable belief that a ceremony builds cohesion does not show that any danger exists. Once the power question is answered no, the requirement falls as to everyone, and no legislative exemption is needed.
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization later gave its own account of the episode. It listed Barnette among the important constitutional decisions that overruled a prior precedent, and it observed that nothing had changed in the intervening three years except the Court's belated recognition that Gobitis had been seriously wrong.61
An exam question asking whether an objecting pupil should be excused from a mandatory pledge is built on the Gobitis framing, and the answer follows Barnette. Ask first whether the State may compel the affirmation at all, because a no ends the inquiry for every pupil and makes the exemption question unnecessary.62 A condition attached to a voluntary opportunity, like the military training in Hamilton, falls on the other side of the line, since the objector may decline the benefit and the State separately holds the militia power. Compulsory attendance backed by expulsion and prosecution of parents leaves the pupil no comparable choice.63
Wooley and Strict Scrutiny
Barnette arose in a classroom, but its reasoning never depended on the schoolhouse, and the Court carried it onto the open road in Wooley v. Maynard. New Hampshire required most automobiles to carry plates bearing the state motto, “Live Free or Die.” A couple who were Jehovah's Witnesses found the motto repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs, covered it, and were prosecuted. The Court held that the State could not require objecting citizens, religious or not, to display the motto.66 It began from the proposition, drawn from Barnette, that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action “includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”67
The Court tied the license plate to the flag salute by degree. Compelling the affirmative act of a salute is a more serious infringement than requiring the passive carrying of a motto, but the difference is one of degree: in both cases the State forces an individual, as part of daily life, to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.68 The harm turns on whose message the person is made to carry, whatever the physical demand of the compelled act. A plate rides on private property wherever the owner drives, so New Hampshire was in effect requiring the couple to use their car as a “mobile billboard” for the State's ideological message, and the government may not force an individual to use property to convey an ideological message the person rejects.69 The State defended the motto by pointing to pride in the State and its history and to the identification of its plates, and the Court found those interests insufficient. The one interest tied to what a plate is for, identifying the vehicle, is served by the registration characters alone, so the motto added only the State's message.
Wooley also supplied the sentence that sums up this whole line of cases: the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of “individual freedom of mind.”70 A system that secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.71 Both rights protect one interest, a person's authority over what that person's own mind and voice are used to say. A government that could not silence a dissenter but could draft the dissenter's voice into an official message would control public opinion by a different route, because listeners would hear the State's view in the objector's mouth. Both sets of challengers were Jehovah's Witnesses, which tempts an exam answer toward an exemption analysis for believers, yet Wooley, like Barnette, protected objecting citizens whether religious or nonreligious.72
The modern doctrine states the pattern as a rule about scrutiny. The Court's cases presumptively forbid the government from dictating the content of speech or symbolic expression by forcing citizens to express messages with which they disagree, and they treat compulsions of that kind as content-based regulations that, like comparable restrictions, trigger strict scrutiny.73 Content-based restrictions have long invoked strict scrutiny, with discrimination against ideas or viewpoints as the archetype.74 In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra the Court reasoned that compelling individuals to speak a particular message alters the content of their expression, and it invalidated mandatory notice requirements imposed on pro-life crisis pregnancy centers. The logic runs in one line: a ban on a message and an order to utter one each let the government decide what a person's expression contains, so each calls for the same demanding justification. The scrutiny for compelled speech is at least as strong as the test for content-based restrictions, consistent with Barnette's suggestion that involuntary affirmation may demand even more urgent grounds than silencing.75
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC states the principle and shows where it stops. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, began from the idea that “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence,”76 and that government action requiring “the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government contravenes this essential right.”77 But the must-carry rules fell outside that line of precedent, because on their face they imposed burdens and conferred benefits without reference to the content of speech.78 Content decides which line of cases governs.
The protection is presumptive rather than absolute, and a sufficiently compelling justification can override it.79 Strict scrutiny asks whether the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest; the test is extremely demanding, though in rare cases a sufficiently powerful justification lets a content-based law survive.80 The qualification is needed because the government compels speech in some settings, such as testimony in court, and a rule forbidding all of it would end evidence that Justice Murphy's concurrence recognized as an essential operation of government.81 The presumption puts the burden on the government, which must show that the required statement serves a purpose strong enough to justify the intrusion. A statement that serves an essential government function can carry that burden. A motto whose point is to foster pride in the State could not, because pride is an ideological goal that the State pursues through the objector's own property.
