Concept
Florida Bar v. Went For It
Regulation of commercial speech
Florida Bar v. Went For It
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. upheld a thirty-day blackout on one kind of lawyer advertising: targeted letters to accident victims. Two Florida Bar rules create the blackout. Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) forbids a lawyer to send, or knowingly permit to be sent, a written communication seeking professional employment when it concerns a personal injury or wrongful death action, or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the addressee or a relative, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days before the mailing. Rule 4-7.8(a) closes the obvious workaround by barring a lawyer from accepting referrals from a lawyer referral service whose communications or direct contacts with prospective clients would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if the lawyer made them. Together the rules keep lawyers from singling out accident victims or their relatives to solicit business, directly or indirectly, during the first 30 days.1
A federal district court rejected a magistrate judge’s recommendation to uphold the rules and entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, relying on Bates v. State Bar of Arizona and later cases. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on similar grounds, though its panel said it was “disturbed that Bates and its progeny require the decision” it reached.2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, five to four.3
The Court measured the rules against Central Hudson, the test that organized the law developed under Virginia Board of Pharmacy into a standard for restrictions on commercial speech.4 Under it, the government may freely regulate commercial speech that concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. Other commercial speech, which includes the advertising here, may be regulated only if the government asserts a substantial interest, shows that the restriction directly and materially advances that interest, and draws the regulation narrowly.5 The opinion counts those requirements as three prongs and treats the lawful-and-not-misleading question as a threshold. The four-part sequence used earlier in this chapter counts the threshold as step one, so the opinion’s first prong is that sequence’s step two, its second prong is step three, and its third prong is step four.6 The subsections below use the opinion’s numbering and note the matching step.
The Court also had to reckon with Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, which held that direct-mail solicitation’s capacity for abuse did not justify a total ban absent specific findings that the solicitation was false or misleading.7 The majority distinguished Shapero and left it in place.8
The case repays close study because the two sides applied the same test and still disagreed at each prong. The majority treated the Bar’s study as adequate proof of real harm and the 30-day limit as a modest burden on lawyers. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, found the evidence inadequate and thought Shapero controlled the privacy rationale.9 Each dispute turns on a question that recurs in commercial speech cases: how much proof the government must produce, and how closely a rule must match the harm it targets. The subsections follow the opinion’s order: the interests the Bar asserted, the evidence of harm, the tailoring of the rule and the alternatives it left open, and the dissent read against Shapero.
Interests Asserted
Because the lawyers’ letters were neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the Bar could restrict them only by asserting a substantial interest and then satisfying the two prongs that follow.10 That first prong is step two of the four-part sequence.11 The Bar asserted two interests and linked them as cause and effect. The first is the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones, whom the Bar sought to protect from intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers.12 The second is the profession’s reputation. The Bar’s study data supported its contention that the Florida public views direct-mail solicitation in the wake of an accident as an intrusion on privacy that reflects poorly on the profession.13 The privacy harm is the cause and the reputational harm the effect, and both serve the Bar’s paramount objective of curbing practices that negatively affect the administration of justice.14
The Court said it had “little trouble crediting the Bar’s interest as substantial.” Each half of the interest had precedent behind it. The Court recalled that states have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries. On privacy, it relied on Edenfield v. Fane for the proposition that protecting potential clients’ privacy is a substantial state interest, and on decisions that place the tranquility and privacy of the home among the interests of the highest order and recognize a state’s power to protect the ability to avoid intrusions.15
Crediting an interest costs the government little at this prong. The burden of showing that the rule actually serves the interest falls on the next prong, and Edenfield shows how heavy it can be: the Court there struck down Florida’s ban on in-person solicitation by accountants because the state board presented no studies or anecdotes showing the dangers it claimed to fear.16
The interest that counts is the one the government presses. Unlike rational basis review, the Central Hudson standard “does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions.”17 The Court applied that limit to the Bar’s own litigation choices. At earlier stages the Bar had also invoked an interest in protecting people against undue influence and overreaching, but it did not press that interest before the Supreme Court, so the Court did not consider it. The Court added that a single substantial interest is enough to satisfy the first prong.18 The omission fits Shapero, which found no serious danger of overreaching in a letter because a letter, unlike a lawyer in person, can be put in a drawer, ignored, or discarded.19 With that interest set aside, the Bar’s case rested on privacy and reputation alone.
