Concept
Why Commercial Speech Gets Less
Regulation of commercial speech
Why Commercial Speech Gets Less
Since 1976, the First Amendment has protected commercial speech, though not fully. Virginia Pharmacy rested on the point that the free flow of commercial information is indispensable to intelligent private economic decisions, and on the consumer’s reciprocal right to receive the advertising that a seller has a right to send.1 The Court nonetheless placed commercial speech in a category of “lower value” speech that does not receive the high degree of protection afforded to “core” speech.2
That placement makes commercial speech the lone formal exception to the two-level approach set out in Chaplinsky. Incitement, fighting words, malicious libel, obscenity, and child pornography receive no First Amendment protection. Commercial speech does receive protection, but not as much as other speech.3
The tier remains contested. A number of Justices have questioned the categorization approach and urged that commercial speech be protected like other speech unless it poses distinctively commercial harms, such as the danger of deception or overreaching. Their approach would substitute balancing for categorization, but they have not yet commanded a majority of the Court.4
The lower tier has concrete consequences. Deceptive advertising can be regulated without showing New York Times malice or even negligence. Prior restraints are allowed, and vagueness and overbreadth rules do not apply.5 The Court justifies these differences by pointing to the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech.6 The first subsection below examines those two features and the objections to them. The second shows how hardiness disables the overbreadth and prior restraint doctrines.
Hardiness and Verifiability
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission names two features of commercial speech that permit regulation of its content.7 Commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of their market and their products, so they are well situated to judge the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity. And commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not “particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”8 The first feature is verifiability and the second is hardiness. Both rest on what the Court calls a “commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.9
Verifiability turns on who holds the facts. A seller can check a claim about its own product more easily than any outside observer can, and that knowledge is why the Court allows regulation of false advertising without the proof of fault that protects other speakers. Deceptive advertising can be regulated without showing malice or even negligence.10 False speech, “commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”11 Central Hudson states the baseline directly: the Constitution permits suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity, and government may ban communications more likely to deceive than to inform.12
Hardiness turns on who captures the benefit of the message. An advertiser recovers the benefit of its message in increased sales of the advertised product. If Apple runs a magazine ad touting the iPhone, most of the benefit accrues to Apple. A magazine’s reports on telecommunications regulation, by contrast, benefit people who never bought the magazine, and the publisher cannot recover that benefit in subscriptions or advertising revenue. Commercial speech may have some beneficial spillovers, but they are proportionately smaller than those of political speech.13 The strong financial incentive behind advertising also means that chilling effects are smaller than for other speakers.14 A rule that punishes false claims is therefore unlikely to deter truthful commercial speech by accident.15
Less protection is not no protection. Central Hudson holds that a state cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to its asserted interest, and that it cannot suppress information completely when narrower restrictions would serve its interest as well. Bates left open the possibility that “some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like” might be required.16 A state retains the power to “insur[e] that the stream of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.”17 Virginia Pharmacy shows the other side. The Court rejected the pharmacy advertising ban as a paternalistic means of securing desirable results, because the ban took away the consumer’s ability to choose by depriving him of the information needed to choose intelligently. Such pre-emption of individual decision-making is objectionable in a free-market economy.18
The pairing of Virginia Pharmacy with Friedman v. Rogers shows how the two features operate. Virginia Pharmacy barred a state from preventing publication of prescription drug prices. Friedman nonetheless allowed Texas to prohibit the practice of optometry under a trade name. The two cases are consistent because trade names present opportunities for deception that drug price advertising does not, and the Texas statute did not “prohibit or limit the type of information protected in Virginia Pharmacy.”19
The lower tier follows the message, not the speaker. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that utilities enjoy the full panoply of First Amendment protections for their direct comments on public issues. Central Hudson saw no reason to give similar protection to statements made only in the context of commercial transactions.20 The Court refused to grant broad protection to any advertising that links a product to a current public debate, because many if not most products can be tied to public concerns about the environment, energy, economic policy, or individual health and safety.21 A utility’s direct comment on a public question therefore receives full protection. The same utility’s advertisement for its own electricity does not.
Both features are generalizations about a category of speech, and critics attack them from several directions. On hardiness, the argument proves too much, because one might just as easily say that commercial magazines and newspapers will not stop publishing for fear of regulation, since they are in business for profit.22 On verifiability, a seller can check its facts more easily than a third party, but so can politicians who make false statements about facts within their own knowledge. It is also easier to test “Cucumbers cost sixty-nine cents” than “Republicans will govern more effectively,” yet not all commercial speech is so objective. What would a court do with “America is turning 7-Up”?23
The objections do not defeat the doctrine, because arguments built on generalizations about whole categories of speech are not inherently objectionable given the need for practical and reasonably categorical rules.24 The generalizations support a lower tier without removing protection altogether. Promotion of illegal activity is not protected advertising, but when a regulation restricts nonmisleading commercial communications, a court must ask whether it directly advances a substantial government interest without unnecessary restrictions on speech.25 A problem about a deceptive claim therefore calls for three steps. First classify the message. Then ask whether the claim is false or misleading. If it is, the state may regulate it, and a required disclaimer does not face the demands that govern political speech.
Doctrines That Do Not Apply
The hardiness that justifies regulating false advertising also explains why two protections that ordinarily shield speech from sweeping regulation lose most of their force when the speech is commercial: the overbreadth doctrine and the ban on prior restraints.27 The result, in short, is that prior restraints are allowed and vagueness and overbreadth rules do not apply.28
Overbreadth responds to a gap in judicial review. An unconstitutional restriction may deter protected speech by parties who are not before the court, and because those parties fall silent, the restriction escapes review.29 The doctrine lets a litigant in court argue on behalf of the silent. That reasoning depends on deterrence being real, and Central Hudson doubts that it is real for advertising. Expression linked to “commercial well-being” is not easily deterred by “overbroad regulation.”30 Justice Blackmun reached the same conclusion in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, writing that the usual justification for overbreadth analysis “applies weakly, if at all,” to commercial speech.31
The practical result is that a facial challenge to a regulation of commercial speech will not succeed on overbreadth grounds.32 Where government is trying to deter or punish false or misleading advertising, a court will not apply overbreadth analysis at all, so the government need not show that its law is no more extensive than necessary to reach that goal.33
Advertisers keep another route. A speaker whose own advertising is suppressed can argue that the restriction violates the First Amendment as applied to that speech. In Central Hudson the commission’s prohibition acted directly against the utility’s own promotional activities, and the Court held the limitations invalid to the extent they were unnecessary to serve the state’s interest.34 That holding is the fourth prong of the intermediate test taught later in this chapter. For a commercial speaker, the four-part analysis serves as the as-applied challenge, and a facial overbreadth theory adds little to it.
The second doctrine concerns prior restraints, meaning government action that stops expression before it reaches the public instead of punishing it afterward. Virginia Pharmacy suggested that the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech might make the prohibitions against prior restraints inapplicable.35 Pittsburgh Press tested that suggestion. The newspaper there argued that a commission’s ban on sex-designated help-wanted columns was an invalid prior restraint, and the Court rejected the argument. The restraint was narrow and the expression it restrained was illegal, so the order presented no danger to “arguably protected speech.”36
Central Hudson speaks more broadly, and more cautiously. The Court observed that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expression that traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply to it. It added that in other areas, such as obscenity, a prescreening arrangement can pass constitutional muster if it includes adequate procedural safeguards.37 An answer on a problem should therefore say that the ban on prior restraints does not carry over with its usual force. It should not say that the ban disappears.38