The doctrine also reaches compulsion that does not script a message. Justice Powell, concurring in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, reasoned that a law forcing a newspaper to open its columns to others burdens its fundamental right to decide what to print or omit and is tantamount to compelled affirmation, presumptively unconstitutional, and that similar speech interests arise when listeners are likely to attribute a guest's message to a store owner.82 Forced-hosting cases such as Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, which involved a parade organizer, and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, which involved a newspaper, protect a host whose choice of contents is itself expressive. That is why a law school's recruiting services, which lack the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or an editorial page, receive no such protection.83
The car, the plate, and the owner's property are the same in the motto case and the registration case; the whole difference lies in whether the State has scripted a message of belief for the owner to carry. A law that does not compel speech draws no special First Amendment scrutiny, and rationality review suffices. A law that compels speech for reasons unrelated to content draws at most intermediate scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is reserved for compulsion of speech of a particular content, or compelled counterspeech answering speech of a particular content, as in Barnette and Wooley.84
The first step does the most work on an exam. A student who sees the word “required” and reaches for strict scrutiny will overread the doctrine, because the presumption attaches to compulsion of a message and not to every duty to provide information. The fourth step guards against the opposite error, since a yes at step one does not decide the case when the government can show an essential function that justifies the demand.
Teaching Versus Compelling
Barnette does not forbid the State to teach, and the Court marked that boundary in the opinion itself. The majority accepted that the State may “require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country,” a proposition it took from Chief Justice Stone's dissent in Gobitis.90 West Virginia went further. The pupils were not merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they might learn what it is or what it means; the Board compelled them to declare a belief, and the Court framed the issue as whether the “slow and easily neglected” route to aroused loyalties may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan.91 A school that requires each student to stand and affirm loyalty in his own voice has crossed from teaching into compelling, exactly as the West Virginia Board did.
Instruction and compulsion do different things to the pupil's mind, and that difference is why the line falls where it does. A student who studies the history of the flag, the structure of government, and the guarantees of civil liberty receives material and arguments, and remains free to weigh them and to reach a conclusion that is the student's own, including one the lesson hoped to prevent. Teaching works through persuasion, and persuasion leaves the learner the author of whatever the learner finally says. A compelled declaration reverses that order, because the State fixes the conclusion in advance and borrows the student's voice to announce it. The slow route is slow because it must win the student's agreement, and the short-cut gains speed by skipping that step. Justice Murphy, concurring, observed that many find it deeply distasteful to join in a public chorus of affirmation of private belief, and he concluded that such a requirement is not essential to effective government and orderly society.92
The boundary is not perfectly sharp, and an exam answer should say so. The constitutional law of compelled speech remains complex, uncertain, and unsettled,93 and government compels speech in many settings, including testimony in court, entries on tax forms, and answers on school exams. Justice Murphy's statement of the principle builds in an exception for the essential operations of government, as in compelling evidence in court.94 A workable way to sort these demands is to ask what the speaker is made to do. A witness supplies facts the tribunal needs, a taxpayer reports figures the revenue system cannot run without, and a student answering an exam question shows what she has learned. Each demand serves the institution's function and asks for information or work product, while the flag salute asks the pupil to avow a belief as his own.
A related line of cases asks when the government may compel a person to pay for another's speech. The First Amendment does not permit the government to compel payment merely because it thinks the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not want to pay,95 though in Davenport v. Washington Education Association the Court upheld a Washington law barring public-sector unions from using nonmembers' agency fees for electoral purposes without their consent.96 That body of law lies beyond this chapter.
The same question explains why hosting another person's message differs from voicing one's own. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, law schools challenged a federal law requiring them to include military recruiters in the interviews and receptions the schools arranged, and they argued that the requirement compelled their speech. The Court rejected the claim. Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send one for a military recruiter is not the same as forcing a student to pledge allegiance or forcing a Jehovah's Witness to display the motto “Live Free or Die,” and treating the two as equivalent would trivialize the freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley.97 The compelled-speech violation in each earlier case arose because the complaining speaker's own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate, as in the parade in Hurley, where every participating unit affects the message the organizers convey.98 A law school's recruiting services lack that expressive quality, and the schools remained free to say whatever they wished about the military's policies.99
The hosting cases therefore turn on whether the host's own message changes, and Justice Powell's concurrence in PruneYard identifies a second trigger, the likelihood that listeners will attribute a guest's views to the owner.100 Where a host cannot disclaim the guest's message without disrupting its own expression, as in a moving parade, the accommodation operates like compelled affirmation. Where the hosting is a service the host provides for other reasons and nobody would take the guest's words as the host's, no compelled speech occurs. This is the first step of the compelled-speech sequence above: a law that compels no speech at all draws only rationality review.101 The usual exam error is to treat every government demand that touches expression as compelled speech. The demand must make the person voice or endorse a message of that person's own, or must change the message the person is already conveying, before the Barnette principle applies.
Pressure Without Penalty
Barnette struck down a flag-salute rule that worked through legal sanctions, which leaves open what happens when a school imposes no sanction at all and the pressure to conform comes from the setting itself. The leading answer is Lee v. Weisman. A middle school principal invited a rabbi to give the invocation and benediction at a graduation ceremony, handed the rabbi a pamphlet of guidelines for civic occasions, and told him the prayers should be nonsectarian. The Court held that including clergy who offer prayers as part of a public school's official graduation ceremony is forbidden by the Establishment Clause.104 Lee rests on the Establishment Clause, and the free speech reasoning of Barnette does not control it. The case belongs in this chapter because it asks Barnette's question in another form: at what point does school pressure become compulsion?