The harder question is whether the reputational interest is only an interest in sparing listeners offense, which earlier decisions treated as thin. The dissent said it was. It invoked Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. for the point that an interest in shielding recipients of mail from offensive material carries little weight. It also quoted Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel for the holding that “the mere possibility that some members of the population might find advertising . . . offensive cannot justify suppressing it,” a rule that applies equally to advertising some members of the bar find beneath their dignity.20
The majority answered that the Bar is concerned not with offense in the abstract but with “the demonstrable detrimental effects that such ‘offense’ has on the profession it regulates.”21 A footnote added that a government acting in its own interests, or on behalf of the entities it regulates, stands differently from one motivated primarily by paternalism, and it read the dissent’s cases as paternalism cases.22
The line matters because the two harms are proved differently. Offense in the abstract depends on how listeners react to a message’s content, so a rule resting on it would let government silence any speech some people dislike. A harm to the profession can be measured, so a record can test it, as the next subsection shows. The majority also stressed that the harm the Bar posited is as much a function of simple receipt of a targeted solicitation within days of an accident as of the letter’s contents.23
The dissent refused to draw the line. It called the reputational interest circular: disrespect for lawyers is a harm only if post-accident solicitation is improper, and that is the point in dispute.24 A bar that protects lawyers’ reputations by suppressing speech some people find offensive, it said, manipulates public opinion by withholding information about how the legal system works, and the result is “censorship pure and simple.”25 Commentary on the case finds it unclear whether the majority’s concern for the profession’s image will bear fruit or prove an aberration. Nothing in Central Hudson directly bars the interest, but the dissenters seem to have a point that it is peculiar to let the state suppress speech to protect the public image of the speakers.26
Those objections show how to use the first prong. Credit the privacy interest of the recently injured and bereaved quickly, because the Bar tied it to documented public reaction and invoked it for a rule confined to a brief period. Treat the reputational interest as a supporting argument of uncertain strength: a bar that asserts reputation alone, with no privacy anchor and no evidence, presents the circularity the dissent identified. Then move to the record at the next prong.
Evidence of Harm
The second prong asks whether the restriction “directly and materially advances” the Bar’s interests, which is step three of the four-part sequence.28 The Court restated the burden. It “is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”29 The first prong let the Bar name privacy and reputation as its interests. This prong asks whether the Bar can prove that those interests are being injured and that a thirty-day blackout would relieve the injury.
Proof is demanded because a restriction on truthful speech imposes a certain cost while the promised benefit may never arrive. A court that took a recited harm on the government’s word would let a legislature or bar association justify nearly any limit by describing a problem. Evidence turns the description into a factual claim that can be examined. Most of the argument in Went For It concerned the first showing, whether the harm was real.
Edenfield marks the floor of the required proof. The Court there invalidated Florida’s ban on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants because the State Board of Accountancy presented no studies suggesting that personal solicitation by accountants creates the dangers of fraud, overreaching, or compromised independence it claimed to fear. The record disclosed no anecdotal evidence from Florida or any other state to validate the Board’s suppositions, and the only evidence in it tended to contradict the Board’s submissions. Finding nothing to substantiate the alleged harm, the Court struck the regulation down.30
The Bar’s showing stood at the opposite end. It gave the district court a 106-page summary of its two-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation, with statistical and anecdotal data of three kinds:
- Volume: as of June 1989, lawyers mailed 700,000 direct solicitations in Florida each year, and 40 percent were aimed at accident victims or their survivors.31
- Attitudes: in a survey, 54 percent of the general population said that contacting people about accidents or similar events violates privacy. Among people who had received lawyer mail in 1987, 45 percent thought it designed to take advantage of gullible or unstable people, 26 percent called it an invasion of privacy, and 27 percent said it lowered their regard for the legal profession and the judicial process.32
- Anecdote: Florida newspapers ran editorials titled “Scavenger Lawyers” and “Solicitors Out of Bounds,” and the Bar’s summary quoted complaints from citizens who received the letters.33
The anecdotes supply what percentages cannot. A survey figure shows that many people dislike a practice, but a complaint shows who received the letter and when. One citizen was appalled by a firm’s letter shortly after he was injured and his fiancée was killed in an auto accident. Another found it despicable that a lawyer wrote to his mother three days after his father’s funeral. A third described a letter his nephew’s family received the day of the nephew’s funeral.34 Those timings match the thirty-day window the rule closes, which ties the evidence to the period the Bar chose to regulate.
