Concept
Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation
Regulation of commercial speech
Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation
Bar rules on lawyers’ communications are tested under the four-part Central Hudson framework. The speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. If it does, the rule survives only if the state’s interest is substantial, the rule directly advances that interest, and the rule is not more extensive than necessary, which the Court describes as a reasonable fit between ends and means.1 The lawyer cases add a second variable: how the lawyer reaches the public. Published advertising receives real protection, live solicitation receives much less, and a targeted letter lands on the protected side. The reason for that last placement shows what the doctrine is really about, which is the mode of communication.
The doctrine begins in 1977. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court held that commercial speech by lawyers is entitled to a limited but meaningful level of First Amendment protection. It questioned the claim that advertising would diminish lawyers’ reputation, gave professional etiquette no weight, and rejected the argument that lawyer advertising “inevitably will be misleading.” A rule allowing restrained advertising, the Court reasoned, accords with the bar’s obligation to “facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.”2
Bates left the states a significant role in protecting the public from deception. In In re R.M.J., the Court explained that “[t]he public’s comparative lack of knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to police themselves, and the absence of any standardization in the ‘product’ renders advertising for professional services especially susceptible to abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in controlling.”3 Model Rule 7.1 supplies the overarching standard for all regulation of attorney advertising and solicitation: a lawyer may not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.4
Live solicitation poses a different problem, and the Court describes it in strong terms. Face-to-face solicitation is “a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud.” The “coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate” and the “pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation” justify strong controls.5 The subsections that follow take published advertising first, then in-person solicitation, and finally the targeted letter, which borrows features of both.
Truthful Lawyer Advertising
A truthful advertisement for a lawful legal service clears the first step of Central Hudson, so the dispute turns to the state’s reasons for suppressing it. The Court’s answer begins in the pharmacy cases. A state may insure that “the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely,” but the question is whether it may “completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.”6 The Court rejected the advertising ban there as a paternalistic way to secure a desirable result. A ban takes away the consumer’s ability to choose by depriving him of the information needed to choose intelligently, and that preemption of individual decision-making is objectionable in a free-market economy.7
The same objection appears whenever the government protects people by withholding information. The Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance banning “for sale” signs because the government suppressed truthful information on the belief that people would be better off with less speech and knowledge.8 The listener has a stake as well. Where a speaker has a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and consumers may assert it.9
Bates applied those principles to a bar rule banning lawyer advertising, and the Court rejected each of the bar’s defenses. The Arizona bar first argued that advertising would harm lawyer professionalism. Justice Blackmun found the link between the ban and professionalism tenuous, noting that the Court had already rejected the same justification for pharmacists in light of the professional standards the state enforced.10 The bar next argued that a price advertisement misleads because it says nothing about quality. The Court withheld judgment on claims about quality but thought it “peculiar” to deny consumers relevant information simply because the information is incomplete. The advertisements concerned routine services such as uncontested divorces, where quality may matter less than in other settings.11 Justice Blackmun rejected the premise “that the public is best kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete information,” and Bates therefore refused any justification “based on the benefits of public ignorance.”12 A consumer who knows one lawyer’s price for an uncontested divorce knows more than a consumer who knows nothing, and can ask about quality before hiring. The ban made the choice harder without making it better.
The same pattern appears outside the professions. The Court held that Rhode Island could not ban advertising of retail liquor prices anywhere but the place of sale, and that the Twenty-first Amendment did not qualify First Amendment protection.13 It also rejected the claim that legislatures have broader latitude to regulate speech promoting socially harmful activities, such as alcohol consumption, than to regulate other types of speech.14 A ban on speech advertising a product is often a greater power, not a lesser one, because it lets the state avoid the hard choices that a complete ban forces on it.15 A state that dislikes an activity therefore gains no extra room to suppress truthful speech about it.