The Court began from the premise that freedom of conscience needs heightened protection from subtle coercive pressure in elementary and secondary public schools. The district's supervision and control of the ceremony placed public and peer pressure on students to stand as a group or at least keep respectful silence. The mechanism has several links. In a ceremony the school stages, standing or silence can signify simple respect or actual participation, and the Court asked whether a reasonable dissenter in that setting could believe the group exercise signified her own participation or approval.105 The student's own posture thus becomes the means by which the school makes the student appear to join, which echoes Barnette's concern with the State using a pupil's own gesture to display assent. The Court added a psychological premise, that adolescents are often susceptible to peer pressure toward conformity and that the influence is strongest in matters of social convention, so the government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.106
The school district argued that attendance at graduation was voluntary, so an objecting student could stay home. The Court treated that option as unreal. Attendance may not be required by official decree, yet a student is not free to absent herself from graduation in any real sense of the term “voluntary,” because absence would cost her the intangible benefits that have motivated her through all of high school.107 Finding no violation on these facts would leave objectors in the dilemma of participating, with all that implies, or protesting, and the Court said the State may not place primary and secondary school children in that position.108 Lee did not decide whether the same choice would be acceptable for mature adults, and it did not hold that every state action touching religion is invalid whenever someone takes offense. People may take offense at all manner of religious and nonreligious messages, and enduring social isolation or even anger may sometimes be the price of conscience or nonconformity.109
The sanctions in Barnette show how far Lee moved the idea of coercion. The earlier school-prayer decisions, Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp, arose against a backdrop of legal coercion to attend school under threat of penalty; in Schempp the prayers were prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students required by law to attend school.110 The Court's attention to the school's own role appears elsewhere, too: it invalidated released-time religious instruction conducted in the public school building because the State provided direct support and placed its imprimatur on the religious message.111 Lee applied that attentiveness to a ceremony the school staged, where no penalty attached to dissent. A rule that requires a threat of penalty is easy to administer but lets a school produce conformity through atmosphere alone, while Lee's rule closes that gap and asks courts to judge how social pressure operates on young people.
The dissent in Lee pointed out that students stood for the Pledge of Allegiance just before the invocation. Since the Pledge now includes the words “under God,” it argued, the majority's logic would reach the Pledge as well: if students were psychologically coerced to remain standing during the invocation, they must have been coerced moments earlier to stand for the Pledge.112 That observation leaves two separate questions. Barnette settles that a school cannot directly compel a student to recite the Pledge, but in the face of an Establishment Clause challenge this freedom from direct coercion might or might not be sufficient.113 The Court avoided that second question in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, holding that a father whose state-law right to sue on his daughter's behalf had been taken away lacked prudential standing.114 Some argue that the Pledge's tradition and the fact that students cannot be directly or substantially coerced to join the recitation mitigate the risk of coercion, though a lingering potential for indirect and subtle coercion remains. The Establishment Clause question stays open, so an exam answer should report it that way and analyze both sides.115
The coercion inquiry applies only when a school itself puts students in the dilemma, and Kennedy v. Bremerton School District supplies the case on the other side. Joseph Kennedy, a football coach at Bremerton High School, made a practice of giving thanks through prayer on the playing field at the conclusion of each game.116 The district disciplined him, and the Court held that it violated the coach's rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. The district defended itself under the Establishment Clause, and the Court answered by replacing the Lemon test and the endorsement test with an analysis based on historical practice and understanding: learning to tolerate speech or prayer of all kinds is part of learning to live in a pluralistic society, and offense does not equate to coercion.117 Coercion survived that shift as a core concern, because the Court seemed to accept that state coercion to engage in religious practices would violate the Establishment Clause.118 On this record it found none. The district had mistakenly believed that it was obliged to suppress religious observances even though it permitted comparable secular speech, and the Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates that discrimination.119
The two decisions differ on who staged the exercise. In Lee the principal chose the clergy member, supplied the guidelines, and controlled the program, and the audience could avoid the exercise only by missing an event of singular importance. In Kennedy the coach's prayer was a private act that others merely witnessed, and students were neither required nor expected to attend it. The Court also distinguished Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, which involved prayers at school football games: although attendance there was not required, cheerleaders, band members, and team members were required to attend.120 An exam stem that stipulates voluntary attendance and no discipline does not end the analysis, because Lee shows that a school-staged religious exercise at a pivotal event can coerce anyway. A stem that shows only a private act of worship, or a student's offense, does not establish coercion either. After Kennedy, expect the analysis to run through coercion and historical practice, and expect uncertainty at the edges.121