Justice Kennedy complained that the record showed few indications of the sample size or selection procedures used by Magid Associates, a nationally renowned consulting firm, and no copies of the surveys. The majority answered that the Bar’s evidence was sufficient to meet the standard in Edenfield v. Fane and that it did not read its case law to require empirical data to arrive with “a surfeit of background information.” In other First Amendment settings, it noted, the Court has let litigants justify speech restrictions with studies and anecdotes from different locales altogether, as in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., or by appeal to history and simple common sense, as in Burson v. Freeman.35 The Court of Appeals had reached the opposite result by treating Shapero as controlling and making no mention of the Bar’s study.36 The Court found the harms the Bar targeted concrete and nonspeculative, which is what distinguished this record from the one in Edenfield.37
The dissent attacked the record at every layer. The Bar’s summary, it said, “includes no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or selection procedures, no explanations of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results.” Its “selective synopses of unvalidated studies deal, for the most part, with television advertising and phone book listings, and not direct-mail solicitations.” The majority called the anecdotal matter “noteworthy for its breadth and detail,” and the dissent found it “noteworthy for its incompetence.”38
The dissent also pressed a mismatch between what the evidence measured and what the Bar said it was protecting. The thrust of the material, it said, went to the Bar’s reputational concerns, and it found nothing in the record showing that the rule protects people suffering trauma and grief. Asked at oral argument what a “typical injured plaintiff get[s] in the mail,” the Bar’s lawyer answered that this was not in the record and that he did not know.39 The point has force because a poll of regard for the profession proves reputational harm directly and proves harm to victims only through the complaints. The split was one of application: the majority found the record enough, and the dissent found it incompetent.
A strong answer on this prong sorts the government’s proof by what it shows and what it omits. Edenfield marks the floor: no studies, no anecdotes, and some contrary evidence. Went For It shows that a two-year study with statistics, survey data, and specific complaints about timing clears the floor, even without methodological detail. The cases in between turn on how closely the evidence fits the speech and the harm at issue, and the dissent attacked that fit hardest.
Tailoring and Alternatives
The third prong asks whether the regulation is “narrowly drawn,” and it is step four of the four-part sequence.41 The Court took its standard from Fox, which made clear that the “least restrictive means” test has no role in commercial speech cases. What the cases require is “a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable,” one whose scope is “in proportion to the interest served” and that employs “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”42
That standard sits between two alternatives that would each give a bad result. A least-restrictive-means test would let any challenger defeat a rule by naming a narrower one, and almost every regulation has a narrower cousin. Rational basis review would ask only whether a legislature could imagine a justification, which would leave advertisers almost unprotected. The Court said it does not equate the test with “the less rigorous obstacles of rational basis review,” and it recalled from Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. that the existence of “numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives” is “certainly a relevant consideration” in deciding whether the fit is reasonable.43
Respondents attacked the rule’s scope in two ways. First, the rule does not distinguish among victims by the severity of their injuries, so it bans mailings even to people whose injuries or grief are relatively minor; respondents called it overinclusive. Second, the rule may keep citizens from learning about their legal options at a time when opposing counsel and insurance adjusters may be clamoring for the victims’ attention, and respondents argued that any benefit of the rule is outweighed by that cost.44 Neither is a facial overbreadth claim, a doctrine that does not apply to commercial speech because of the lesser danger of chilling hardy commercial speech.45 Each is an argument that the rule’s scope is out of proportion to its interest.
The majority answered the first objection by pointing to the difficulty of drawing lines: it said it was hard to imagine the contours of a rule that sorted victims by the severity of their injuries. The dissent replied that criminal law routinely distinguishes degrees of bodily harm, and that if the delineation is workable there, it should not be “hard to imagine the contours of a regulation” that satisfies the reasonable-fit requirement.46 The exchange shows what a reasonable-fit standard leaves to judgment. A standard that does not demand a perfect fit tolerates some overinclusion in exchange for a workable rule, and how much it tolerates depends on how hard the line is to draw.
The second objection drew the fuller answer. The Court said the point would have force if the Bar’s rule were not limited to a brief period and if there were not many other ways for injured Floridians to learn about the availability of legal representation during that time.47 Those two conditions carry the weight. Florida lawyers may advertise on prime-time television and radio and in newspapers, rent billboard space, send untargeted letters to the general population or to discrete segments of it, and list themselves in the Yellow Pages. Each channel tells an injured person that lawyers are available, so the rule removes one mode of contact for one month while the information itself stays in circulation. Finding no basis to question the commonsense conclusion that the many alternative channels are sufficient, the Court saw no defect in the regulation.48
The dissent saw the alternatives differently. It argued that the problem “is largely self-policing”: potential clients will not hire lawyers who offend them, and Florida, like some other states, lets clients rescind certain attorney contracts within a stated time after signing. The reasonableness of a state’s methods, it said, can be judged in part by considering other possible means that the state has not tried.49 It added that the other-channels argument concedes the necessity of the very representation the lawyers solicit, and that the cost falls hardest on accident victims who lack education, linguistic ability, or familiarity with the legal system and so cannot seek out legal services themselves. It also saw “latent protectionism for the established bar” in the Bar’s position.50
The majority’s summary puts its two decisive features together: the Bar’s palliative “is narrow both in scope and in duration,” and the Constitution “requires nothing more.” It also gave a reason for deferring to the Bar’s line-drawing. The case concerned pure commercial advertising, which has always received a lesser degree of protection, and because states have traditionally regulated the standards and conduct of licensed lawyers extensively, the Court thought it all the more appropriate to keep its scrutiny commensurate with the “subordinate position” of commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values.51
Narrowness is not self-proving. A partial ban on speech is not automatically a lesser power than a complete ban, because a complete ban carries an inner political check that a partial ban lets the state avoid.52 That is one reason brevity alone should not carry the fit analysis; the Court also relied on the documented harm and the open alternative channels.
