455 U.S. 191 (1982)
R.M.J. graduated from law school in 1973 and was admitted to the Missouri and Illinois Bars in the same year.1 After a short stint with the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D.C., he moved to St. Louis in April 1977 and began practice as a sole practitioner.2
To announce the opening of his office, R.M.J. mailed professional announcement cards to a selected list of addressees and placed several advertisements in local newspapers and in the yellow pages of the local telephone directory.3 The advertisements appeared in January, February, and August 1978 and stated that he was licensed in Missouri and Illinois, noted in large capital letters that he was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, listed areas of practice using terms such as personal injury and real estate instead of the prescribed tort law and property law, included additional areas such as contract, zoning and land use, pension and profit sharing plans, and communication that had no analogue on the approved list, and omitted the required disclaimer of certification of expertise after the listing of areas in two of the three advertisements.4
Prior to 1977, Missouri placed an absolute prohibition on advertising by lawyers.5 After the decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Committee on Professional Ethics and Responsibility revised Rule 4 to permit publication in newspapers, periodicals, and yellow pages of ten categories of information while requiring that any listing of areas of practice use one of three general descriptive terms or one or more of twenty-three specific areas phrased in exact language set out in an addendum, and that any such listing be followed by a disclaimer of certification of expertise.6
The revised rule also provided that professional announcement cards could be mailed only to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives.7 On November 19, 1979, the Advisory Committee filed an information in the Supreme Court of Missouri charging R.M.J. with publishing three advertisements that listed unapproved areas of law, listed courts and states of admission, and in two instances omitted the disclaimer, as well as with sending announcement cards to persons outside the permitted categories.8
In 1981 the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the constitutionality of DR 2-101 of Rule 4 and issued a private reprimand to R.M.J. without explaining which charges it sustained or addressing DR 2-102.9
Whether Missouri's requirement that lawyers use only specified language when listing areas of practice in advertisements conforms to the First Amendment?10
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.11 But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions.12 Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.13 But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the State lawfully may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State's substantial interest.14
No. The Advisory Committee does not argue that R.M.J.'s listing was misleading. The use of the words real estate instead of property could scarcely mislead the public. Similarly, the listing of areas such as contracts or securities that are not found on the Advisory Committee's list in any form presents no apparent danger of deception. Indeed, in some respects R.M.J.'s listing is more informative than that provided in the addendum.15
Because the listing published by R.M.J. has not been shown to be misleading, and because the Advisory Committee suggests no substantial interest promoted by the restriction, this portion of Rule 4 is an invalid restriction upon speech as applied to R.M.J.'s advertisements.16
Missouri's requirement that lawyers use only specified language when listing areas of practice in advertisements does not conform to the First Amendment.17
Whether Missouri's prohibition on lawyers identifying the jurisdictions in which they are licensed to practice in advertisements conforms to the First Amendment?18
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. Even when a communication is not misleading, the State retains some authority to regulate.19 But the State must assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served.20 Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the State lawfully may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State's substantial interest.
No. R.M.J. was licensed to practice in both Illinois and Missouri. This is factual and highly relevant information particularly in light of the geography of the region in which R.M.J. practiced. Nor has the Advisory Committee identified any substantial interest in a rule that prohibits a lawyer from identifying the jurisdictions in which he is licensed to practice. Such information is not misleading on its face.21
Missouri's prohibition on lawyers identifying the jurisdictions in which they are licensed to practice in advertisements does not conform to the First Amendment.22
Whether Missouri's restriction limiting professional announcement cards to mailings only to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives conforms to the First Amendment?23
Even when a communication is not misleading, the State retains some authority to regulate. But the State must assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served. Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the State lawfully may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State's substantial interest. The absolute prohibition on appellant's speech, in the absence of a finding that his speech was misleading, does not meet these requirements.24
No. R.M.J. mailed professional announcement cards to a selected list of addressees that included persons other than lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives. Mailings and handbills may be more difficult to supervise than newspapers. But there is no indication that an inability to supervise is the reason the State restricts the potential audience of announcement cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the only solution.25
For example, by requiring a filing with the Advisory Committee of a copy of all general mailings, the State may be able to exercise reasonable supervision over such mailings. There is no indication in the record of a failed effort to proceed along such a less restrictive path.26
Missouri's restriction limiting professional announcement cards to mailings only to lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives does not conform to the First Amendment.27