Bates also drew a line that later decisions follow. It distinguished advertising for routine legal services from advertising about their quality, such as a claim that one lawyer’s training, experience, or success rate is superior to that of other lawyers. Such claims, the Court said, “are probably not susceptible to precise measurement or verification, and, under some circumstances, might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false.”16 A price can be checked against a fee agreement, but a boast of superior skill has nothing to check against. Since Bates, the Court has generally struck down restrictions on quality-related advertising when a lawyer wishes to make objectively verifiable claims, such as certification as a specialist by a professional organization.17 Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission, which involved a lawyer’s truthful claim of specialist certification, is the leading example. Ibanez v. Florida Board of Accountancy extended the same skepticism to a lawyer’s truthful use of professional credentials. Both decisions rest on a demand the Court has repeated: a state does not carry its burden “by mere speculation or conjecture.” The harms must be real, and the regulation must actually and materially alleviate them.18
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel shows the baseline operating on one advertisement. An Ohio lawyer’s print advertisement indicated his wish to represent women who had used the Dalkon Shield. It contained an illustration, and it stated that clients owed no legal fees if there was no recovery, but it did not disclose that clients might be liable “for significant litigation costs even if their lawsuits were unsuccessful.”19
The Court treated the three features separately. It rejected the illustration ban. Ohio defended the rule as ensuring dignity and preventing confusion, manipulation, and misleading of the public, but those interests were too minimal to justify a blanket ban, and illustrations that actually deceive can be handled case by case.20 It also declined to treat the print advertisement like in-person solicitation, because print is unlikely to put the same pressure on a reader and leaves time for reflection and an informed choice. The interests that justified the ban in Ohralik were not as substantial for print.21 And it recognized that making injured persons aware of their legal rights is a positive public good, so a lawyer may not be prevented from engaging in truthful and nondeceptive advertising that encourages others to file lawsuits.22
The litigation-cost omission came out the other way. Justice White rejected the contention that disclosure requirements must fall as the blanket bans had, because there are “material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.”23 The illustration ban took speech away from the public, while the disclosure rule added information to an advertisement whose silence about costs could mislead. Most states and the Model Rules have since replaced general advertising disclaimers with the single prohibition on communications that are “false or misleading.”24 The final part of this chapter returns to the standard for required disclosures.
None of this disables the state from policing deception, which every decision above preserved. Comment [3] to Rule 7.1 reaches even a truthful report of a lawyer’s achievements when it may cause a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation about the results the lawyer can obtain.25 In Farrin v. Thigpen, a federal district court found misleading a dramatization that showed an insurance company settling when it learned the identity of the plaintiff’s lawyer. Advertisements announcing big verdicts are sometimes considered misleading because a prospective client may believe they implicitly promise similar results, and lawyers who call themselves one of the top lawyers in the state may also be found to create unjustified expectations. See, e.g., In re Peters.26 Many cases in this area turn on where a communication falls in the gray zone between truth and falsity. The state may punish the particular advertisement that actually misleads, but it may not suppress truthful information because it fears what the public will do with it.27
In-Person Solicitation
Bates left open whether a state could restrict “in-person solicitation of clients—at the hospital room or the accident site,” and Justice Blackmun warned that such solicitation “might well pose dangers of overreaching and misrepresentation not encountered in newspaper announcement advertising.”29 A year later the Court answered in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association. The lawyer there approached two young accident victims, one in a hospital room where she lay in traction and the other on the day she returned home from the hospital. He secretly taped the conversations, and he refused to withdraw from one woman’s case when she asked him to.30 An accident victim filed a grievance, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered him suspended, and the Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting his contention that the First Amendment shielded his conduct. The decision upheld a ban on in-person solicitation of accident victims, the conduct known as “ambulance chasing.”31
The Court did not require proof that Ohralik’s approach had harmed anyone. It treated in-person solicitation as essentially a business transaction in which speech is only a subordinate part. That classification did not remove First Amendment protection, but it lowered the level of scrutiny. The state’s interest in preventing harmful activity was strong, proof of harm was not essential, and the state could prohibit in-person solicitation solely as a prophylactic measure.32
The contrast with Bates explains the result. The advertising in Bates informed the public, while in-person solicitation tends to discourage people who need counsel from comparing legal services and so frustrates “informed and reliable decisionmaking.”33 The government has a compelling interest in preventing the aspects of solicitation that involve “fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious conduct,” and face-to-face solicitation inherently risks deception and pressure because no one is there to monitor the communications.34 A letter can be set aside, but a trained advocate in the room presses for an immediate yes-or-no answer.35 The absence of any monitor helps explain why the Court accepted a rule aimed at the whole category of conduct rather than at proven harm in each case.