On an exam, a fit analysis of a restriction on targeted mail should sort the facts the way the majority did: how long the rule lasts, how much speech it reaches, and which channels stay open. Expect two objections. Overinclusion is answered by the difficulty of line-drawing and by a standard that tolerates an imperfect fit. Lost information is answered by the brief window and the open channels. The Court’s own phrasing was conditional, since the lost-information objection would have force if the rule were not brief and the alternatives not many, so a rule that lacked those features would lose the answer.
Dissent and Shapero Contrast
Justice Kennedy’s dissent began from the practical stakes. When an accident causes death or injury, it is often urgent to investigate, identify witnesses, and preserve evidence, and vital interests in speech are at stake when a lawyer may not write to the victim or family to explain that and offer competent help. Meanwhile, the dissent observed, represented and better-informed parties, and their attorneys, investigators, and adjusters, remain free to contact unrepresented people to gather evidence or offer settlement. “This scheme makes little sense.”54 Its objections then follow the prongs in order, and the first, aimed at the privacy interest, depends on Shapero.
Kentucky had defended its ban on targeted letters by reciting fears of “overreaching and undue influence.” The Court found no such dangers in direct mail, because a letter, “like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded.” The relevant inquiry, it said, “is not whether there exist potential clients whose ‘condition’ makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility.”55
The dissent argued that the majority could avoid Shapero only by relocating the privacy interest. The concern became that victims and their families will be offended by a solicitation that arrives during their grief and trauma, and restrictions on speech may not be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener. The burden of discarding unwanted mail, the dissent said, is “an acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned,” and if the Court meant to overrule the cases forbidding restrictions on speech that might offend, it should say so.56
The majority answered by changing the account of how a letter causes harm. Throwing a letter away shortly after opening it may limit the intrusion of its contents, but the harm the Bar posits is as much a function of simply receiving targeted solicitations within days of an accident as of what the letters say, so the trash can does little to combat it. The purpose of the rule is to forestall the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession that solicitation days after accidents has engendered.57
The two opinions therefore rest on different theories of harm. Shapero’s theory is persuasion: a letter cannot pressure anyone into signing, because the reader controls when and whether to respond, so the mode itself removes the danger. The majority’s theory is receipt: the injury occurs when a targeted letter arrives at a raw moment, whether or not the reader is persuaded, and discarding the letter comes only after the arrival. Under the persuasion theory the power to discard answers everything, and under the receipt theory it answers nothing, because the harm precedes the discarding. The dissent’s reply, in effect, is that the receipt theory proves too much, since it would let government suppress any truthful message people dislike receiving. That disagreement is why the same facts can be argued either way.
The dissent’s remaining objections track the later prongs and appear above: a record it called incompetent, a fit it saw as disproportionate, and alternatives it said the Court ignored. It closed on a principle: “Self-assurance has always been the hallmark of a censor,” and under the First Amendment the public, not the State, has the right and the power to decide what ideas and information deserve its adherence.58
Both rules reached truthful targeted letters, so the differences lie in what surrounded the speech. Three variables separate them:
- Reach and duration: Florida’s rule covers only letters about an accident or disaster involving the addressee or a relative and lapses after 30 days.59 The Bar’s ban was narrow in both length and scope, while Shapero involved a total ban.60
- Asserted harm: Kentucky recited overreaching and undue influence, which a discardable letter does not present.61 Florida invoked the privacy of the recently injured and bereaved, and in this case privacy was a major concern.62
- Record: Shapero’s capacity-for-abuse rationale lacked specific findings that the letters were false or misleading, while the Florida Bar had collected statistical and anecdotal evidence before adopting its rule.63
On a fact pattern about targeted mail, first identify the harm the state invokes. A harm that depends on the reader’s inability to put a letter aside is the harm Shapero rejected. A harm that arises on receipt, in a narrow window, and is documented by evidence is the harm Went For It credited. Then check the three variables.