The prophylactic rule depends on a commercial setting. In re Primus, decided the same day as Ohralik, an attorney affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union in South Carolina was disciplined for impermissible solicitation after offering to represent women for free. A welfare department had told the women they had to be sterilized to keep receiving public medical assistance.36 The Supreme Court held that solicitations are protected when the lawyer offers to represent a client without charge. It described the ACLU’s litigation as “a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public,” and required the state to meet “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights.” The lawyer was not seeking to profit directly, which raised the importance of the speech as political activity and lessened the likelihood of deception. The possibility that she might later seek attorney’s fees from the state was irrelevant.37 The Court reversed the public reprimand.38 Like NAACP v. Button, Primus treats litigation sponsored by an advocacy group as political expression and association.
The rule also depends on who is speaking. In Edenfield, the accountant-solicitation case, the Court refused to carry the Ohralik rule over to in-person solicitation by certified public accountants. CPAs are not trained in the art of persuasion, so their solicitation is “not inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct,” and the risk that innocent people will be misled is slight.39 The Court distinguished Ohralik on two grounds: a lawyer is “a professional trained in the art of persuasion,” and the “typical client of a CPA is far less susceptible to manipulation than the young accident victim in Ohralik.” It still held that solicitation is a form of speech entitled to some constitutional protection.40 Without an inherent danger to rely on, the state had to show real harm. A burden on commercial speech is not justified “by mere speculation or conjecture,” the harms must be real, and the regulation must actually and materially alleviate them.41
Edenfield also called “[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression” suspect and stressed that the clients in Ohralik were approached “at a moment of high stress and vulnerability.” That language could support an argument for a less absolute prohibition, one focused on the circumstances of the solicitation. Leading commentators nonetheless doubt that Edenfield will cause the Court to reverse field on real-time lawyer solicitation for pecuniary gain.42
Targeted Direct Mail
A lawyer’s letter to a person known to face a particular legal problem aims at a specific prospect, as live solicitation does, but travels on paper, as advertising does. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association placed it on the advertising side. The Court held that Kentucky could not prevent lawyers from sending truthful, non-deceptive letters soliciting legal business about a specific legal issue, and Kentucky’s total ban on targeted mailed solicitations violated the First Amendment.44
Justice Brennan reasoned for the Court that Zauderer, the print advertising case, governed the targeted-mail question.45 Zauderer had found that print advertising is unlikely to put the same pressure on a prospective client as a lawyer’s personal offer, particularly in a stressful setting such as a hospital, and that print leaves time for reflection and an informed choice.46 A letter has the same features. The state’s fear that direct mail is capable of abuse or presents an opportunity for mistakes did not justify a total ban without specific findings that the solicitation was false or misleading.47 Central Hudson asks the same question about the state’s reasons and the fit of its rule, and a total ban on all truthful letters fails it.48
Shapero framed the controlling inquiry in terms of the mode of communication. The relevant question is “not whether there exist potential clients whose ‘condition’ makes them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility,” and “the mode of communication makes all the difference.” A letter, “like a printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer), can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded.”49 That framing matters because a lawyer who writes to an accident victim or to a defendant in a lawsuit always knows the recipient is in trouble. If susceptibility alone justified a ban, nothing would remain of the protection for targeted mail. A letter also removes the features that make live solicitation dangerous: the reader chooses when to read it and whether to reply, and no trained advocate stands there pressing for an immediate answer.50
Ohralik supplies the contrast. There the lawyer approached two young accident victims, one in a hospital room where she lay in traction and the other on the day she returned home from the hospital, and the Court upheld the ban on that conduct because of the inherent risk of abuse or overreaching.51 The direct mail in Shapero did not present that justification, and Shapero made an explicit distinction between direct, in-person solicitations and direct-mail solicitations.52 The prospective clients in both settings were people whose need for a lawyer was known, and what differed was the mode of contact.
Shapero protects truthful, non-deceptive letters and leaves the state free to punish the rest. A letter that is false or misleading remains punishable, and Comment [3] to Rule 7.1 treats even a truthful account of a lawyer’s achievements as misleading if it may cause a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation about the results the lawyer can obtain.53
Shapero settles that overreaching alone cannot justify a flat ban on truthful letters, because a reader can set a letter aside. The next section takes up Florida Bar v. Went For It, where the dissent insisted that Shapero had already drawn the line by distinguishing in-person solicitation from direct mail.54